Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Larry Gronland and Linda Gronland (now Coleman), married in 1971 and divorced in 1994. The district court originally awarded Linda Gronland spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month until her death, remarriage, or when Larry began drawing Social Security, whichever occurred first. In March 2014, Linda made a motion to modify the amended judgment under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1. Larry moved to dismiss the motion, contending the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the support award because a court's jurisdiction to modify a support award was limited to ongoing support awards. Larry argued no support award was ongoing at the time of the motion because the support award terminated as of January 1, 2014, the date on which he started drawing Social Security. The court dismissed the motion for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue presented on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify a spousal support award that terminated prior to Linda filing her motion to modify the award. Linda argued the district court erred in holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that she never received actual notice that Larry began drawing Social Security. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Gronland v. Gronland" on Justia Law

Six months after the divorce judgment giving Jason Capes primary residential responsibility, Jennifer Capes (now Novak), filed for substantial changes in parenting time and decision-making authority, which were granted by a different judge. Jason appealed the amended divorce judgment. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court's finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred since entry of the divorce judgment was clearly erroneous, it reversed the amended judgment and remanded to the court for entry of an amended judgment incorporating the parties' July 2014 stipulation into the original May 2013 judgment. View "Capes v. Capes" on Justia Law

In 2012, Mary Ann Klein brought an action for divorce. Wesley Klein and Mary Ann Klein were married for 31 years and had nine children together, three of whom were still minors. Mary Ann was 52 and Wesley was 53 years of age at the time of the divorce proceedings. Mary Ann appealed the trial court's award of spousal and child support. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in its award of spousal support, but concluded the court erred in calculating Wesley's income for child support purposes. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Klein v. Klein" on Justia Law

G.L. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights. He argued the juvenile court erred by declaring him in default, finding the conditions and causes of the child's deprivation were likely to continue, and determining the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") did not apply. M.R., the child at issue, was placed in the custody of social services due to concerns that her mother was unfit to care for her. After the child was placed into custody, a social services employee petitioned for termination of parental rights. The petition stated that paternity had not been confirmed, but it noted an individual named V.G. could be the father. It was subsequently established that V.G. was not the father. G.L. then came forward claiming to be the father, but his paternity was never confirmed by biological testing. At a hearing on the petition, M.R.'s mother appeared and stated she desired to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. In an interim order, the juvenile court noted ICWA might apply because G.L. was a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe. The juvenile court then sent notices of the right to intervene to the tribe. In response, Spirit Lake Tribal Social Services sent a letter stating that, after reviewing the case, the tribal court and the ICWA director "would support the current Termination of Parental Rights in order to establish permanency for [M.R.]." Noting G.L. had refused paternity testing, the tribe indicated it would not intervene unless there was biological proof G.L. was M.R.'s father. At the hearing on termination of parental rights, G.L.'s counsel was present, but G.L. failed to appear. His counsel requested a continuance so G.L. could be present; the court denied the motion. G.L.'s attorney told the court he had recently learned that G.L. was incarcerated in Minnesota. The court then took a recess to allow G.L.'s attorney to contact G.L. to determine whether he could appear by telephone. After the recess, G.L.'s attorney informed the court that he chose not to attempt to contact G.L. "based on all the conversations [he] had previously with [G.L.]." The hearing then proceeded in G.L.'s absence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err when it terminated G.L.'s parental rights, and it affirmed the order. View "Interest of M.R." on Justia Law

Damon Grigg appealed a district court order denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility. Grigg and Dusty Lemke (formerly Grigg) were divorced in 2010. The district court awarded primary residential responsibility of the couple's three children to Lemke, reasonable parenting time to Grigg, and joint decision-making to both parties. Shortly after the divorce was final, Lemke and the children moved from Bottineau to live with her father and stepmother in Cando. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding Grigg established a prima facie case for modification warranting an evidentiary hearing. View "Grigg v. Grigg" on Justia Law

LaTanya Gabaldon, formerly known as LaTanya Gabaldon-Cochran, appealed a district court judgment granting her a divorce from Jeremy Cochran. Gabaldon argued the court's property distribution was not equitable, the court erred in awarding Cochran a cash payment as part of the property distribution and the court failed to include all of her educational debt in the marital estate. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gabaldon-Cochran v. Cochran" on Justia Law

B.K.J. appealed a district court order appointing J.W. and Guardian and Protective Services, Inc. ("G.A.P.S"), as her co-guardians. B.K.J.'s niece, J.W., petitioned for the appointment of a guardian and a conservator on grounds B.K.J. suffered mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease and dementia and had shown decline in her ability to care for herself and her finances. Particularly, J.W. asserted B.K.J. had over $600,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties and had allegedly been taken advantage of monetarily by certain friends and family members. After a hearing for emergency guardianship, the district court appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as emergency co-guardians to B.K.J. pending further hearing. The district court appointed a physician and a visitor to examine B.K.J., and an attorney to represent B.K.J. as guardian ad litem. A hearing was held on the petition. At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that a guardianship was necessary for B.K.J., and that she did not oppose the appointment of First International Bank as her conservator. The court-appointed physician, the court-appointed visitor, B.K.J.'s guardian ad litem, and others testified regarding the extent of B.K.J.'s incapacity, the necessity of a guardian, and who should be appointed as B.K.J.'s guardian. B.K.J. testified that she did not want J.W. appointed as her guardian and nominated two of her friends, F.C. and T.C., to be appointed as her co-guardians. The district court appointed First International Bank as B.K.J.'s conservator and appointed J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians, concluding the evidence established they were the proper and best qualified persons to serve as her guardians and represent the best interests of B.K.J. B.K.J. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing J.W. and G.A.P.S. as B.K.J.'s co-guardians. View "Guardianship/Conservatorship of B.K.J." on Justia Law

Andrew Votava appealed a district court order that denied his request to hold Kelly Votava in contempt and modified his parenting time. Upon review of the specific facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to find Kelly Votava in contempt, but the Court concluded the court erred in modifying Andrew Votava's parenting time without a motion or notice. View "Votava v. Votava" on Justia Law

The parties were married in August 2009 when Kevin Fugere was 51 years old and Marie Fugere was 46 years old, and they lived on a ranch Kevin owned. According to Kevin Fugere, his net worth at the time of the marriage exceeded $3 million, consisting mainly of the ranch which he had operated since 1981. Marie Fugere, having recently completed bankruptcy, brought to the marriage her Post Office Thrift Savings Account worth approximately $100,000 and some personal property. Marie Fugere eventually quit her job as postmaster, assisted with the ranch work, and did most of the household chores. She had emotional problems and drank excessively during the marriage. She attempted suicide on two occasions and spent time at a treatment facility in Grand Forks. Following a quarrel with Kevin Fugere after Christmas 2012, Marie Fugere left the ranch in early January 2013. Kevin Fugere filed for divorce shortly thereafter. Marie Fugere appealed the judgment of divorce, the division their marital estate, and her award of rehabilitative spousal support. Because the district court's property distribution from this marriage was not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fugere v. Fugere" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1992 and divorced in 2012. Under the divorce judgment, the parties were awarded joint decision making for their two minor children, and Brenda Schiele was awarded primary residential responsibility. At the time the divorce judgment was entered, neither party had residential responsibility for their youngest child, C.B.S., as he was in the custody of the State and resided at the Jamestown State Hospital, and the divorce judgment did not provide a child support obligation for C.B.S. In spring 2013, C.B.S. was admitted into the Life Skills and Transition Center in Grafton; Cass County Social Services closed its case, and returned residential responsibility of C.B.S. to the parties, "per the terms of [their] divorce decree." In October 2013, Brenda Schiele moved to establish or modify child support for C.B.S. No written order was issued after the hearing on the motion, but the district court orally ruled Bradley Schiele had an obligation to pay child support. Bradley Schiele moved for relief from the judgment, or alternatively, to amend the judgment, requesting the parties' divorce judgment be amended to provide that neither party be awarded primary residential responsibility of C.B.S. because the child did not live with either party. The referee denied the motion because it was untimely and found Bradley Schiele had not alleged facts to support modifying residential responsibility. Bradley Schiele filed a request for review of the referee's decision, and the district court affirmed. The district court remanded the matter to the referee for a determination of child support, and a second amended divorce judgment was entered. On appeal, Bradley Schiele argued the district court erred in ruling he had an obligation to pay child support while C.B.S. was not living in either party's home and erred in determining he was not entitled to an offset of his child support obligation for benefits paid on behalf of C.B.S. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in ordering Bradley Schiele to pay child support and did not err in failing to offset the child support obligation based on the benefits the child receives. View "Schiele v. Schiele" on Justia Law