Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Larry Rubey appealed a district court order limiting the presentation of evidence at his discharge hearing and from a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Rubey argued the district court erred in restricting the evidence and finding he remained a sexually dangerous individual. Upon review of the district court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order that Rubey remained a sexually dangerous individual and deny Rubey's requested relief on the evidentiary limitation. View "Matter of Rubey" on Justia Law

Nicholas Baatz appealed an order that denied his second application for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case back to the district court to address the merits of Baatz's claims of denial of the right to counsel and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because, under the law-of-the-case doctrine (from "North Dakota v. Baatz" (806 N.W.2d 438)), Baatz was allowed to raise these issues in a second post-conviction proceeding. View "Baatz v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Matthew Graham appealed a district court order that denied his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court erred in extending res judicata in this case to the question whether a committed individual has a congenital or acquired condition manifested by a sexual disorder, personality disorder or other mental disorder or dysfunction. View "Interest of Graham" on Justia Law

Stark County appealed the dismissal of its case against the defendant vehicle and third-party defendant Ryan Strozzi. Stark County Road Superintendent Al Heiser was notified that an excavating machine was being used in a Dickinson subdivision. Heiser went to the subdivision and saw Ryan Strozzi loading an excavator onto a low-boy trailer. Heiser believed the tractor trailer unit carrying the excavator would exceed the 5-ton per axle and 60,000 pound maximum weight restrictions applicable to the roads leading out of the subdivision. Stark County brought an in rem action against the tractor trailer unit for extraordinary use of the highways under Chapter 39-12, N.D.C.C., alleging only that it violated the per axle weight restrictions. Strozzi responded as a third-party defendant. After a court trial, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling the weight restrictions apply to vehicles moved on the road, and the statutory movement requirement had not been met because there was no testimony the tractor trailer unit carrying the excavator had been moved prior to issuance of the ticket. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's finding the vehicle had not been moved was not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirmed the judgment dismissing the County's case. View "Stark County v. A motor vehicle" on Justia Law

North Central Electric Cooperative appealed a district court judgment affirming a Public Service Commission order that dismissed its complaint against Otter Tail Power Company. The Commission decided it did not have regulatory authority over Otter Tail's extension of electric service to a facility owned by the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians on tribal trust land within the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. North Central argued on appeal: (1) the Commission has jurisdiction under North Dakota law; and (2) the Commission's findings were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and did not sufficiently address North Central's evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Commission did not err in deciding it lacked authority to regulate the Tribe's decision to have Otter Tail provide electric service to a tribal-owned facility on tribal-owned land within the reservation. View "North Central Electric Coop., Inc. v. Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

Bobby Bell filed an action in small claims court against Pro Tune Plus for damages to his vehicle. Pro Tune responded to the claim, and filed the correct documents to remove the action to the district court. After Bell attempted to amend his claim in the district court, the district court remanded the case to small claims court because it appeared that the claim affidavit and answer from small claims had not been filed with the district court as required by N.D.C.C. 27-08.1-04. Bell moved under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to correct the record because the clerk had apparently mistakenly failed to file the documents for removal. Bell asked the district court to vacate its order for remand. The district court denied Bell's motion to correct the record, holding Bell did not have a right to remove the action to the district court and, because Pro Tune did not oppose remand, Bell would need to seek dismissal without prejudice from the small claims court in order to return to the district court. Bell then appealed the district court's order remanding the case to small claims court. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court erred by remanding the case to small claims court. "Once the action is properly before the district court, the defendant does not have the option to choose whether or not to remand the case to small claims court. Just as the plaintiff's decision to proceed in small claims court is irrevocable, so is the defendant's decision to remove the action to district court. The district court did not have the authority to decline jurisdiction over an action properly before it." View "Bell v. Pro Tune Plus" on Justia Law

Brandon Charvat appealed a district court order denying his motion to amend a divorce judgment to modify primary residential responsibility of the parties' child. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, concluding Brandon Charvat established a prima facie case justifying modification and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. View "Charvat v. Charvat" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation appealed a judgment reversing the Department's decision to suspend Jonathan Daniels' driving privileges for 365 days. Because the issue that formed the basis for the district court's decision was not sufficiently articulated in Daniels' specification of errors, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and reinstated the administrative decision. View "Daniels v. Ziegler" on Justia Law

Kurt Datz appealed a divorce judgment awarding primary residential responsibility of the parties' two minor children to Helen Dosch, distributing the marital estate after finding economic and non-economic fault by Datz and ordering Datz to pay child support and one-half of the cost of hiring a nanny for the children. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed on primary residential responsibility, affirmed the remainder of the judgment and remanded. Except for the brief reference to the domestic violence factor, the district court never identified any of the best interest factors in its findings. Rather, the court's findings appear to be a summarization of evidence supporting Dosch's position. At the end of the summarization, with no discussion of individual factors or explanation of which factors favored which party, the trial court concluded that "[t]he court has considered N.D.C.C. 14-09-06.2" and "[t]he factors have been addressed." View "Datz v. Dosch" on Justia Law

Thain Cashmore, individually, as personal representative of the estate of Robert Cashmore, and as trustee of the Robert Cashmore Trust, and Bourck Cashmore, individually and as trustee of the Robert Cashmore Trust, appealed an order that held the personal representative in contempt of court and an order denying the personal representative's N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion to vacate the contempt order. In 2009, the personal representative moved to approve an "amended" final report and account and proposed distribution which differed significantly from the judgment approving the original final report entered the previous month. The amended final report purported to show estate assets had brought in less money than anticipated in the original final report. The amended final report also requested $2,502.13 in additional personal representative fees, $9,965.20 in additional attorney fees, and $8,000 in additional fees to close the estate. As a result, the amended final report showed the estate with a zero balance instead of the $72,598.56 listed in the original final report, and the estate therefore claimed it would be unable to pay Trudy Cashmore the $6,377.83 approved in the original final report. Undeterred by the Supreme Court's affirmance of the district court's final judgment ordering Trudy Cashmore be paid $6,377.83 within ten days, the personal representative did not pay her. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the personal representative in contempt or in denying the motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Estate of Cashmore" on Justia Law