Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Greywind appealed a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Greywind previously pled guilty to committing robbery while in possession of a dangerous weapon. He filed an application for post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, imposition of a longer sentence than a co-defendant, and alleged the prosecuting attorney violated his due process rights. The district court denied the application without a hearing or response from the State. Citing North Dakota caselaw, the court held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not arise by virtue of the fact that counsel did not inform Greywind prior to entry of his plea that his conviction would result in serving 85% of his sentence. The court also held that the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and disparate sentence were not grounds for post-conviction relief because Greywind's co-defendant was sentenced after him and he did not possess the knife used in the robbery. Whether Greywind's counsel provided zealous legal representation, however, was a genuine issue of material fact. The Supreme Court concluded that Greywind was entitled to file a brief with supporting materials and that the district court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in considering information outside the pleading in denying the application without allowing Greywind to file a brief with supporting materials. The Supreme Court denied the district court's order denying Greywind's application for post-conviction relief and remanded for the court to allow Greywind to file a brief with supporting materials and, if appropriate, an evidentiary hearing. View "Greywind v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In May 2014, Bureau of Criminal Investigation Special Agent Arnie Rummel applied for a search warrant for the Darrell Schrum Trucking Shop in Dickey County, claiming there was probable cause to believe a stolen New Holland payloader was being concealed in the shop. The district court issued the search warrant to seize the payloader as evidence of a crime and commanding that it be brought before the court. Rummel executed the search warrant two days later and took custody of the payloader. Rummel immediately handed the payloader over to a non-law enforcement, non-government party who trucked the payloader out of North Dakota. Schrum moved for return of property under N.D.R.Crim.P. 41, claiming he purchased the payloader as a good-faith purchaser and requested the court order the property be returned to him immediately or, alternatively, the property not be transferred or transported further until the ownership issues were resolved. The Dickey County state's attorney and an assistant attorney general appeared on behalf of the State. Schrum and Rummel testified. After the hearing, the court granted Schrum's motion and ordered the State and Rummel to return the payloader to the Dickey County Sheriff for safekeeping. Schrum moved for contempt and requested remedial contempt sanctions. Schrum contended the court ordered Rummel to return the property to Dickey County, but Rummel did not comply with the court's order. He reported the payloader was in Mexico and later advised counsel the payloader was in Texas. Schrum requested the court order Rummel and the State to reimburse him for the loss and injury he incurred as a result of the contempt in an amount to be determined following a hearing. The district court found Rummel was in contempt, and ordered Rummel and the State to pay sanctions. The State appealed. Although it appeared undisputed that Rummel secured a search warrant to seize a payloader as evidence of a crime, while intending to hand it over immediately to a non-law enforcement party, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ordering Rummel and the Attorney General to pay compensatory remedial contempt sanctions without first requiring compliance with the statutory requirements for claims against the State. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. New Holland" on Justia Law

Brett Zacher appealed a district court order denying his motion to suppress evidence and from a criminal judgment entered after his conditional guilty plea to the charge of possession of a controlled substance. After review of the specific facts in the district court record, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred in relying on the plain view doctrine to justify the warrantless seizure of the plastic bag located in Zacher's vehicle. The case was remanded to allow Zacher to withdraw his guilty plea. View "North Dakota v. Zacher" on Justia Law

James Weinmann, Jr. and Kayla Weinmann appealed a criminal judgment entered upon their conditional pleas of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance (hashish), possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), possession of drug paraphernalia (methamphetamine), and possession of drug paraphernalia (marijuana). The Weinmanns pled guilty after the district court denied their motion to suppress evidence. They argued the district court erred in denying the motion when it determined probable cause was established for the issuance of a search warrant, the reliability of the confidential informant was established, and the affiant did not intentionally mislead the magistrate by omitting certain facts from the magistrate. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Weinmann" on Justia Law

The State filed an information charging Taylor Weight with insurance fraud, a class A felony, and criminal mischief, a class B felony, for allegedly setting fire to his parents' combine. At the preliminary hearing, the district court determined there was no probable cause to believe Weight committed insurance fraud, and that charge was dismissed without prejudice. At the October 2014 jury trial on the criminal mischief charge, Weight moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State's case. The district court orally granted Weight's motion, stating the State failed to meet its burden under N.D.C.C. 29-21-14, and "as a matter of law," it "must dismiss the complaint." The court issued a "judgment of acquittal" on November 4, 2014, noting the State's evidence was "insufficient to sustain a conviction." The Supreme Court agreed the State failed to prove its case, and dismissed the State's appeal. View "State v. Weight" on Justia Law

Galen Rufus appealed a criminal judgment entered after a bench trial finding him guilty of human trafficking. Rufus responded to an advertisement posted on Craigslist under "personals > casual encounters" by a Ward County Deputy Sheriff using the undercover persona of "Chad Russo." The advertisement indicated Russo's girlfriend would be out of town for the weekend and her daughter wanted to make some money while her mother was gone. According to the advertisement, interested individuals could contact Russo for more details. Rufus responded to the advertisement requesting more information. Russo replied, informing Rufus that the girl was fourteen years old. Rufus asked Russo whether it would be illegal, as the girl was only fourteen, and requested more details. Russo acknowledged fourteen was illegal, but indicated he would not tell anyone. In two separate online Yahoo Messenger conversations, Russo and Rufus discussed the pricing for various sexual acts and a meeting place and time. Russo also sent Rufus a picture of "the girl." During Yahoo Messenger conversations, Rufus agreed to exchange two bags of marijuana, each worth $60, for one hour of time with the fourteen-year-old girl. Finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's verdict finding Rufus guilty of human trafficking, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Rufus" on Justia Law

A Watford City police officer, initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for exceeding the speed limit. The driver of the vehicle could not produce any form of identification, proof of insurance, or registration, but identified herself as Sarah Hernandez. The officer detected an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and noticed the driver had bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech and displayed slow, sluggish movements. After the driver submitted to field sobriety testing and an onsite screening test, she was arrested for driving under the influence. The officer received the driver's permission to move the vehicle out of a private driveway, across the street. The driver submitted to a chemical blood test and was taken to jail for booking. During the booking process, law enforcement realized the driver had provided false identification information. When confronted by law enforcement, the driver identified herself as Pogue and admitted she had initially provided a false name. According to Pogue's arrest report, law enforcement then impounded the vehicle Pogue had been driving and performed an inventory search of it due to "the vehicle not belonging to her, expired registration, and False Information charge . . . ." During the search, law enforcement found a black cloth bag containing drug paraphernalia items and methamphetamine. The officer applied for a warrant to further search the vehicle and submitted an affidavit in support of the application. In the affidavit, the officer stated he impounded the vehicle "due to no current registration, false information to a police officer, and obstruction of a private driveway." The officer also stated "[u]pon completing an impound inventory, per department directive," he found a black cloth bag containing multiple items of drug paraphernalia and a clear plastic container of a white crystalline substance, which tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. The district court issued a search warrant for the vehicle based upon the affidavit. The officer executed the search warrant and found additional used syringes and what resembled a drug transaction ledger. The State appealed a district court order granting Rebekah Pogue's motion to suppress evidence found in her impounded vehicle. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order because the State did not satisfy its burden to show law enforcement's warrantless search of Pogue's vehicle qualified as a valid inventory search, an exception to the warrant requirement, or that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "North Dakota v. Pogue" on Justia Law

Darl Hehn appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. In 1997, Hehn pleaded guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of terrorizing. In 2003, Hehn was released from prison on supervised probation but his probation was subsequently revoked, and he was returned to prison in 2004. In 2006, Hehn was committed to the North Dakota State Hospital as a sexually dangerous individual, and the Supreme Court affirmed the commitment. In 2011, Hehn filed a second petition for discharge. While his second petition was pending, Hehn also filed a letter with the district court requesting an annual review, which the court treated as a third petition. The district court denied his second petition, which was affirmed on appeal. In December 2013, Hehn filed another petition requesting a discharge hearing. On August 14 and 15, 2014, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on Hehn's petition for discharge. In November 2014, the court denied his petition, finding he continues to be a sexually dangerous individual. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Hehn had engaged in sexually predatory conduct; had a congenital or acquired condition that was manifested by a sexual disorder, a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; was likely to engage in future sexually predatory acts; and had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The court specifically found a nexus between Hehn's disorder and the likelihood of re-offense and found Hehn would have serious difficulty controlling his behavior in a less restrictive environment. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of Hehn" on Justia Law

Joshua Clark and Theo Crowe were acquaintances and co-workers at a construction business in Bismarck. They were drinking together at Clark's apartment one evening in 2013. In an interview with law enforcement officers, Clark stated he and Crowe were upset about the women in their lives and statements were made to the effect "they were so mad they could kill somebody." Clark testified at trial he did not specifically recall making that statement, but he "might have said it," and if he did, he was not serious and "it would've just been two individuals blowing off steam." After a confrontation between Crowe and Clark's roommate at Clark's apartment, Clark and Crowe got a ride to Crowe's apartment. A neighbor testified he later saw Crowe and Clark leave Crowe's apartment and "they seemed like they were intoxicated and they wanted to fight or something like that." Clark testified they left Crowe's apartment to get some marijuana, and they saw John Swain, an individual he had never met, at a nearby park. Clark testified Crowe invited Swain back to Crowe's apartment, where the three men listened to music and drank for about ten to fifteen minutes before Crowe got up and hit Swain in the head with a hammer. Clark testified he was "shocked" by the incident and Crowe hit Swain four or five more times and then told Clark "it's your turn now." Clark testified he believed Swain was already dead and he hit Swain once in the head because he was scared of repercussions if he did not follow Crowe's directions. Clark testified that after he hit Swain, he gave the hammer back to Crowe, who continued to hit Swain at least five more times. Clark testified he helped Crowe move Swain's body to a bathtub, he started to wipe up some blood, he helped amputate Swain's legs, and he helped move the body into a garage. Clark appealed after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Clark argued there was insufficient evidence to establish he conspired or agreed with another to commit murder. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was indeed sufficient evidence to support the verdict, and affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Clark" on Justia Law

In March 2013, the City of Dickinson charged Byishimo Etienne with simple assault domestic violence, alleging he violated Dickinson Municipal Code 25.08.010. Etienne personally appeared before the Dickinson municipal judge and signed a document stating that the judge had explained the notification of rights to Etienne and that he did not wish to consult with an attorney and waived his right to assistance of an attorney. Etienne also signed a notification of rights and acknowledgment, stating he had been orally informed of rights listed on a preprinted form and understood those rights, including that if he pled guilty, there would not be a trial of any kind and he would give up his right to a trial and to confront witnesses as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Etienne appeared again without counsel and pled guilty to the charge. Etienne claimed he subsequently learned the deportation consequences of his conviction, and in May 2014, he moved to vacate his guilty plea. The municipal court denied Etienne's motion, ruling he failed to show either the court or the prosecutor had an obligation to inform him that deportation may result from his guilty plea. The municipal court concluded withdrawal of Etienne's guilty plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Etienne appealed to the district court, and the court ruled it had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. 29-28-06(5) to hear Etienne's appeal of the municipal court's decision denying his motion to vacate the guilty plea because the municipal court's decision affected Etienne's substantial rights. The district court nevertheless affirmed the municipal court's denial of Etienne's motion to vacate the guilty plea. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, concluding Etienne did not have a right to appeal to the district court the municipal court's post-judgment order under N.D.C.C. 40-18-19, and his post-judgment motions, which were made more than one year after entry of the judgment of conviction, did not extend the time for filing an appeal from the judgment. Etienne did not exercise his right to appeal in the manner prescribed by N.D.C.C. 40-18-19 and N.D.R.Crim.P. 37, and the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear Etienne's appeal. View "City of Dickinson v. Etienne" on Justia Law