Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Kevin Hartson, who was charged with felony murder, with the underlying offenses of attempted robbery and attempted felonious restraint. Hartson argued that the charge of felony murder was not legally cognizable due to an inconsistency in the elements of criminal attempt and the elements of the underlying predicate felonies. He contended that the charge of criminal attempt requires the actor to have intended to complete the commission of the underlying crime, while the underlying offenses of robbery and felonious restraint only require the actor to act knowingly. Hartson's motion to dismiss the charge was denied by the district court, which held that any inconsistency could be reconciled by requiring the State to apply intentional culpability to both the attempt and the underlying predicate felonies. Hartson was subsequently found guilty of felony murder by a jury.On appeal, Hartson reiterated his argument that felony murder based on the predicate offenses of attempted robbery and attempted felonious restraint is not a cognizable offense. He also argued that the district court erred in allowing the State to remove “knowingly” from the charge of felony murder and use only the culpability level of “intentional”. Furthermore, he claimed that the court committed obvious error in instructing the jury by misstating the law and allowing for a verdict without a unanimous jury finding on the predicate felony offense.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the district court did not err in modifying the level of culpability from "knowingly" to "intentionally". The court also found that the jury was properly instructed that they could convict Hartson on nothing less than intentional conduct with respect to the predicate felonies. Furthermore, the court concluded that Hartson failed to demonstrate an obvious error with regard to the absence of an instruction on attempt and the requirement of a unanimous decision on the attempted predicate offense. Lastly, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. View "State v. Hartson" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Glaum, who had pleaded guilty to various criminal charges in several cases between 1997 and 2008. In 2023, Glaum moved to reopen these cases and withdraw his guilty pleas. Around the same time, he made similar motions in four other closed cases. All these motions were denied by the district court. In April 2023, the presiding judge of the Northeast Central Judicial District entered a proposed pre-filing order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, finding Glaum to be a vexatious litigant. This order prohibited Glaum from filing any new litigation or new documents in existing litigation as a self-represented party without first obtaining leave of the court. Glaum appealed this pre-filing order.The State moved to dismiss Glaum's appeal, arguing it was untimely. The State contended that Glaum's appeal of the pre-filing order was an appeal from an order in a criminal case, which should have been filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed. Glaum, however, argued that this was an appeal from an order in a civil case, which should be filed within 60 days from service of notice of entry of the judgment or order being appealed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding the appeal was timely. The court determined that the pre-filing order was not an order in a criminal case, but rather an order in a civil case or a postconviction proceeding. The court noted that the time for filing an appeal did not begin to run because Glaum was not served with the notice of entry of the pre-filing order, nor was there evidence of actual knowledge of entry. The court affirmed the pre-filing order, finding Glaum to be a vexatious litigant. View "Glaum v. State" on Justia Law

The defendant, Jason Pederson, was found guilty of one count of terrorizing following a jury trial. The charge was based on two emails Pederson sent to her former employer, threatening to retrieve damages through the taking of physical assets and warning employees to stay out of the way to avoid unnecessary deaths. These emails were sent after Pederson had filed an employment discrimination lawsuit against her former employer. After receiving the emails, the employer contacted law enforcement, leading to Pederson's arrest.The case was first heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. During the trial, Pederson, who represented herself, argued that the State had violated her rights under Brady v. Maryland by failing to provide her with a recording of a conversation she had with Officer Tanner Anderson, who had informed her that she was trespassed from her former employer's property. The State argued that the recording was not relevant to the terrorizing charge and had been filed under a civil trespass file, not the criminal case. The court ruled that the State's failure to disclose the recording was not intentional and that the State must provide it before Officer Anderson was called as a witness.The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that Pederson did not establish a Brady violation. The court found that although the State had possessed the recording and did not disclose it to Pederson, Pederson had not demonstrated that the recording was favorable to her or plainly exculpatory. The court also concluded that Pederson did not preserve the issue of insufficient evidence because she failed to move for acquittal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 and did not argue obvious error. View "State v. Pederson" on Justia Law

Michael Fuglesten was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a police officer entered his garage without a warrant. The officer had responded to a 911 call about a truck repeatedly driving by a house with loud music. The officer identified the truck as Fuglesten's, knew his license was suspended, and followed him to his home. The officer did not attempt a traffic stop or initiate his overhead lights. Upon reaching Fuglesten's home, the officer approached the garage on foot and interacted with Fuglesten, who was inside the garage. Fuglesten was subsequently arrested and charged.Fuglesten filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's entry into his garage was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and Fuglesten conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Fuglesten had committed the offense of driving under suspension, but did not find evidence of exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lange v. California, exigent circumstances were required for law enforcement to enter Fuglesten's garage without a warrant. The court found that the facts presented to the district court did not establish exigent circumstances. The court concluded that the officer's entry into Fuglesten's garage, without exigent circumstances, constituted an illegal entry. The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Fuglesten to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Fuglesten" on Justia Law

Tevin Dewayne Freeman was charged with the murder of Erica L. Herrera, a class AA felony, in October 2020. The case was brought to trial in November 2022. The prosecution's witnesses included the 911 dispatcher who received Freeman's emergency call, law enforcement officers who responded to the scene and investigated Herrera's death, the medical examiner who conducted Herrera's autopsy, and a mutual friend of Freeman and Herrera. The medical examiner testified that Herrera's injuries were inconsistent with self-inflicted or accident-related injuries and that she died from blunt force trauma. Freeman claimed that Herrera's injuries were from a fall. After the prosecution rested its case, Freeman moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The defense did not call any witnesses.During the defense's closing argument, the prosecution objected to the defense counsel's use of "I believe" statements. This led to a sidebar conference, after which the court was informed that a juror needed a break. The court allowed a ten-minute recess. After the recess, Freeman moved for a mistrial, arguing that the break and the prosecution's objection during closing argument prejudiced him. The court denied Freeman's motion for a mistrial. The jury found Freeman guilty of murder, and judgment was entered in June 2023.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Freeman argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. He claimed that the break during the defense's closing argument showed indifference to the defense's case and that no curative jury instruction could remedy the situation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Freeman had not shown that allowing a short break in the defense's closing argument at the request of a juror to use the restroom was a manifest injustice or that the district court abused its discretion. Freeman also argued that the convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence regarding the culpability element of intentionally or knowingly. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Freeman intentionally or knowingly committed the charged offense. View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In April 2021, Jaime Urrabazo was found guilty of delivering a controlled substance by a jury. While his appeal was pending, Urrabazo filed his first application for postconviction relief, which was dismissed after he failed to attend the hearing. In April 2023, Urrabazo filed a second application for postconviction relief, arguing that the jury in his trial was not unanimous because one juror's response during the polling of the jury was inaudible on the recording.The District Court of Cass County denied Urrabazo's second application for postconviction relief. The court found that Urrabazo had misused the process by failing to raise his claim about the lack of jury unanimity in his first postconviction proceeding. The court also found that Urrabazo's trial counsel was objectively reasonable for not moving for a mistrial after the jury polling, and that Urrabazo's appellate counsel was objectively reasonable in not raising the issue of jury unanimity on appeal.Urrabazo appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred in finding his application for postconviction relief was a misuse of process and that his counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Urrabazo's second petition for postconviction relief was not a misuse of process and that his counsels' representation was objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Urrabazo had not shown that the jury was not unanimous and that his counsels' representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Urrabazo v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Defendant Joseph Glaum, who appealed an amended criminal judgment and the denial of his request to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. Glaum claimed that the court had abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the court had misapplied the factors for considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. He also made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that the six issues preserved for appeal by his conditional pleas were wrongly decided by the court.The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors outlined in State v. Lium, and did not clearly err in determining that Glaum did not meet his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. The court also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine Glaum’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Glaum further argued that his right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution was violated. The court applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo to evaluate this claim, considering the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether there was any prejudice to the accused. Upon balancing these factors, the court found that Glaum had not shown a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and denied Glaum’s motion for continuance, finding that the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or misinterpret or misapply the law. View "State v. Glaum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the decision of the District Court of Ramsey County in a case involving a man, James Driver, who was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, reckless endangerment, and driving under suspension or revocation. Driver appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was the operator of the vehicle involved in the chase and that the vehicle was driven in a way that showed extreme indifference to human life. He also argued that the State had presented irrelevant evidence and made an improper opening statement about dismissed theft and trespassing charges, thus prejudicing his case.The Supreme Court disagreed, indicating that the district court did not err in denying Driver's motion for a new trial or his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in these decisions, and that there was substantial evidence to support Driver's convictions. In terms of the opening statement and the presentation of evidence, the court found that the State's actions were proper at the time and that any comments made about the dismissed charges were reasonable given the circumstances. The court also noted that the jury had been instructed to disregard any statements made by counsel that were not supported by evidence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Driver's conviction. View "State v. Driver" on Justia Law

Zachary Archambault appealed from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Archambault had been found guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a minor child, a class AA felony. Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In these proceedings, the applicant bears the burden to establish the grounds for relief.Archambault claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in six ways. The district court addressed each of his claims and made detailed findings and conclusions regarding each ground. Among his claims, Archambault argued that his trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress his three-hour video confession because he was suffering from drug and alcohol effects and wanted to self-harm. Additionally, he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not interview the minor victim before trial.The district court found that Archambault did not show his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court made a series of findings that were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and were supported by evidence. These included the court's conclusion that the decision to permit equipment in the jury room is a discretionary decision that will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion, and that an unsuccessful trial strategy does not make defense counsel’s assistance defective. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the record, it agreed with the district court in denying Archambault’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the order denying his application for postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Archambault v. State" on Justia Law