Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appeals from a judgment reversing the decision of an administrative hearing officer revoking Corey Joseph Jesser’s driving privileges for 180 days. Jesser refused to take a sobriety test and was arrested for driving under the influence. The hearing officer found Peterson had reason to believe Jesser was involved in a traffic accident as the driver, Jesser’s body contained alcohol, and he refused to submit to the onsite screening test. The hearing officer found the arresting police officer had reasonable grounds to believe Jesser was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The hearing officer found Jesser was arrested and refused to submit to the chemical breath test. The license was revoked for 180 days based on Jesser's refusal of the onsite screening and chemical tests. Notwithstanding these findings, the district court reversed the hearing officer's decision. Refusal of the screening test could have been cured by consenting to take the chemical test after arrest; Jesser argued a statutory opportunity to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to the chemical test was deprived. Whether the statutory right to counsel before chemical testing under N.D.C.C. 39-20-01 impacted the right to cure under N.D.C.C. 39-20-14 was a question of first impression for the North Dakota Supreme Court. After review, the Court determined the limited statutory right of a defendant to consult with an attorney before taking a chemical test attached only after arrest. The Court rejected the argument that a post-arrest limited statutory right to counsel created a pre-arrest right because an individual was deprived of a post-arrest remedy. The Court reversed the district court judgment and reinstated the hearing officer's decision revoking Jesser's driving privileges. View "Jesser v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

After falling into arrears on his court-ordered child support obligation, the North Dakota suspended Joshua Rose's drivers license. In November 2018, Rose entered into a child support payment plan with the State which lifted his drivers license suspension. The payment plan required Rose to make a $1,000 down payment and pay $836 per month for his current child support obligation and $167.20 per month for his arrears. Rose stopped paying his child support obligation after December 31, 2018. Following Rose’s failure to comply with the payment plan, the State resuspended his drivers license. Rose requested a hearing in the district court and asked to appear telephonically to contest the license suspension. The court denied the motion on May 17, 2019, reasoning Rose “has failed to show any statutory, or procedural, basis for granting his requests.” The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred, reversed and remanded for a hearing as required by N.D.C.C. 50-09-08.6. View "North Dakota v. Rose" on Justia Law

Bile Salat appealed the discontinuation of his disability benefits. In 2016, Salat slipped and fell at work. On March 31, 2016, WSI accepted liability for a contusion of the lower back and pelvis and a right ankle sprain. By November 2016, an independent medical examination revealed Salat's ankle injury had not healed and was not at pre-injury status, but low back pain was unrelated to the work injury. Salat's personal physician reviewed the IME's opinion and did not have any "objective findings on physical exam to challenge or disagree with his medical opinion." On August 5, 2016, WSI issued an order discontinuing Salat’s disability benefits after June 29, 2016. On December 15, 2016, WSI issued a notice of decision denying further benefits of Salat’s lumbar spine after November 11, 2016. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the discontinuation of benefits, finding Salat's physician's statement was misunderstood by the district court as a "blanket agreement" with the independent medical examiner: Salat's physician's "statement is better understood as stating she had no objective findings on physical exam to challenge or disagree with [the IME] opinion regarding the source of Salat’s back pain." On this record, the Supreme Court surmised the ALJ could have reasonably found the two physicians had conflicting medical opinions on the source of continued back pain, and that a "reasoning mind reasonably could determine" Salat suffered low back pain after November 11, 2016 that was attributable to the compensable work injury. View "WSI v. Salat, et al." on Justia Law

Brandon Lindstrom appealed the district court judgment affirming the hearing officer’s decision to suspend Lindstrom’s license for 180 days. On January 28, 2019, Lindstrom was arrested for driving under the influence and given a chemical breath test which showed he was over the legal limit for driving. Lindstrom requested an adminstrative hearing. The hearing officer found the Highway Patrol Trooper had reasonable grounds to believe Lindstrom was driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and the Trooper who stopped Lindstrom forwarded the report and notice form and test results to the Department of Transportation by placing them in the mail in an in-house mailing bin on January 29, 2019. The hearing officer suspended Lindstrom’s driving priviledges for 180 days. Lindstrom appealed to the district court which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Lindstrom argued the report and notice was not forwarded to the Department within five days as required by law. Instead, Lindstrom claimed the Trooper placed the report and notice in an in-house mail bin on January 29, 2019, and an envelope postmark showed it was sent seven days later to the Department on February 4, 2019. In affirming the district court, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that because the Trooper testified he deposited the report and notice in an in-house mail bin on January 29, 2019, and the hearing officer relied on her common sense and experiences of how in house mailing bins operate, the hearing officer could have reasonably found the report and notice were mailed on January 29, 2019, and therefore were forwarded to the Department on the same day. View "Lindstrom v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Larry Alber appealed a district court order denying his motion for injunctive relief against the City of Marion. Alber also appealed an order denying his motion for reconsideration. In 2003, the City sued Alber, alleging certain abandoned vehicles on Alber’s property violated a City ordinance and were a public nuisance. The district court entered a judgment against Alber finding the vehicles on Alber’s property were a public nuisance. The judgment required Alber to remove or lawfully maintain the vehicles. In 2013, the district court found Alber in contempt for violating the 2003 judgment’s requirement that he maintain the vehicles or remove them from his property. The court ordered Alber to remove all nuisance vehicles from his property. The court also ordered that any vehicles not removed by Alber could be removed by the City. In December 2016, Alber moved for injunctive relief, requesting a temporary restraining order prohibiting the City from entering his property to remove nuisance vehicles. As it related to the denial of his motion for injunctive relief, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Alber’s brief failed to demonstrate that any of the injunctive relief factors weighed in his favor: he did not show a substantial probability of succeeding on the merits, proof of irreparable injury, harm to other interested parties, and how the public interest would be benefited by the granting of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court. View "North Dakota ex rel. City of Marion v. Alber" on Justia Law

Continental Resources, Inc. appealed a district court judgment dismissing its declaratory judgment action against the North Dakota Department of Environmental Quality (“Department”). Continental’s action for declaratory judgment requested the district court find “that if an approved control device is installed and operating at an oil and gas production facility, the mere presence of an emission from a closed tank hatch or control device does not, in and of itself, establish a violation of N.D. Admin. Code 33-15-07-2(1).” The district court dismissed Continental’s declaratory judgment action after finding the Environmental Protection Agency was an indispensable party, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and the matter was not ripe for judicial review. While this appeal was pending, the Department moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing Continental’s request for declaratory judgment as not ripe for judicial review. View "Continental Resources v. N.D. Dept. of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Lawrence Didier appeals from an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. On appeal, Didier argues the district court’s factual basis was insufficient to legally conclude he met the substantive due process requirement of the inability to control his behavior. Didier also argues he did not receive a fair hearing that comports with procedural due process. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of Didier" on Justia Law

J.B. appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. J.B. argued the district court erred in determining he remains a sexually dangerous individual because the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence supported the court’s finding J.B. had serious difficulty controlling his behavior, and affirmed. View "Interest of J.B." on Justia Law

Huey Brock appealed judgments dismissing his negligence action against Richard Price and KS Industries, LLC (“LLC”) and awarding Price and LLC costs and disbursements in the amount of $181,467. Price and LLC cross-appealed the judgment awarding costs and disbursements. In 2011, Brock was severely injured in a traffic accident while traveling in a company-owned vehicle with Price and another LLC employee, resulting in Brock becoming quadriplegic. Days later WSI accepted his claim for benefits. In June 2012, Brock, WSI, and LLC entered into a stipulation that Brock would continue to receive WSI benefits while seeking workers’ compensation benefits in California from KS Industries, LP (“LP”). The stipulation further provided that WSI would cease paying benefits if his claim against LP’s insurance carrier were accepted and his attorney would act in trust for WSI in pursuing reimbursement of funds paid in connection with Brock’s claim. Brock then filed an application for California workers’ compensation benefits claiming he was employed by LP at the time of the accident. Based on a California administrative decision, LP’s workers’ compensation carrier commenced paying benefits to Brock and reimbursed WSI all funds expended on Brock. In 2014, WSI issued a notice of decision reversing its prior decision accepting Brock’s claim. In February 2015, Brock brought this negligence action against Price and LLC. Brock moved for summary judgment arguing collateral estoppel based on the California administrative proceedings precluded Price and LLC from arguing LLC was Brock’s employer rather than LP, and therefore his action was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of North Dakota law. In November 2018, Price and LLC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing collateral estoppel did not apply and the exclusive remedy provisions applied to bar Brock’s action against LLC and his co-worker, Price. The district court agreed and dismissed the action. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the negligence action because it was indeed barred by the Workforce Safety and Insurance Act’s exclusive remedy provisions. The Court reversed the award of costs and disbursements and remanded for the court to hold a hearing on Brock’s objections required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(e)(2). View "Brock v. Price, et al." on Justia Law

On August 14, 2017, Susan Franciere and her dog were attacked by another dog in Mandan. Two days later, she went to the Mandan Police Department, asserted her rights under Article I, section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, and requested a copy of the police report on the incident under the open records law. On August 17, 2017, she called the police department and was informed the dog was undergoing a 10-day rabies quarantine. On August 18, 2017, Franciere sent a letter to the chief of police requesting the police report. On August 22, 2017, she received a phone call from a police lieutenant who told her she would not receive the report because the case was still active and no information would be released until the case was closed. In September 2017, she contacted the city attorney about the incident. In October, she filed suit in another attempt to get the records. On November 1, 2017, Franciere received a redacted version of the report. On January 13, 2018, she received an unredacted report. She appealed when her case was dismissed as moot, because Franciere eventually received the records she requested. The district court specifically declined to rule on the City’s motion to dismiss the proceedings for insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that because a determination of subject matter and personal jurisdiction had to precede any dismissal with prejudice, the court was required to resolve the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service and lack of personal jurisdiction before dismissing the claims with prejudice on the grounds that they were moot. The judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for a ruling on the City's motion to dismiss. View "Franciere v. City of Mandan" on Justia Law