Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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A law enforcement officer with the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force sought and obtained a search warrant to search a residence. In his affidavit in support of the warrant, the officer stated he received information from a University of North Dakota college student that Nathe and unknown counterparts were part of a drug trafficking organization in the Grand Forks area that distributed marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, ecstasy, MDMA, DMT and other types of research chemicals. As part of the investigation, the Task Force conducted a garbage pull at the residence. During the garbage pull, the Task Force found a paystub containing identifying information for Nathe and a receipt from Jimmy Johns with the name and phone number of another individual, along with items containing marijuana residue. Finding probable cause existed, the magistrate issued a search warrant. Evan Taylor resided in the searched residence, and was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The information was later amended, to charge Taylor with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Taylor moved to suppress the evidence found in his bedroom, arguing law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Particularly, he asserted law enforcement violated his reasonable expectation of privacy by searching his private bedroom without a separate warrant. The district court entered a memorandum decision and order granting Taylor's motion to suppress evidence, concluding the evidence found in Taylor's bedroom was not lawfully seized under the search warrant because Taylor was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and no exigent circumstances existed which would have justified entering Taylor's bedroom without a search warrant. The State appealed. After reviewed, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting Taylor's motion to suppress evidence found inside his bedroom and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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Matthew Jasmann appealed a judgment entered on a jury's verdict finding him guilty of gross sexual imposition. According to trial testimony, Jasmann met some family and friends at a local bar. While at the bar, Jasmann met A.W. who was with one of Jasmann's relatives. When the bar was about to close, some of the individuals, including Jasmann and A.W., went to the apartment where Jasmann was spending the night, to have a party. After a few hours, everyone had left the apartment, except for Jasmann, A.W., and two other individuals. The two other individuals slept in a bedroom of the apartment. Jasmann and A.W. slept in the living room. A.W. testified she fell asleep and awoke to Jasmann having sexual intercourse with her. The next day, A.W. reported to police that she had been sexually assaulted. A.W. made a phone call to Jasmann, which was recorded by law enforcement, to discuss the incident with him. The next day police interviewed Jasmann about the incident. According to the transcript of this interview that was read into evidence at trial, Jasmann claims A.W. was awake and initiated the sexual contact, however, Jasmann denied sexual intercourse occurred. Jasmann was charged with gross sexual imposition. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding: (1) the State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the failure of the district court to give a cautionary instruction did not amount to obvious error; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "North Dakota v. Jasmann" on Justia Law

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On November 21, 2013, a Stark County deputy sheriff pulled over Kyle Baxter's vehicle in Dickinson after observing the vehicle with frost on the windshield weaving, being driven in the opposite lane of traffic, and almost hitting the curb. The deputy noticed a very strong odor of alcohol on Baxter and that he was lethargic and slow to respond to questions. After Baxter failed a field sobriety test, the HGN test in which he "[s]cored six out of the possible six clues," the officer read him the implied consent advisory and asked him to take an onsite screening test with an Intoximeter. Baxter refused. The deputy placed Baxter under arrest, took him to the law enforcement center, again read him the advisory, and asked him to take a chemical test. Baxter again refused. Baxter appealed his conviction entered on a conditional plea of guilty to refusal to submit to an onsite screening or chemical test. Because the Supreme Court concluded the criminal refusal statutes did not violate Baxter's rights under the Fourth Amendment and N.D. Const. art. I, section 8, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, or the due process clause, the Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Baxter" on Justia Law

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In January 2004, Garron Gonzalez pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition, both class A felonies. He was sentenced to five years' incarceration, with all but 130 days suspended for five years, and five years' supervised probation. In November 2004, the State petitioned to revoke Gonzalez's probation. After a hearing, the district court revoked probation and entered an amended criminal judgment, resentencing Gonzalez to five years incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, with all but 30 months suspended for five years, credit given for time served, and five years of supervised probation. The court also ordered Gonzalez's probation subject to certain rules and conditions, including he submit to a search of his vehicle or place of residence by any probation officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant; he not have unsupervised contact with minor females under the age of 18; he not purchase, possess, or use sexually stimulating materials of any kind; he not use 900 telephone numbers; and he not date or socialize with anyone who has children under the age of 18. In December 2010, Gonzalez's probation officer received information from the Mandan Police that Gonzalez was being investigated for contact with a minor. The probation officer and other law enforcement officers searched Gonzalez's residence and vehicle. During the search, the officers found two smartphone cellular phones, which were searched. The probation officer found evidence Gonzalez violated the conditions of his probation, and Gonzalez was resentenced to twenty years incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, with credit for time served Gonzalez argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his cell phones exceeded the scope of an authorized probation search, was not reasonable, and violated the Fourth Amendment. Concluding that the search was a valid probationary search, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

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In October 2013, McKenzie County Deputy Sheriff Travis Bateman stopped defendant Michael Filkowski's vehicle after he observed the vehicle weave, leave the roadway on a curve and cross over the center line and into the lane for oncoming traffic. When Bateman approached the vehicle, he observed an odor of alcohol, noted defendant had bloodshot watery eyes and slurred speech. Highway Patrol Trooper Chelsey Schatz arrived at the scene of the stop and took over the investigation. Schatz noticed an odor of alcohol and defendant's speech was mumbled and slurred. Defendant failed the field sobriety tests, and later agreed to take an onsite screening test. Defendant would ultimately be arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and was informed of the implied consent advisory. He agreed to take a chemical blood test. A blood sample was collected and submitted to the state crime laboratory. Defendant requested an administrative hearing, arguing the Department did not have jurisdiction to suspend his license because a portion of Form 104, the blood collection and submission form, was not forwarded to the Department's director. Defendant also objected to the admission of the analytical report of the blood test because it used the word "ethanol," which did not comply with the statute defining alcohol concentration. He also claimed the Department failed to show the approved method for conducting blood analysis was used and no evidence showed who performed the blood-alcohol analysis. The hearing officer admitted the analytical report and foundational documents and suspended defendant's license for 91 days. Defendant appealed and the district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department had authority to suspend defendant's driving privileges and the hearing officer did not err in admitting the analytical report containing the results of defendant's blood test. View "Filkowski v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

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In 2008, Randy Holkesvig was charged with stalking, a class A misdemeanor, and with violation of a disorderly conduct restraining order, another class A misdemeanor. In June 2008, Holkesvig pleaded guilty to the stalking charge, and the other charge was dismissed. Holkesvig received a two-year deferred imposition of sentence, which he completed. In 2011, Holkesvig applied for postconviction relief which the district court denied, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed on appeal. Since pleading guilty, Holkesvig engaged in extensive, unsuccessful and frivolous civil litigation against various parties, alleging wrongdoing in the criminal investigation and prosecution. He appealed a district court order denying his various postconviction motions in these criminal cases and an order barring him from filing any further motions or pleadings at the district court level in these cases. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's order denying his motions because the district court did not abuse its discretion and because his appeal was frivolous. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the separate order enjoining Holkesvig from further filings in these criminal cases, as modified to comport with N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1. View "North Dakota v. Holkesvig" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2005, David Moe was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession with intent to manufacture psilocybin, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. Moe appealed a district court order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. He argued the district court erred in applying the statute of limitations and dismissing his application because the State waived the statute of limitations defense and a statutory exception applied to the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moe v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

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Respondent-appellant Garrett Loy was convicted in 2004 of gross sexual imposition. In 2005, Loy pleaded guilty to a separate charge of gross sexual imposition and his probation from his 2004 conviction was revoked. Loy was sentenced to ten years in custody with five years suspended for the 2004 conviction, and sentenced to ten years in custody with five years suspended for the 2005 conviction, to be served consecutively. Loy was also required to complete the Intensive Sex Addiction Treatment Program. Loy appealed the order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Matter of Loy" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2012, a jury found Leron Howard guilty of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Howard appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts and the district court erred by using a multi-county jury pool and denying his pre-trial motion for change of venue. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. In January 2014, Howard filed his own verified application for post-conviction relief on numerous grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and an "unconstitutionally selected and impaneled jury." The State answered and moved to summarily dismiss Howard's application because he failed to provide support for any of his allegations. In February, before the district court had acted on the State's motion for summary dismissal, Howard filed a second verified application for post-conviction relief, providing greater detail in support of his claims. Howard was then assigned court-appointed counsel. In March, the State answered Howard's second post-conviction application and once again moved for summary dismissal. The district court issued a scheduling order directing the State to file a motion for summary disposition. In April, one day before the State's third motion for summary disposition, Howard supplemented his post-conviction application. The supplemental filing restated the claims in his application in greater detail, with no references to the record or other competent evidence. The next day, the State moved for summary disposition again, arguing Howard had failed to provide admissible evidentiary support for his allegations. In June, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the State's motion for summary disposition. Howard appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Howard failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. View "Howard v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

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According to the administrative hearing testimony, a Bismarck police officer stopped appellant Richard Keller for driving over a lane-dividing line. The officer detected the odor of alcohol, and Keller admitted he had been drinking. After failing to complete a field sobriety test, Keller submitted to and failed an onsite breath test and was arrested. The officer transported Keller to the police department for chemical testing, and Keller blew into the Intoxilyzer machine providing only one adequate breath sample for the machine to read and would not or could not provide a second breath sample. The officer prematurely terminated the test sequence before the machine timed itself out. Keller appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges. Keller argued on appeal that the Department failed to show scrupulous compliance with the approved method for administering the Intoxilyzer test, warranting exclusion of his test record. Because the Supreme Court concluded the approved method for administering an Intoxilyzer test was not followed and no expert testimony was offered on the effect, if any, of the deviation, it reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Keller v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law