Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Miguel Humberto Medina Romero was convicted by jury of murder, unlawful possession/manufacture of a controlled substance (marijuana), and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver. Upon review of Romero’s arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Romero's motion to allow the jury to view the crime scene, in instructing the jury on self-defense, and in denying Romero's motion under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29 for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Furthermore, the Court held that Romero failed to establish reversible error regarding inaudible words in the transcript of the jury selection. View "North Dakota v. Romero" on Justia Law

After a shooting incident in a Fargo movie theater parking lot, the State charged Felipe Estrada with attempted murder for shooting Juan Garza in an attempt to cause his death. Estrada was also charged with aggravated assault for striking Charles Roskom on the head with a handgun and fracturing his skull and with two counts of reckless endangerment for shooting in the direction of DeShawn Stodola as she ran away and for shooting toward members of the public inside the movie theater. Estrada appealed his convictions on two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of reckless endangerment. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts, and affirmed them. View "North Dakota v. Estrada" on Justia Law

Michael Jassek appealed a district court judgment that affirmed the binding dispute resolution decision of Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") that denied payment for a myoelectric prosthesis. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore vacated the judgment. Jassek contended that because WSI failed to explain its reasons for disregarding the medical evidence favorable to Jassek, its binding dispute resolution decision was arbitrary, and that WSI's binding dispute resolution procedure violated his right to due process because it failed to provide a formal hearing. The language of N.D.C.C. 65-02-20 unambiguously provides that "[a] dispute resolution decision under this section requested by a medical provider concerning . . . a request for . . . treatment is not reviewable by any court." The statute based appealability on the identity of the party who requests binding dispute resolution, not on who appeals the binding dispute resolution decision. Jassek’s orthotist was a "medical provider," and this dispute concernd "a request for diagnostic tests or treatment," specifically the determination of an appropriate prosthetic device. Accordingly, WSI's decision on the medical provider’s request for binding dispute resolution was not reviewable by the district court, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment affirming WSI's decision was void. View "Jassek v. Workforce Safety and Insurance" on Justia Law

S.R.B. appealed the trial court's order for hospitalization and treatment at the North Dakota State Hospital for ninety days and its order requiring use of prescribed medication. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded insufficient findings appeared in the record to support the trial court's orders. The case was remanded with instructions for expedited entry of findings for the order for hospitalization and treatment, and the Court reversed the order requiring use of prescribed medication. View "Interest of S.R.B." on Justia Law

Robert R. Hoff appealed an order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by not independently making an individualized determination on the record whether it was necessary to restrain Hoff during the hearing, and its failure to do so was not harmless error. View "Interest of Hoff" on Justia Law

William Florian Wosick appealed a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. Wosick argued the district court abused its discretion by admitting a blood analysis report and obvious error occurred because of lack of notice of the charge against him and the improper admission of testimony. Finding that Wosick did not demonstrate that admission of the blood test report constituted a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law, the Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment against him. View "City of Grafton v. Wosick" on Justia Law

Tyler Dawson appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded a reasoning mind could not reasonably conclude the finding that Dawson drove or was in physical control of a motor vehicle within two hours of the performance of a chemical test was supported by a preponderance of the evidence on the entire record. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and the Department hearing officer's decision and remanded to the Department for reinstatement of Dawson's driving privileges. View "Dawson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

The State appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's findings of fact and order dismissing the State's petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child. The State filed a petition alleging M.H.P. was a delinquent child who committed gross sexual imposition. The judicial referee found M.H.P. was not in need of treatment or rehabilitation as a delinquent child. The judicial referee explained he previously found beyond a reasonable doubt that M.H.P. committed the delinquent act of gross sexual imposition and stated, "Although this fact alone would be sufficient to sustain a finding of a need for treatment and rehabilitation, there was a substantial amount of evidence to the contrary." Based on these findings, the judicial referee dismissed the petition. The juvenile court adopted the judicial referee's findings and order, dismissed the proceeding and concluded the issue of M.H.P. registering as a sexual offender did not need to be addressed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the State from appealing the juvenile court's order. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the juvenile court's findings. View "Interest of M.H.P." on Justia Law

HIT, Inc. appealed a district court judgment affirming the administrative order requiring HIT to pay back excess reimbursements in the amount of $90,699.80. HIT argued the Department used an incorrect method to calculate the margin to determine whether HIT was required to refund the excess reimbursements. Furthermore, HIT argued it was reversible error for the ALJ to defer to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "HIT, Inc. v. N.D. Dep't of Human Services" on Justia Law

Pro se Defendant-Appellant Michael Farrell appealed a district court civil judgment of $400 in unpaid fines and fees. In 1993, Farrell pled guilty to criminal trespass and criminal mischief and was ordered to pay fines, restitution, and fees. In 1994, the district court issued a bench warrant for failure to pay $1,351.88 in fines and costs. In 2012, Farrell requested from the district court under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act a final disposition on any and all charges. In response to Farrell's letter, the State moved to dismiss a separate pending simple assault charge because Farrell was incarcerated in Utah and the case was too old to warrant prosecution. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the simple assault charge. On the same day, the district court ordered a civil judgment totaling $400 be docketed against Farrell for unpaid fines and costs. The civil judgment was mailed, and Farrell appealed to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the State moved to "satisfy the judgment," acknowledging that under N.D.C.C. 29-26-22.1, a criminal judgment that imposes fines and fees may be docketed as a civil judgment only within 10 years of the criminal judgment. The district court granted the State's motion and ordered the civil judgment satisfied on January 3, 2013. Generally, a satisfaction on the record extinguishes a claim, and the controversy is deemed ended, leaving an appellate court with nothing to review. Although the State's motion to the district court was labeled as a "motion to satisfy judgment" and the court ordered the "judgment be satisfied," there was not a satisfaction of judgment under North Dakota law. "The intent may have been to vacate the judgment, but because of the appeal, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the January 3, 2013, order." Accordingly the Supreme Court reversed the district court's civil judgment for costs and fees. View "North Dakota v. Farrell" on Justia Law