Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Brian Warnke appealed a district court order that denied his motion to vacate a default divorce judgment from Joan Marie Warnke. On appeal, David Warnke argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the default judgment, because he appeared in the district court but did not receive adequate notice of the second hearing. He also argued the district court failed to obtain evidence a default judgment was appropriate and failed to equitably distribute the marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying David Warnke's motion to vacate the default judgment, and affirmed its decision. View "Warnke v. Warnke" on Justia Law

Caryn Weber appealed two district court orders and a fourth amended divorce judgment. When Weber and Duane Sall divorced in 2003, Weber received custody of the parties' two minor children. The divorce judgment ordered Sall to pay all costs related to the children's extracurricular activities, including sports equipment, musical instruments, summer camps, or any other extraordinary expenses. Sall was also ordered to maintain medical and hospitalization insurance for the children, and Weber and Sall were to each pay one-half of the children's medical, dental, and optical expenses which were not paid by insurance. Sall was also ordered to maintain and pay for medical insurance for Weber for a period of 36 months. Because Weber had no income, Sall was allowed to claim the income tax exemptions for the children. After the divorce judgment was entered, Sall paid for medical insurance but not for dental and vision insurance for Weber. Disputes also arose over Sall's payment of extracurricular and medical expenses for the children. In July 2010, Weber moved to hold Sall in contempt of court for his failure to pay her dental and vision insurance premiums from 2003 through 2006. The district court denied Weber's motion to hold Sall in contempt, finding the divorce decree was silent as to payment of the expenses. Upon careful review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court partly affirmed, partly reversed the district court's holding, and remanded the case for further proceedings: "the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold Duane Sall in contempt of court for failing to pay Weber's dental and vision insurance premiums, but the district court erred in holding that Weber's claims for reimbursement of the children's extracurricular and medical expenses more than two years old were stale as a matter of law." View "Sall v. Sall" on Justia Law

R.G., father of A.L., appealed a juvenile court order confirming a judicial referee's decision to terminate his parental rights to four minor children. In 2003, R.G. was placed on criminal probation, and in March 2009, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to a three-year prison term. In September 2009, R.G.'s four children involved in this action were all less than four years old and were residing with their mother when the children were taken into protective custody by Benson County Social Services and placed in foster care after the mother left the children with relatives and did not return. In May 2010, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.G. and the mother. In August 2010, the juvenile court terminated the mother's parental rights and also found the children were deprived as to R.G., but the evidence was not sufficient to terminate his parental rights. The juvenile court stated R.G. was anticipating being paroled in January 2011 with release to a halfway house for three to four months. The court also stated R.G.'s early release was contingent upon his completion of a drug and alcohol treatment program. After a hearing, a judicial referee terminated R.G.'s parental rights to the four children, finding R.G. was not granted his early parole as anticipated because he had not yet completed his drug and alcohol treatment program due to his conduct in the prison facility. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not clearly err in finding the children were deprived, and did not abuse its discretion in terminating R.G.'s parental rights. View "Interest of A.L." on Justia Law

Defendant Ben Simons appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an order of the Department of Human Services which found that he had abused his two-year-old child and that services were required. Defendant and his wife Traci required their children to always respond to a parent in a respectful manner and to use the phrases "yes, sir" or "yes, ma'am." In 2009, while the Simons family was attending church, their two-year-old child refused to use the phrases "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am" when responding to his parents. Defendant took the child outside and swatted him twice on his bottom. When they went back inside, Traci Simons was able to get the child to say "yes, sir" and "yes, ma'am." Later that evening, after returning home, the child again refused to respond to Defendant with "yes, sir." Defendant took the child to an upstairs bedroom and explained to him that he would be spanked if he did not say "yes, sir." When the child continued his refusal, Defendant placed him over his knee and struck him on his buttocks three times with a wooden backscratcher. The child was wearing pants and a diaper. Defendant then hugged and consoled the child for approximately fifteen minutes, explained the consequences if he refused to say "yes, sir," and emphasized to the child that he needed to show respect to his parents. He then gave the child the opportunity to say "yes, sir," and the child again refused. Defendant repeated the three swats with the wooden backscratcher, and again consoled and spoke with the child for approximately fifteen minutes. Two days later, Stark County Social Services received a report of suspected child abuse regarding the child. A social worker investigated the report and observed the bruises on the child's buttocks. Upon completion of the investigation, Stark County Social Services found the child was an abused child and issued a "services required" finding. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department's findings that Defendant had inflicted bodily injury upon the child and used unreasonable force were supported by a preponderance of the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions governing child abuse were not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. View "Simons v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Steve Wolt appealed from an order denying his motion to amend a divorce judgment. In January 2010, the juvenile court found the two oldest Wolt children deprived because of Steve Wolt's "intentional and systematic efforts to alienate the children from [their mother] Kathy and to undermine Kathy's custody, authority and control of the children." The court found "these actions motivated [the two older children] to engage in unruly conduct, which in turn, caused them to be adjudicated as unruly children and placed in foster care." The juvenile court also found that "[w]ith regard to Kathy, the children are deprived because the alienation and disrespect that Steve has instilled in [the oldest children] towards Kathy, have caused such a serious disruption in their relations that Kathy can no longer provide proper parental care and control for [them], even though she obviously wishe[d] to do so." Steve Wolt argued the district court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to amend the judgment to change primary residential responsibility with regard to his third child who remained in his ex-wife's custody. He argued he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he established a prima facie case under state law. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on his motion to award him primary residential responsibility of his children and did not err in awarding Kathy Wolt attorney's fees. The Court also concluded, however, the district court erred in denying Steve Wolt a hearing on his motion to amend his parenting time. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wolt v. Wolt" on Justia Law

Karol Kelly appealed a judgment in a divorce action brought by Richard Kelly in which the district court granted her custody of the parties' minor child, restrained her from interfering with Richard Kelly's insurance business for five years and awarded Richard Kelly a $40,000 cash payment for Karol Kelly's conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide child custody, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Richard Kelly the $40,000 cash payment and the court did not err in restraining Karol Kelly from interfering with Richard Kelly's insurance business. However, the Court concluded the court erred in not limiting the geographic scope of the restraining order and remanded the case for further proceedings as to the scope of the restraining order. View "Kelly v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Daniel Leverson appealed an order denying his motion to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligation to Karen Leverson. Upon review of the divorce court record and the applicable settlement agreement, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling an award of spousal support to Karen Leverson under the parties' settlement agreement that was incorporated in the divorce judgment. The Court found the lower court disregarded the pertinent part of the agreement where the marital property distribution could not be later modified. The Court reversed the order and remanded it to the district court to address whether Daniel Leverson established that a material change of circumstances has occurred to justify modification of his spousal support obligation. View "Leverson v. Leverson" on Justia Law

Aimee Martinson appealed an order upon remand that denied her additional attorney fees and costs in connection with her motions for a protective order and to modify the visitation provisions of a divorce judgment. Aimee Martinson was awarded physical custody of the parties' two minor children, and James Martinson was awarded visitation. Aimee Martinson was permitted to move with the children to Minnesota. In 2007, the children alleged they had been sexually abused by their father. The allegations were reported to Minnesota law enforcement and social services agencies which began investigations. Concurrent with Minnesota's investigation into the children's allegations, Aimee Martinson successfully moved for an ex parte interim order in North Dakota to prohibit James Martinson from having any contact with the children. The North Dakota order directed that Aimee Martinson receive attorney fees for bringing the Minnesota and North Dakota proceedings which was later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Minnesota would find the children's allegations were unsubstantiated, and the family attempted to reunify. A hearing to sort out the details of the reunification was held, and financial issues pertaining to the attorney fees was presented. The district court ordered Aimee Martinson receive fees for the Minnesota proceedings, but denied all other requested fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, concluding the district court failed to comply with the directions in the Court's prior opinion that awarded Aimee Martinson fees and costs for both Minnesota and North Dakota proceedings. View "Martinson v. Martinson" on Justia Law

Julie Mees appealed a judgment granting Clint Miller primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child. Ms. Mees argued on appeal that the court erred in basing its decision on Miller's affidavits, which were not presented in open court, and in awarding Miller primary residential responsibility of the child. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded the court's reference to Miller's affidavits was not reversible error and the court's decision to award Miller primary residential responsibility was not clearly erroneous. View "Miller v. Mees" on Justia Law

In 1996 the State sued Defendant Troy Wolff, seeking to establish his paternity and obtain a child support order after the mother and child began receiving public assistance. The court also established a child support obligation for Defendant. The mother was given custody of the child. In 1999 Defendant and the mother stipulated to a reduction of Defendant's child support obligation, and an amended judgment was entered incorporating the stipulation. The State was a party to the action and signed the 1999 stipulation. In January 2009, Defendant and the mother entered into another stipulation pertaining to custody and visitation, and they agreed to modify the child support obligation. The parties agreed that Defendant would no longer have a support obligation to the mother, and that Defendant would not seek support from the mother. The court entered a second amended judgment incorporating the new stipulation. In October 2009, the State moved to vacate the second amended judgment, arguing that it was a party to the action and did not agree to the new stipulation. Defendant argued on appeal that the judicial referee did not have jurisdiction to issue the order to vacate the second amended judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State was a real party in interest and had standing, the second amended judgment contains unenforceable provisions, and the court did not err in vacating the second amended judgment. View "North Dakota ex. rel. Schlect v. Wolff" on Justia Law