Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Fuglesten was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor after a police officer entered his garage without a warrant. The officer had responded to a 911 call about a truck repeatedly driving by a house with loud music. The officer identified the truck as Fuglesten's, knew his license was suspended, and followed him to his home. The officer did not attempt a traffic stop or initiate his overhead lights. Upon reaching Fuglesten's home, the officer approached the garage on foot and interacted with Fuglesten, who was inside the garage. Fuglesten was subsequently arrested and charged.Fuglesten filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officer's entry into his garage was unlawful. The district court denied the motion, and Fuglesten conditionally pled guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court found that the officer had probable cause to believe Fuglesten had committed the offense of driving under suspension, but did not find evidence of exigent circumstances relating to dissipation or destruction of evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision. The court held that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lange v. California, exigent circumstances were required for law enforcement to enter Fuglesten's garage without a warrant. The court found that the facts presented to the district court did not establish exigent circumstances. The court concluded that the officer's entry into Fuglesten's garage, without exigent circumstances, constituted an illegal entry. The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded the case to allow Fuglesten to withdraw his guilty plea. View "State v. Fuglesten" on Justia Law

Tevin Dewayne Freeman was charged with the murder of Erica L. Herrera, a class AA felony, in October 2020. The case was brought to trial in November 2022. The prosecution's witnesses included the 911 dispatcher who received Freeman's emergency call, law enforcement officers who responded to the scene and investigated Herrera's death, the medical examiner who conducted Herrera's autopsy, and a mutual friend of Freeman and Herrera. The medical examiner testified that Herrera's injuries were inconsistent with self-inflicted or accident-related injuries and that she died from blunt force trauma. Freeman claimed that Herrera's injuries were from a fall. After the prosecution rested its case, Freeman moved for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The defense did not call any witnesses.During the defense's closing argument, the prosecution objected to the defense counsel's use of "I believe" statements. This led to a sidebar conference, after which the court was informed that a juror needed a break. The court allowed a ten-minute recess. After the recess, Freeman moved for a mistrial, arguing that the break and the prosecution's objection during closing argument prejudiced him. The court denied Freeman's motion for a mistrial. The jury found Freeman guilty of murder, and judgment was entered in June 2023.On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Freeman argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. He claimed that the break during the defense's closing argument showed indifference to the defense's case and that no curative jury instruction could remedy the situation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision, stating that Freeman had not shown that allowing a short break in the defense's closing argument at the request of a juror to use the restroom was a manifest injustice or that the district court abused its discretion. Freeman also argued that the convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence regarding the culpability element of intentionally or knowingly. The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Freeman intentionally or knowingly committed the charged offense. View "State v. Freeman" on Justia Law

In April 2021, Jaime Urrabazo was found guilty of delivering a controlled substance by a jury. While his appeal was pending, Urrabazo filed his first application for postconviction relief, which was dismissed after he failed to attend the hearing. In April 2023, Urrabazo filed a second application for postconviction relief, arguing that the jury in his trial was not unanimous because one juror's response during the polling of the jury was inaudible on the recording.The District Court of Cass County denied Urrabazo's second application for postconviction relief. The court found that Urrabazo had misused the process by failing to raise his claim about the lack of jury unanimity in his first postconviction proceeding. The court also found that Urrabazo's trial counsel was objectively reasonable for not moving for a mistrial after the jury polling, and that Urrabazo's appellate counsel was objectively reasonable in not raising the issue of jury unanimity on appeal.Urrabazo appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that the district court erred in finding his application for postconviction relief was a misuse of process and that his counsel was not ineffective. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Urrabazo's second petition for postconviction relief was not a misuse of process and that his counsels' representation was objectively reasonable. The court concluded that Urrabazo had not shown that the jury was not unanimous and that his counsels' representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. View "Urrabazo v. State" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a plea agreement between the State and Michael Brenum in a criminal case. The court ordered a pre-plea presentence investigation (PSI) and combined the change of plea and sentencing hearing. The risk assessment score from the PSI triggered a secondary phase of the assessment, which was referred to the North Dakota Department of Health and Human Services (Department) and Dr. Hein-Kolo. They refused to approve the secondary process of the assessment based on a pre-plea PSI, arguing that the risk assessment process should be used only after a conviction has occurred according to assessment guidelines. The district court held the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt for not completing the risk assessment.The Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo petitioned the Supreme Court of North Dakota to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a supervisory writ, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the law by ordering a risk assessment before acceptance of a guilty plea and that there is no other adequate remedy. They also argued that the issue is not appealable and no adequate alternative remedy exists.The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo, stating that the plain language of the statute gives the Department the authority to approve the secondary process of the risk assessment and the responsibility to perform that secondary process. The court also clarified that a risk assessment is conducted on “a person that committed an offense,” and a person is considered to have committed an offense only after a conviction. The court concluded that the district court may order a PSI at any time, but it may not require the Department to perform the risk assessment other than by its approved process or before the substantive requirements are met. The Supreme Court of North Dakota exercised its supervisory jurisdiction and vacated the district court’s order directing the Department to conduct a pre-plea risk assessment and the order holding the Department and Dr. Hein-Kolo in contempt. View "State v. Thornton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court's decision in a case involving Defendant Joseph Glaum, who appealed an amended criminal judgment and the denial of his request to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. Glaum claimed that the court had abused its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the court had misapplied the factors for considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11. He also made claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and asserted that the six issues preserved for appeal by his conditional pleas were wrongly decided by the court.The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the factors outlined in State v. Lium, and did not clearly err in determining that Glaum did not meet his burden to show a fair and just reason to withdraw his conditional guilty pleas. The court also concluded that the record was inadequate to determine Glaum’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Glaum further argued that his right to a speedy trial under the federal constitution was violated. The court applied the balancing test announced in Barker v. Wingo to evaluate this claim, considering the accused’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, and whether there was any prejudice to the accused. Upon balancing these factors, the court found that Glaum had not shown a violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the State’s motion to amend the information and denied Glaum’s motion for continuance, finding that the court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or misinterpret or misapply the law. View "State v. Glaum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the decision of the District Court of Ramsey County in a case involving a man, James Driver, who was charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, reckless endangerment, and driving under suspension or revocation. Driver appealed his conviction, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was the operator of the vehicle involved in the chase and that the vehicle was driven in a way that showed extreme indifference to human life. He also argued that the State had presented irrelevant evidence and made an improper opening statement about dismissed theft and trespassing charges, thus prejudicing his case.The Supreme Court disagreed, indicating that the district court did not err in denying Driver's motion for a new trial or his motion for judgment of acquittal. The court ruled that the district court had not abused its discretion in these decisions, and that there was substantial evidence to support Driver's convictions. In terms of the opening statement and the presentation of evidence, the court found that the State's actions were proper at the time and that any comments made about the dismissed charges were reasonable given the circumstances. The court also noted that the jury had been instructed to disregard any statements made by counsel that were not supported by evidence. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Driver's conviction. View "State v. Driver" on Justia Law

Zachary Archambault appealed from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Archambault had been found guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a minor child, a class AA felony. Postconviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. In these proceedings, the applicant bears the burden to establish the grounds for relief.Archambault claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in six ways. The district court addressed each of his claims and made detailed findings and conclusions regarding each ground. Among his claims, Archambault argued that his trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress his three-hour video confession because he was suffering from drug and alcohol effects and wanted to self-harm. Additionally, he argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not interview the minor victim before trial.The district court found that Archambault did not show his trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The court made a series of findings that were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and were supported by evidence. These included the court's conclusion that the decision to permit equipment in the jury room is a discretionary decision that will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion, and that an unsuccessful trial strategy does not make defense counsel’s assistance defective. Based on the Supreme Court's review of the record, it agreed with the district court in denying Archambault’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and the order denying his application for postconviction relief was affirmed. View "Archambault v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Kimberly Ann Henderson, who was convicted of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and attempted theft. Henderson worked for Home Helpers, an agency that assists elderly people. During her time there, she was assigned to Mr. and Mrs. Cooper and had access to their financial information. The State alleged she used the Coopers’ financial accounts to pay her bills and make personal purchases. She was charged with exploitation of an eligible adult and criminal attempt of theft of property, with the value of the funds in question exceeding $50,000 and $10,000 respectively.At trial, the State presented testimony from four witnesses and submitted thirteen exhibits, including financial documents, receipts, an eviction notice, surveillance photos from multiple businesses, and a video of an interview with Henderson. Henderson objected to the admissibility of 12 exhibits, arguing they were not properly authenticated and were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court overruled these objections and admitted the exhibits. The jury subsequently convicted Henderson on both counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the District Court had abused its discretion by admitting the exhibits without proper authentication and as inadmissible hearsay. The Supreme Court held that the testimony did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 803(6)(D), N.D.R.Ev. which provides a hearsay exception for records kept in the regular course of business. The Court found that the detective's testimony did not explain how the exhibits came into existence in the ordinary course of business, nor did the record contain an affidavit that could have rendered them self-authenticating. Given these pervasive errors and considering a set value was alleged in each count, the judgment was reversed. View "State v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Lawrence Weber, who was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI). Weber's driving privileges were suspended for 180 days by a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer following his refusal to take a chemical breath test after his arrest. Weber argued that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney, which he claimed invalidated the authority of the North Dakota Department of Transportation to revoke his driving privileges.On February 26, 2023, Weber was arrested after an onsite screening test showed a blood alcohol content of .152 percent. Following his arrest, when asked to take a chemical breath test, Weber invoked his Fifth Amendment rights and requested an attorney. Despite being given access to his phone to contact his attorney, Weber made a call to an individual who refused to help him contact his attorney. Weber did not attempt to make further calls or ask for additional time to contact his attorney.The hearing officer found that Weber refused to take the chemical breath test and had a reasonable opportunity to call an attorney. The officer's findings were upheld by the district court. Weber appealed the decision, maintaining that he was not provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court concluded that Weber was provided with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney and his right to counsel was satisfied. Weber's claim that he was denied the opportunity to contact an attorney was not supported by the evidence. The court found that the hearing officer's findings were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and her conclusion that Weber was not deprived of his right to consult counsel was in accordance with the law. View "Weber v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Rozalyn Rinde appealed from a criminal judgment after the district court revoked her probation and resentenced her. Rinde was initially charged with five counts, including unlawful possession of a controlled substance and endangerment of a child or vulnerable adult. She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to 360 days with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, with all but 63 days suspended for two years of supervised probation. However, after multiple violations of her probation, the court revoked her probation and resentenced her to 360 days on the misdemeanor count and to five years on the felony count. Rinde argued that the court imposed an illegal sentence, exceeding the maximum penalty allowed at the time of her original offenses. She also claimed that the sentence violated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.The Supreme Court of North Dakota found that the district court had not imposed an illegal sentence. The court stated that the determining factor in applying the statute governing probation revocation (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-07(6)) was the date of the original convictions and sentencing, not the date of the offense. Since Rinde’s original conviction and sentencing occurred after the August 2021 amendment of the statute, which removed the restriction on a court’s ability to resentence a defendant in the case of a suspended sentence, the court was not limited by the pre-amendment version of the statute. Therefore, the court was within its rights to resentence Rinde to five years on her felony count. The court also rejected Rinde's claim of an "ex post facto application," stating that the amendment did not increase the maximum possible punishment for her crime, nor did it make an innocent act criminal, aggravate the crime, or relax the evidence required to prove the offense. As such, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "State v. Rinde" on Justia Law