Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christopher Williamson appealed a district court order affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years. Officer Travis Martinson stopped Williamson after he drove over a fire hose at a fire scene. Martinson smelled alcohol in Williamson's vehicle and noticed Williamson had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Williamson refused field sobriety tests but consented to perform an onsite screening test. The onsite test estimated Williamson's blood alcohol content was greater than permitted for operating a vehicle and Martinson arrested Williamson. Martinson took Williamson to the Williams County Correctional Center and Sergeant Randy Haugenoe administered an Intoxilyzer 8000 chemical test. The Intoxilyzer reported Williamson had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.231 percent by weight. A hearing officer introduced the Intoxilyzer report at an administrative hearing. Williamson objected, alleging the statutory requirements were not met and the report was inadmissible for lack of foundation. The hearing officer concluded the test was fairly administered, the objection was overruled and the hearing officer's suspension of Williamson's driving privileges for two years was not in error. The district court affirmed the decision. Williamson appealed, arguing the district court erred by receiving evidence that was not adequately authenticated. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williamson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

James Leno appealed a Department of Transportation decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the arresting officer's testimony sufficiently established he performed the required steps listed on the specimen submitter's checklist and Leno received a fair and impartial hearing, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Leno v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Patricia Olson appealed a judgment affirming a decision of the Department of Transportation to suspend her driving privileges for two years. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Report and Notice form was sufficient to give the Department authority to suspend Olson's driving privileges, and because the Court rejected her constitutional arguments, it affirmed the judgment. View "Olson v. Levi" on Justia Law

In May 2014, Bureau of Criminal Investigation Special Agent Arnie Rummel applied for a search warrant for the Darrell Schrum Trucking Shop in Dickey County, claiming there was probable cause to believe a stolen New Holland payloader was being concealed in the shop. The district court issued the search warrant to seize the payloader as evidence of a crime and commanding that it be brought before the court. Rummel executed the search warrant two days later and took custody of the payloader. Rummel immediately handed the payloader over to a non-law enforcement, non-government party who trucked the payloader out of North Dakota. Schrum moved for return of property under N.D.R.Crim.P. 41, claiming he purchased the payloader as a good-faith purchaser and requested the court order the property be returned to him immediately or, alternatively, the property not be transferred or transported further until the ownership issues were resolved. The Dickey County state's attorney and an assistant attorney general appeared on behalf of the State. Schrum and Rummel testified. After the hearing, the court granted Schrum's motion and ordered the State and Rummel to return the payloader to the Dickey County Sheriff for safekeeping. Schrum moved for contempt and requested remedial contempt sanctions. Schrum contended the court ordered Rummel to return the property to Dickey County, but Rummel did not comply with the court's order. He reported the payloader was in Mexico and later advised counsel the payloader was in Texas. Schrum requested the court order Rummel and the State to reimburse him for the loss and injury he incurred as a result of the contempt in an amount to be determined following a hearing. The district court found Rummel was in contempt, and ordered Rummel and the State to pay sanctions. The State appealed. Although it appeared undisputed that Rummel secured a search warrant to seize a payloader as evidence of a crime, while intending to hand it over immediately to a non-law enforcement party, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ordering Rummel and the Attorney General to pay compensatory remedial contempt sanctions without first requiring compliance with the statutory requirements for claims against the State. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. New Holland" on Justia Law

In November 2002, J.G. was initially committed as a sexually dangerous individual based on the crime of indecent exposure which occurred when he was 12 years old. J.G. has unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge numerous times since his initial commitment. J.G. appealed an order finding he continued to be a sexually dangerous individual and civilly committed him to the care, custody, and control of the executive director of the Department of Human Services for placement in the least restrictive facility or program. Because the district court's findings of fact were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the commitment decision. View "Matter of J.G." on Justia Law

Darl Hehn appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. In 1997, Hehn pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of terrorizing. In 2003, Hehn was released from prison on supervised probation but his probation was subsequently revoked, and he was returned to prison in 2004. In 2006, Hehn was committed to the North Dakota State Hospital as a sexually dangerous individual, and the Supreme Court affirmed the commitment. In 2011, Hehn filed a second petition for discharge. While his second petition was pending, Hehn also filed a letter with the district court requesting an annual review, which the court treated as a third petition. The district court denied his second petition, which was affirmed on appeal. In December 2013, Hehn filed another petition requesting a discharge hearing. On August 14 and 15, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Hehn's petition for discharge. In November 2014, the court denied his petition, finding he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Hehn had engaged in sexually predatory conduct; had a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; was likely to engage in future sexually predatory acts; and had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The court specifically found a nexus between Hehn's disorder and the likelihood of re-offense and found Hehn would have serious difficulty controlling his behavior in a less restrictive environment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of Hehn" on Justia Law

Nelson Whitetail, Sr. was committed as a sexually dangerous individual by court order on December 21, 2012. Whitetail appealed the commitment order, which the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. In 2014, Whitetail filed a petition for discharge under N.D.C.C. 25-03.3-18. An evaluation was completed and submitted by Dr. Robert Lisota, a psychologist at the North Dakota State Hospital, concluding Whitetail was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct. An independent evaluation was completed and submitted by another psychologist, Dr. Robert Riedel. Dr. Riedel came to an opposite conclusion. At the September 15, 2014 hearing, the court heard testimony from Dr. Lisota, Dr. Riedel and Whitetail. The district court found Whitetail continued to be a sexually dangerous individual under N.D.C.C. ch. 25-03.3, and denied Whitetail's petition for discharge and ordered continued commitment. Whitetail appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Interest of Whitetail" on Justia Law

Robert Hale, doing business as Bullwinkle Builders, Inc., ("Hale") appealed a district court order affirming a City of Minot Board of Appeals decision to affirm the denial of Hale's application for a building permit. In December 2013, after a series of conversations and exchanges of information between the City's building official and Hale and his representatives, the building official denied the permit application for failure to submit certain required documentation. At issue was the building official's determination under the 2009 International Building Code ("IBC"), as adopted by the City, that Hale's facility was an "assisted living facility" classified as Institutional Group I-1, rather than an apartment building classified as Residential Group R-2. An applicant for a Institutional Group I-1 building permit was required to submit additional documentation prepared by a registered design professional and had to install more expensive wiring. The Supreme Court concluded after its review, that the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in affirming a City building official's decision to deny the application and that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision. The Court therefore affirmed the district court order. View "Hale v. City of Minot" on Justia Law

Calvin Anderson appealed a judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") decision approving a vocational rehabilitation plan. In January 2005, after slipping on an icy driveway and injuring his right shoulder and left hip while working as an inspector-tester for Finley Engineering, Anderson reported the injury to WSI. On January 28, 2005, WSI accepted liability for the right shoulder and left hip injury and paid benefits to Anderson. During the following three years, Anderson worked in similar positions with different companies. After his injury, and throughout 2010, Anderson sought medical and chiropractic care from numerous providers to address complications with his right shoulder, neck, and left hip. In April 2010, WSI issued a notice of its decision to deny further liability for Anderson's left hip injury on the grounds that the arthritis of which he complained had been present before he sustained the work injury in 2005. After finding no objective medical evidence indicating Anderson's hip condition was caused by his work injury, WSI issued its order denying liability for his hip condition. Anderson argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that WSI's selection of a vocational rehabilitation plan under N.D.C.C. ch. 65-05.1 was not physically appropriate because no reasoning mind, after a review of his medical conditions, could conclude he was capable of completing the work required in his vocational rehabilitation plan. Anderson argued WSI failed to properly consider his difficulties with driving when it formed his vocational rehabilitation plan. "A vocational rehabilitation plan is appropriate if it meets the statutory requirements and gives the injured worker a reasonable opportunity to obtain substantial gainful employment." After review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined the vocational rehabilitation plan would return Anderson to substantial gainful employment that was reasonably attainable in light of his injury.The Court therefore affirmed the district court judgment. View "Anderson v. WSI" on Justia Law

Bridge Company appeals a district court judgment ordering it to donate a toll bridge to the cities of Fargo, North Dakota, and Moorhead, Minnesota, free and clear of all liens. In May 1986, the cities and the Company entered into an agreement for the purpose of construction and operation of a private toll bridge over the Red River connecting the cities. The bridge was completed and started operations on June 1, 1988. The bridge was originally financed with publicly-sponsored bonds issued by Moorhead and capital from an investment firm. In 2004, the cities agreed to allow the Company to refinance the indebtedness, but the refinancing was required to be completely amortized by June 1, 2013, which was 25 years from the commencement of the operation of the bridge. The bank refinancing the debt required personal guarantees from the Company's two shareholders. As of June 1, 2013, the Company owed approximately $75,000 on the refinanced loan. In early September 2013, the Company's two shareholders satisfied their personal guarantees for the debt, and as of September 6, 2013, none of the original indebtedness for construction of the bridge remained outstanding. During the 25-year time span, the Company's records reflected $108,761 was paid for maintenance and repair of the bridge. All of these bills were paid by the Company before February 6, 2014. However, taxes remained owing to Cass County, North Dakota, and Clay County, Minnesota, and the unpaid taxes constituted a lien on the bridge. The district court found that during the 25-year period between June 1, 1988, and June 1, 2013, the bridge was closed 249 days because of flooding on the Red River. Applying an Acts of God clause in the original agreement, the court ruled the 25-year period was extended 249 days to February 5, 2014, and because there was no qualifying debt in existence as of that date, the Company was required to donate the bridge to the cities free and clear of any liens. Because the district court did not err in interpreting the parties' agreement and the court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "City of Moorhead v. Bridge Co." on Justia Law