Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Hale, individually and on behalf of the State of North Dakota, and Susan Hale appealed a summary judgment dismissing their public nuisance claim against Ward County and the City of Minot. The Hales had a house on agricultural land about one mile southeast of a shooting range in Ward County, which was used to train local, state, and federal law enforcement officers. Several other farms and homes are located near the Hales' property and the law enforcement shooting range, and County Road 12 runs adjacent to the west side of that shooting range. In "Gowan v. Ward Cnty. Comm.," (764 N.W.2d 425), the Supreme Court affirmed a Ward County Commission zoning decision denying an application to rezone neighboring land, which is about one-quarter mile downrange from the law enforcement shooting range, from agricultural to residential for construction of a residential subdivision. The Ward County Commission denied Gowan's application, citing safety concerns resulting from the proximity of his land to the law enforcement shooting range. In "Hale v. Ward Cnty.", the Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Hales' public nuisance claim. The Court discussed the differences between a private and a public nuisance and explained different evidence was relevant to the Hales' claims for a private and a public nuisance. The Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the Hales' private nuisance claim, concluding they failed to present competent evidence supporting their claim the law enforcement shooting range posed a danger to their property. The Court reversed the summary judgment on the Hales' public nuisance claim about use of County Road 12 and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. The Court recognized, however, that Ward County and Minot had not argued the Hales failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. 42-01-08, and neither the parties nor the district court had addressed the propriety of the Hales bringing an action to abate the law enforcement shooting range under N.D.C.C. ch. 42-02. On remand, the district court concluded "private citizens can bring an action 'ex rel.', but as a threshold matter, such citizens must first satisfy the special injury showing of N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08 or their public nuisance claim must be dismissed." The court granted Ward County and Minot summary judgment on the remanded claim for public nuisance regarding the Hales' use of County Road 12, concluding as a matter of law they failed to meet the "specially injurious" requirement for a private person to maintain a public nuisance claim under N.D.C.C. § 42-01-08. The court also denied the Hales' request to join additional neighbors as parties to their action. The Hales argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment on their public nuisance claim, and in denying their joinder request. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hale v. Ward County" on Justia Law

Rodney Chisholm appealed a district court order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. Chisholm argued the court erred in summarily dismissing his application on its own motion without providing him with notice or an opportunity to be heard. He also claims the court erred in failing to rule on every issue raised in his application. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the court erred in summarily dismissing the application. View "Chisholm v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Barry Roe appealed after a jury found him guilty of two counts of gross sexual imposition. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in admitting child hearsay statements as part of a stipulation. The Court also concluded there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions and the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument. View "North Dakota v. Roe" on Justia Law

Omar Mohamed Kalmio appealed after a jury found him guilty of four counts of class AA felony murder after a jury trial. He argued the judgments should have been reversed because the district court abused its discretion by allowing hearsay testimony and testimony regarding his prior bad acts, denying his request for an alibi jury instruction and denying his motion for mistrial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Kalmio also argued the evidence is insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Kalmio" on Justia Law

Troy Lehman appealed a district court order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. In 2009, a jury found Lehman guilty of kidnapping and terrorizing. Lehman was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Department of Corrections for the kidnapping charge and five years for the terrorizing charge, with the sentences to be served concurrently. Lehman alleged, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for numerous reasons including: (1) he did not subpoena all the witnesses Lehman requested; (2) he failed to impeach several witnesses including Daniel Flyinghawk, Patty LeCroix, and Camille Lorenzen; (3) he failed to demand a mistrial; (4) his closing statement was unrelated to the case; and (5) he failed to inform Lehman that not testifying would hinder the appeals process. After a hearing, the district court denied the petition. Lehman appealed. In late, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the application. Effective August 1, 2013, N.D.C.C. 29-32.1-01(2) was amended and reenacted to create a statute akin to a statute of limitations requiring applications for post-conviction relief to be filed within two years following a conviction. On August 2, 2013, one day after the enactment of N.D.C.C. sections 29-32.1-01(2), and 29-32.1-09(1) and (2), Lehman filed his second application for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the first post-conviction relief hearing. Lehman argued, among other things, that his post-conviction counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to: (1) conduct a proper investigation; (2) produce exculpatory evidence; (3) depose key witnesses; and (4) investigate whether trial counsel prepared for cross-examination. The State filed a motion for summary disposition of the application. The district court dismissed the application for post-conviction relief without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in summarily dismissing Lehman's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Lehman v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Michael Hamre appealed a district court order affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation ("DOT") order disqualifying his commercial driver's license for one year. Hamre argued: (1) that DOT misapplied the law by considering the administrative suspension of his noncommercial license a "conviction" under N.D.C.C. 39-06.2-10(7) (2011); (2) that N.D.C.C. 39-06.2-10(7) (2011) was void for vagueness; (3) that the one-year suspension of his driving privileges commenced on May 29, 2012, rather than on January 13, 2013; and (4) that he was entitled to attorney fees and costs. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hamre v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Sandy Mangelsen appealed a district court order finding he was a sexually dangerous individual and committed him to the care, custody, and control of the Executive Director of the Department of Human Services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings that Mangelsen had exhibited serious difficulty in controlling his behavior and that he was a sexually dangerous individual were not clearly erroneous. View "Matter of Mangelsen" on Justia Law

Cory Reis appealed criminal judgments entered after he conditionally pled guilty to controlled substance, burglary and theft of property charges. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Reis' motion to suppress because the police officers had probable cause to believe his vehicle contained contraband justifying a warrantless search of the vehicle. View "North Dakota v. Reis" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed the reversal of an administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Tammy Wampler's driving privileges. A Jamestown city police officer received a call regarding an intoxicated driver. The officer arrived on the scene, located the vehicle, and observed it weaving between lanes. The officer initiated his overhead lights, but the vehicle continued to drive for almost half a mile before it came to a stop, and it did so only after the officer turned on his siren. The officer administered three field sobriety tests, and Wampler failed two of them and could not complete the other. Wampler submitted to an on-site chemical screening test, which indicated an alcohol concentration level of at least .08. Wampler was then placed under arrest for Driving Under the Influence. Within two hours of driving, Wampler submitted to an intoxilyzer breath test. The test results showed Wampler's alcohol concentration was 0.159. When the officer completed his certified written report to the director, he wrote "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank. Wampler made a timely request for an administrative hearing with the Department. At that hearing, Wampler raised three arguments, one of which was that the Department lacked the authority to revoke her driving privileges because the law enforcement officer failed to write "by weight" next to the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank of his Report and Notice. The administrative hearing officer rejected Wampler's argument, holding "the failure to write 'by weight' is not jurisdictional." The administrative hearing officer suspended Wampler's driving privileges for 91 days, and Wampler appealed to the district court, raising all three issues. The district court determined North Dakota law required the law enforcement officer to complete a certified written report which indicated that test results showed Wampler had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater by weight, that this was a basic and mandatory provision of the statute under prevailing case law, and that, while the law enforcement officer's Report and Notice included the notation "0.159" in the "Test Results" blank, the omission of the phrase "by weight" stripped the Department of authority to suspend Wampler's driving privileges. The district court determined this was the dispositive issue on appeal and did not address Wampler's other arguments. The district court reversed the decision of the administrative hearing officer and ordered that Wampler's driving privileges be restored. The Supreme Court held that the inclusion of the phrase "by weight" in the "Test Results" portion of a law enforcement officer's certified written report was not necessary to satisfy N.D.C.C. 39-20-03.1. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and reinstated the administrative hearing officer's decision. View "Wampler v. N.D. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Joshua Cook appealed a criminal judgment entered after he conditionally pled guilty to four drug-related charges and after a jury found him guilty of reckless endangerment. Because he failed to comply with the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "North Dakota v. Cook" on Justia Law