Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andrew Gillmore appealed a judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Department's decision was "in accordance with the law, its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and support the conclusions of law, and Gillmore's constitutional rights were not violated," it affirmed the judgment. View "Gillmore v. Levi" on Justia Law

Andrew Gillmore appealed a judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Department's decision was "in accordance with the law, its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and support the conclusions of law, and Gillmore's constitutional rights were not violated," it affirmed the judgment. View "Gillmore v. Levi" on Justia Law

William Rakowski appealed after a district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Fargo. Rakowski owned rental houses in Fargo. In November 2011, Fargo inspected one of the houses and found the garage was deteriorating, the siding on the house was deteriorating, two egress window wells were collapsing and one window was broken. Fargo notified Rakowski of the need for repairs and re-inspection. The house was re-inspected a month later, and three once a month, three months after that. Fargo charged Rakowski a single $100 fee for a January 2012 re-inspection, which Rakowski did not pay. Fargo brought a small claims action to collect the fee, Rakowski removed the claim to district court and both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Fargo and Rakowski appeals. Rakowski argued the district court erred because Fargo did not have authority to assess a re-inspection fee, Fargo was required to have a search warrant before re-inspecting the house, the re-inspection fee constituted an illegal bill of attainder, Fargo's claim was barred by double jeopardy and res judicata and he was entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Fargo v. Rakowski" on Justia Law

Bo Schmidt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges. Schmidt argued the implied consent advisory was misleading, the chemical test was a warrantless search and North Dakota's refusal statute is unconstitutional. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Levi" on Justia Law

Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. appealed a judgment affirming a Public Service Commission order granting Montana-Dakota Utilities Company ("MDU") a certificate of public convenience and necessity to extend its electric service in Burleigh County. Because the Commission's order was in accordance with the law, its findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and sufficiently addressed the evidence presented, and those findings supported the conclusions of law, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Capital Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. N.D. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Craig Cudmore was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") after his responses to the deputy's requests to submit to a chemical blood test were deemed a refusal. Cudmore appealed the district court's judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation's ("DOT") revocation of his driving privileges. Cudmore argued the hearing officer erred in finding that he did not invoke his right to consult with counsel before submitting to a chemical test. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cudmore v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Williston Education Association ("WEA") sued the Williston Public School District No. 1 ("District") on behalf of Williston middle school teachers. The WEA claimed the District owed teachers compensation for extra classes they taught during the 2012-2013 school year. The underlying dispute was whether prime time constituted a "class period" under the terms of the Agreement. If the court interpreted "class period" to include prime time, the District would owe teachers additional compensation because they taught six or more class periods plus prime time during the 2012-2013 school year. If prime time was not a "class period," the majority of teachers only taught six class periods; the District would not owe them extra compensation. The district court interpreted "class period" to include prime time. It awarded summary judgment in favor of the WEA and ordered the District pay damages to the teachers. The District filed a timely appeal. When a trial court can reasonably draw conflicting inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it granted the WEA's motion for summary judgment, finding there were multiple issues of fact from which "differing reasonable inferences could be drawn." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to resolve these issues of fact. View "Williston Education Association v. Williston Public School Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

In June 2015, the State began this civil action against Patricia Goodale, contending that her home was a public nuisance. The Walsh County sheriff's office personally served Goodale with the summons and complaint. On August 5, 2015, after several weeks without receiving an answer from Goodale, the State filed with the district court an affidavit of default and proof for judgment; proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abatement; and a proposed judgment. On August 7, 2015, the district court signed the findings and order, and a default judgment for abatement of nuisance was entered. Goodale was served notice of the judgment. Goodale did not seek relief from the default judgment in the district court under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), but instead appealed directly to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Goodale" on Justia Law

Friends of Duane Sand 2012 was a political campaign committee formed for the 2012 election of Duane Sand as a United States Senator from North Dakota. Friends of Duane Sand ceased operation in June 2012, when Sand was defeated in the state primary election. In 2013, the Job Service received an interstate request to investigate whether Friends of Duane Sand was required to pay unemployment insurance for Joe Meyer, a campaign worker who filed a claim for unemployment benefits in Minnesota. Friends of Duane Sand claimed its campaign workers were either independent contractors or volunteers and it was not subject to charges for unemployment insurance. After an investigation and a hearing, an administrative law judge determined Friends of Duane Sand was an employing unit, Meyer was an independent contractor and not an employee, and another campaign worker, Sarah Mohler, was an employee. Job Service declined to review the administrative law judge's decision. Friends of Duane Sand 2012 appealed a district court order denying a motion for reconsideration of a judgment affirming a Job Service decision that Friends of Duane Sand was an employing unit and that Sarah Mohler was an employee. The Supreme Court dismissed, finding that post-judgment motions under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59 and 60 were not applicable to a district court's review of an appeal from a Job Service decision. Further, the Court found Friends of Duane Sand 2012 did not timely appeal the judgment affirming Job Service's decision. View "Sand v. Job Service" on Justia Law

Dwight Johnson and Darin Vangsness appealed from a judgment affirming the State Board of Public School Education's decision to deny their petition for annexation of property from one school district to another. Johnson and Vangsness owned land that was transferred to the Lewis and Clark district, and they sought annexation of property to the Garrison district. The McLean and Ward county committees approved the petition. The petition was then submitted to the State Board of Public School Education for approval. Proponents and opponents of the petition testified and presented other evidence. Johnson, Vangsness and others, including the superintendent of Garrison, testified in favor of the annexation petition. The superintendent of Lewis and Clark and the president of its school board testified in opposition to the petition. Because the Board acted in accordance with the law, did not violate Johnson and Vangsness' constitutional rights or their rights to a fair hearing, and its decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Annexation of a Part of Lewis & Clark Public Sch. Dist." on Justia Law