Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Thomas Feist appealed, and Cheryl Feist cross-appealed a district court divorce judgment dividing the parties' marital estate. The parties were married in 1971 and divorced in 2013. The parties had two children together who have both reached the age of majority. During the marriage, Cheryl inherited mineral and surface interests in McKenzie County from her parents and had been receiving royalty payments from those interests. In allocating the marital property between the parties, the district court awarded $1,248,358.30 (50.05%), including all of the mineral interest assets, to Cheryl and $1,245,945.76 (49.95%) to Thomas, and denied Cheryl Feist's request for attorney fees. On appeal, Thomas argued the district court erred in awarding Cheryl all of the mineral interest assets because their value was too speculative. In her cross-appeal, Cheryl argued she should have been awarded attorney fees and a greater distribution of the marital estate. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in equitably distributing the parties' marital estate and awarding all of the mineral interests to Cheryl and did not abuse its discretion in failing to award her attorney fees, it affirmed. View "Feist v. Feist" on Justia Law

Kesha Lavallie and Dustin Lavallie had a child born in 2010. Dustin claimed he was and is "an enrolled resident of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation." He stated he is "temporarily confined to the North Dakota State Penitentiary," but upon release will return home to Belcourt, North Dakota. While he claimed the child "was conceived, born and currently resides permanently on the reservation," the child's birth certificate stated the child was born in Brown County, South Dakota. Kesha filed for and received child support benefits from South Dakota from July 2011 to July 2012. South Dakota entered a support order on July 18, 2011. In August 2012, South Dakota Child Support registered the order in North Dakota, requesting the Devils Lake Regional Child Support Unit to enforce a child support order against Dustin. The North Dakota district court notified Lavallie of the registered order and informed him that he had twenty days to request a hearing on the validity of the registration and that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order would result in confirmation and enforcement of the order. Lavallie failed to timely contest the order, which was then registered in North Dakota on November 7, 2012. In May 2014, Lavallie moved to dismiss the order, asserting the South Dakota court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the motion frivolous. Lavallie filed a motion to reconsider, arguing the court failed to consider his reply to the State's response to his motion to dismiss. The district court denied his motion to reconsider. Lavallie appealed the denial of the order denying reconsideration of his motion to dismiss. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Lavallie" on Justia Law

Bradley Jordet appealed district court orders consolidating cases, adopting a judicial referee's decision denying his request for a money judgment against Tracy Jordet, and denying his motion for a new trial or amended findings. Bradley argued the district court erred in consolidating his action for reimbursement with the divorce and he was entitled to a default judgment on his motion for entry of a money judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, concluding it did not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Bradley Jordet did not appeal from a final, appealable order. View "Jordet v. Jordet" on Justia Law

In September 2010, Chelsi Lavallie and the State of North Dakota as a statutory party in interest sued Curtis Lavallie for child support, alleging he was the natural father of a minor child born to Chelsi in 2010, he was currently incarcerated in Bismarck, conception of the child occurred in North Dakota and the State obtained personal jurisdiction over him, Chelsi Lavallie and the child lived in Rolette County, and Chelsi Lavallie assigned her right to the State to recover for benefits paid by the State for the child. The State sought to impose a future child support obligation on Curtis and also to recover a judgment for support expended to Chelsi on behalf of the child. The summons and complaint were personally served on Curtis at the state penitentiary in Burleigh County. He requested a hearing, stating he "would like to dispute the claim" he was the child's father. A notice of hearing was served on Curtis, which stated he could appear by telephone at a hearing in Rolette County, and provided him with instructions for appearing by telephone. At the hearing, a judicial referee stated the court recorder had called the prison and was informed Curtis had not made arrangements to appear by telephone and "because of some problem down there, he is not able to be removed from the cell." Curtis therefore did not appear personally or by telephone at the hearing, but the referee acknowledged he had raised a paternity issue and initially heard evidence regarding paternity. After the hearing, the referee entered a judgment stating the court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the parties, Curtis and Chelsi Lavallie were married and the child was conceived and born during their marriage, and Curtis was the legal father of the child and had an obligation to provide financial support for the child. A notice of entry of judgment was served by mail on Curtis, and he did not appeal that judgment. In May 2014, on motion by the State, the district court reduced Curtis' child support obligation to $28 per month during his incarceration. Curtis then moved to "take [his] rights back as a sovereign individual" and to dismiss the "child support procurement" proceeding, asserting the state district court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. He claimed that although he was temporarily confined in the state penitentiary, he has always been an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians; that Chelsi was too, and that the child was conceived and born on the reservation. The State resisted Curtis' motion to dismiss, asserting the state court had concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate child support. The district court denied Curtis' motion to dismiss, ruling the state and tribal courts had concurrent jurisdiction to determine the child support obligation. The court subsequently denied Curtis' amended motion to dismiss the child support proceeding. The Supreme Court concluded the district court had jurisdiction to determine his child support obligation, and affirmed. View "Lavallie v. Lavallie" on Justia Law

Bradley and Tracy Jordet were divorced in 2010. Bradley was awarded primary residential responsibility for the parties' two children and Tracy was ordered to pay child support. Bradley was ordered to pay Tracy rehabilitative spousal support. Both parties fell into arrears on their financial obligations to each other. Bradley obtained an execution of judgment from the district court against Tracy directing the Cass County Sheriff to satisfy a $9,071.78 judgment for unpaid child support "out of the personal property of the judgment debtor within your County." Thereafter, the sheriff levied on Tracy's bank accounts. Bradley, accompanied by his attorney, Jonathan Garaas, and a Cass County deputy sheriff, went to the office of Tracy's attorney, the Brazil Law Office. Bradley gave the firm's office assistant a personal check, made payable to Tracy's attorney for $7,825.89 and marked "Back Spousal Support." The sheriff then delivered a notice of levy to the office assistant and took possession of the check. The notice of levy stated that claims for exemptions from process must be made within 10 days. Tracy did not claim any exemptions. Tracy objected to the notice of levy and sought an emergency hearing, asking the district court to hold Garaas in contempt "for attempting to circumvent" the earlier order denying the motion to allow a setoff. After a hearing, the court held Garaas in contempt for intentional disobedience of a court order and ordered that Garaas may purge the contempt by turning over the $7,825.89 check. The Cass County deputy sheriff submitted an execution return showing, after payment of fees, he had collected $8,290.30 for Tracy's child support obligation. A partial satisfaction of Bradley's child support judgment against Tracy in that amount was filed with the district court. Tracy initiated garnishment proceedings against Bradley to enforce the spousal support judgment, and his employer withheld funds from his paycheck. Tracy did not issue a satisfaction of judgment after Bradley gave the check for the full amount of the spousal support judgment to the Brazil Law Office. Bradley sent letters to Tracy and the Brazil Law Office requesting a satisfaction of judgment. Bradley and Garaas appealed from the order denying Bradley Jordet's motion to allow him to setoff the spousal support and child support arrearages and the order holding Garaas in contempt. While the appeal was pending, Bradley sued Tracy and the Brazil Law Office for abuse of process and conversion in a separate action. Bradley alleged he paid the judgment for the spousal support arrearages in full, Tracy refused to issue a satisfaction of judgment, the garnishment proceedings were improper, and his employer withdrew funds from his paycheck and paid the funds to the Brazil Law Office. All three parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment to Tracy and the Brazil Law Office, dismissing Bradley's claims. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the abuse of process claim but there were genuine issues of material fact related to Bradley's conversion claim. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the abuse of process claim, and reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim and remanded. View "Jordet v. Jordet" on Justia Law

The parties divorced in October 2011. Jill Hankey was awarded primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child, L.C.H., who was born in 2009, subject to Blake Hankey's right of parenting time, and the parties were awarded joint decision-making responsibility. In April 2014, Blake sought to modify residential responsibility, seeking primary residential responsibility for L.C.H. and requested an evidentiary hearing. Blake claimed there had been a material change in circumstances warranting modification, and in support of his motion, he submitted affidavits and other supporting evidence alleging Jill deliberately frustrated his parenting time, disregarded the parenting time schedule on several occasions, and exercised unilateral decision-making by taking the parties' child to occupational and play therapy without his knowledge or consent. Jill submitted counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence challenging Blake's allegations. The district court denied Blake's motion without an evidentiary hearing, determining he had failed to present a prima facie case justifying modification because he had "failed to show a material change of circumstances" and "failed to show that a modification of primary residential responsibility is in the best interest of LCH." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding Blake established a prima facie case for modification, warranting an evidentiary hearing. View "Hankey v. Hankey" on Justia Law

Timothy Eggers and Kimberly Eggers were married in 2002 and were residents of North Dakota. They had three minor children. Kimberly filed for divorce in 2012. She worked until 2008, after which both parties agreed she would be a stay-at-home mother to their three children. She did not plan to return to work as a cosmetologist due to the cost of retraining/certification and a sensitivity to chemicals used in that profession. She expressed interest in seeking a college degree in American Sign Language. From 1998 until 2013, Timothy worked for Dakota Central Telecommunications installing phone, cable, and line services for homes and businesses. At the time of this appeal, he worked for Pinnacle West in Fargo. Kimberly's annual income when working was considerably less than Timothy's income. In 2009, both parties agreed to allow Kimberly to relocate their children from North Dakota to Ohio where her parents lived and could assist in child care. Over the next three years, she and the children would return to North Dakota and move back to Ohio several times. After filing for divorce, she requested and received consent from Timothy to move the children to Ohio. His understanding was the move would only last until the divorce was finalized. In 2013, the parties' home in Jamestown was sold and Timothy moved into an apartment in Minnesota with the intent of obtaining an apartment in North Dakota after the divorce. Kimberly, in her parenting plan, requested changing the children's residence from Ohio to North Carolina due to the planned move of her father. Timothy testified he had revoked his consent to the Ohio move and opposed the move to North Carolina. The district court awarded Kimberly primary residential responsibility of the children, ordered child support, and ordered spousal support to be used toward receiving a college degree. The district court declined to issue an order to change residence because Timothy lived outside of North Dakota and was not entitled to an order. On appeal, Timothy argued the district court erred in determining no court order was necessary to move the minor children to North Carolina, failed to apply the "Stout-Hawkinson" factors in this case, and in the award of spous View "Eggers v. Eggers" on Justia Law

The parties married in June 2004 and divorced in September 2011. After a trial, Svetlana Seay was awarded primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child and her seventeen-year-old son from a previous relationship, whom Darren Seay had adopted, and she was granted the right to move out of state with the children. However, the part of the judgment ordering that she may move out of state with the children without Darren Seay's consent or further order of the court was reversed by the Supreme Court. In February 2014, Svetlana Seay requested approval from the district court to relocate with the parties' minor child to Ohio to live with her new husband. Darren Seay opposed her motion and moved to modify residential responsibility, seeking an award of primary residential responsibility. Following a trial on both motions, the district court found there had been material changes in the parties' circumstances, namely Svetlana Seay's remarriage and her proposed move to Ohio. Because the court found the changes were "positive" and "not adverse to the child's best interests," it found it did "not need to further analyze the best interest factors" and instead, proceeded with an analysis of the Stout-Hawkinson relocation factors. The court granted Svetlana Seay's motion to move to Ohio with the child and denied Darren Seay's motion to modify primary residential responsibility. On appeal, Darren Seay argued the district court erred by neglecting to analyze the best interest factors before denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility. He did not argue that the district court erred in applying the Stout-Hawkinson relocation factors. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for findings on the best interest factors. View "Seay v. Seay" on Justia Law

Sandra Hoverson appealed an amended divorce judgment denying her motion to modify spousal support and parenting time, granting Carl Hoverson's motion to modify parenting time and to appoint a parenting coordinator, and granting Carl Hoverson's request for attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after a review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment. View "Hoverson v. Hoverson" on Justia Law

Nicholas Law appealed a district court amended judgment that awarded Danielle Whittet parenting time every alternating week and ordered Law to pay child support. The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed this case previously in "Law v. Whittet," 844 N.W.2d 885, concluding the district court's judgment was clearly erroneous and remanded with instructions to grant Law primary residential responsibility of the minor child and to consider limited parenting time for Whittet. Law argued the district court did not follow the Supreme Court's mandate in the prior case, and erred by not granting primary residential responsibility to Law. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with "Law v. Whittet," 844 N.W.2d 885. View "Law v. Whittet" on Justia Law