Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Rodney Brossart appealed a default judgment entered against him in a collection action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Raymond J. German, Ltd. for legal services allegedly rendered to him. On appeal, Appellant argued the district court erred in granting German a default judgment, and German failed to prove the existence of an attorney-client agreement between itself and Appellant, precluding the default. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the default and affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in entering a default in favor of German, because Appellant "appeared" under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a) and German provided him with notice of the motion for a default judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 55(a)(3). Furthermore, the Court held that it was reasonable for the trial court to ask for written proof of the attorney-client relationship prior to entering the default judgment. View "Raymond J. German, Ltd. v. Brossart" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Morin appealed a criminal judgment that was based upon his conditional plea of guilty to simple assault on a peace officer. Defendant pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. In 2010, Bismarck police officers responded to a domestic-disturbance call at the residence of Defendant and Christine Chase, Defendant’s girlfriend. At the suppression hearing, Chase and Officer Dustin Miller, one of the officers who responded, testified. Defendant moved to suppress evidence, alleging "[l]aw enforcement officers in this matter unlawfully entered the residence of Mr. Morin in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure." Defendant moved to suppress all "illegally obtained evidence seized" as a result of the entry and any statements he made after the entry. The State resisted Defendant’s motion. The district court held a hearing and denied Defendant’s motion, determining Chase consented to Officer Miller's entry of the home and exigent circumstances existed to allow Officer Miller to enter the home without a warrant. Based on the issues presented from the parties and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there was sufficient competent evidence to support the district court's findings. View "North Dakota v. Morin" on Justia Law

Defendant Christian Antonio Alaniz, Jr., appealed an order deferring imposition of sentence entered after he conditionally pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argued the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because there was not probable cause to justify the search of his person and the exception to the probable cause requirement for warrantless searches by school officials did not apply. Troy Vanyo was a police officer with the Grand Forks Police Department and was assigned to work as a school resource officer at a high school in Grand Forks. Vanyo had received information about possible drug use involving students in an area approximately a block and a half from the high school. One of the students was later identified as Defendant. The students walked to a town square area and Vanyo followed in his patrol car. Vanyo testified the students were seated when they saw him, stood up, and quickly walked toward a stage area in the town square. Later, Vanyo observed Defendant waiting to talk to the attendance secretary and he informed the school principal that Defendant was the other individual he observed in the town square and suspected was involved in drug activity. The principal took Defendant into a detention room and Vanyo followed them. Vanyo testified the principal questioned Defendant, Vanyo testified he told Defendant something like "if you have anything on you, you need to lay it on the table now." Defendant emptied his pockets, which contained a glass pipe and synthetic marijuana. In moving to suppress the evidence, Defendant argued the police failed to advise him of his rights under "Miranda v. Arizona," (384 U.S. 436 (1966)), there was not probable cause justifying the search of his person, and the exception to the probable cause requirement for searches by school officials did not apply. The district court denied the motion, ruling the reasonableness standard for searches by school officials applied and the search was reasonable. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the search was not excessively intrusive in light of Defendant's age, gender, and nature of the suspicion. View "North Dakota v. Alaniz" on Justia Law

Petitioner Paul Schock appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative order suspending his driver's license for 180 days for driving a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding "a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded Schock provided a breath sample within two hours of driving a motor vehicle." The Court declined to grant his request for attorney's fees and costs. View "Schock v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Attorney General, representing the State Board of Higher Education, petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and enjoin Secretary of State from placing a referendum measure on the June 2012 primary election ballot regarding 2011 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 580 ("Senate Bill 2370"). The submission of the referendum measure to the Secretary of State reinstated N.D.C.C. 15-10-46, which requires the University of North Dakota (UND) to use the "Fighting Sioux" nickname and logo for its intercollegiate athletic teams. A majority of the Court would have exercised its discretionary original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional issue about the Board's authority over UND; two members of the Court concluded this was not an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction. As a result, there were not enough members willing to decide the constitutional issue. The Court therefore did not address the constitutional issue presented, and declined to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum measure on the ballot. View "N.D. State Board of Higher Education v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

The City of Bismarck appealed from a district court order granting Defendant Daniel J. McCormick's post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal. In 2010, Defendant was charged with driving under the influence in violation of a Bismarck city ordinance. Defendant pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The jury returned a guilty verdict. In 2011, Defendant filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal because the City did not introduce the driving-under-the-influence ordinance into evidence. The City resisted, asserting Defendant was not surprised by the ordinance because the ordinance is almost identical to the statute prohibiting driving under the influence in the North Dakota Century Code. The City further asserted Defendant's post-trial motion was untimely because it was a motion that should have been made before trial. The district court granted Defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. The court held that without a statutory requirement it was not permitted to take judicial notice of a city ordinance unless a copy of the ordinance was received into evidence or the parties stipulated to its admission into evidence. The court also determined McCormick's motion was timely because he argued the city failed on its burden of proof at trial, which was a motion he could not have argued before trial. Concluding that the district court erred in granting Defendant's judgment of acquittal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Bismarck v. McCormick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Roger Mills, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, appealed a judgment that dismissed his claims against the City of Grand Forks to recover the amount of fines and fees collected in the past for noncriminal traffic violations by the City exceeding the amount the City could legally impose under state law. The City cross-appealed that judgment. In 2004, a Grand Forks police officer cited Plaintiff with careless driving. Under Grand Forks City Code, the maximum fine for violation of a noncriminal offense was $1,000 "in the discretion of the court." Plaintiff pled not guilty and proceeded to trial in municipal court. Plaintiff was found guilty. The municipal court imposed against Plaintiff "a fine in the amount of $151 with $0 suspended" and a hearing fee of $15. Plaintiff appealed to district court for a new trial; the court affirmed the conviction and the fine and fees totaling $166. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, but on December 1, 2004, the Court dismissed the appeal because the district court judgment was "not appealable under N.D.C.C. 39-06.1-03(5)." On August 16, 2010, Plaintiff brought a "Class Action Complaint for Restitution" in state district court seeking the amount of monies paid to Grand Forks exceeding the state law limits for fines for similar state offenses. Plaintiff asserted the excess fines, fees and charges were "involuntary and void." The City argued Plaintiff's claims were precluded by both res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the prior federal court action, and by res judicata because Mills failed to challenge the City's fine scheme in the 2004 state court proceedings. Because the district court correctly ruled Plaintiff's claims were thus barred by res judicata, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Mills v. City of Grand Forks" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Gregorio Montano appealed his conviction after a jury found him guilty of possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver, and for delivery of marijuana. Defendant argued on appeal that the Supreme Court should reverse his convictions and remand his case for further proceedings because his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when the district court failed to impose sanctions after the prosecutor made an inappropriate racial comment during rebuttal argument, and that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding his argument without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions. View "North Dakota v. Montano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Allen Perius appealed a district court judgment following a jury verdict in favor of Appellee Nodak Mutual Insurance Company. In 2004, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident with an uninsured driver, Jacob Kessler. Plaintiff insured his vehicle with Nodak for basic no-fault benefits and uninsured motorist benefits. Nodak paid Plaintiff no-fault benefits as a result of the accident. Plaintiff did not seek further medical treatment until March 2005, when he saw a chiropractor. Plaintiff submitted the bills to Nodak for payment as no-fault benefits. After Plaintiff submitted to an independent medical examination, Nodak denied him payment for any medical treatment after December 31, 2004, concluding such treatment was unrelated to the accident. In 2007, Plaintiff brought suit against Kessler, alleging he negligently operated his motor vehicle and caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff also sued Nodak, alleging the company breached its insurance contract with him. Nodak denied liability, and asserted a cross-claim against Kessler regarding Plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim. Kessler did not answer the claims against him. In 2009, Nodak moved for summary judgment, arguing no competent, admissible evidence established his claimed injuries were caused by the accident. Plaintiff resisted the motion, and submitted the affidavits of two of his treatment providers who stated their belief that Plaintiff's injuries and treatment were due to the accident. The district court granted Nodak's motion for summary judgment, and this Court reversed and remanded, finding disputed issues of material fact existed. A trial was set on remand. Shortly after, Plaintiff sent Nodak amended responses to Nodak's interrogatories. Prior to trial, Nodak was informed of Plaintiff's intent to call a chiropractor, as an expert witness. Nodak filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the expert witness, alleging the expert was not properly disclosed.The district court granted Nodak's motion, but ordered the doctor would still be allowed to testify as a fact witness. The jury returned a verdict in Nodak's favor. The Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff did not properly disclose his witness and that the district court did not abuse its discretion excluding the expert's testimony as a discovery sanction. View "Perius v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Edith Johnson appealed a district court judgment that affirmed an administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dismissing her claim for benefits from Workforce Safety and Insurance (WSI). On appeal, Appellant argued the ALJ improperly set aside the parties' stipulated specification of issues and abused its discretion by dismissing her claim for benefits as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: the ALJ dismissed the action as a sanction after Appellant refused to comply with WSI's discovery request and the ALJ's decision granting WSI's motion to compel discovery. In deciding to dismiss Appellant's claim, the ALJ noted Appellant did not offer a defense for failing to comply with discovery and made it clear that she would rather have the matter dismissed than comply with discovery. The ALJ found Appellant almost invited dismissal by failing to respond to WSI's motion for sanctions, moving to reconsider the order granting WSI's motion to compel, and submitting two proposed orders with one granting the motion to reconsider and the other granting WSI's motion to dismiss. "While the ALJ should not be guided solely by the parties' requests and must exercise its own judgment in determining an appropriate sanction, under the facts of this case [the Court] conclude[d] the ALJ did not abuse its discretion in dismissing [Appellant's] claim." View "Johnson v. N.D. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law