Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Melissa Rudnick, formerly known as Melissa Nelson, appealed an amended judgment modifying residential responsibility of the minor child she has with Kirk Rode. Rudnick argued the district court erred in entering an ex parte order, the court erred in finding Rode established a prima facie case justifying modification of primary residential responsibility, and the court's decision to modify residential responsibility was clearly erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding Rode failed to meet his burden of proof under N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.6(6) for a modification of residential responsibility. View "Rudnick v. Rode" on Justia Law

Cheryl Rae Schulte appealed an amended divorce judgment eliminating Kenneth Kramer's obligations to pay her spousal support, to provide health insurance, and to pay non-covered medical costs. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the award of health insurance was spousal support and not property division; the Court reversed, concluding the trial court clearly erred in granting Kramer's motion to eliminate his spousal support obligations; and the Court reversed for the trial court to consider whether to grant Schulte's request for attorney's fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Schulte v. Kramer" on Justia Law

J.A. appealed a juvenile court order terminating parental rights to his daughter, A.W. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the court's findings that J.A. abandoned the child, that the child was deprived, and that the conditions and causes of the deprivation were likely to continue were supported by clear and convincing evidence and were not clearly erroneous. View "Interest of A.W." on Justia Law

Defendant Julie Castro appealed a district court order dismissing without prejudice her interstate custody proceeding against Crescencio Castro for custody of the parties' minor child. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law for exercising jurisdiction for an interstate custody proceeding, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Castro v. Castro" on Justia Law

Defendant Helen Cupido appealed a trial court's summary judgment entered in favor of Recovery Resources, LLC. Helen and David Cupido married in January 1993. In March 2010, David Cupido incurred medical expenses at St. Alexius Medical Center. The parties divorced in April 2011. Under the divorce judgment, the trial court ordered David Cupido responsible for payment of the debt owed to St. Alexius Medical Center. The divorce judgment also required Helen and David to indemnify one another from any and all collection activities, which may arise regarding debts awarded to a party. Recovery Resources, LLC, a collection company, sued Helen and David for $9,494.61 owed to St. Alexius Medical Center for medical care provided to David while he and Helen were married and living together. David did not answer Recovery Resources' claim and a default judgment was entered against him. Helen answered denying liability and cross-claimed for indemnity against David. Helen then moved for summary judgment arguing she was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because the divorce judgment allocated the debt to David. Recovery Resources resisted and moved for summary judgment arguing it was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, because Helen was liable for the debt. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Recovery Resources. On appeal, Helen contended the trial court erred: (1) by concluding she is jointly and severally liable for the debt David incurred, and (2) by failing to dismiss her from the lawsuit based on the indemnification language in the divorce judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the indemnification language in the divorce judgment between Helen and David Cupido did not affect Recovery Resources' statutory right to recover the debt. Accordingly the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss Helen from the collection action. View "Recovery Resources, LLC v. Cupido" on Justia Law

Jordan Michael Engelhardt appealed a domestic violence protection order prohibiting him from having contact with Sara J. Rinas for twenty years. Engelhardt and Rinas, who were never married, have a minor child together. In 2011, after the relationship ended, Rinas filed a petition for protective relief from Engelhardt. Rinas alleged Engelhardt had been physically abusive on multiple occasions, one of which occurred while Engelhardt was holding their child. Rinas also alleged Engelhardt had threatened to kill her and she received threatening text messages from him. The district court granted a temporary domestic violence protection order and scheduled a hearing. In October 2011, Engelhardt filed a parenting time action, but no parenting time order had been issued. Despite Engelhardt's testimony at the hearing, he did not challenge the finding of domestic violence on appeal. Nor did he challenge the interpretation of the domestic violence protection order statute; rather, he argued the judicial referee abused his discretion by including the specific terms of relief in the protection order. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the domestic violence protection order and affirmed it as modified. View "Rinas v. Engelhardt" on Justia Law

Arnold Kosobud appealed and Teresa Kosobud cross-appealed a judgment(1) granting the parties a divorce, distributing their marital property, and ordering Arnold Kosobud to pay spousal support and attorney fees to Teresa Kosobud. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court's findings of fact on property distribution and spousal support were not clearly erroneous and the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and in denying Arnold Kosobud's post-trial motions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the distribution of the Kosobud marital property. View "Kosobud v. Kosobud" on Justia Law

Roger Skachenko appealed a district court order that denied his request to use marital estate funds to conduct an evaluation of Kathryn Skachenko's business, a district court order that denied his request to include as a separate asset of the marital estate a loan owed by Kathryn Skachenko's business to her, and a district court judgment that required him to pay Kathryn Skachenko's attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court orders and judgment, concluding the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roger Skachenko's motion to use frozen marital funds to conduct a business evaluation, in denying Roger Skachenko's motion to include, as a separate asset of the marital estate, a loan owed by "Specialty Sling Co." to Kathryn Skachenko, or in ordering Roger Skachenko to pay Kathryn Skachenko's attorney fees and costs. View "Skachenko v. Skachenko" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Parizek appealed a district court order that affirmed an administrative enforcement action which placed a lien on his personal property held by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The State, through the High Intensity Enforcement Unit of Child Support Enforcement, placed a lien on any funds or accounts the Department was holding for Plaintiff to secure payment for his past due child support obligation. Plaintiff unsuccessfully requested judicial review of the lien, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and therefore the property did not qualify for an account lien. Plaintiff them moved to dismiss the lien with prejudice, arguing the lien was improper because the Department was not a financial institution and an account lien could not be enforced against the accounts it managed, and his spending account did not qualify as personal property. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued the Department and the State violated state law by entering into an agreement or relationship under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, with the sole purpose of enforcement of an administrative action upon him. Furthermore, Plaintiff claimed the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the lien without allowing him a hearing as he requested. He maintained the court erred when it failed to allow him 14 days from the service of the "notice of proposed order" before denying his motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the order denying Plaintiff's motion to dismiss was filed after the notice of appeal, and therefore it was not appealed and was not properly before the Court. View "Parizek v. Parizek" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Ashley Vining appealed a district court amended judgment that granted Defendant-Appellee Michael Renton's motion to modify primary residential responsibility for their child. Appellee argued the district court's decision was in error. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellee's argument that the district court's decision was based on factors other than frustration of parenting time was persuasive: the Court was not convinced the district court failed to try other remedies before ordering a change of primary residential responsibility. Near the beginning of these proceedings, the district court held Appellant in contempt and ordered her to agree to a parenting schedule permitting Appellee substantial parenting time, including overnights. Approximately one week later, Appellee informed the district court Appellant refused to allow him overnight parenting time and submitted a proposed parenting schedule. The district court issued an interim order adopting Appellee's proposed schedule. When the interim order expired, Appellee attempted to continue his parenting time by extending the schedule in the interim order. Appellant refused to allow Appellee to exercise the amount of parenting time he was granted in the interim order until the district court issued an order for continued interim parenting time. Appellant's refusal to allow Appellee overnight visitation after being ordered to so by the district court and her refusal to continue Appellee's parenting time after the order for interim parenting time expired demonstrated that, even after being held in contempt, Appellant was not willing to facilitate a relationship between Appellee and the child. Under these circumstances, the Court was reluctant to conclude the district court did not attempt other remedies before ordering a change of primary residential responsibility. View "Vining v. Renton" on Justia Law