Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jay Jelinek, who was appealing an order denying his motion to suppress evidence and challenging evidentiary rulings made by the district court during his trial. Jelinek was found by a North Dakota Game and Fish Department Warden in a field during deer hunting season. The Warden recognized Jelinek from previous encounters and knew that his hunting privileges were suspended. Jelinek was replacing batteries in a trail camera and stated that he had been sitting in a deer stand with his wife, who had a deer tag, earlier that day. Jelinek moved to suppress evidence gathered during his encounter with the Warden, arguing that he was unlawfully seized and that the Warden did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.The District Court of Grand Forks County denied Jelinek's motion to suppress, finding that he was not subject to an improper seizure prior to his arrest and that the Warden had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Jelinek also argued that the court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on one count, as the State's only evidence of guilt was his own statements. He further argued that the court erred in allowing evidence of his criminal history to go to the jury and that his 6th Amendment rights were violated.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Jelinek's motion to suppress, as there was sufficient evidence supporting the district court's findings that Jelinek was not unlawfully seized. The court also found that the district court did not err in denying Jelinek's motion for acquittal, as there was substantial independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of Jelinek's statements to law enforcement. However, the court found that the district court erred in allowing Jelinek's criminal history to be considered by the jury after one count was dismissed. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jelinek" on Justia Law

Regina Goodale was found guilty of accomplice to murder—extreme indifference for the murder of her husband. The State alleged that Goodale had conspired with Mathew Anderson, who was believed to have committed the murder. The State's evidence included testimony from several witnesses, including acquaintances of Goodale, the investigating officer, and her co-defendant, Whitney Racine. Goodale did not present any additional evidence and was convicted by a jury.Prior to the trial, the State had moved to join Anderson’s and Goodale’s cases, to which Goodale did not respond. The district court permitted the joinder. During the trial, Goodale moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The jury found Goodale guilty, and she appealed the decision.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Goodale argued that the jury instructions were improper, there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict, the district court erred in allowing the State to join her and Anderson’s cases for trial, and that the court imposed an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the jury instructions, while containing an error, did not prejudice Goodale. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to convict Goodale and that the district court did not err in permitting the joinder of the defendants or in sentencing Goodale. View "State v. Goodale" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Richard Sargent, who was charged with 17 counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 17 counts of theft of a firearm, and one count of theft of $500-$1000. The charges were based on evidence obtained during a traffic stop, where law enforcement officers found firearms in a vehicle being towed by Sargent. The stop was initiated based on an anonymous tip and a traffic violation committed by Sargent. Sargent filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop and subsequent search were unlawful.The District Court of Williams County denied Sargent's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the traffic stop was valid due to a traffic violation committed by Sargent. It also ruled that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and call in a K-9 unit, based on Sargent's extreme nervousness, his criminal history, his probation status, and the inconsistencies in his travel plans. The court further held that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement allowed the officers to search the vehicle being towed by Sargent.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court agreed that the traffic stop was valid and that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. It also held that the automobile exception permitted the officers to search the towed vehicle. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Sargent's motion to suppress evidence, thereby affirming the lower court's decision. View "State v. Sargent" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Justin Lee Camperud, who was accused of sexually abusing a child in 2016. The child's mother reported the incident to the Fargo police department in July 2021. The child was later interviewed by the Red River Children's Advocacy Center, a non-governmental organization. In October 2021, Dr. Anna Schimmelpfennig, the director of mental health services at the Center, participated in a mental health assessment for the child. The State notified Camperud in November 2022 that it intended to call Schimmelpfennig as an expert witness. However, the State failed to disclose that Schimmelpfennig was married to a Cass County Assistant State’s Attorney and that she had participated in the child's mental health assessment.The case was initially heard in the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District. On the day before the trial was to start, Camperud learned about Schimmelpfennig's marriage and her participation in the child's assessment. He moved to exclude Schimmelpfennig’s testimony due to the State's failure to provide him with this information. The district court allowed Camperud to question Schimmelpfennig about her relationship with the Assistant State’s Attorney and her involvement in the child's assessment. The court also delayed the start of the trial by a day. Despite Camperud's attempts to impeach Schimmelpfennig over her marriage, a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition.The case was then reviewed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Camperud argued that the district court abused its discretion by not granting a continuance after he and the court learned about the undisclosed evidence. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the State had committed discovery violations. However, it ruled that the district court had chosen the least severe sanctions to rectify the non-disclosure, including requiring the production of the assessment, limiting the expert’s testimony, permitting two voir dire sessions of the expert, and delaying the start of trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that it did not abuse its discretion by denying Camperud’s motion for a continuance. View "State v. Camperud" on Justia Law

The case involves Howard Studhorse, who was charged with five counts of gross sexual imposition and one count of contributing to the deprivation or delinquency of minors. The charges were based on allegations involving three victims, identified as Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and Jane Doe 3. After a jury trial, Studhorse was found guilty on all six charges. He appealed, raising several issues including the district court's application of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and potential violations of his right to remain silent and his protection against double jeopardy.Studhorse argued that the district court misapplied the North Dakota Rules of Evidence by allowing Jane Doe 3 to testify without taking an oath or affirmation to tell the truth. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court's discussion with Jane Doe 3 impressed upon her the duty to tell the truth, which complied with the rules. Therefore, this was not an obvious error.Studhorse also claimed that the State improperly elicited testimony about his silence, implying his guilt. The court found that any error in this regard was harmless and did not require reversal of Studhorse's convictions.Studhorse further argued that he was convicted of non-cognizable offenses on counts IV and V because the jury instructions did not require that he touched the victims on "sexual or other intimate parts," as required by the statute. The court found that the lack of specificity in the jury instructions did not create a non-cognizable crime.Studhorse also claimed that his convictions on counts II and V violated his right against double jeopardy. The court found that the jury instructions for counts IV and V permitted a conviction for both counts on the basis of the same conduct, which was an obvious error. Therefore, the court reversed Studhorse's conviction on count V as duplicative to count IV.Finally, Studhorse argued that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of counts I and II. The court found that the evidence was insufficient to prove a sexual act in count I, and reversed Studhorse's conviction on that count. However, the court affirmed the conviction on count II. View "State v. Studhorse" on Justia Law

The defendant, Rolanda Doyle, was charged with murder in the course of a felony and child abuse of a victim under six years old, following the death of a child at her home. The State presented testimony from two doctors, one of whom conducted the autopsy of the child. Doyle objected to portions of their testimony, arguing that they constituted expert testimony and the State had not provided the required expert witness summaries.The district court overruled Doyle's objections and the jury found her guilty on both counts. Doyle appealed, arguing that the doctors had testified as expert witnesses and the State had not complied with the requirements for expert witness summaries.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Doyle. It found that the State had introduced expert testimony and had not complied with the requirements for expert witness summaries. The court also found that the district court had abused its discretion by allowing the State's expert to testify without the required summaries. The court concluded that this error was not harmless and reversed the judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Doyle" on Justia Law

In May 2023, Zeferino Rangel pleaded guilty to five felony counts, including patronizing a minor for commercial sexual activity, corruption or solicitation of minors, possession of certain prohibited materials, promoting or directing a sexual performance by a minor, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In August 2023, the district court sentenced Rangel, including consecutive sentences on some counts. Rangel moved to withdraw his guilty plea in September 2023, asserting that he was surprised by the sentence imposed and that a manifest injustice would occur if he was not allowed to withdraw his plea.The district court denied Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea after an evidentiary hearing in October 2023. The court found that Rangel's reasons for withdrawal did not amount to manifest injustice. The court held that the prison terms it imposed were within the latitude under the law for each count, and that it had the authority to order periods of incarceration to run consecutively.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rangel's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court concluded that Rangel failed to show a manifest injustice necessitating the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Therefore, the district court's order was affirmed. View "State v. Rangel" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Alvin Brown, who pleaded guilty to two counts of endangerment of a child. After serving his sentence, he was put on probation. However, the State filed a petition to revoke his probation after he violated its terms. The court ordered Brown to wear an alcohol SCRAM bracelet and remain in custody at the Lake Region Law Enforcement Center until a spot was available at a halfway house. Brown was warned that leaving the halfway house would be considered an escape, which would result in additional charges. Despite these warnings, Brown absconded from the Center and was subsequently charged with escape, to which he pleaded guilty.Brown later filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his conviction was invalid and his trial attorney was ineffective. He claimed that he was not in official detention when he left the Center, and therefore, the State could not charge him with escape. The district court denied his petition, finding that Brown was indeed in official detention and that he failed to establish the second prong of the Strickland test, which requires showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision. The court found no error in the lower court's determination that Brown was in official detention when he left the Center. It also agreed with the lower court's finding that Brown did not meet the second prong of the Strickland test. The court concluded that Brown's arguments were either unnecessary for the decision or without merit. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

Brent Castleman was charged with 13 separate offenses, including stalking, harassment, tampering with physical evidence, and 10 counts of disobedience of a judicial order. Castleman filed a motion to sever the 13 counts into individual trials, arguing that the joinder of the offenses was prejudicial. The district court denied the motion, stating that the charges were connected with a common scheme or plan, and that trying them together would serve judicial economy. The court also found that Castleman would not be prejudiced by a single trial.The district court's decision was based on North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, which allows for the joinder of offenses if they are of the same or similar character, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. The court also referenced Rule 14, which allows for relief from prejudicial joinder. Castleman entered conditional Alford pleas on some of the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to sever.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Castleman argued that the offenses should not have been joined due to extreme prejudice, as they involved different victims, times, locations, and methods of contact. He also claimed that the district court's decision was merely a recitation of Rule 14. The Supreme Court found that Castleman failed to provide specifics on what prejudice would occur or how the joinder would hinder his defense. The court concluded that the district court did not act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably, and did not misinterpret or misapply the law. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying Castleman's motion to sever. View "State v. Castleman" on Justia Law

The case involves Steven Aune, who was convicted of manslaughter. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of North Dakota. Aune later applied for postconviction relief, but his application was dismissed by the district court as it was deemed untimely. Aune also requested a change of judge, which was denied. He then moved to have his application and demand for change of judge reconsidered, but both motions were denied. Aune appealed these decisions.The district court dismissed Aune's application for postconviction relief on the grounds that it was filed after the two-year limit from the date his conviction became final. The court also denied Aune's request for a change of judge, stating that postconviction relief proceedings are treated as a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and therefore, the applicant is not entitled to a new judge.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that the district court has the authority to summarily dismiss a postconviction relief application for being untimely. The court also ruled that a district court may summarily dismiss an application without notice if it concludes no set of facts would justify granting relief on the claims made in the application. Regarding Aune's request for a change of judge, the court held that a demand for a change of judge is not the proper route to remove a judge for bias. The court affirmed the orders denying the demand for a change of judge and the motions to reconsider the summary dismissal of the postconviction application and the denial of the demand for a change of judge. View "Aune v. State" on Justia Law