Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ronald Thompson appealed an order denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 1991 Thompson was charged with gross sexual imposition and received a court appointed defense lawyer. In 1992 Thompson pled guilty and was sentenced to a ten year prison term with three years suspended. Thompson completed his sentence and the term of probation has expired. In 2012 Thompson applied for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting dismissal of the conviction. Thompson alleged his counsel failed to competently prepare his defense, obtain an independent DNA test, adequately investigate the victim, hire a private investigator and develop a tactical trial strategy. Thompson claimed his attorney's failure to obtain a copy of a DNA report fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudiced him. To meet the prejudice prong of the "Strickland" test, the defendant bore the heavy burden of establishing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Because the standard used by the district court to analyze the prejudice prong of the Strickland test was an error of law, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. "On remand, the district court must make findings regarding whether a reasonable probability exists that, but for the alleged errors, Thompson would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. If the district court finds a reasonable probability Thompson would have insisted on going to trial, it also must make findings on the first prong of the Strickland test. If the district court finds no reasonable probability Thompson would have insisted on going to trial, post-conviction relief may be denied without examining prong one." View "Thompson v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Andrew Gillmore appealed a judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Department's decision was "in accordance with the law, its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and support the conclusions of law, and Gillmore's constitutional rights were not violated," it affirmed the judgment. View "Gillmore v. Levi" on Justia Law

Andrew Gillmore appealed a judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's decision to suspend his driving privileges for 91 days. Because the Supreme Court concluded the Department's decision was "in accordance with the law, its findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence and support the conclusions of law, and Gillmore's constitutional rights were not violated," it affirmed the judgment. View "Gillmore v. Levi" on Justia Law

Tilmer Everett appealed from a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief and barring him from filing further motions or pleadings without leave of the district court. In 2007, a jury convicted Everett of gross sexual imposition. He appealed, arguing the State violated his constitutional right to remain silent, the court erred by failing to admonish the jury before taking two recesses during trial, and there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Everett first applied for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. Everett later amended his application for post-conviction relief, alleging twelve counts of prosecutorial misconduct and fourteen counts of ineffective assistance of counsel. In March 2009, Everett filed a second application for post-conviction relief, claiming a law enforcement officer gave false and perjured testimony during his trial. By February 2013, Everett had filed a seventh application for post-conviction relief and moved for a "substitute" judge. Everett later moved to amend his application, alleging there was newly discovered evidence, including recordings of two 911 telephone calls, and the State failed to disclose this evidence. The district court denied Everett's application and motion for a "substitute" judge. Everett appealed, arguing the court denied his right to a fair appeal in a previous appeal by not ruling on the State's motion for protective order and ruling after the fact on discovery issues; the State denied his right to a fair trial by failing to disclose certain information and to provide recordings of the 911 calls; and the court erred by failing to hear his supplemental motion regarding withheld and newly-discovered evidence. He also asserted the court erred in denying his motion for a substitute judge, arguing the court was biased and prejudiced regarding his motion to disqualify the judge, his motion to compel the State to transcribe the two recorded 911 calls, and in ruling the matter was res judicata. In June 2015, Everett filed his current application for post-conviction relief, making essentially the same arguments made in his seventh application. Finding no error in the district court's denial of the eighth application and bar from filing additional motions without leave of court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Everett v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Bo Schmidt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges. Schmidt argued the implied consent advisory was misleading, the chemical test was a warrantless search and North Dakota's refusal statute is unconstitutional. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Levi" on Justia Law

Cameron Lee Peltier appealed after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. Peltier alleged the minor's mother told law enforcement that the minor may have been touched inappropriately by a cousin five years earlier. A forensic interviewer allegedly asked the minor whether she had ever been touched in a manner that made her feel unsafe and she said she had not. Before trial Peltier moved to admit evidence the minor had been sexually assaulted by her cousin. Peltier alleged the minor's failure to disclose a prior incident of abuse during the forensic interview was a prior inconsistent statement and therefore admissible under N.D.R.Ev. 613 for impeachment. Peltier argued on appeal of the district court's judgment that it abused its discretion in excluding that evidence of prior sexual abuse. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Peltier" on Justia Law

In May 2015, a highway patrol officer stopped defendant Blaise O'Connor's car for a defective taillight. The officer observed O'Connor had slurred speech and bloodshot and watery eyes. O'Connor admitted he consumed some alcohol. The officer administered field sobriety tests, recited a complete implied consent advisory and asked O'Connor if he would submit to an onsite screening test. The State contended O'Connor was read the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(a), which included the warning that "refusal to take the test . . . is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." O'Connor contended he was given the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(3), relating to screening tests, which included the warning that "refusal to take the screening test is a crime." O'Connor submitted to the onsite screening test which revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the jail, the officer asked O'Connor whether he remembered the implied consent advisory previously read to him and O'Connor responded, "yeah, I think so." It was undisputed that before O'Connor submitted to the Intoxilyzer chemical test the officer provided him with a partial implied consent advisory which failed to inform him that refusal to take a chemical test "is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." The chemical test revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor moved to suppress the result of the Intoxilyzer chemical test because the officer failed to provide him with the complete implied consent advisory after he was arrested and before he submitted to the chemical test. The district court agreed with O'Connor and suppressed the result of the chemical test. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression because the law enforcement officer after placing O'Connor under arrest did not inform him of the complete implied consent advisory before administering the Intoxilyzer test. View "North Dakota v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

In May 2015, a highway patrol officer stopped defendant Blaise O'Connor's car for a defective taillight. The officer observed O'Connor had slurred speech and bloodshot and watery eyes. O'Connor admitted he consumed some alcohol. The officer administered field sobriety tests, recited a complete implied consent advisory and asked O'Connor if he would submit to an onsite screening test. The State contended O'Connor was read the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(a), which included the warning that "refusal to take the test . . . is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." O'Connor contended he was given the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(3), relating to screening tests, which included the warning that "refusal to take the screening test is a crime." O'Connor submitted to the onsite screening test which revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the jail, the officer asked O'Connor whether he remembered the implied consent advisory previously read to him and O'Connor responded, "yeah, I think so." It was undisputed that before O'Connor submitted to the Intoxilyzer chemical test the officer provided him with a partial implied consent advisory which failed to inform him that refusal to take a chemical test "is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." The chemical test revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor moved to suppress the result of the Intoxilyzer chemical test because the officer failed to provide him with the complete implied consent advisory after he was arrested and before he submitted to the chemical test. The district court agreed with O'Connor and suppressed the result of the chemical test. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression because the law enforcement officer after placing O'Connor under arrest did not inform him of the complete implied consent advisory before administering the Intoxilyzer test. View "North Dakota v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jason Gale was cited for driving under the influence. Gale retained attorney Henry Howe to represent him. Howe requested a jury trial. Although the record did not contain information regarding plea negotiations that presumably took place, a sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 21, 1995. Gale failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, despite the court having mailed him three notices stating he was required to appear personally. After Gale failed to appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. No subsequent action was taken on the case until March 5, 2015, when Gale filed a motion to recall the arrest warrant. The City of Grand Forks then filed an amended information, and Gale filed a motion to dismiss arguing his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court held a hearing on his motion. Gale asserted he was unaware of the pending case and bench warrant because Howe had told him the case was closed and that Gale's bond had been used to pay the associated fines. Gale claimed he was made aware of the open case when a pre-employment background check revealed the warrant. He asserted the City did not prosecute his case for twenty years despite the fact that he had appeared in North Dakota courts for various criminal and child support proceedings. Gale argued his address was on file with the state, and the City's failure to prosecute the matter amounted to a speedy trial violation. The City claimed it could not locate Gale because he moved to Colorado soon after he failed to appear. The City claimed it had no knowledge of Gale's whereabouts, he caused the delay, and there was no speedy trial violation. The district court found Gale's testimony incredible. The court reasoned Gale likely knew the case was pending but chose not to do anything about it. The court found it likely the only reason Gale took action in 2015 was because his employment opportunity was dependent upon resolution of the warrant. The court denied Gale's motion to dismiss. A jury ultimately found Gale guilty of driving under the influence. He appealed that conviction. The Supreme Court concluded Gale's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, and reversed the judgment. View "City of Grand Forks v. Gale" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Craig Cudmore was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") after his responses to the deputy's requests to submit to a chemical blood test were deemed a refusal. Cudmore appealed the district court's judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation's ("DOT") revocation of his driving privileges. Cudmore argued the hearing officer erred in finding that he did not invoke his right to consult with counsel before submitting to a chemical test. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cudmore v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law