Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

K.H. appealed juvenile court order that extended the placement of his daughter T.H. in the custody and control of Barnes County Social Services and an order that denied his motion to dismiss. On appeal, K.H. argued the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction, applied the wrong standard of proof in finding the child was deprived in 2008, erred in allowing his plea to the allegations of deprivation, the duration of the deprivation proceedings was excessive, and in finding the child continues to be deprived. Finding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of T.H." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Bethany Johnson appealed an amended judgment that modified a California divorce judgment regarding custody of three children and awarded Defendant-Appellee Keith Johnson primary residential responsibility of the parties' seven children. Upon review, the Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal, holding that she forfeited and abandoned her appeal by disregarding the district court's order and judgment. View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Theresa Horsted appealed a district court order, divorce judgment, and amended divorce judgment that awarded Christopher Horsted joint decision-making responsibility and visitation with the parties' daughter and dividing custody investigator fees between the parties. Concluding that the district court did not provide sufficient findings to allow proper appellate review of its decision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for the district court to make findings regarding the child's best interests. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Horsted v. Horsted" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Maria Seibold appealed a district court order that denied her motions for a second amended judgment and to hold Defendant-Appellee Paul Leverington in contempt and denied her request for a hearing on her motions. Seibold and Leverington have one child together. In 2006, a judgment was entered finding Leverington is the child's natural father, awarded Seibold sole legal and physical custody of the child, and awarded Leverington visitation. In 2009, Leverington moved to modify custody. After a hearing, the district court entered an order finding there was a material change in circumstances and it was in the child's best interests to modify custody. The court awarded Leverington sole legal and physical custody of the child and awarded Seibold visitation. The court also addressed the parties' parental rights and responsibilities and ordered that both parents have certain rights and duties related to the child, including the right to access and obtain copies of certain records related to the child and the right to contact the child by phone. An amended judgment was entered in September 2009. In 2011, Seibold moved for a second amended judgment, but the district court denied her motions without holding a hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court erred in denying Seibold's motions without providing her with sufficient time to schedule a hearing. The Court reversed the court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Seibold v. Leverington" on Justia Law

Amanda Thompson Wetch (formerly known as Amanda Thompson) appealed an order that denied her motion to amend the second amended judgment granting Scott Thompson sole physical custody of the parties' two minor children during the school year and granting the parties joint physical custody during the summer. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ms. Thompson Wetch established a prima facie case and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her motion to modify primary residential responsibility of the children. View "Thompson v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Tim Sorenson appealed an amended judgment that awarded primary residential responsibility of his son to Respondent-Appellee Jana Slater, the child's mother. Sorenson and Slater, who were never married, had a child together in May 2008. The child initially lived with Slater, but Sorenson petitioned for custody of the child. In 2008, the child suffered a broken clavicle. The parties disputed whether the injury occurred during a weekend visitation with Sorenson or after the child had been returned to Slater. The emergency room doctor who treated the child filed a report with social services, resulting in investigations into the incident by social services and law enforcement. Sorenson and Slater both submitted to polygraph examinations as part of the criminal investigation. No criminal charges were filed, but social services recommended that Sorenson and Slater attend parenting classes. In 2009, following a two-day trial, the district court issued its order awarding primary custody to Sorenson, with reasonable visitation to Slater. Slater appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the judgment and remanded. A majority of the Court concluded that the district court's findings were clearly erroneous and were "spare and conclusory." On remand, the district court held a supplemental evidentiary hearing, and concluded that it was in the best interests of the child for Slater to have primary residential responsibility. On appeal of this decision to the Supreme Court, Sorenson contended the district court exceeded the scope of the remand when it held the supplemental hearing and allowed Slater to present additional evidence on issues other than the two findings of fact which the Court had expressly found to be clearly erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in admitting evidence of the polygraph and relying on evidence that was inadmissible when it made its findings of fact. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sorenson v. Slater" on Justia Law

David Brian Warnke appealed a district court order that denied his motion to vacate a default divorce judgment from Joan Marie Warnke. On appeal, David Warnke argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the default judgment, because he appeared in the district court but did not receive adequate notice of the second hearing. He also argued the district court failed to obtain evidence a default judgment was appropriate and failed to equitably distribute the marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying David Warnke's motion to vacate the default judgment, and affirmed its decision. View "Warnke v. Warnke" on Justia Law

Caryn Weber appealed two district court orders and a fourth amended divorce judgment. When Weber and Duane Sall divorced in 2003, Weber received custody of the parties' two minor children. The divorce judgment ordered Sall to pay all costs related to the children's extracurricular activities, including sports equipment, musical instruments, summer camps, or any other extraordinary expenses. Sall was also ordered to maintain medical and hospitalization insurance for the children, and Weber and Sall were to each pay one-half of the children's medical, dental, and optical expenses which were not paid by insurance. Sall was also ordered to maintain and pay for medical insurance for Weber for a period of 36 months. Because Weber had no income, Sall was allowed to claim the income tax exemptions for the children. After the divorce judgment was entered, Sall paid for medical insurance but not for dental and vision insurance for Weber. Disputes also arose over Sall's payment of extracurricular and medical expenses for the children. In July 2010, Weber moved to hold Sall in contempt of court for his failure to pay her dental and vision insurance premiums from 2003 through 2006. The district court denied Weber's motion to hold Sall in contempt, finding the divorce decree was silent as to payment of the expenses. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the district court's holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings: "the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold Duane Sall in contempt of court for failing to pay Weber's dental and vision insurance premiums, but the district court erred in holding that Weber's claims for reimbursement of the children's extracurricular and medical expenses more than two years old were stale as a matter of law." View "Sall v. Sall" on Justia Law

R.G., father of A.L., appealed a juvenile court order confirming a judicial referee's decision to terminate his parental rights to four minor children. In 2003, R.G. was placed on criminal probation, and in March 2009, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year prison term. In September 2009, R.G.'s four children involved in this action were all less than four years old and were residing with their mother when the children were taken into protective custody by Benson County Social Services and placed in foster care after the mother left the children with relatives and did not return. In May 2010, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.G. and the mother. In August 2010, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and also found the children were deprived as to R.G., but the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights. The juvenile court stated R.G. was anticipating being paroled in January 2011 with release to a halfway house for three to four months. The court also stated R.G.'s early release was contingent upon his completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. After a hearing, a judicial referee terminated R.G.'s parental rights to the four children, finding R.G. was not granted his early parole as anticipated because he had not yet completed his drug and alcohol treatment program due to his conduct in the prison facility. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding the children were deprived, and did not abuse its discretion in terminating R.G.'s parental rights. View "Interest of A.L." on Justia Law

Defendant Ben Simons appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order of the Department of Human Services which found that he had abused his two-year-old child and that services were required. Defendant and his wife Traci required their children to always respond to a parent in a respectful manner and to use the phrases "yes, sir" or "yes, ma'am." In 2009, while the Simons family was attending church, their two-year-old child refused to use the phrases "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am" when responding to his parents. Defendant took the child outside and swatted him twice on his bottom. When they went back inside, Traci Simons was able to get the child to say "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am." Later that evening, after returning home, the child again refused to respond to Defendant with "yes, sir." Defendant took the child to an upstairs bedroom and explained to him that he would be spanked if he did not say "yes, sir." When the child continued his refusal, Defendant placed him over his knee and struck him on his buttocks three times with a wooden backscratcher. The child was wearing pants and a diaper. Defendant then hugged and consoled the child for approximately fifteen minutes, explained the consequences if he refused to say "yes, sir," and emphasized to the child that he needed to show respect to his parents. He then gave the child the opportunity to say "yes, sir," and the child again refused. Defendant repeated the three swats with the wooden backscratcher, and again consoled and spoke with the child for approximately fifteen minutes. Two days later, Stark County Social Services received a report of suspected child abuse regarding the child. A social worker investigated the report and observed the bruises on the child's buttocks. Upon completion of the investigation, Stark County Social Services found the child was an abused child and issued a "services required" finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department's findings that Defendant had inflicted bodily injury upon the child and used unreasonable force were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions governing child abuse were not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Simons v. North Dakota" on Justia Law