Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tyler Dawson appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded a reasoning mind could not reasonably conclude the finding that Dawson drove or was in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of the performance of a chemical test was supported by a preponderance of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and the Department hearing officer's decision and remanded to the Department for reinstatement of Dawson's driving privileges. View "Dawson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The State appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's findings of fact and order dismissing the State's petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child. The State filed a petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child who committed gross sexual imposition. The judicial referee found M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child. The judicial referee explained he previously found beyond a reasonable doubt that M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition and stated, "Although this fact alone would be sufficient to sustain a finding of a need for treatment and rehabilitation, there was a substantial amount of evidence to the contrary." Based on these findings, the judicial referee dismissed the petition. The juvenile court adopted the judicial referee's findings and order, dismissed the proceeding and concluded the issue of M.H.P. registering as a sexual offender did not need to be addressed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State from appealing the juvenile court's order. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the juvenile court's findings. View "Interest of M.H.P." on Justia Law

HIT, Inc. appealed a district court judgment affirming the administrative order requiring HIT to pay back excess reimbursements in the amount of $90,699.80. HIT argued the Department used an incorrect method to calculate the margin to determine whether HIT was required to refund the excess reimbursements. Furthermore, HIT argued it was reversible error for the ALJ to defer to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "HIT, Inc. v. N.D. Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant-Appellant Michael Farrell appealed a district court civil judgment of $400 in unpaid fines and fees. In 1993, Farrell pled guilty to criminal trespass and criminal mischief and was ordered to pay fines, restitution, and fees. In 1994, the district court issued a bench warrant for failure to pay $1,351.88 in fines and costs. In 2012, Farrell requested from the district court under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act a final disposition on any and all charges. In response to Farrell's letter, the State moved to dismiss a separate pending simple assault charge because Farrell was incarcerated in Utah and the case was too old to warrant prosecution. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the simple assault charge. On the same day, the district court ordered a civil judgment totaling $400 be docketed against Farrell for unpaid fines and costs. The civil judgment was mailed, and Farrell appealed to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the State moved to "satisfy the judgment," acknowledging that under N.D.C.C. 29-26-22.1, a criminal judgment that imposes fines and fees may be docketed as a civil judgment only within 10 years of the criminal judgment. The district court granted the State's motion and ordered the civil judgment satisfied on January 3, 2013. Generally, a satisfaction on the record extinguishes a claim, and the controversy is deemed ended, leaving an appellate court with nothing to review. Although the State's motion to the district court was labeled as a "motion to satisfy judgment" and the court ordered the "judgment be satisfied," there was not a satisfaction of judgment under North Dakota law. "The intent may have been to vacate the judgment, but because of the appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the January 3, 2013, order." Accordingly the Supreme Court reversed the district court's civil judgment for costs and fees. View "North Dakota v. Farrell" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Human Services appealed a district court order reversing and remanding the Department's order decreasing Plaintiff-Appellee Penne Nienow's monthly Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP") benefits. The County determined Nienow received income from a prior mineral rights lease and, therefore, the 2011 payment was a recurring lump-sum payment. The County reduced Nienow's SNAP benefits to $16 per month. Nienow filed a request for hearing to the Department, and an evidentiary hearing was held. The County's representative testified Nienow stated that she leased the mineral rights and received income from the lease every five years and that she had leased the rights at least once before. After the hearing, the administrative law judge ("ALJ") concluded the County correctly determined Nienow's income and properly reduced her SNAP benefits. The Department adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. Nienow appealed the Department's order to the district court. The district court reversed and remanded, concluding Nienow's payment was a mineral leasing bonus, a nonrecurring lump-sum payment, and should not have been considered as income in determining Nienow's eligibility. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the district court order and reinstated the Department's final order reducing Nienow's SNAP benefits. View "Nienow v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Thomas Doppler appealed a district court judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia following a jury trial. Doppler argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Doppler's prior felony convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding Doppler's substantial rights were affected by the improper admission of Doppler's prior convictions. View "North Dakota v. Doppler" on Justia Law

The State appealed trial court orders dismissing three separate criminal complaints of endangerment of a child against Defendants Alexis Stegall, Chelsea Hettich, and Kimberlie Lamon. In each case, defendants gave birth to children who tested positive for methamphetamine in their systems. The dispositive issue before the Supreme Court was whether the offense of endangerment of a child applied when a pregnant woman ingests a controlled substance that continues to affect the child postpartum (specifically, the child tests positive for a controlled substance following birth). Under the Court's statutory interpretation of N.D.C.C. 19-03.1-22.2 and its holding in "Geiser," the Court held that a pregnant woman is not criminally liable for endangerment of a child for prenatal conduct that ultimately harms a child born alive. "If we limited the scope of Geiser to only unborn children who died in utero, but held a pregnant woman liable if the child ultimately lives and tests positive for a controlled substance postpartum, we would be criminalizing a nonfatal injury while not criminalizing conduct resulting in a fatal injury. Such an interpretation would create an absurd result. It would criminalize conduct that is not a crime at the time the conduct occurs, is not a crime if the unborn child dies in utero, but is a crime only by virtue of its effect on the child born alive." Accordingly the Court affirmed the trial courts' orders dismissing the criminal complaints. View "North Dakota v. Stegall" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Edward Waslaski appealed a district court order denying his petition for post-conviction relief on charges he pled guilty to 24 years ago. Petitioner pled guilty to 39 counts of burglary under a plea agreement. On appeal, he argued he was prejudiced because his counsel was unable to review a transcript or file and he should be able to use his recitation of fact in the absence of a transcript. He also argued his original guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Waslaski v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Lindsey Hysjulien appealed a grant of summary judgment which dismissed her claims for employment discrimination and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hill Top Home of Comfort, Inc. and Greg Armitage. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the running of the statutes of limitations for her state and federal employment discrimination claims and regarding her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court erred in granting summary judgment on these claims. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hysjulien v. Hill Top Home of Comfort" on Justia Law

Respondent-Appellant Kelly Kroshus appealed a district court order granting Petitioner-Appellee Andrea Hanisch a two-year disorderly conduct restraining order against him. The parties were never married but dated until Fall, 2011. They had one child together. After unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation, Hanisch petitioned the district court for the restraining order after he sent her a series of allegedly harassing text messages, some of which contained sexually explicit pictures of her, and threatened to post those pictures on a website. Kroshus essentially acknowledged that he sent the text messages described in Hanisch's petition for the restraining order, but testified that sending such messages and sexual pictures was a normal part of their relationship while they were dating. Kroshus argued that he and Hanisch would both often send pictures to each other and make derogatory comments toward each other, and that they did this to spice up their relationship, as a way of flirting. Kroshus contended that once he received the text message from her telling him to stop texting, he stopped. He also asserted that cell phone reception on his phone was limited and prevented him from receiving text messages from Hanisch until later in the day. Kroshus argued further that the facts of the case did not support a finding of disorderly conduct: the text messages to Hanisch took place during a relatively short period of time, that he had consumed a large amount of alcohol and thought they were still working on their relationship, and that the delay for him to stop texting her does not amount to an attempt to adversely affect her safety, security, or privacy. Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the restraining order. View "Hanisch v. Kroshus" on Justia Law