Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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Bradley and Tracy Jordet were divorced in 2010. Bradley was awarded primary residential responsibility for the parties' two children and Tracy was ordered to pay child support. Bradley was ordered to pay Tracy rehabilitative spousal support. Both parties fell into arrears on their financial obligations to each other. Bradley obtained an execution of judgment from the district court against Tracy directing the Cass County Sheriff to satisfy a $9,071.78 judgment for unpaid child support "out of the personal property of the judgment debtor within your County." Thereafter, the sheriff levied on Tracy's bank accounts. Bradley, accompanied by his attorney, Jonathan Garaas, and a Cass County deputy sheriff, went to the office of Tracy's attorney, the Brazil Law Office. Bradley gave the firm's office assistant a personal check, made payable to Tracy's attorney for $7,825.89 and marked "Back Spousal Support." The sheriff then delivered a notice of levy to the office assistant and took possession of the check. The notice of levy stated that claims for exemptions from process must be made within 10 days. Tracy did not claim any exemptions. Tracy objected to the notice of levy and sought an emergency hearing, asking the district court to hold Garaas in contempt "for attempting to circumvent" the earlier order denying the motion to allow a setoff. After a hearing, the court held Garaas in contempt for intentional disobedience of a court order and ordered that Garaas may purge the contempt by turning over the $7,825.89 check. The Cass County deputy sheriff submitted an execution return showing, after payment of fees, he had collected $8,290.30 for Tracy's child support obligation. A partial satisfaction of Bradley's child support judgment against Tracy in that amount was filed with the district court. Tracy initiated garnishment proceedings against Bradley to enforce the spousal support judgment, and his employer withheld funds from his paycheck. Tracy did not issue a satisfaction of judgment after Bradley gave the check for the full amount of the spousal support judgment to the Brazil Law Office. Bradley sent letters to Tracy and the Brazil Law Office requesting a satisfaction of judgment. Bradley and Garaas appealed from the order denying Bradley Jordet's motion to allow him to setoff the spousal support and child support arrearages and the order holding Garaas in contempt. While the appeal was pending, Bradley sued Tracy and the Brazil Law Office for abuse of process and conversion in a separate action. Bradley alleged he paid the judgment for the spousal support arrearages in full, Tracy refused to issue a satisfaction of judgment, the garnishment proceedings were improper, and his employer withdrew funds from his paycheck and paid the funds to the Brazil Law Office. All three parties moved for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court granted summary judgment to Tracy and the Brazil Law Office, dismissing Bradley's claims. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in dismissing the abuse of process claim but there were genuine issues of material fact related to Bradley's conversion claim. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the abuse of process claim, and reversed the dismissal of the conversion claim and remanded. View "Jordet v. Jordet" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The parties divorced in October 2011. Jill Hankey was awarded primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child, L.C.H., who was born in 2009, subject to Blake Hankey's right of parenting time, and the parties were awarded joint decision-making responsibility. In April 2014, Blake sought to modify residential responsibility, seeking primary residential responsibility for L.C.H. and requested an evidentiary hearing. Blake claimed there had been a material change in circumstances warranting modification, and in support of his motion, he submitted affidavits and other supporting evidence alleging Jill deliberately frustrated his parenting time, disregarded the parenting time schedule on several occasions, and exercised unilateral decision-making by taking the parties' child to occupational and play therapy without his knowledge or consent. Jill submitted counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence challenging Blake's allegations. The district court denied Blake's motion without an evidentiary hearing, determining he had failed to present a prima facie case justifying modification because he had "failed to show a material change of circumstances" and "failed to show that a modification of primary residential responsibility is in the best interest of LCH." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding Blake established a prima facie case for modification, warranting an evidentiary hearing. View "Hankey v. Hankey" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Timothy Eggers and Kimberly Eggers were married in 2002 and were residents of North Dakota. They had three minor children. Kimberly filed for divorce in 2012. She worked until 2008, after which both parties agreed she would be a stay-at-home mother to their three children. She did not plan to return to work as a cosmetologist due to the cost of retraining/certification and a sensitivity to chemicals used in that profession. She expressed interest in seeking a college degree in American Sign Language. From 1998 until 2013, Timothy worked for Dakota Central Telecommunications installing phone, cable, and line services for homes and businesses. At the time of this appeal, he worked for Pinnacle West in Fargo. Kimberly's annual income when working was considerably less than Timothy's income. In 2009, both parties agreed to allow Kimberly to relocate their children from North Dakota to Ohio where her parents lived and could assist in child care. Over the next three years, she and the children would return to North Dakota and move back to Ohio several times. After filing for divorce, she requested and received consent from Timothy to move the children to Ohio. His understanding was the move would only last until the divorce was finalized. In 2013, the parties' home in Jamestown was sold and Timothy moved into an apartment in Minnesota with the intent of obtaining an apartment in North Dakota after the divorce. Kimberly, in her parenting plan, requested changing the children's residence from Ohio to North Carolina due to the planned move of her father. Timothy testified he had revoked his consent to the Ohio move and opposed the move to North Carolina. The district court awarded Kimberly primary residential responsibility of the children, ordered child support, and ordered spousal support to be used toward receiving a college degree. The district court declined to issue an order to change residence because Timothy lived outside of North Dakota and was not entitled to an order. On appeal, Timothy argued the district court erred in determining no court order was necessary to move the minor children to North Carolina, failed to apply the "Stout-Hawkinson" factors in this case, and in the award of spous View "Eggers v. Eggers" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The parties married in June 2004 and divorced in September 2011. After a trial, Svetlana Seay was awarded primary residential responsibility of the parties' minor child and her seventeen-year-old son from a previous relationship, whom Darren Seay had adopted, and she was granted the right to move out of state with the children. However, the part of the judgment ordering that she may move out of state with the children without Darren Seay's consent or further order of the court was reversed by the Supreme Court. In February 2014, Svetlana Seay requested approval from the district court to relocate with the parties' minor child to Ohio to live with her new husband. Darren Seay opposed her motion and moved to modify residential responsibility, seeking an award of primary residential responsibility. Following a trial on both motions, the district court found there had been material changes in the parties' circumstances, namely Svetlana Seay's remarriage and her proposed move to Ohio. Because the court found the changes were "positive" and "not adverse to the child's best interests," it found it did "not need to further analyze the best interest factors" and instead, proceeded with an analysis of the Stout-Hawkinson relocation factors. The court granted Svetlana Seay's motion to move to Ohio with the child and denied Darren Seay's motion to modify primary residential responsibility. On appeal, Darren Seay argued the district court erred by neglecting to analyze the best interest factors before denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility. He did not argue that the district court erred in applying the Stout-Hawkinson relocation factors. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for findings on the best interest factors. View "Seay v. Seay" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Sandra Hoverson appealed an amended divorce judgment denying her motion to modify spousal support and parenting time, granting Carl Hoverson's motion to modify parenting time and to appoint a parenting coordinator, and granting Carl Hoverson's request for attorney fees. Finding no reversible error after a review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court affirmed the amended judgment. View "Hoverson v. Hoverson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Nicholas Law appealed a district court amended judgment that awarded Danielle Whittet parenting time every alternating week and ordered Law to pay child support. The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed this case previously in "Law v. Whittet," 844 N.W.2d 885, concluding the district court's judgment was clearly erroneous and remanded with instructions to grant Law primary residential responsibility of the minor child and to consider limited parenting time for Whittet. Law argued the district court did not follow the Supreme Court's mandate in the prior case, and erred by not granting primary residential responsibility to Law. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with "Law v. Whittet," 844 N.W.2d 885. View "Law v. Whittet" on Justia Law

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Justin Combs and Lisa Combs were in the midst of a divorce. Dallas Lund was dating Lisa. In the early hours of March 23, 2014, Lisa had an argument with one of her children at the Combs' residence. The argument became physical, and Lisa called Lund, asking him to come over to help her. On March 27, 2014, Justin Combs and the Combs' children filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Lund. The district court granted a temporary order and set a hearing. According to the children's testimony, Lund used physical force with one or more of the Combs' children. Lisa and Lund testified that Lund did not. The children testified they were afraid of Lund. Lund appealed the district court order granting Justin and the children a disorderly conduct restraining order against him. Lund argued the district court failed to make the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law under required by statute. Lund also argued the district court abused its discretion in issuing the order because the order improperly created a right of review or modification in a divorce proceeding to which Lund was not a party. We reverse and remand. The Supreme Court found Lund's arguments persuasive. It reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Combs v. Lund" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Mervyn Mertz appeals from a district court divorce judgment distributing marital assets and debts and ordering him to pay spousal support. He argues the district court erroneously awarded permanent spousal support and the district court's division of assets and debts is clearly erroneous. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: the district court only found that Darlene Mertz was a disadvantaged spouse, without analysis under the "Ruff-Fischer" guidelines. The district court also awarded spousal support in excess of the amount requested. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the district court's findings were inadequate and it misapplied the law. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the spousal support and property distribution issues. View "Mertz v. Mertz" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Glenvin Albrecht sued Sharleen Albrecht for a divorce in February 2010, after nearly 50 years of marriage. After an evidentiary hearing in October 2012, a "judgment" was filed on October 19, 2012, "order[ing], adjudg[ing] and decree[ing]" that each party was entitled to a divorce from the other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and reserving disposition of all property issues for further proceedings. After another evidentiary hearing in March 2013, the district court issued a memorandum opinion on August 2, 2013, stating Sharleen Albrecht had died after the March 2013 hearing and distributing the parties' marital property equally. The court awarded Sharleen Albrecht assets valued at $702,290 and Glenvin Albrecht assets valued at $2,333,248, and ordered him to pay her $815,479 to equalize the property distribution. The court also awarded each party half of the proceeds from the sale of corn and soybeans and half of future payments from Sharleen Albrecht's two pensions, payable in a qualified domestic relations order. The court explained the marriage was long-term and none of the Ruff-Fischer guidelines established any reason to distribute the marital property unequally. The court issued a subsequent order substituting Sharleen Albrecht's estate as a party in the divorce action and denying Glenvin Albrecht's motion for clarification of the award of proceeds from the corn and soybeans and the date of division of Sharleen Albrecht's pensions. Glenvin Albrecht appealed the judgment distributing the parties' marital property, substituting his ex-wife's estate in place of his ex-wife. Upon review of the matter, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the death of Sharleen Albrecht before entry of a final judgment abated the divorce action. The holding was reversed and the case remanded for dismissal of the divorce action. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Gardell Frey married Elizabeth Wonser (previously Frey) in 2003 and the parties divorced in 2008. Based on a settlement agreement between the parties, Wonser was awarded primary residential responsibility of the parties' two children, A.H.F., born in 2003, and A.E.F., born in 2007. After the divorce, Wonser and the children continued to live in Mott. In January 2011, Wonser moved with A.E.F. to Alvarado, Minnesota. A.H.F. stayed in Mott and moved in with Frey in order to finish the school year. In July 2011, Frey moved to modify primary residential responsibility. An interim hearing was held in October 2011. The court issued an interim order granting temporary primary residential responsibility to Frey and parenting time to Wonser. On August 24, 2012, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Frey's motion to modify primary residential responsibility. The district court denied Frey's motion, concluding evidence did not support finding a material change in circumstances to allow modification of primary residential responsibility. Frey appealed the district court's decision. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not clearly err in determining modification was not necessary to serve the best interests of the children and did not abuse its discretion in denying back interim child support. View "Frey v. Frey" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law