Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner-Appellant Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate of Audrey Hollingsworth, appeals from a district court judgment determining the distribution of insurance proceeds. Jerry Hollingsworth, Petitioner's brother had lived in a house he shared with their mother Audrey and continued to live there after her death. The house was insured under a farm and ranch policy issued by Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak) which listed Jerry Hollingsworth as the primary insured, with Audrey Hollingsworth listed as an additional insured. After Audrey Hollingsworth's death, the Estate was listed as the additional insured. The house was destroyed by fire in 2006. Nodak issued several checks made payable to Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate for the loss. Disputes arose over the various heirs' rights in the insurance proceeds, and Lyle Hollingsworth, as personal representative of the Estate, began proceedings in the informal probate requesting that the district court order a division of the insurance proceeds. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment directing division of various components of the insurance proceeds between Jerry Hollingsworth and the Estate. The court concluded that the portion of the insurance proceeds paid for loss of the dwelling should be divided on the basis of the relative percentage value of Jerry Hollingsworth's life estate and the Estate's remainder interest, as calculated by actuarial tables. Finding that there was an "unsupervised probate" of the case, it could not be appealed without a Rule 54(b) certification. Because the district court's judgment resolved some but not all of the disputed between the parties in this case, the disbursement of the insurance proceeds was not a final, appealable judgment. The Supreme Court determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case further, and dismissed the appeal. View "Estate of Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

JB Mineral Services, LLC (JB), appealed the grant of summary judgment declaring an oil and gas lease terminated and awarding statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees to Dahn P. Beaudoin and J. Willard Beaudoin, as trustees of the William Beaudoin Irrevocable Mineral Trust (Beaudoins). JB sought to lease the Beaudoins' oil and gas interests, and sent a lease, a supplemental agreement and a document it alleged was a "120-say sight draft" for $165,000. Later, JB sent a revised lease and a 25-day sight draft to Beaudoins, reflecting JB's claim that Beaudoins owned 3.68 fewer mineral acres than covered in the original lease. The revised lease would also have extended the term of the lease approximately six months longer than a July 2009 lease. Beaudoins never executed or agreed to the revised lease and did not present the second sight draft for payment. Beaudoins claim that the "termination date" under the supplemental agreement was January 12, 2010, which was 120 business days after they signed the lease and supplemental agreement in July, 2009. JB's position was that it had until January 20, 2010, to pay a supplemental bonus payment by funding the July 2009 sight draft. Beaudoins' counsel responded by faxed letter dated January 20, 2010, reiterating that the lease had already terminated and was invalid. JB never authorized payment of the July 2009 sight draft, but recorded the original July 2009 lease on January 20, 2010. Beaudoins sued JB to have the lease declared invalid and for statutory damages, costs, and attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Beaudoins, finding the district court did not err in concluding JB failed to timely pay or tender the sum required to continue the 2009 lease and that the lease automatically terminated by its express terms. View "Beaudoin v. JB Mineral Services" on Justia Law

The Marcil Group, Inc. (TMGI), Michael J. Marcil, and Arthur S. Rosenberg appeal from a judgment awarding Alerus Financial, N.A., $2,520,383.07 based on guaranties they had given Alerus for a commercial real estate loan made to KRE, LLC. In 2008, KRE received a loan from Alerus to purchase commercial real estate in Fargo. Marcil and Rosenberg are respectively the chief executive officer and president of TMGI, which holds 51 percent of KRE's stock. KRE granted Alerus a first mortgage against the property purchased with the loan proceeds. TMGI, Marcil, and Rosenberg individually executed separate documents guaranteeing KRE's debt. In 2010, KRE defaulted on the promissory note. Alerus declared the entire balance of the loan due, commenced a foreclosure action against KRE, and indicated it would not seek a deficiency judgment against KRE but would instead pursue its available remedies against the guarantors. In 2011, the district court granted Alerus's motion for summary judgment in the foreclosure action against KRE and scheduled a sheriff's sale of the property for early March 2011. KRE filed for bankruptcy shortly before the scheduled sale, and the sheriff's sale was cancelled. During this time, Alerus had also begun a separate action against TMGI, Marcil, and Rosenberg to enforce the guaranties. After Alerus moved for summary judgment, the guarantors moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted Alerus's summary judgment motion and denied the guarantors' motion to dismiss. The court concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact and held TMGI, Marcil, and Rosenberg jointly and severally liable under the terms of their guaranties. In June 2011, while this appeal was pending, Rosenberg filed for bankruptcy. Rosenberg's appeal was stayed pending discharge of his bankruptcy proceedings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded TMGI and Marcil did not present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact about fraud, mistake, waiver, or estoppel. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting Alerus's motion for summary judgment. View "Alerus Financial v. Marcil Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Chase Wisness appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Nodak Mutual Insurance Company (Nodak), finding its Farm and Ranch Excess Liability Policy did not provide coverage for his claim. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred by finding the insurance policy did not provide underinsured motorist coverage. In 2007, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle driven by an unrelated third party. An accident occurred, and Plaintiff was injured and is now a paraplegic. At the time of the accident, Milo Wisness, Plaintiff's father, owned a Nodak Mutual automobile insurance policy with underinsured motorist limits of $500,000. Milo Wisness also owned a Farm and Ranch Excess Liability Policy issued by Nodak. Plaintiff settled with Nodak for underinsured limits on the automobile policy and reserved the right to pursue a claim under the excess liability policy. Plaintiff then sued alleging that Nodak wrongfully denied his claim under his excess liability policy because the policy provided underinsured motorist coverage, that Nodak used bad faith when denying the claim and that his father's insurance agent negligently counseled Milo Wisness about what insurance policy to buy. Nodak and the agent denied the allegations. Plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to declare coverage existed for his claim. Judgment was entered awarding Nodak its costs and dismissing Wisness's claim with prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the excess liability policy did not cover Plaintiff's claim, and affirmed the court's decision. View "Wisness v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Benz Farm, LLP ("Benz") appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against Cavendish Farms, Inc. ("Cavendish") for breach of contract and violation of the Unlawful Sales or Advertising Practices Act, and awarding Cavendish attorney fees. In 2006, Cavendish and Benz entered into written agreements for the sale and purchase of potatoes. One was a "Grower Storage Agreement," under which Benz agreed to grow and sell, and Cavendish agreed to buy, 150,000 hundredweight of potatoes, to be stored after harvest by Benz until Cavendish directed they be delivered to its processing plant. The second agreement was a "Company Storage Agreement," under which Benz agreed to grow and sell, and Cavendish agreed to buy, 113,000 hundredweight of potatoes, to be delivered to and stored by Cavendish. The parties also entered into a written credit agreement, whereby Cavendish agreed to provide financing for Benz's expenses in growing the potatoes. Benz claims that there were numerous oral agreements regarding the dates that Cavendish would accept deliveries, but that Cavendish accepted only limited deliveries on those dates, causing inefficiencies and additional expenses for Benz. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissing Benz's breach of contract claims; (2) the Unlawful Sales or Advertising Practices Act did not apply to, or create a cause of action against, a purchaser; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Benz's motion to amend its complaint; and (4) the district court did not err in awarding Cavendish attorney fees. View "Benz Farm, LLP v. Cavendish Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

K & L Homes appealed a district court judgment based upon a jury verdict in favor of Neal Leno and Susan Leno ("the Lenos"). On appeal, K & L Homes argued: (1) the district court erred by deciding K & L Homes had not sufficiently raised the defense of fault by the Lenos in its answer; (2) the court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, the court erred by denying K & L Homes' request for inspection and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during a jury viewing; and (3) the court erred by ruling K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties as a matter of law. The Lenos purchased a newly-constructed house from K & L Homes. The Lenos alleged they noticed cracks, unevenness, and shifting due to improper construction not long after purchasing the house from K & L Homes. Initially, the Lenos claimed K & L Homes was negligent, breached the parties' contract, and breached implied warranties. The Lenos claimed the parties' contract implied warranties that the house would be built according to the applicable codes, that it would fit its purpose as a residence, and that it would be constructed according to engineering standards and in a workmanlike condition. K & L Homes requested the jury be instructed on comparative fault, but the district court denied the proposed comparative fault instruction. The district court decided K & L Homes had not adequately pled fault, and comparative fault did not apply to Lenos' cause of action. The district court also found, as a matter of law, that K & L Homes had not disclaimed any implied warranties in a Homeowners' Guide given to the Lenos at the closing on the house. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the findings made by the district court and affirmed its decisions as to all issues raised on appeal. View "Leno v. K & L Homes" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Loren David appealed a district court's judgment confirming an arbitration panel's award of damages to James Valley Grain, LLC. In July 2007, James Valley and Defendant contracted to sell James Valley soybeans to be grown during the 2008 season. In August 2008, James Valley sued, alleging Defendant improperly cancelled the contracts in April 2008 and claiming damages for anticipatory repudiation, breach of contract and promissory estoppel. James Valley moved to compel arbitration, arguing the National Grain and Feed Association ("NGFA") Rules were incorporated into the contracts. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that no valid arbitration agreement existed and, if there was a valid arbitration agreement, it was unconscionable and that James Valley waived arbitration by filing the complaint. The district court ordered arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was properly incorporated, that the arbitration clause was not unconscionable and that James Valley did not waive its right to arbitrate by filing the complaint. The parties arbitrated the case before a panel from the NGFA. A hearing about confirmation of the arbitration award was held, and the district court confirmed the arbitration award. Defendant argued the district court erred by confirming the arbitration decision because a valid arbitration agreement did not exist, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and the arbitration panel failed to properly apply the law and arbitration rules. James Valley argued Defendant waived his right to challenge the arbitration award because he did not move to vacate the award within the statutory time limit. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment confirming the arbitration award. View "James Valley Grain v. David" on Justia Law

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order. View "Brigham Oil v. Lario Oil" on Justia Law

Defendant Linus Poitra appealed a default judgment entered by the district court regarding a lease between Plaintiff Darrel Gustafson as lessee and Leon and Linus Poitra as lessors. Linus Poitra argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the default judgment because the Poitras were members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, and the land subject to the lease is Indian-owned fee land located within the boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Linus Poitra argued the default judgment infringed upon tribal sovereignty because of cases pending in the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the evidence presented at trial, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment finding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the lease.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Doug Zink and Ted Keller appealed a district court judgment that dismissed their complaint, denied their motions, and awarded Enzminger Steel attorney's fees and costs. Enzminger Steel contracted with Doug Zink to supply components for a new grain drying site. The contract listed Zink as the purchaser, but Zink and his son Jeremy signed the contract. Doug Zink and Keller contend that they had formed a partnership for the purposes of constructing and operating the site. They further alleged that it was this partnership and not the Zinks separately, that entered into the contract with Enzminger Steel. Sometime after construction began, Zink and Keller learned that certain unsuitable components had been used in the site's construction. Zink and Keller refused to make payments under the contract. Two separate breach of contract actions followed, one brought by Enzminger Steel and one brought by Zink and Keller. At trial, the district court repeatedly questioned whether the alleged partnership between Zink and Keller was a ruse to allow Keller to practice law without a license. Keller later told the court that he and Zink had entered into an unwritten partnership agreement to share profits and losses. The court replied, "[T]he agreement that you are in is to share profits off this lawsuit which is not allowed." Neither Zink nor Keller produced any documents to prove the partnership. The district court entered an order denying all of the motions in this case and dismissed the action brought by Zink and Keller with prejudice. On appeal, Zink and Keller argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying the various motions in this case, ordering them to prove that a partnership existed, and awarding attorney's fees and costs to Enzminger Steel. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that while the district court had the power to dismiss a case in the absence of a party's motion, it must provide the parties with adequate notice and an opportunity to respond. Because Doug Zink did not have adequate notice or an opportunity to respond, the dismissal of his case with prejudice was reversed. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.