Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In December 2012, the State charged Russell Everett, Jr. with aggravated assault involving domestic violence, and counsel was appointed to represent him. Everett was unable to post bond and he remained in custody until May 2013, when he appeared at a change of plea hearing with counsel, pled guilty to the charge, and was sentenced to a period of incarceration. In August 2013, Everett filed a self-represented application for post-conviction relief, claiming his plea was not voluntary and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Everett's application claimed his guilty plea was not voluntarily made with an understanding of the charge and the consequences of his plea because his lawyer "was not helping [him]" and his "lawyer said [he] would get probation and get out." Everett also claimed his "plea bargain did not come true" and he was "lied [to] about [his] plea bargain." He also claimed he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was "unlawfully arrested . . . with no evidence against" him. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding Everett failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a guilty plea to a charge of aggravated assault involving domestic violence and that withdrawal of the guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. View "Everett v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Watford City Police Officer Dylan Bostic stopped James Bauer for speeding at approximately 3:00 a.m., on Highway 85, near Watford City. During the stop, the officer noticed Bauer had slurred speech, watery and bloodshot eyes, poor balance and alcohol on his breath. The officer asked Bauer to submit to field sobriety testing, but Bauer declined. The officer read Bauer the North Dakota implied consent advisory and asked Bauer to submit to a preliminary breath test. Bauer agreed. The test showed a blood alcohol content over the legal limit for driving. The officer arrested Bauer for driving while under the influence and read Bauer his Miranda rights. The officer asked Bauer if he understood his rights, but Bauer remained silent. After transporting Bauer to the county jail, the officer again read Bauer the North Dakota implied consent advisory and asked Bauer if he would submit to a blood draw at the hospital. Bauer did not answer. The officer left Bauer in the squad car to consider his options and upon return, again asked if Bauer would submit to a blood draw. Bauer remained silent. The officer told Bauer if he did not answer, his silence would be considered a refusal. Bauer did not respond. The officer cited Bauer for refusal to submit to onsite screening or chemical test. Bauer appealed the judgment entered upon his conditional plea of guilty to refusal to submit to a chemical test. Bauer pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to suppress and dismiss his charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Bauer argued the district court erred in denying his motion when it determined the use of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence did not violate Bauer's constitutional rights against self-incrimination, due process or the Fifth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Bauer" on Justia Law

Todd Rounkles appealed a district court's judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision suspending his driving privileges for ninety-one days for driving under the influence. On appeal, Rounkles argued the hearing officer erred in its decision to suspend his driving privileges because: (1) the breath tests were unconstitutional searches in violation of state and federal constitutions; (2) North Dakota's implied consent law violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine; (3) without the results of the preliminary breath test, the deputy sheriff would not have had probable cause to arrest him; and (4) the Intoxilyzer breath test was not fairly administered. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rounkles v. Levi" on Justia Law

In 2009, Riak Riak pled guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition, a class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty years in prison with three years suspended for ten years while on supervised probation. In 2010, Riak applied for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of his trial attorney, but he subsequently withdrew that application by stipulation. In February 2013, Riak filed another application for post-conviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and that his sentence was too long. In March 2013, the State filed a request for additional time to respond, and the court granted the State's request. In May 2013, the parties jointly filed a stipulation requesting an additional 60 days for the State to file an answer or response motion, which the court again granted. The State did not file a response within the following 60 days. In November 2013, the district court's "Electronic Court Recorder" mailed a "Notification of Dismissal and Order of Dismissal" to the parties. The notice stated the case would be dismissed without prejudice after 14 days unless the court received "the required documents." Neither the State nor Riak's attorney filed any response to the notification. The district court thereafter entered an order dismissing Riak's February 2013 application without prejudice. No notice of entry of the order was filed after the court entered its dismissal order. In a letter dated February 4, 2014, and filed on February 12, 2014, Riak on his own behalf informed the district court that he was filing a disciplinary complaint against his appointed counsel and requested the court to appoint different counsel for him. In a letter to the court dated February 18, 2014, and filed February 24, 2014, he was aware his application had been dismissed in November 201, requested his post-conviction relief application be reopened, a hearing be scheduled, and new counsel be appointed for him. The district court judge informed Riak that the court was unable to act on the request in his February 4 letter, and that Riak would need to make and serve "an appropriate motion." Riak moved to reopen his dismissed post-conviction relief application, asserting complaints against his appointed post-conviction counsel. The district court denied Riak's motion, and Riak appealed from the order denying his motion. Under the narrow circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion because Riak filed his application under prior law and had not yet been put to his proof when the court dismissed his application. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Riak v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

William Roberts appealed a district court judgment affirming an order of the Department of Transportation revoking his driving privileges for two years for refusing to submit to a chemical test. Roberts argued the district court erred by affirming the hearing officer's decision revoking Roberts' license for two years based upon his refusal to submit to a chemical test because Roberts submitted to an onsite screening test prior to being arrested for driving under the influence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roberts v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Julie Ann Kopperud appealed a district court order granting the State's motion for her to pay $1,317.70 in jury expenses. Kopperud was charged with reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor. A jury trial was scheduled but Kopperud failed to appear at the time of the trial and the jurors were dismissed. The district court issued a bench warrant for Kopperud's arrest. Kopperud was arrested the next day. In a "Motion To Reimburse Trial Expenses," the State moved the district court requesting Kopperud be ordered "to reimburse Dickey County $1,317.70 for Jury Expenses incurred in the trial State of North Dakota versus Julie Ann Kopperud . . . ." Kopperud ultimately pled guilty to reckless driving and was sentenced under a plea agreement. The Supreme Court reversed: the district court's order requiring Kopperud to reimburse jury expenses violated the plain language of N.D.R.Crim.P. 23.1, which prohibited the assessment of jury expenses in a criminal case. View "North Dakota v. Kopperud" on Justia Law

On December 29, 2013, Johnny Lowe was booked into Morton County on Morton County case number 30-2011-CR-1042, Revocation of Probation--Possession of Methamphetamine & Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Methamphetamine); Burleigh County case numbers 08-2013-CR-2222/2288, Failure to Appear--Driving Under Suspension & No Liability Insurance; Burleigh County case number 08-2011-CR-1792, Revocation of Probation--Possession of Methamphetamine & Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Methamphetamine); and Norman County, Minnesota case number 54-CR-13-280, Failure to Appear--Possession of Marijuana & DWI-Drugs. Lowe was held in Morton County Detention Center until March 3, 2014 and then was transferred to the North Dakota Department of Corrections. After revocation of Lowe's probation in Burleigh County case number 08-2011-CR-1792, an amended judgment was entered on March 13, 2014, sentencing Lowe to thirty-six months on each of the two counts and granting Lowe credit for eighteen months. The sentence was to run concurrently with Morton County case number 30-2011-CR-1042 and Burleigh County case number 08-2013-CR-2288. Lowe was sentenced in Morton County case number 30-2011-CR-1042 on March 3, 2014. He was sentenced to forty-two months, receiving credit for the two years previously spent in custody at the North Dakota Department of Corrections under the original judgment and commitment plus an additional sixty-four days as time spent in custody awaiting the hearing on the Morton County revocation. In a March 31, 2014 letter to the Burleigh County district court, Lowe requested credit for time he served on case number 08-2011-CR-1792, in Morton County, while awaiting his revocation and sentencing hearing. The State did not respond. In September 2014, Lowe filed a second motion for credit for time served. The State filed a response, arguing Lowe was entitled to credit for time served on the warrant. The district court denied Lowe's motion. Lowe moved for reduction of his sentence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35. The Supreme Court dismissed this motion on grounds that neither Lowe nor his counsel mentioned, either in brief or at oral argument, that Lowe's sentence may have been illegal, and no reference was made to Rule 35(a), N.D.R.Crim.P. At oral argument, Lowe's counsel agreed the sentence was discretionary and not mandatory under N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-02(2). Lowe's motion for reduction of sentence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(b) was discretionary and therefore not appealable. View "North Dakota v. Lowe" on Justia Law

A law officer attempted to serve a misdemeanor bench warrant on Devan Lavallie at the location listed on the warrant. Deven Schmidt resided at that residence, but was not a subject of the warrant. Schmidt answered the door for the officer, who asked if Lavallie was there. Schmidt responded that he was sleeping in the back bedroom. The officer then informed him that he had an arrest warrant for Lavallie. Schmidt did not verbally respond or invite the officer in, but did step back and walk to Lavallie's bedroom with the officer following. During Lavallie's arrest, the officer observed in plain view drug paraphernalia in his bedroom. The officer took him into the living room and detained both him and Schmidt. The officer then observed drug paraphernalia in the living room. Officers received permission to search the residence from Schmidt and Lavallie. That search discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia in both of their bedrooms, and they were placed under arrest. The State appealed from a district court order granting Deven Schmidt's motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the Court agreed with the lower courts that a warrant supported by probable cause, regardless of whether it is a felony or misdemeanor warrant, provides a law officer authority to enter the residence of the person named in the warrant in order to execute the warrant. In this case, the district court granted the motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the initial entry into the home was unlawful because no consent was given. Here, no consent was necessary for the initial entry into Lavallie's residence by law enforcement for the purpose of executing the misdemeanor bench warrant. The Court did not reach other issues raised on appeal with respect to the time after the initial entry into the home. View "North Dakota v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith appealed after a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court's denial of Smith's motion to strike the mandatory minimum sentence did not amount to obvious error and that sufficient evidence supported his conviction. View "North Dakota v. Smith" on Justia Law

Andrew Williams appealed a criminal judgment entered after conditionally pleading guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and drug paraphernalia. After review of the case, the Supreme Court held that the law enforcement officer's use of a drug canine in a condominium building's hallway did not violate Williams' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Williams" on Justia Law