Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Steve Wolt appealed from an order denying his motion to amend a divorce judgment. In January 2010, the juvenile court found the two oldest Wolt children deprived because of Steve Wolt's "intentional and systematic efforts to alienate the children from [their mother] Kathy and to undermine Kathy's custody, authority and control of the children." The court found "these actions motivated [the two older children] to engage in unruly conduct, which in turn, caused them to be adjudicated as unruly children and placed in foster care." The juvenile court also found that "[w]ith regard to Kathy, the children are deprived because the alienation and disrespect that Steve has instilled in [the oldest children] towards Kathy, have caused such a serious disruption in their relations that Kathy can no longer provide proper parental care and control for [them], even though she obviously wishe[d] to do so." Steve Wolt argued the district court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to amend the judgment to change primary residential responsibility with regard to his third child who remained in his ex-wife's custody. He argued he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he established a prima facie case under state law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on his motion to award him primary residential responsibility of his children and did not err in awarding Kathy Wolt attorney's fees. The Court also concluded, however, the district court erred in denying Steve Wolt a hearing on his motion to amend his parenting time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wolt v. Wolt" on Justia Law

Karol Kelly appealed a judgment in a divorce action brought by Richard Kelly in which the district court granted her custody of the parties' minor child, restrained her from interfering with Richard Kelly's insurance business for five years and awarded Richard Kelly a $40,000 cash payment for Karol Kelly's conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide child custody, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Richard Kelly the $40,000 cash payment and the court did not err in restraining Karol Kelly from interfering with Richard Kelly's insurance business. However, the Court concluded the court erred in not limiting the geographic scope of the restraining order and remanded the case for further proceedings as to the scope of the restraining order. View "Kelly v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Daniel Leverson appealed an order denying his motion to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligation to Karen Leverson. Upon review of the divorce court record and the applicable settlement agreement, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling an award of spousal support to Karen Leverson under the parties' settlement agreement that was incorporated in the divorce judgment. The Court found the lower court disregarded the pertinent part of the agreement where the marital property distribution could not be later modified. The Court reversed the order and remanded it to the district court to address whether Daniel Leverson established that a material change of circumstances has occurred to justify modification of his spousal support obligation. View "Leverson v. Leverson" on Justia Law

Aimee Martinson appealed an order upon remand that denied her additional attorney fees and costs in connection with her motions for a protective order and to modify the visitation provisions of a divorce judgment. Aimee Martinson was awarded physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and James Martinson was awarded visitation. Aimee Martinson was permitted to move with the children to Minnesota. In 2007, the children alleged they had been sexually abused by their father. The allegations were reported to Minnesota law enforcement and social services agencies which began investigations. Concurrent with Minnesota's investigation into the children's allegations, Aimee Martinson successfully moved for an ex parte interim order in North Dakota to prohibit James Martinson from having any contact with the children. The North Dakota order directed that Aimee Martinson receive attorney fees for bringing the Minnesota and North Dakota proceedings which was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Minnesota would find the children's allegations were unsubstantiated, and the family attempted to reunify. A hearing to sort out the details of the reunification was held, and financial issues pertaining to the attorney fees was presented. The district court ordered Aimee Martinson receive fees for the Minnesota proceedings, but denied all other requested fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, concluding the district court failed to comply with the directions in the Court's prior opinion that awarded Aimee Martinson fees and costs for both Minnesota and North Dakota proceedings. View "Martinson v. Martinson" on Justia Law

Julie Mees appealed a judgment granting Clint Miller primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child. Ms. Mees argued on appeal that the court erred in basing its decision on Miller's affidavits, which were not presented in open court, and in awarding Miller primary residential responsibility of the child. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded the court's reference to Miller's affidavits was not reversible error and the court's decision to award Miller primary residential responsibility was not clearly erroneous. View "Miller v. Mees" on Justia Law

In 1996 the State sued Defendant Troy Wolff, seeking to establish his paternity and obtain a child support order after the mother and child began receiving public assistance. The court also established a child support obligation for Defendant. The mother was given custody of the child. In 1999 Defendant and the mother stipulated to a reduction of Defendant's child support obligation, and an amended judgment was entered incorporating the stipulation. The State was a party to the action and signed the 1999 stipulation. In January 2009, Defendant and the mother entered into another stipulation pertaining to custody and visitation, and they agreed to modify the child support obligation. The parties agreed that Defendant would no longer have a support obligation to the mother, and that Defendant would not seek support from the mother. The court entered a second amended judgment incorporating the new stipulation. In October 2009, the State moved to vacate the second amended judgment, arguing that it was a party to the action and did not agree to the new stipulation. Defendant argued on appeal that the judicial referee did not have jurisdiction to issue the order to vacate the second amended judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State was a real party in interest and had standing, the second amended judgment contains unenforceable provisions, and the court did not err in vacating the second amended judgment. View "North Dakota ex. rel. Schlect v. Wolff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Paulson appealed an amended divorce judgment ordering him to pay spousal support to Defendant Cheryl Paulson. The parties began living together in 1987 and married in 1994. They separated in 2006, and Mark Paulson brought this action for divorce in 2008. Following a trial, the district court granted the divorce, divided the marital property and debts, and denied Cheryl Paulson's request for spousal support. Cheryl Paulson appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the property division but concluded the district court had failed to properly apply the "Ruff-Fischer" guidelines and its findings of fact on spousal support were clearly erroneous. On remand, the district court sent a letter to counsel for the parties suggesting one possible procedure to follow, but giving the parties the opportunity to suggest other alternatives. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Mark Paulson failed to demonstrate that the district court's findings of fact on spousal support were clearly erroneous. The district court on remand followed the Supreme Court's directions by fully analyzing the relevant factors and making more complete findings of fact: "[a]lthough Mark Paulson raised some generic challenges to various findings, he did not demonstrate that any finding was induced by an erroneous view of the law or that any finding was without support in the evidence, and [the Court is] not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." The Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Paulson v. Paulson" on Justia Law

N.M. and M.M. appealed a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their four minor children, arguing that the juvenile court erred in finding two of the children, K.B. and P.M., were deprived. N.M. and M.M. were the parents of K.B., born in 2007; W.M. and J.M., special-needs twins born prematurely in 2008; and P.M., born in 2010. In November 2008, when the twins were about five months old, W.M. was admitted to the hospital for head trauma. At the time, the parents claimed a car seat had landed on W.M. when K.B. pulled the seat off a sofa. Treating physicians, however, opined that the parents' explanation was inconsistent with W.M.'s injuries and that the actual nature of W.M.'s injuries was consistent with "shaken baby syndrome." On November 17, 2008, K.B., W.M., and J.M. were placed in the custody of Cass County Social Services. The State petitioned to terminate the parents' parental rights to K.B., W.M., and J.M. In March 2010, while the termination petition was pending, the parents had another child, P.M., and Social Services immediately took custody of P.M. and placed him in foster care. In May 2010, an amended petition for termination of parental rights was filed to include the newborn P.M. N.M. and M.M. requested review of the referee's order. After making additional findings and conclusions, the juvenile court adopted and affirmed the referee's findings and order. Upon review of the juvenile court's record, the Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding K.B. and P.M. were deprived and affirmed the termination of the parents' rights to those two children. View "Interest of K.B." on Justia Law

Julie Glass appealed a judgment changing primary residential responsibility of her three children from her to their father, Darin Glass. The parties lived together in Bismarck at the time of their divorce in 2005. Julie Glass moved with the children to Casselton in June 2006 and remarried, but was divorced three years later. Julie Glass began dating Steve McNab in March 2009, and he moved into her home two months later. McNab was divorced and had three children through his prior marriage, and during his parenting weekends, McNab's children resided with Julie Glass and her children. Darin Glass remarried in February 2009 and lived with his wife, Debbie. After his divorce, Darin Glass exercised sporadic parenting time with his children until he remarried, when he began exercising parenting time about one weekend per month. In late 2009, Darin Glass moved for an ex parte interim order to immediately change the primary residential responsibility of his three children, which was followed by a motion to modify the parties' divorce judgment to grant him primary residential responsibility of the children. The motions were triggered by two violent incidents that occurred at Julie Glass's home in late 2009. Numerous witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing, including the two oldest children. The children testified that they wanted to live with their mother. Julie Glass testified that she "hope[d]" to continue her relationship with McNab. Following the hearing, the court granted Darin Glass's motion and awarded him primary residential responsibility of the children. In finding in favor of Darin Glass, the district court found that McNab was a negative impact on the children given the domestic violence situation: "this incident may be minimized by all involved, but the fact it occurred at all is significant to this Court." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, concluding that the district court's decision to change primary residential responsibility was not clearly erroneous and the court did not abuse its discretion.

Chad Crandall appealed and Heidi Crandall cross appealed a divorce judgment that distributed the parties' marital property, awarding Mr. Crandall primary residential responsibility for the parties' three minor children and ordering Mr. Crandall to pay Mrs. Crandall $680 per month in child support. Mr. Crandall argued the district court erred in not requiring Mrs. Crandall to pay him child support. He asserted the child support guidelines do not contemplate requiring the custodial parent to pay the noncustodial parent child support. Mrs. Crandall responded that state law allows for a deviation from the child support guidelines, and that the court exercised its discretion in awarding her child support after making a finding the award was based on a consideration of the child support guidelines and the amount of time each parent will spend with the children. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower court's child support award did not follow the law, and reversed the award and remanded for calculation of child support under the guidelines with the appropriate recoupment of child support erroneously paid by Mr. Crandall. With regard to the distribution of property, the Court was "not left with a definite and firm conviction the district court made a mistake in finding the value of the parties' marital estate and distributing the parties' marital assets." The case was remanded for further proceedings.