Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In June 2014, the Traill County Water Resource District initially approved Patricia Bertsch's application to install subsurface drain tile on her land, conditioned on her obtaining flowage easements from affected landowners, including appellant Ray Zajac. At a regularly scheduled meeting on July 7, 2015, the Resource District amended its original approval of Bertsch's application to eliminate the requirement that she obtain an easement from Zajac. Zajac did not dispute the agenda for the Resource District's regularly scheduled July 7, 2015 meeting was filed with the Traill County Auditor before the meeting and stated the "Jon Bertsch-Zajac Easement Issue" would be addressed at 7:30. The parties did not dispute that a separate notice of hearing was not mailed to or otherwise served upon Zajac before the meeting. After amending approval of Bertsch's application, the Resource District sent Zajac a July 14, 2015 letter notifying him of the July 7, 2015 decision. On August 10, 2015, Zajac filed a notice of appeal from the Resource District's amended decision with the district court. The district court dismissed Zajac's appeal, concluding it was not timely under N.D.C.C. 28-34-01. Finding no error in the district court's dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Zajac v. Traill County Water Resource District" on Justia Law

Sarah Vogel appealed a district court judgment dismissing without prejudice her complaint against Marathon Oil Company. Marathon operated the Elk USA 11-17H well in Mountrail County. The well began producing in 2011 and continued through at least January 2014. Vogel owned mineral interests and received royalties from the oil or gas produced and sold from the well. Vogel, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, sued Marathon seeking declaratory relief as well as money damages for failure to pay royalties on flared gas. Vogel argued her claims should not have been dismissed by the district court because she had a private right of action for violations of the statute restricting the flaring of gas produced with crude oil from an oil well, N.D.C.C. 38-08-06.4, and she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Vogel v. Marathon Oil Corporation" on Justia Law

Andrew Gillmore appealed a judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Department's decision was "in accordance with the law, its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and support the conclusions of law, and Gillmore's constitutional rights were not violated," it affirmed the judgment. View "Gillmore v. Levi" on Justia Law

Andrew Gillmore appealed a judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Department's decision was "in accordance with the law, its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and support the conclusions of law, and Gillmore's constitutional rights were not violated," it affirmed the judgment. View "Gillmore v. Levi" on Justia Law

William Rakowski appealed after a district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Fargo. Rakowski owned rental houses in Fargo. In November 2011, Fargo inspected one of the houses and found the garage was deteriorating, the siding on the house was deteriorating, two egress window wells were collapsing and one window was broken. Fargo notified Rakowski of the need for repairs and re-inspection. The house was re-inspected a month later, and three once a month, three months after that. Fargo charged Rakowski a single $100 fee for a January 2012 re-inspection, which Rakowski did not pay. Fargo brought a small claims action to collect the fee, Rakowski removed the claim to district court and both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fargo and Rakowski appeals. Rakowski argued the district court erred because Fargo did not have authority to assess a re-inspection fee, Fargo was required to have a search warrant before re-inspecting the house, the re-inspection fee constituted an illegal bill of attainder, Fargo's claim was barred by double jeopardy and res judicata and he was entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Fargo v. Rakowski" on Justia Law

Bo Schmidt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges. Schmidt argued the implied consent advisory was misleading, the chemical test was a warrantless search and North Dakota's refusal statute is unconstitutional. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Levi" on Justia Law

Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. appealed a judgment affirming a Public Service Commission order granting Montana-Dakota Utilities Company ("MDU") a certificate of public convenience and necessity to extend its electric service in Burleigh County. Because the Commission's order was in accordance with the law, its findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and sufficiently addressed the evidence presented, and those findings supported the conclusions of law, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. N.D. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Craig Cudmore was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") after his responses to the deputy's requests to submit to a chemical blood test were deemed a refusal. Cudmore appealed the district court's judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation's ("DOT") revocation of his driving privileges. Cudmore argued the hearing officer erred in finding that he did not invoke his right to consult with counsel before submitting to a chemical test. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cudmore v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Williston Education Association ("WEA") sued the Williston Public School District No. 1 ("District") on behalf of Williston middle school teachers. The WEA claimed the District owed teachers compensation for extra classes they taught during the 2012-2013 school year. The underlying dispute was whether prime time constituted a "class period" under the terms of the Agreement. If the court interpreted "class period" to include prime time, the District would owe teachers additional compensation because they taught six or more class periods plus prime time during the 2012-2013 school year. If prime time was not a "class period," the majority of teachers only taught six class periods; the District would not owe them extra compensation. The district court interpreted "class period" to include prime time. It awarded summary judgment in favor of the WEA and ordered the District pay damages to the teachers. The District filed a timely appeal. When a trial court can reasonably draw conflicting inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it granted the WEA's motion for summary judgment, finding there were multiple issues of fact from which "differing reasonable inferences could be drawn." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to resolve these issues of fact. View "Williston Education Association v. Williston Public School Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

In June 2015, the State began this civil action against Patricia Goodale, contending that her home was a public nuisance. The Walsh County sheriff's office personally served Goodale with the summons and complaint. On August 5, 2015, after several weeks without receiving an answer from Goodale, the State filed with the district court an affidavit of default and proof for judgment; proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abatement; and a proposed judgment. On August 7, 2015, the district court signed the findings and order, and a default judgment for abatement of nuisance was entered. Goodale was served notice of the judgment. Goodale did not seek relief from the default judgment in the district court under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), but instead appealed directly to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Goodale" on Justia Law