Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In July 2013, a Bismarck Police Officer arrested Appellant Ducote Haynes for being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The police transported Haynes to jail, but the arresting officer did not have a copy of the correct Report and Notice form for Haynes. The officer went to the police station to obtain and fill out the proper Report and Notice. The arresting officer's shift ended shortly after he filled out the Report and Notice and he requested another officer issue the Report and Notice and deliver it to Haynes at the jail. The second officer testified he delivered the Report and Notice to the jail and placed it in an elevator for jail staff to retrieve. Haynes requested an administrative hearing regarding the revocation of his driving privileges. At the hearing, Haynes argued the Department did not have authority to revoke his license because he was not immediately issued the Report and Notice. The hearing officer found Haynes received the Report and Notice and revoked Haynes' driving privileges for 180 days. Haynes appealed the decision to the district court, arguing the hearing officer erred in finding the Department had authority to revoke his license because the Report and Notice was not immediately issued and was not personally served on him. The district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Haynes v. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law

Gerald Middleton was found guilty by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child, a class AA felony, and corruption of a minor, a class C felony. After the trial, attorney Steven Light, now deceased, was substituted as Middleton's new counsel. Middleton then moved for a new trial. The district court denied Middleton's motion, ruling Middleton failed to include any legal arguments or facts to support his motion. Middleton was sentenced, and a judgment was subsequently entered. Light died three months after submitting the brief in support of the new trial motion. Middleton filed an application for postconviction relief, arguing his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective on four grounds. With respect to Light, Middleton argued, "Post-trial counsel filed a substantively deficient motion for new trial thereby effectively denying Mr. Middleton direct appellate review of his case by the North Dakota Supreme Court[.]" After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Middleton's application for postconviction relief. Middleton appealed the district court order denying his application for postconviction relief, challenging only the ruling as it pertained to Light's representation. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of postconviction relief: "Middleton has not established the existence of meritorious issues that could have been raised in either the new trial motion or the direct appeal had a new trial motion not been filed by Light. Rather, Middleton argues prejudice should be presumed because the inadequate new trial motion effectively denied him the right to appeal." View "Middleton v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Nicholas Baatz was convicted by a jury of gross sexual imposition in 2009 and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. In 2010 Baatz filed an application for postconviction relief alleging he was denied effective assistance of counsel because no attorney was appointed for him before trial and because the attorney who finally was appointed failed to appeal his criminal conviction. The district court granted the petition insofar as Baatz requested the right to file an untimely appeal from his criminal conviction, but did not specifically address the other issues raised because "[t]estimony by Defendant at the hearing indicated his only contention at this point was his denial of a right to appeal issue and not ineffective assistance of counsel at trial." Baatz appealed from the criminal judgment and filed a supplemental brief raising the same arguments that were not specifically addressed by the district court in the postconviction order. Baatz did not appeal from the postconviction order, but the State appealed, arguing the court erred in allowing Baatz to file an untimely appeal from the criminal judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the court's decision to allow the appeal "without prejudice to Baatz's right to raise denial of his constitutional right to counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel in postconviction proceedings." No petitions for rehearing were filed. In 2012 Baatz filed a second application for postconviction relief again alleging he was denied his right to counsel before trial and effective assistance of trial counsel after counsel was appointed. Baatz also claimed he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in the prior appeal. The district court denied the application, concluding the first two grounds alleged were barred by res judicata or misuse of process and Baatz had not shown how appellate counsel was ineffective. Baatz appealed the district court order denying his postconviction application, challenging only the district court's findings on res judicata and misuse of process. He did not challenge the district court's substantive findings on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court determined that, under the law of the case doctrine, its Court's decision in Baatz's first case allowed Baatz to raise the claims of denial of the right to counsel and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a second postconviction proceeding. The case was then remanded to address the merits of these claims. On remand, the district court held no additional hearings, but addressed the merits of Baatz's claims of denial of the right to counsel and of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court determined Baatz waived his right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, Baatz failed to show trial counsel was ineffective, and Baatz failed to show trial counsel's alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial. Baatz appealed the district court's denial, on the merits, of his postconviction application. Finding that Baatz failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice resulting from his trial attorney's conduct, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Baatz v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Jason Gullickson appealed a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief after he pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine (second offense), possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver (second offense), possession of psilocybin, possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Gullickson argued to the Supreme Court that the district court erred denying postconviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not notify him that two of his charges should not have been second offenses and failed to file a motion to suppress evidence discovered upon execution of a search warrant. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gullickson v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

On September 1, 2013, at approximately 12:39 a.m., a Morton county deputy was traveling east when he observed a vehicle traveling west on the same road accelerate past him at a high rate of speed. The car was pulled over; the deputy observed the driver, defendant Kyle Boehm, had red, bloodshot, watery eyes. The deputy detected an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. Boehm admitted consuming four beers. Boehm would later be arrested for DUI. The deputy advised Boehm of the North Dakota implied consent law, asked if Boehm would submit to a blood test at the Morton county jail, and Boehm agreed to submit. At trial, Boehm moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing the blood test "was a search conducted without a search warrant and without voluntary and freely given consent," and the blood test "was drawn in an unreasonable manner" in violation of state and federal constitutional protections. Boehm also argued North Dakota's implied consent law violated "Missouri v. McNeely," (133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)), and state and federal constitutional protections. The State appealed the district court's order granting Boehm's motion. The Supreme Court reversed: "[t]he district court's analysis is flawed from the outset, as the district court appears to be applying a probable cause standard to a preliminary breath test. It is not necessary for a law enforcement officer to have probable cause sufficient for arrest to request a preliminary breath test. Under North Dakota's implied consent law, N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(1), a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of the individual's breath for the purpose of estimating the alcohol concentration if there is reason to believe: (1) a traffic violation has occurred, and (2) in conjunction with the violation, the officer, based on observation, formulates an opinion the driver's body contains alcohol. The traffic stop for speeding and Boehm's admission to consuming alcohol clearly meets the requirements of N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(1)." View "North Dakota v. Boehm" on Justia Law

On May 20, 2013, a Stark County Sheriff's Deputy stopped Defendant Lee Rahier's vehicle and, subsequently, arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon, hindering law enforcement, and disorderly conduct. Rahier moved to suppress evidence alleging the law enforcement officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rahier claimed the law enforcement officer's discovery of a concealed weapon was the result of an illegal search and should be suppressed. The State opposed the motions to suppress. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motions and granted Rahier's motions. The State argued on appeal that the district court erred in finding the deputy did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Rahier. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding there was sufficient competent evidence to support the district court's decision that the arresting law enforcement officer lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Rahier, and the district court's decisions did not go against the manifest weight of the evidence. View "North Dakota v. Rahier" on Justia Law

Joseph Smith appealed his conviction entered on a conditional plea of guilty for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Smith argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that he claims was obtained in violation of "Missouri v. McNeely," (133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)), and his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. The Supreme Court found after review of the record that Smith consented to take the chemical breath test given by the law enforcement officer, therefore, Smith's constitutional rights were not violated as a matter of law by North Dakota's implied consent law. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Smith's motion to suppress. View "North Dakota v. Smith" on Justia Law

Three men dressed in face masks, gloves and dark clothing forcibly broke into a Grand Forks home in the early morning. The occupants, Carmen and Sherman Jones, were watching television at the time; a security system recorded surveillance of the break-in. The masked men kicked in the front door, assaulted the homeowners with wooden tire thumpers and killed the Jones's dog. The Grand Forks Police Department investigated and discovered evidence that appeared to link defendants Allen and Nathan Ratliff and Cody Boulduc to the robbery. The three men were arrested. In consolidated appeals, all three appealed their convictions of robbery, burglary, two counts of aggravated assault, theft of property, and felonious restraint. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motions for new trial. Furthermore, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions for each charge and that the defendants failed to properly preserve their remaining issues on appeal. View "North Dakota v. Ratliff" on Justia Law

Joshua Cook appealed his conviction entered upon a conditional guilty plea to six counts of possession of drugs and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest. The Supreme Court dismissed Cook's appeal because he failed to comply with the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "North Dakota v. Cook" on Justia Law