Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In 1989, Southeastern recovered a judgment against David Herzig in a North Carolina court. In August 1998, the North Carolina judgment was transcribed and filed in North Dakota under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and renewed in North Carolina in 2000, and was again transcribed and filed in North Dakota for enforcement purposes. In 2004, Alphild Herzig, David Herzig's mother, was joined as a party. In 2005, Southeastern moved for an order compelling Alphild Herzig to comply with Southeastern's discovery requests and requested sanctions. In June 2006, Southeastern moved to compel discovery and requested sanctions. The court granted Southeastern's motion for sanctions against Alphild Herzig contingent on submission of a checklist of items to be produced so the court could set a daily sanction for each item not provided. The court also found Alphild Herzig was in contempt and awarded attorney fees. In August 2006, Alphild Herzig moved for release from the sanctions. The court denied her motion. In 2008, Alphild Herzig moved for an order to dismiss her as a party in the original action and vacating the 2004 order joining her as a party and all subsequent orders issued against her, including the 2006 contempt orders. Southeastern opposed Alphild Herzig's motion to dismiss. However, Alphild Herzig died before the court ruled on the motion. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the daily sanctions imposed on Alphild Herzig under 2006 contempt orders abated at her death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not followed its instructions on whether a portion of the daily sanctions were intended to be money damages to compensate Southeastern or whether the sanctions were a forfeiture. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the district court to make that determination. View "Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig" on Justia Law

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Marilyn Sateren appealed an order that denied reallocation of marital property in a stipulated divorce case, and Lorne Sateren moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review of the trial court record and the arguments the parties made on appeal, the Supreme Court denied Lorne Sateren's motion to dismiss because Marilyn Sateren did not waive her right to appeal by unconditionally, voluntarily and consciously accepting a substantial benefit under the divorce judgment. The Court reversed the order denying reallocation of marital property and remanded the case for the district court to adequately explain the evidentiary and theoretical basis for its decision to deny reallocation. View "Sateren v. Sateren" on Justia Law

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Vincente Chacano appealed a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of attempted murder. Because the trial court did not err in admitting an audio recording of the courtroom scuffle, sufficient evidence existed to sustain the convictions, and the prosecutor's improper statement in closing argument did not reach the level of obvious error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Chacano" on Justia Law

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Alois Vetter appealed a district court's judgment entered after he was convicted by jury of aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Vetter argued a vehicle is not a dangerous weapon under the plain language of N.D.C.C. 12.1-01-04(6). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding a vehicle may be considered a dangerous weapon. View "North Dakota v. Vetter" on Justia Law

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Dawn Kirby appealed a district court order that denied her motion to modify primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that Kirby made a prima facie case for modification, and accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. View "Sweeney v. Kirby" on Justia Law

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Wendell Lund appealed a district court order dismissing his action against his mother Betty Lund for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wendell is the son of Orville and Betty Lund. Orville and Betty Lund owned real property in Bottineau County. Wendell claimed that in 1985 he entered into an implied contract with his parents whereby he agreed to provide certain labor and supplies to maintain the real property and to pay half of the real estate taxes, and that in exchange his parents agreed to convey the property to him. In 1991, Orville and Betty signed a deed purporting to convey their interest in the property to Orville and Wendell. When Orville and Betty divorced in 2010, the trial court found the 1991 deed was not a legitimate transaction, but rather had been an attempt to deprive Betty of her interest in the property and her homestead rights. The court included the entire value of the real property in the marital estate and awarded it to Orville. Betty received other offsetting property, and each party ultimately received approximately one-half of the marital estate. Betty Lund moved to Arizona in 2010. Since then, she held an Arizona driver's license, registered her vehicle in Arizona and where she registered to vote. In 2011, Wendell brought this action against his parents alleging they failed to comply with the 1985 implied contract. He sought damages and transfer of the real property to him. Wendell claimed that Betty could not be located for service of process, so service was made by publication. Betty entered a special appearance through her attorney and moved to dismiss the action against her, arguing she was a permanent resident of Arizona and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. The district court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty and subsequently dismissed Wendell's claims against both of his parents, to which Wendell appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Betty Lund resided in North Dakota, owned real property, and allegedly entered into a contract regarding her property in North Dakota. Those contacts were sufficient under Rule 4(b)(2) to assert personal jurisdiction over her for the transactions related to those activities, and she was not immune from suit because she left. The Court concluded the district court erred in concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty Lund. View "Lund v. Lund" on Justia Law

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B.N. appealed juvenile court orders terminating his parental rights to J.N. and J.N. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the juvenile court failed to make a required finding of fact and the court's findings did not adequately explain the basis for its decision. View "Interest of J.N." on Justia Law

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K.H. appealed a juvenile court permanency order extending placement of his daughter, T.H., in the custody and control of Barnes County Social Services until June 1, 2012. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed because the hearing to extend the permanency order was not held before the prior permanency order expired as required under N.D.C.C. section 27-20-36. View "Interest of T.H." on Justia Law

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M.D. appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. M.D. argued the court's finding that he remain a sexually dangerous individual was clearly erroneous and the court abused its discretion in granting the State's motion for a continuance. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no abuse of the district court's discretion and affirmed its decision. View "Matter of M.D." on Justia Law

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n 2001, Defendant Mark Palmer was convicted of four counts of gross sexual imposition. Defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. In 2011, Defendant appealed a district court order that denied his N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for relief from an order that denied his application for post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Palmer's motion. View "Palmer v. North Dakota" on Justia Law