Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three children were removed multiple times from the home of their parents, S.S. and T.C., due to concerns about drug use and domestic violence. Initially, two children were removed in 2018, and all three children were subsequently placed in and out of care between 2018 and 2023. After a guardianship arrangement expired in 2023, law enforcement again found evidence of drug use in S.S.’s home, leading to another removal of the children in early 2024. The children were placed in the care of the Mountrail McKenzie Human Service Zone (MMHSZ).The State petitioned in 2025 to terminate the parental rights of both S.S. and T.C. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, found that the children were in need of protection and had been in care for the statutory number of nights required under North Dakota law. The juvenile court issued an order terminating S.S.’s parental rights. S.S. appealed, arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not making a specific finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify him with his children.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that, under the relevant statutes, a specific finding on reasonable efforts to reunify is not required at the time of termination of parental rights when the statutory criteria of need for protection and number of nights in care are met. The court further concluded that the juvenile court’s findings demonstrated sufficient consideration of the efforts made by social services and that its decision to terminate S.S.’s parental rights was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order. View "Interest of W.S." on Justia Law

A dispute arose concerning the residential responsibility and decision-making authority for a young child, M.R.M.-B., born to two unmarried parents, Monkman and Binney. After an incident in which Monkman withheld the child from Binney and the child was found with bruising and signs of neglect, Cass County Human Service Zone removed the child from both parents and placed her with the Hackmanns, who served as foster parents for approximately two years. Following the juvenile court’s decision to return the child to her parents, the Hackmanns sought to intervene and obtain residential responsibility, asserting they were psychological parents. Meanwhile, Binney and Monkman filed competing motions regarding residential responsibility and support.The District Court of Cass County first denied, then later granted, the Hackmanns’ motion to intervene, determining that the Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act (N.D.C.C. ch. 14-09.4) was not the exclusive means for nonparents to seek custody, and that an equitable claim as psychological parents was cognizable. After hearings, the district court awarded the Hackmanns primary residential responsibility and sole decision-making authority for the child, subject to Monkman’s supervised parenting time and Binney’s unsupervised time. Monkman appealed, challenging the award to the Hackmanns, the restriction on his parenting time, and the calculation of child support.The Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that, under N.D.C.C. § 14-09.4-02(3), a nonparent whose relationship with a child is based solely on foster parent status may not be found to be a psychological parent. It found the Hackmanns’ relationship with M.R.M.-B. was solely as foster parents and that the district court’s finding to the contrary was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the amended judgment, denied the Hackmanns’ request for attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Interest of M.R.M." on Justia Law

B.S. filed a petition for a domestic violence protection order against Carlos Lopez-Rangel on behalf of herself and the parties’ two minor children, alleging that Lopez-Rangel sexually assaulted her in her home. B.S. provided testimony and physical evidence of the alleged assaults, including medical findings and photographs of injuries. She also noted that the children were present in the home during the incidents but did not know if they were awake or aware of what had occurred. At the time, Lopez-Rangel faced related criminal charges, and no-contact orders were in place to protect B.S. and the children.The District Court of Dunn County, Southwest Judicial District, first issued a temporary protection order, then, after a hearing, entered a domestic violence protection order in favor of B.S. and the two minor children, with the order designated to last for an unlimited duration. The district court found that domestic violence had been committed against B.S. but made no specific findings of harm or imminent harm to the children. Lopez-Rangel appealed, contesting the inclusion of his children as protected parties and challenging the unlimited duration of the order.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed the case. It held that there was sufficient evidence to support B.S.'s inclusion as a protected party, affirming that portion of the order. However, the court found no evidence of domestic violence directed at or witnessed by the children and therefore reversed their inclusion as protected parties. The court also found the district court abused its discretion by imposing an unlimited duration without sufficient findings, reversed that portion, and remanded for the district court to set a reasonable duration supported by specific findings. View "B.S. v. Lopez-Rangel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parents, Khilyn Craig and Dwayne Vormestrand, over the primary residential responsibility for their minor child. Initially, both parties agreed to share equal residential responsibility, with a provision that Craig would gain primary responsibility and could relocate once the child reached school age. Over time, both parties failed to adhere to the parenting schedule, leading to court admonishments. In 2024, Craig relocated to Texas with the child before the court ruled on her motion to enforce the automatic modification provision. Both parties subsequently filed motions seeking primary residential responsibility.The District Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, held a hearing in December 2024, where Craig represented herself. After hearing testimony from both parties and other witnesses, the court awarded Vormestrand primary residential responsibility in an amended judgment. Craig then moved for a new trial or reconsideration, arguing that there were procedural irregularities, insufficient evidence, and that the decision was against the law. The District Court denied her motion, concluding it had properly considered all relevant factors, especially Craig’s conduct in withholding the child and relocating without court approval.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying a new trial or reconsideration. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, the Supreme Court held that, despite a minor misinterpretation of the statutory domestic violence factor, the error was harmless because the District Court did not find credible evidence of domestic violence. The Supreme Court concluded the District Court’s findings were supported by the record, it gave proper weight to the parties’ conduct, and no procedural irregularities warranted a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed both the amended judgment awarding Vormestrand primary residential responsibility and the order denying a new trial or reconsideration. View "Vormestrand v. Craig" on Justia Law

Richard Marschner and Roxane Marschner divorced in 2016 after reaching a settlement agreement dividing their marital property. Richard received a lump sum from Roxane’s retirement account, and Roxane was to receive a portion of Richard’s Army National Guard pension and Federal Employees’ Retirement System benefits upon his retirement. The divorce judgment included provisions that if Richard took action to prevent or reduce Roxane’s share of his military retirement pay—including by waiving retirement pay in favor of disability pay—he would be required to indemnify Roxane. Both parties waived spousal support in the original settlement.After Richard was separated from the National Guard for medical reasons, he began receiving military disability retired pay and waived all his retirement pay. When Roxane attempted to collect her share, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service denied her request, stating that disability pay was not divisible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act. Roxane then sought an amended judgment or redistribution of the marital estate from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District. The district court awarded Roxane spousal support equivalent to her lost share of Richard’s retirement pay, relying on the indemnification provision and reasoning that federal law did not prevent enforcement of the parties’ agreement.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether federal law preempts enforcement of the indemnification provision. The court held that federal law, as interpreted in Howell v. Howell, prohibits state courts from dividing military disability retired pay or enforcing indemnification provisions, even if contractually agreed upon. The district court’s award of spousal support was deemed an impermissible division of disability pay. The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the amended judgment. View "Marschner v. Marschner" on Justia Law

The parties in this case have two minor children. Following their divorce in 2018, the mother was awarded primary residential responsibility based on agreement, and the father received limited parenting time. In February 2021, the father sought primary residential responsibility, leading to the appointment of a parenting investigator and subsequent hearings. Ultimately, the district court awarded equal residential responsibility, but after appellate review, the judgment was reversed due to insufficient findings. In February 2024, the father again moved for increased parenting time, which led to another evidentiary hearing. During this hearing, the court conducted an in chambers interview with one child over the mother’s objection and considered evidence from a prior parenting investigator’s report.The District Court of McLean County, South Central Judicial District, initially denied the father’s request for primary residential responsibility but granted an evidentiary hearing to consider modifying parenting time. After the hearing, the court found sufficient grounds for modification based on the mother’s interference with the parenting plan, the children’s desire to spend more time with their father, and uncertain exchange times. The court ordered increased parenting time for the father. The mother objected to the in chambers interview and the use of the parenting investigator’s report, arguing procedural errors and lack of proper notice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s finding that a material change in circumstances justified modifying parenting time. However, it reversed the district court’s actions in conducting an in chambers interview without both parents’ consent and considering the parenting investigator’s report without notice and opportunity for cross-examination. The Supreme Court held that both errors were not harmless and remanded for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct a new best interests analysis without considering the improperly admitted evidence, or to hold a supplemental evidentiary hearing if requested. View "Goetz v. Goetz" on Justia Law

The parties, following their divorce, entered into a stipulated judgment that set out how they would share expenses for their three children, including extracurricular activities, school events, and medical costs. The judgment required equal sharing for listed traditional activities, certain forms of communication about new or related expenses, and equal division of out-of-pocket medical expenses. Communication provisions specified that if a question was posed through their shared application and no response was received within five days, consent was presumed.After the judgment, the plaintiff moved the District Court of Stutsman County to hold the defendant in contempt for failing to pay his share of these expenses. The court found the defendant in contempt, rejecting his arguments about the form of communication required and about whether certain expenses were his responsibility. The court held line-by-line hearings on the expenses, found the plaintiff had met her burden for most items, and awarded remedial sanctions and attorney’s fees. This included some expenses that had not been previously submitted to the defendant, some for which there was no clear obligation under the judgment, and mileage for transporting children to therapy. The defendant appealed, also arguing that the plaintiff’s motion was frivolous and that he was entitled to his own attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the defendant in contempt. However, it reversed the award of remedial sanctions and attorney’s fees in part, finding that some sanctions were for expenses already paid, not required under the judgment, or not properly supported by findings. It remanded for further proceedings to recalculate the proper amount of sanctions and attorney’s fees. The District Court’s order was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Bedgar v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the primary residential responsibility and parenting time for a child born in 2024 to two unmarried parents. The father sought an interim order for custody, and after several reschedulings, a hearing was held where only the father's counsel and the mother's attorney appeared; the mother herself was absent. Subsequently, the court granted the father primary residential responsibility and gave the mother supervised parenting time. The mother’s attorney later withdrew, and the court set further hearings, but it was unclear if the mother received proper notice of these dates.When the mother failed to appear at the scheduled pretrial conference, the District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, sanctioned her by barring her from presenting any evidence at trial, except regarding her income for child support purposes. At trial, she appeared without counsel and was only allowed to testify about her income, while the father and his mother provided testimony on other issues. The district court then entered judgment awarding primary residential responsibility to the father, continuing supervised parenting time for the mother, and ordering her to pay child support. The mother appealed, arguing she was denied due process due to improper service and that the sanction was excessive.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case. It declined to address the mother’s due process arguments, finding her appellate briefs did not comply with procedural rules. However, it held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an evidentiary sanction that prevented the court from considering evidence relevant to the child’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the monetary sanction for attorney’s fees but reversed the evidentiary sanction, remanding for a new trial where sanctions, if imposed, must not interfere with the court’s ability to evaluate the child’s best interests. View "Kostelecky v. Erickson" on Justia Law

A 76-year-old man petitioned to adopt a 40-year-old woman whom he had known for six years. The parties participated in evidentiary hearings, and a court-appointed investigator prepared a report. Testimony revealed inconsistencies regarding the stated purpose of the adoption, particularly concerning the petitioner’s claim that the adoption would allow the adoptee to care for him, despite evidence that the adoptee’s health issues prevented her from working. The court also noted that the adoptee was unaware adoption would sever her legal relationship with her mother, with whom she lived and received financial support. Additionally, concerns arose regarding the petitioner’s mild cognitive impairment and unaccounted trust distributions.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the petition and evidence. The court found that the adoption was not in the best interests of the adoptee, considering the potential negative impact on her relationship with her biological mother, possible contentious inheritance issues, and inconsistencies in the petitioner’s stated goals. The court also considered the medical evidence and concluded the doctor’s report did not sufficiently address the petitioner’s cognitive capacity or awareness of the adoption’s implications. Based on these findings, the court denied the adoption petition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota applied the clearly erroneous standard to the district court’s factual findings and reviewed the denial of the adoption decree for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, nor did the court abuse its discretion or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the adoption petition. View "In re Adoption of K.J.K." on Justia Law

A father with a high monthly income was ordered to pay $5,000 per month in child support for his minor child, which included a $1,500 upward deviation above the presumptive guideline amount. The deviation was based on the child’s significant disabling conditions and the father’s substantial income and assets. In addition, the father was required to maintain a $750,000 life insurance policy to secure his child support obligation. The mother documented considerable ongoing expenses for the child’s developmental and medical needs, including frequent travel for therapy and care. The District Court of Eddy County initially entered this support order, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found the lower court’s findings insufficient to support the upward deviation and remanded for more explicit findings and reconsideration of the life insurance amount. On remand, the district court provided additional findings, detailing the child’s medical needs, the family’s prior standard of living, and specific expenses justifying the deviation. The court again found the deviation in the child’s best interest due to her lifelong health conditions and the desire for her to maintain a standard of living similar to that before the divorce. The court attributed $750 per month to the child’s medical needs and $750 per month to maintaining her standard of living, and reinstated the $750,000 life insurance requirement. Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the district court’s findings were explicit and supported by evidence. The court affirmed that the upward deviation in child support and the life insurance requirement were in the child’s best interest and not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Kingstone v. Kingstone" on Justia Law