Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Mark Paulson appealed an amended divorce judgment ordering him to pay spousal support to Defendant Cheryl Paulson. The parties began living together in 1987 and married in 1994. They separated in 2006, and Mark Paulson brought this action for divorce in 2008. Following a trial, the district court granted the divorce, divided the marital property and debts, and denied Cheryl Paulson's request for spousal support. Cheryl Paulson appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the property division but concluded the district court had failed to properly apply the "Ruff-Fischer" guidelines and its findings of fact on spousal support were clearly erroneous. On remand, the district court sent a letter to counsel for the parties suggesting one possible procedure to follow, but giving the parties the opportunity to suggest other alternatives. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Mark Paulson failed to demonstrate that the district court's findings of fact on spousal support were clearly erroneous. The district court on remand followed the Supreme Court's directions by fully analyzing the relevant factors and making more complete findings of fact: "[a]lthough Mark Paulson raised some generic challenges to various findings, he did not demonstrate that any finding was induced by an erroneous view of the law or that any finding was without support in the evidence, and [the Court is] not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." The Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Paulson v. Paulson" on Justia Law

N.M. and M.M. appealed a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their four minor children, arguing that the juvenile court erred in finding two of the children, K.B. and P.M., were deprived. N.M. and M.M. were the parents of K.B., born in 2007; W.M. and J.M., special-needs twins born prematurely in 2008; and P.M., born in 2010. In November 2008, when the twins were about five months old, W.M. was admitted to the hospital for head trauma. At the time, the parents claimed a car seat had landed on W.M. when K.B. pulled the seat off a sofa. Treating physicians, however, opined that the parents' explanation was inconsistent with W.M.'s injuries and that the actual nature of W.M.'s injuries was consistent with "shaken baby syndrome." On November 17, 2008, K.B., W.M., and J.M. were placed in the custody of Cass County Social Services. The State petitioned to terminate the parents' parental rights to K.B., W.M., and J.M. In March 2010, while the termination petition was pending, the parents had another child, P.M., and Social Services immediately took custody of P.M. and placed him in foster care. In May 2010, an amended petition for termination of parental rights was filed to include the newborn P.M. N.M. and M.M. requested review of the referee's order. After making additional findings and conclusions, the juvenile court adopted and affirmed the referee's findings and order. Upon review of the juvenile court's record, the Supreme Court concluded that the juvenile court did not clearly err in finding K.B. and P.M. were deprived and affirmed the termination of the parents' rights to those two children. View "Interest of K.B." on Justia Law

Julie Glass appealed a judgment changing primary residential responsibility of her three children from her to their father, Darin Glass. The parties lived together in Bismarck at the time of their divorce in 2005. Julie Glass moved with the children to Casselton in June 2006 and remarried, but was divorced three years later. Julie Glass began dating Steve McNab in March 2009, and he moved into her home two months later. McNab was divorced and had three children through his prior marriage, and during his parenting weekends, McNab's children resided with Julie Glass and her children. Darin Glass remarried in February 2009 and lived with his wife, Debbie. After his divorce, Darin Glass exercised sporadic parenting time with his children until he remarried, when he began exercising parenting time about one weekend per month. In late 2009, Darin Glass moved for an ex parte interim order to immediately change the primary residential responsibility of his three children, which was followed by a motion to modify the parties' divorce judgment to grant him primary residential responsibility of the children. The motions were triggered by two violent incidents that occurred at Julie Glass's home in late 2009. Numerous witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing, including the two oldest children. The children testified that they wanted to live with their mother. Julie Glass testified that she "hope[d]" to continue her relationship with McNab. Following the hearing, the court granted Darin Glass's motion and awarded him primary residential responsibility of the children. In finding in favor of Darin Glass, the district court found that McNab was a negative impact on the children given the domestic violence situation: "this incident may be minimized by all involved, but the fact it occurred at all is significant to this Court." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, concluding that the district court's decision to change primary residential responsibility was not clearly erroneous and the court did not abuse its discretion.

Chad Crandall appealed and Heidi Crandall cross appealed a divorce judgment that distributed the parties' marital property, awarding Mr. Crandall primary residential responsibility for the parties' three minor children and ordering Mr. Crandall to pay Mrs. Crandall $680 per month in child support. Mr. Crandall argued the district court erred in not requiring Mrs. Crandall to pay him child support. He asserted the child support guidelines do not contemplate requiring the custodial parent to pay the noncustodial parent child support. Mrs. Crandall responded that state law allows for a deviation from the child support guidelines, and that the court exercised its discretion in awarding her child support after making a finding the award was based on a consideration of the child support guidelines and the amount of time each parent will spend with the children. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower court's child support award did not follow the law, and reversed the award and remanded for calculation of child support under the guidelines with the appropriate recoupment of child support erroneously paid by Mr. Crandall. With regard to the distribution of property, the Court was "not left with a definite and firm conviction the district court made a mistake in finding the value of the parties' marital estate and distributing the parties' marital assets." The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Gregory Krueger appealed a district court's order that denied his motion to enforce visitation along with the court's subsequent order that increased his child support obligation. Gregory and Deborah Krueger (now known as Bentz), were married in 1992 and divorced in 1999. They had one child, L.K., who was born in 1994. Upon divorce, Bentz was given custody of L.K., but Krueger maintained liberal visitation rights. Numerous motions, mostly concerned with adjustments in visitation and child support, were filed after the divorce. The district court amended its original judgment in 2003. This amended judgment allowed Bentz to retain custody of L.K. and restricted Krueger's visitation rights. This arrangement continued until 2007, when an incident occurred while L.K. was visiting Krueger. This incident allegedly turned physical, with both the 13-year-old L.K. and Krueger pushing each other. The relationship between L.K. and Krueger became strained, and all visitation apparently ceased following this incident. Krueger again moved to amend the judgment that would restore his visitation with L.K. In 2009, the district court ordered visitation should resume in the form of joint counseling sessions between L.K. and Krueger. After the new order was in place, the therapy sessions quickly broke down, and the unrestricted visitation contemplated in the order never materialized. Krueger again moved to amend the judgment and require visitation. The court concluded in its order denying Krueger's motion that there was "nothing for the Court to order" and refused to establish a visitation schedule between L.K. and Krueger. In a separate order, the district court amended its judgment to increase Krueger's child support obligation. The order did not specify how it arrived at its new net income figures, but rather stated its decision was based on a net monthly income and was made according to the State Child Support Guidelines. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Krueger's visitation motion, concluding the 2009 order remained in effect and restricted full visitation. The Court reversed the order increasing Krueger's child support obligation, because the district court did not make independent, specific findings regarding his net income and remanded the case for those findings to be made.

Dominique Smith appealed a district court judgment that granted Angie Martinez primary residential responsibility of the parties' child. Smith and Martinez have never been married to each other. They have one child, C.R.S., born in 2009. Shortly after C.R.S. was born, Martinez left North Dakota and moved to Texas. Smith initiated an action seeking primary residential responsibility of C.R.S. At the district court hearing, both parties alleged the other perpetrated incidents of domestic violence. Smith alleged Martinez had been violent, had a felony record, was unemployed, and had a "serious psychological history." Martinez alleged Smith caused the problems she had, and she has improved since leaving Smith. In its analysis of the factors to determine the best interests of the child, the district court included some findings on domestic violence between the parties, but the court did not address the domestic violence presumption. The court awarded Martinez primary residential responsibility with parenting time for Smith. Smith appealed, arguing the court erred by not analyzing whether the domestic violence presumption applied, and he argued the court erred in its findings on several other factors under the best interests of the child analysis. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court made inadequate findings on domestic violence between the parties and the presumption against awarding primary residential responsibility to the perpetrator of domestic violence. The Court reversed and remanded the case back to the district court to make the necessary findings.

F.T. (the Father) appealed a district court judgment that granted the State's petition to involuntarily terminate F.T.'s parental rights. In September 2009, the State filed a petition to terminate F.T.'s parental rights, alleging that T.T., a child, was deprived, neglected and abandoned. A hearing was held in December. F.T. moved to sequester the State's witnesses. The district court granted the motion, stating that the State's witnesses should remain in the hallway until called to testify and that Irene Dybwad, the representative from Grand Forks County Social Services, could stay in the courtroom. During a recess F.T.'s attorney observed Dybwad speaking with the State's witnesses. F.T. raised the issue to the court. The court gave F.T. the opportunity to question the witnesses that were seen talking in the hallway. The witnesses testified that no specific testimony was discussed, that they were told the State had a hard time qualifying a witness as an expert and that they were told to stick to their reports. F.T. moved for a mistrial. The district court granted the motion, explaining: "I guess I should have explained that sequestering means do not go--leave the courtroom and talk to any of the witnesses." Before the second hearing, F.T. moved to prevent the State's three witnesses involved in the mistrial from testifying at the second hearing, arguing that allowing the witnesses to testify would be unfair because the witnesses knew the questions F.T.'s attorney would ask. The district court denied F.T.'s motion, stating that the mistrial was granted based on Dybwad's misconduct and that F.T. would be able to cross-examine the three witnesses about the sequestration violation. Trial proceeded, and the district court eventually entered its judgment terminating F.T.'s parental rights. On appeal to the Supreme Court, F.T. argued that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the State's three witnesses involved in the sequestration violation to testify. Upon careful consideration of the record, the Supreme Court found that the district court's findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. The Court affirmed the termination of F.T.'s parental rights.

C.S. appealed from a juvenile court's order that found his child T.S., a delinquent and unruly child for committing disorderly conduct. At the hearing, the State presented evidence about the two alleged acts of disorderly conduct. The State asserted the first act of disorderly conduct involved a classroom incident. T.S.'s second-grade teacher testified that while attending class, T.S. started screaming words that were not making sense. T.S. later kicked the aide after a short "time out." The second act of disorderly conduct took place on a school bus. The bus driver testified that while driving the special needs bus, she heard T.S. scream the "N" word. She asked T.S. to go to the front of the bus but he refused and called her "a**hole" and "fat a**." The bus driver used physical force to restrain T.S. The juvenile court found T.S. a delinquent child and an unruly child in need of treatment and rehabilitation. The court concluded it was in the best interest of T.S. to be removed from the care of his father and be placed in the care, custody, and control of Stutsman County Social Services for one year. On appeal, C.S. argued that insufficient evidence was presented to support the juvenile court's findings of fact. Furthermore, C.S. asserted the juvenile court violated T.S.'s constitutional rights by failing to sua sponte conduct a competency hearing. Upon careful consideration of the juvenile court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the court's finding. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate T.S.'s due process rights by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's order.

R.A. appealed a juvenile court order that transferred its jurisdiction to the district court and the district court's order affirming the transfer. In March 2010, a delinquency petition and notice of intent to transfer to district court was filed, alleging R.A. committed the offenses of gross sexual imposition and terrorizing. The State alleged R.A. engaged in a sexual act with another juvenile, A.H., by compelling A.H. to submit by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury. The State alleged R.A. sent A.H. text messages and other messages through the Internet that contained threats. After a hearing on the transfer request, the judicial referee found there was probable cause to believe R.A. committed the offenses and ordered the case be transferred to district court. R.A. requested a district court judge review the judicial referee's findings and order, arguing the evidence did not support a finding of probable cause, the judicial referee misinterpreted or misapplied the transfer statute because the statute requires the threats be to the victim and not another person, and his confrontation rights were violated. The district court affirmed and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal to the Supreme Court, R.A. argued there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause because the threats of physical harm were threats of future conduct and were not imminent. The Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err in finding there was probable cause R.A. committed the offenses. The Court affirmed the lower courts' orders.

B.T., the father of L.T., appealed the juvenile court's order that adopted a judicial referee's findings of fact and order committing L.T. to the care of the Division of Juvenile Services following his admissions to gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance. During his initial appearance and his pretrial conference, L.T. appeared with court-appointed counsel, but his parents were not separately represented. L.T. admitted to the charges in the State's petition following an amendment. The amendment reduced the felony level of the gross sexual imposition charge against L.T. which allowed him to avoid being tried as an adult. At the dispositional hearing, L.T. and his parents B.T. and H.T. were all represented by separate court-appointed counsel. There was much debate over mandatory registration of L.T. as a sexual offender, but the judicial referee concluded L.T. would be required to register. Neither L.T. nor his mother H.T. appealed the judicial referee's order committing L.T. to Juvenile Services and mandating his registration as a sexual offender. However B.T. appealed, requesting the juvenile court to review the judicial referee's order. B.T. argued the referee erred by not adequately advising B.T. that L.T. would be required to register as a sexual offender after admitting to the State's charges. Furthermore, B.T. contended it was unconstitutional for an indigent parent to be denied court-appointed counsel during the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court rejected B.T.'s arguments and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal, B.T. argued the State Uniform Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional, and his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the first of L.T.'s adjudicative hearings. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the right-to-counsel statute in North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act protects the constitutional rights of parents and juveniles. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's disposition of L.T.'s case.