Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee Barbara McDermott appealed a district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Kevin Pifer when the court concluded that Defendant's mother Dorothy Bevan, validly gifted Plaintiff an option to purchase land. In 2001, Ms. Bevan executed a durable power of attorney in favor of Plaintiff who was a distant relative. Thereafter, Plaintiff assisted Bevan with managing her farmland and performing miscellaneous other tasks. Ms. Bevan granted Plaintiff the option to purchase that land in 2004. Ms. Bevan died in 2010, and Plaintiff recorded a notice of his intent to exercise the option. Defendant rejected the attached cashier's check, questioning Ms. Bevan's capacity to execute the purchase option agreement. Plaintiff subsequently sued for specific performance of the purchase option. The district court granted Plaintiff partial summary judgment, concluding the purchase option agreement was valid and enforceable. In its judgment, the district court stated, "This Judgment shall be final for appeal purposes, and there is no just reason for delay." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court inappropriately certified the partial summary judgment under the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court abused its discretion in directing an entry of final judgment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed Defendant's appeal and directed the district court to vacate its portion of the partial summary judgment certifying the judgment as final. View "Pifer v. McDermott" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Rodney Brossart appealed a default judgment entered against him in a collection action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Raymond J. German, Ltd. for legal services allegedly rendered to him. On appeal, Appellant argued the district court erred in granting German a default judgment, and German failed to prove the existence of an attorney-client agreement between itself and Appellant, precluding the default. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the default and affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in entering a default in favor of German, because Appellant "appeared" under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and German provided him with notice of the motion for a default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a)(3). Furthermore, the Court held that it was reasonable for the trial court to ask for written proof of the attorney-client relationship prior to entering the default judgment. View "Raymond J. German, Ltd. v. Brossart" on Justia Law

Sisters of Mary of the Presentation Long Term Care, d/b/a Ave Maria Village ("Sisters of Mary"), appealed, and Northern Excavating Co., Inc. ("Northern") cross-appealed a trial court's judgment awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent and costs at $743.33, and awarding Sisters of Mary $3,231.00 in attorney's fees. In October of 2009, Sisters of Mary and Northern executed a contract wherein Northern agreed to repair a water main break on Sisters of Mary's property for the cost of its "[t]ime and [m]aterials[.]" The contract did not contain a specific price. Following completion of the repairs, Northern submitted a bill for $103,244.11 to Sisters of Mary. Sisters of Mary found the bill excessive and refused to pay, asserting the repairs only had a value of approximately $40,000. Northern filed a construction lien covering the repaired property and sued Sisters of Mary seeking $98,806.98 for breach of contract and foreclosure of the lien. Sisters of Mary answered and counterclaimed alleging breach of contract, unlawful sales practices, and invalid construction lien/slander of title. Sisters of Mary also sought a jury trial. By stipulation, issues relating to the foreclosure of the construction lien were reserved and not submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict awarding Northern $81,694.23 plus interest at 1.5 percent for time and materials provided under the contract. After the verdict was rendered, Sisters of Mary applied for its costs and attorney's fees. In its post-trial brief, Sisters of Mary claimed it successfully challenged Northern's lien and argued the court was required to award it all of its attorney's fees and costs associated with the action. In its own post-trial brief, Northern argued it was unreasonable to require lienholders to pay costs and attorney's fees when a lienholder does not recover the precise amount claimed in a lien. The trial court ultimately awarded Sisters of Mary a portion of its attorney's fees, explaining it was a reasonable award given Sisters of Mary failed to specify "any fees that were directly related to the construction lien issue[.]" The trial court also found Northern was the prevailing party and awarded its costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Legislature intended to award an owner literally all of the costs and attorney's fees arising out of a lawsuit when challenging a lien was not the only disputed cause of action: "[t]here is nothing in the statute or the legislative history to support that conclusion. We recognize that Sisters of Mary must provide the court with an itemization of its attorney's fees and costs in order for the trial court to determine those related to the successful contest of the accuracy of the lien." The Court reversed the award of attorney's fees and costs and remanded that issue to the trial court. Because the district court misconstrued the fees and costs statute, the Court reversed in part and remanded for the district court to determine the reasonable amount of attorney's fees associated with contesting the accuracy of the construction lien. View "Northern Excavating v. Sisters of Mary of the Presentation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Sean Weeks appealed a summary judgment that dismissed his claims against Michael Geiermann and Collection Center, Inc. (collectively "Collection Center") for violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. In 2009, Plaintiff brought this action against the Center for its attempt to collect $3,034.21 in interest on a debt he owed to Medcenter One for clinic and hospital services. Plaintiff obtained medical services from Medcenter's clinic and hospital. According to billing records for the clinic, Plaintiff received services between 2002 and 2008 and was billed $6,752.46, of which his insurance paid $4,698.72. After an insurance adjustment of $1,427.26, Weeks was responsible for $626.48. Weeks paid $453.40, and after another adjustment of $2.03, $171.05 remained unpaid. In July 2009, attorney Geiermann on behalf of Collection Center sent Plaintiff a letter, demanding payment to the hospital for $4,481.22 and to the clinic for $171.05. The letter also demanded $3,003.28 in interest for the hospital and $30.93 in interest for the clinic. The district court granted Collection Center's summary judgment motion and dismissed Plaintiff's action, stating the case was "fairly straightforward." The court held there was no disagreement that Plaintiff had incurred a debt to Medcenter for medical services that remained unpaid which constituted a "legal indebtedness." The court further held that, according to Plaintiff's affidavit, he never received anything in writing from Medcenter indicating any interest would be assessed in the event of nonpayment of this debt after a specified period of time. The court concluded "as a matter of law, that [Collection Center was] rightfully entitled to collect interest from Weeks at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the legal indebtedness owed by Weeks to [Collection Center], as the assignee of Medcenter One." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that a "medical services provider," who does not make disclosures required under N.D.C.C. 13-01-15 to charge the "late payment charge" allowed under N.D.C.C. 13-01-14.1, is still entitled to prejudgment interest under N.D.C.C. 47-14-05 at the legal rate of six percent per annum. View "Weeks v. Geiermann" on Justia Law

Richard and Elaine Benson, Bill and Mary Bliven, Don and Annette Feist, Pat Lynch, and Lloyd and Donna Tribitt ("Bensons") appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed their claim that SRT Communications, Inc.,was contractually obligated to provide them post-retirement health and medical benefits. The Bensons are four retired employees of the Minot telephone business, their spouses, and Pat Lynch, the widow of a deceased retiree, Thomas Lynch. Richard Benson, Bill Blevin, Don Feist, Lloyd Tribitt, and Thomas Lynch worked for NSP before it sold its telephone business to Minot Telephone in 1991, and they all retired from Minot Telephone between 1991 and 1994, before Souris River purchased Minot Telephone from Rochester. With the exception of Don Feist, the retired employees belonged to Local Union No. 949 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers when the labor union and NSP entered into a collective bargaining agreement in 1991. Feist previously had been a member of the labor union, but did not belong to the union when it entered into the 1991 collective bargaining agreement with NSP. The district court concluded the 1991 collective bargaining agreement expired on December 31, 1993, and although SRT Communications continued to provide post-retirement health benefits to the Bensons for over fourteen years after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, it did so as a matter of business discretion and not because of a contractual obligation. The district court dismissed the Bensons' claims against SRT Communications. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the Bensons' action was governed by federal law and they failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact. View "Benson v. SRT Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Richard Dregseth appealed a district court's judgment that dismissed his equitable claims against Appellee Randy Brown. Appellant argued that the district court erred in failing to make findings of fact, failed to reject testimony and dismissed his promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment claims. In 1999, Appellant left his job at Bremer Bank to work for Appellee Brown at Capital Harvest, Inc., a captive finance company for AGSCO, Inc., a corporation owned Brown. Appellant worked for Brown until 2003, first at Capital Harvest then at AGSCO. In 2005, Appellee and two former Capital Harvest employees, John D. Erickson and Jon A. Ramsey, sued Brown and Capital Harvest for breach of contract, fraud, deceit, promissory estoppel, equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary duty. Appellee claimed he was entitled to be paid the value of an ownership interest in Capital Harvest that Brown promised to provide as part of his compensation. Prior to trial, the district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims except for breach of contract and fraud. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part of the first appeal. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Appellant's deceit and equitable claims. On rehearing, the district court then dismissed the remaining claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed. In this case before the Supreme Court, the Court found that the district court's findings and conclusions were based on evidence from all of the witnesses, including Appellant, Brown and the economists who testified on behalf of both parties. Therefore the Court concluded the district court did not err relying on that evidence, nor did it err concluding under the facts of this case that Brown was not unjustly enriched by not paying Appellant for the value of the ownership interest in Capital Harvest that was not transferred by Brown. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no error to make findings of fact, to reject testimony or in dismissing Appellant's claims. View "Erickson v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellants Cendak Development Corporation and Fort Rice Bar & Grill, Inc. (Cendak), appealed a judgment entered in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellees Richard and Mary Bendish, which cancelled the Bendishes' contract for deed with James Castillo and held Cendak had no right to redeem the property under a lease purchase agreement. This issue in this case centered on the cancellation of a contract for deed. In 2003, Bendishes owned land in Fort Rice where they operated a business called the "Outpost." In March 2003, the Bendishes entered into a contract for deed to sell the property to Castillo for $40,400. Castillo made a down payment of $7,500 and was to make monthly payments of $620.86 on the contract for deed, with an annual interest rate of five percent. Castillo made regular payments on the contract for deed through January 1, 2005. In 2006, Richard Bendish, Castillo, and Ivan Gange, on behalf of Cendak, executed a "Lease Purchase Agreement," which included handwritten notations initialed by each of the parties. The agreement was not filed with the Morton County Register of Deeds. Castillo and then Gange operated the Fort Rice Bar & Grill on the premises. After January 2005, Bendishes received sporadic payments from Castillo and then Gange. In 2010, the Bendished sued Castillo alleging default under the terms of the contract for deed. Cendak answered the suit, alleging that Castillo had assigned the contract to Cendak, the Bendishes accepted the assignment and accepted payments from Cendak pursuant to the contract. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the district court erred when it failed to give Cendak a period of redemption in the action to cancel the contract for deed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "Based upon the language of the Lease Purchase Agreement and the equities of the situation, we cannot say that the district court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or that its decision was not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Cendak a redemption period." View "Bendish v. Castillo" on Justia Law

The Industrial Commission and Slawson Exploration Company appealed a district court judgment that reversed the Commission's assessment of a risk penalty against Gadeco, LLC. The issue in this case arose from a challenge to the validity of an invitation to participate in the cost of drilling a well which resulted in the Commission's assessment of a 200 percent risk penalty. Because the Supreme Court was unable to discern the basis for the Commission's decision, the Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the Commission for the preparation of findings that explain the reasons for its decision. View "Gadeco v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

Defendants-Appellants Dakota Sanitation Plus, Inc. (DSP) and Peggy Becker appealed a district court judgment that awarded Plaintiff-Appellee Mark Rickert the value of his shares in DSP at the time the corporation was dissolved in December 2007. Prior to his death in 1998, Harvey Rickert operated an unincorporated trash removal business called Dakota Sanitation which had a contract to provide residential trash removal for the City of Mandan. Becker lived with and was engaged to Harvey Rickert, and she worked in the trash removal business with him. Becker, Mark Rickert, and Kim Rickert thereafter incorporated DSP, with each owning one-third of the shares. Becker was the president of the corporation and was in charge of its daily operations. The three stockholders shared the corporate profits equally. DSP provided residential trash removal under the existing contract with Mandan and, when that contract expired in October 2007, DSP was awarded a new contract for trash removal in Mandan through October 2012. Becker contended the shareholders had entered into an unwritten agreement which provided that, after expiration of the original Mandan contract in 2007, the corporation would be dissolved, Becker would receive all the assets of DSP, and Becker would acquire "the sole and exclusive right to the City of Mandan contract." At a special shareholders' meeting in December 2007, Becker and Kim Rickert voted to dissolve DSP. Mark Rickert voted against dissolution. All of the corporate assets, including the new Mandan contract, were subsequently transferred to Armstrong Sanitation and Rolloff, Inc., a separate corporation solely owned by Becker. Mark Rickert made a written demand for payment of the fair value of his shares as a dissenting shareholder. When DSP and Becker failed to comply with Mark Rickert's demand, sued for recovery of the fair value of his shares on the date of dissolution and damages for fraud. DSP and Becker answered and counterclaimed, with Becker seeking damages against Mark Rickert for unjust enrichment. DSP and Becker argued that Mark Rickert was not entitled to payment for the value of his shares because of the alleged unwritten shareholder agreement that DSP would be dissolved in 2007 and Becker would receive all of the corporate assets, with no compensation to Mark Rickert or Kim Rickert. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in its judgment against Mark Rickert. The Court affirmed the district court. View "Rickert v. Dakota Sanitation Plus" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Nodak Mutual Insurance Company appealed from a judgment awarding Plaintiff-Appellee Barry Myaer $34,933.24 plus interest in his breach of contract action against Nodak. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in ruling Plaintiff was entitled to deferred commissions payable to him in December 2009, but did err in ruling those commissions could exceed 10 percent under the terms of the parties' contract. View "Myaer v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law