Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Timothy Deviley and Ryan Lee appealed the criminal judgments entered on their conditional guilty pleas for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and reserving the right to appeal the order denying their motions to suppress evidence. Deviley and Lee argued they were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment because they were detained without a reasonable and articulable suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity. Lee further argued the length of time for the drug dog to arrive created a de facto arrest. Lee also argued the district court erred by denying a motion to reduce the charge against him because of inconsistent statutes. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the motions to suppress evidence, concluding there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion the defendants were engaged in criminal activity, and there was no unreasonable delay creating a de facto arrest. Further, the Court concluded Lee was correctly charged with a Class A felony and affirmed the criminal judgments. View "North Dakota v. Deviley" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dennis Gaede appealed an order that denied his application for post-conviction relief. In 2006 a jury convicted Petitioner of murdering Timothy Wicks in Gardner, and the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In October 2008, Petitioner filed his application raising 23 issues. An attorney was appointed to represent him. On the State's motion, the district court summarily dismissed five of the issues on the basis of misuse of process and res judicata, and ordered an evidentiary hearing to consider the remaining issues. The court subsequently granted Petitioner's motion to supplement his application to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise meritorious issues on direct appeal. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court rejected Petitioner's remaining allegations and denied his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, newly discovered evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other alleged defects in his jury trial. The Court denied Petitioner's application and dismissed his appeal. View "Gaede v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Defendant Branden Clark appealed an order that denied his motion for correction of sentence. Defendant argued his sentences were illegal because they merged with his sentences in two other cases and his due process rights were violated by the delay in holding a hearing on the petition to revoke his probation. In January 2005, Defendant was convicted of theft by deception (a class C felony) for which he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison with fifteen suspended and three years probation in each case. In April 2005, Defendant was convicted of theft of property (a class C felony) for which he was sentenced to five years in prison with three suspended and five years probation. In November 2005, Defendant was convicted of theft of services (a class C felony), for which he was sentenced to five years in prison with three years suspended and three years probation. In December 2005, the State filed a petition to revoke Defendant's probation. In 2009, the district court entered an order revoking Defendant's probation in all of his 2005 cases, and resentenced him to serve five years' imprisonment in each case. Upon review of Defendant's lengthy criminal record and the district court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's sentence was not illegal and his due process rights were not violated. The Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny Defendant's motion for correction of sentence. View "North Dakota v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant Kyle Pederson appealed a district court order that denied his motion to suppress evidence. Defendant became a suspect in multiple armed robberies in the Grand Forks area. Police officers decided to arrest Defendant based on information a confidential informant provided. Law officers conducted surveillance on Defendant's house and followed him when he left his home with the informant. Defendant and the informant went to a motel and reserved a room. Later that night the informant left the motel room and met with law officers. Four officers went to the motel room, carrying firearms and dressed in SWAT t-shirts and body armor. Defendant was charged with multiple counts of robbery and multiple counts of drug possession. Defendant moved to suppress, arguing all evidence seized after he was arrested should be suppressed because he was illegally arrested at the motel without a warrant, and any statements he made during his interrogation should have been suppressed because he invoked the right to an attorney. After a hearing, the district court denied Defendant's motion, ruling officers lawfully entered the motel room because Defendant voluntarily consented to the entry. The court concluded the statements made during the interrogation should not have been suppressed because Defendant did not unambiguously request an attorney. Defendant conditionally plead guilty to the charges against him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence supports the court's findings, and the court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statements. View "North Dakota v. Pederson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Paul Smestad appealed an order that denied his application for post-conviction relief. In December 2003, Petitioner pled guilty in Burleigh County to one count of theft by deception and one count of forgery. He was sentenced to three years in jail with all but eighteen months suspended and was placed on probation for three years following completion of his incarceration. In May 2008, a petition for extension of probation was filed because Petitioner had not fully paid restitution ordered under his initial sentence and an order was issued to extend Petitioner's probation for five years. After a hearing, the district court revoked his probation and sentenced him to three years in jail. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that he was entitled to post-conviction relief in part because documents that bore his signature extending his probation were not actually signed by Petitioner. The State opposed Petitioner's application claiming some issues raised were barred by res judicata. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Defendant's claim that his signature on a document extending his probation was not his signature was barred by res judicata. The Court denied Petitioner's application and dismissed his appeal. View "Smestad v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

The State appealed a district court order that granted Defendant Kevin Gefroh's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant was stopped for traffic violations. Officers had a drug-sniffing dog walk around the vehicle during the traffic stop, while Defendant was still sitting in his vehicle, and the drug-sniffing dog indicated the presence of controlled substances at the passenger-side door of the vehicle. Defendant was asked to step out of his vehicle, and he complied. After a pat-down search of Defendant, officers discovered four bundles of white powder that tested positive for cocaine. Defendant was arrested after the officers discovered the cocaine. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Defendant made a motion to suppress his statements and all physical evidence obtained by law enforcement during the stop, arguing he was illegally seized and searched. The district court found there was no testimony indicating officers believed the soft object found from the pat down could be a weapon, and concluded officers lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion Defendant's pocket contained a weapon. On appeal, the State argued the district court erred in suppressing the cocaine evidence because the search of Defendant's person was within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the warrantless search of Defendant's person. The Court affirmed the district court's order to suppress evidence. View "North Dakota v. Gefroh" on Justia Law

Defendant Adam Timothy Sommer appealed a criminal judgment entered on his conditional plea of guilty to three drug offenses. An informant told members of the Fargo Police Department Defendant was transporting marijuana and possibly heroin from the state of Washington to North Dakota. The Fargo Police Department obtained search warrants for Defendant's apartment and business. Police decided to search Defendant's vehicle without a warrant specifying the vehicle. The vehicle was parked outside the door to the apartment, but police moved the vehicle inside Defendant's automotive shop because of winter weather conditions. In order to move the vehicle, a detective drove to the jail, obtained Defendant's set of keys without his knowledge or consent, and brought the keys back to the search site. Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver or manufacture, possession of paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. He moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of the warrantless search of his vehicle, arguing the search was unconstitutional because there were no exigent circumstances--Defendant was in jail and there was no risk of him disposing of any evidence. After a suppression hearing the district court denied the motion. Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to each of the three charges. On appeal, Defendant argued the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in his circumstances because "something more than 'inherent' mobility is required." Specifically, Defendant argued "the likelihood of actual mobility must be evaluated" to determine if the automobile exception applies. Upon review, the Supreme Court reduced the issue on appeal in this case to "the dispositive question concerning application of the automobile exception" and "whether probable cause supported the search." Defendant conceded probable cause supported the search of his vehicle. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence found in the search of his vehicle. View "North Dakota v. Sommer" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivan Aabrekke appealed a jury's verdict that found him guilty of gross sexual imposition and the denial of his motions for a new trial and for a judgment of acquittal. The State charged Defendant with gross sexual imposition for allegedly engaging in a sexual act with his thirteen-year-old granddaughter at his Minnewaukan home on August 16, 2009. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to prevent the State from introducing evidence that he "has a history of engaging in various types of sexual activity with the [complainant] and that this activity has occurred over the years" and that "relatives of [Aabrekke] may have engaged in sexual acts with either the [complainant], or the [complainant's] mother." Defendant did not testify at trial, but did present other circumstantial evidence that the complainant was lying and that he had not engaged in the sexual act with the complainant. The court did not instruct the jury about the limited use of the evidence about prior sexual contact or acts, and the jury found Defendant guilty of gross sexual imposition. The court thereafter denied Defendant's post-trial motions for a new trial and for judgment of acquittal. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court erred in allowing the complainant to testify that he had engaged in prior sexual contact with her and in allowing the complainant's mother to testify about those acts. Defendant argued the court did not use the proper three-pronged analysis for considering the admissibility of prior bad act evidence and did not give a cautionary instruction regarding the limited purpose of that evidence. Defendant further argued the complainant's testimony about the prior bad acts was harmful and prejudicial and should have been excluded under the rules of procedure because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court failed to correctly apply the law regarding the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts.

Defendant Garron Gonzalez appealed from a second amended criminal judgment and order that revoked his probation and re-sentenced him to twenty years' imprisonment each on two counts of gross sexual imposition, to run consecutively. The trial court found that while Gonzalez's actions have not "yet risen to the level of actual sexual contact or sexual assault," Defendant had exhibited predatory behavior, which warranted a revocation of probation. The trial court further found Defendant took steps to conceal his activity and his status as a sex offender by using his middle rather than his first name and by misrepresenting his age to at least one of the minor females with whom he had contact. Based on Defendant's conduct and the fact this was his second revocation hearing, the trial court concluded Gonzalez was a dangerous person and re-sentenced him with credit given for time served. Defendant argued the trial court abused its discretion in calculating his sentence. Upon consideration of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Defendant Joshua Stroh appealed his conviction following a jury verdict that found him guilty of driving under the influence. Specifically, Defendant argued that the arresting officer had failed to ascertain a 20-minute waiting period before administering a chemical test on the "Intoxilyzer 5000," during which time the test subject may not have anything to eat, drink, or smoke. Over Stroh's objection, the court received the test record into evidence. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the Intoxilyzer test had been fairly administered and by admitting the test result into evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.