Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Charles Blunt appealed a district court order that denied his motion for a new trial. He argued the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the State violated procedural discovery rules. Defendant was the Executive Director of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") from 2004 to 2007. The State Auditor's Office conducted a performance review of WSI in 2006, and the Auditor's report questioned the use of public funds at WSI. As a result of the Auditor's report, Defendant was charged with two counts of misapplication of entrusted property in violation of state law. State rules of procedure hold that if the State fails to disclose certain discoverable information to a criminal defendant, the trial court has discretion in applying a remedy when a violation of the rule has been shown. Without a showing of an abuse of the court's discretion, the issue is not appealable. Although the Supreme Court concluded the State likely violated the discovery rules, a careful review of the entire record reflected that the information contained in the undisclosed documents was contained in other documents provided to Defendant. Furthermore, the Court concluded that Defendant did not establish he was prejudiced by the violations. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion for a new trial.

Defendant Kenneth Murchison appealed a district court order that summarily denied his application for post-conviction relief. Defendant was convicted of assaulting a correctional institution employee, and judgment was entered on November 3, 2003. Represented by an attorney, Defendant appealed his conviction arguing he was denied a fair trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was denied the right to an impartial and unbiased trial judge. In July 2010, Defendant filed an application for post-conviction relief in the district court. Defendant argued his due process rights were violated because the arraignment, preliminary hearing, pretrial hearing and trial were held on the same day. Furthermore, Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and during his appeal. The State moved for summary judgment and dismissal of Defendant's application for post-conviction relief. The district court granted the State's motion, and Defendant appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant failed to meet "his heavy burden" of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Murchison claimed he did not receive the appellate briefs or this Court's decision, but he failed to state how he was prejudiced or how the result would have been any different. Further, his attorney's decision to waive oral argument cannot alone be considered ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Defendant failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney's conduct, the district court did not err in denying his application for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner David Allen Day sought a supervisory writ from the Supreme Court to direct the district court to vacate its order denying his motion to dismiss. In April 2010, Petitioner was charged by complaint with driving under the influence of alcohol. A jury trial was held in February 2011. After the jury was empanelled and sworn, the trial court called a brief recess and the attorneys left the courtroom. At some point, Petitioner was alone in the courtroom with the jurors and the bailiff. When the attorneys returned to the courtroom, they witnessed what appeared to be a conversation between the bailiff, the jurors, and Petitioner. The trial court returned to the courtroom and read the opening instructions. After the instructions were read, the State moved for a mistrial based on the communication between the bailiff, the jurors and Petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing a second trial was prohibited under Fifth Amendment double jeopardy principles. The trial court, with a different presiding judge, denied Petitioner's motion to dismiss, finding a mistrial was reasonably necessary. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a supervisory writ, concluding that double jeopardy prohibited the district court from retrying Petitioner. The Court directed the lower court to enter an order dismissing the complaint.

Defendant-Appellee Salome Hinojosa appealed a jury verdict finding him guilty of delivering methamphetamine within one thousand feet of a university. The incident was alleged to have occurred in June 2009, in an apartment building near university property where law enforcement officers had sent a female confidential informant to purchase the drugs. In October, Defendant, who was already serving a prison sentence in North Dakota on a previous conviction, filed a request to have his trial held within 90 days. The case was set for a jury trial to be held on December 29, 2009. At the scheduled preliminary hearing on December 10, 2009, Defendant's attorney obtained a continuance of the preliminary hearing. On December 15, 2009, the State moved for a continuance of the trial to February 2010 because one of the State's scheduled witnesses was unavailable. Defendant's trial date was continued on two more occasions with his consent, subject to the condition that Defendant was not waiving his "ability to argue that his right to a speedy trial was violated at some time in the past." The trial was eventually held in April 2010. On appeal, Defendant argued his rights under the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act were violated when the district court in December 2009 granted the State's motion for a continuance which pushed his trial date beyond the 90-day limit. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act was not violated by the failure to hold Defendant's trial within 90 days of the filing of his request and that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision and Defendant's conviction.

B.T., the father of L.T., appealed the juvenile court's order that adopted a judicial referee's findings of fact and order committing L.T. to the care of the Division of Juvenile Services following his admissions to gross sexual imposition and ingestion of a controlled substance. During his initial appearance and his pretrial conference, L.T. appeared with court-appointed counsel, but his parents were not separately represented. L.T. admitted to the charges in the State's petition following an amendment. The amendment reduced the felony level of the gross sexual imposition charge against L.T. which allowed him to avoid being tried as an adult. At the dispositional hearing, L.T. and his parents B.T. and H.T. were all represented by separate court-appointed counsel. There was much debate over mandatory registration of L.T. as a sexual offender, but the judicial referee concluded L.T. would be required to register. Neither L.T. nor his mother H.T. appealed the judicial referee's order committing L.T. to Juvenile Services and mandating his registration as a sexual offender. However B.T. appealed, requesting the juvenile court to review the judicial referee's order. B.T. argued the referee erred by not adequately advising B.T. that L.T. would be required to register as a sexual offender after admitting to the State's charges. Furthermore, B.T. contended it was unconstitutional for an indigent parent to be denied court-appointed counsel during the adjudicative phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court rejected B.T.'s arguments and adopted the judicial referee's findings and order. On appeal, B.T. argued the State Uniform Juvenile Court Act was unconstitutional, and his constitutional right to counsel was violated in the first of L.T.'s adjudicative hearings. Upon careful consideration of the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that the right-to-counsel statute in North Dakota's Uniform Juvenile Court Act protects the constitutional rights of parents and juveniles. The Court affirmed the juvenile court's disposition of L.T.'s case.

On April 7, 2010, officers entered Tucker Payne's residence under the authority of Mr. Payne's probation. The officers limited their search to the living room area and to Mr. Payne's bedroom, which he shared with his girlfriend, Defendant-Appellant Karleen Peterson. In the bedroom, the officers found drug paraphernalia and a purse on the bedroom floor. A search of the purse revealed more drug paraphernalia. Defendant told the officers all drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom belonged to her. The State charged Defendant with one count each of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from her purse, arguing the warrantless search of the purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court found that by choosing to reside with a probationer, Defendant had a diminished expectation of privacy in the areas of the residence that she shared with the probationer. However the trial court concluded that Defendant's decision to live with a probationer could not "translate into consent for a warrantless search of her purse." Accordingly, the trial court concluded the warrantless search of Defendant's purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights, and it granted her motion to suppress. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record revealed that while searching Payne's bedroom, the officers found the paraphernalia in plain view. Nothing in the record demonstrated the non-suppressed evidence was inadequate for the drug paraphernalia charge. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's suppression of evidence taken from Defendant's purse because the State had ample other evidence to prove its case.

The State appealed from a district court order dismissing a charge of gross sexual imposition against Defendant-Appellee Willie Midell. At the preliminary hearing, the complaining witness, S.D.W., testified on behalf of the State. Upon the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the district court dismissed the charge with prejudice, finding the State failed to establish probable cause that Defendant committed the offense. On appeal, the State contended it presented evidence sufficient to support a finding of probable cause that Defendant committed the offense. The State also argued the district court erred by finding S.D.W.'s testimony implausible and incredible. Upon review of the testimony presented at the hearing, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not resolve conflicts between the witnesses' testimony in favor of the prosecution. The Court found that the evidence produced by the State was sufficient to establish that a crime had been committed and Defendant was probably guilty. The testimony was a "classic question of fact" for a jury and not for the district court in this preliminary hearing. The Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Petitioner Jonathan Kasowski appealed the revocation of his driving privileges by the North Dakota Department of Transportation (DOT) and the district court judgment affirming the revocation. Petitionerâs privileges were revoked for four years after he refused to submit to a chemical test for intoxication. The basis of Petitionerâs argument centered on whether he was âunder arrestâ when officers asked that he submit for the test. When he was first pulled over by police, the officer asked whether Petitioner had been drinking, and told him ânot to lie.â Petitioner stated that he âwanted to speak to his attorney about that.â No test was conducted at that time. Petitioner was taken to jail, and âsaid something about not being able to get a hold of an attorney at that time of the night.â The arresting officer repeated the state implied consent advisory, and again Petitioner refused to take the sobriety test. An administrative hearing was held at the DOT, and the hearing officer concluded that Petitioner was not under arrest when he was told ânot to lie.â When at the jail, the hearing officer found that Petitioner decided against speaking with an attorney. On review of the record, the Supreme Court reasoned that even if Petitioner was effectively subjected to a de facto arrest when he was first questioned, the arresting officers reasonably understood that Petitioner decided against speaking to an attorney. Petitioner was not denied the reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. The Court affirmed the revocation of Petitionerâs driving privileges.

Defendant Shane Duncan appealed his sentence stemming from domestic violence charges. He argued that judgment should be reversed and that he should be acquitted because of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendantâs wife refused to testify against him at trial. The State sought to admit an audio recording of the 911 call Mrs. Duncan made. Defendant alleged that his due process rights were violated when the State sought admission of the phone call. Defendant did not argue that the court erred in admitting the recording. Upon review, the Supreme Court did not find that Defendantâs due process rights were violated by the admission of the tape recording. The Court affirmed Defendantâs conviction.

Defendant Billy Joe Kinsella appealed the jury verdict that found him guilty of sexual assault and the order that denied him a new trial. Defendant argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the juryâs verdict and asserted that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendantâs motion for a new trial because the record contained sufficient evidence to establish each of the elements of the offenses. The Court held that the verdict did not go against the weight of the evidence, and affirmed the lower courtâs decisions.