Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009, Riak Riak pled guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition, a class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty years in prison with three years suspended for ten years while on supervised probation. In 2010, Riak applied for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of his trial attorney, but he subsequently withdrew that application by stipulation. In February 2013, Riak filed another application for post-conviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and that his sentence was too long. In March 2013, the State filed a request for additional time to respond, and the court granted the State's request. In May 2013, the parties jointly filed a stipulation requesting an additional 60 days for the State to file an answer or response motion, which the court again granted. The State did not file a response within the following 60 days. In November 2013, the district court's "Electronic Court Recorder" mailed a "Notification of Dismissal and Order of Dismissal" to the parties. The notice stated the case would be dismissed without prejudice after 14 days unless the court received "the required documents." Neither the State nor Riak's attorney filed any response to the notification. The district court thereafter entered an order dismissing Riak's February 2013 application without prejudice. No notice of entry of the order was filed after the court entered its dismissal order. In a letter dated February 4, 2014, and filed on February 12, 2014, Riak on his own behalf informed the district court that he was filing a disciplinary complaint against his appointed counsel and requested the court to appoint different counsel for him. In a letter to the court dated February 18, 2014, and filed February 24, 2014, he was aware his application had been dismissed in November 201, requested his post-conviction relief application be reopened, a hearing be scheduled, and new counsel be appointed for him. The district court judge informed Riak that the court was unable to act on the request in his February 4 letter, and that Riak would need to make and serve "an appropriate motion." Riak moved to reopen his dismissed post-conviction relief application, asserting complaints against his appointed post-conviction counsel. The district court denied Riak's motion, and Riak appealed from the order denying his motion. Under the narrow circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion because Riak filed his application under prior law and had not yet been put to his proof when the court dismissed his application. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Riak v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

A law officer attempted to serve a misdemeanor bench warrant on Devan Lavallie at the location listed on the warrant. Deven Schmidt resided at that residence, but was not a subject of the warrant. Schmidt answered the door for the officer, who asked if Lavallie was there. Schmidt responded that he was sleeping in the back bedroom. The officer then informed him that he had an arrest warrant for Lavallie. Schmidt did not verbally respond or invite the officer in, but did step back and walk to Lavallie's bedroom with the officer following. During Lavallie's arrest, the officer observed in plain view drug paraphernalia in his bedroom. The officer took him into the living room and detained both him and Schmidt. The officer then observed drug paraphernalia in the living room. Officers received permission to search the residence from Schmidt and Lavallie. That search discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia in both of their bedrooms, and they were placed under arrest. The State appealed from a district court order granting Deven Schmidt's motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the Court agreed with the lower courts that a warrant supported by probable cause, regardless of whether it is a felony or misdemeanor warrant, provides a law officer authority to enter the residence of the person named in the warrant in order to execute the warrant. In this case, the district court granted the motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the initial entry into the home was unlawful because no consent was given. Here, no consent was necessary for the initial entry into Lavallie's residence by law enforcement for the purpose of executing the misdemeanor bench warrant. The Court did not reach other issues raised on appeal with respect to the time after the initial entry into the home. View "North Dakota v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith appealed after a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court's denial of Smith's motion to strike the mandatory minimum sentence did not amount to obvious error and that sufficient evidence supported his conviction. View "North Dakota v. Smith" on Justia Law

Andrew Williams appealed a criminal judgment entered after conditionally pleading guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and drug paraphernalia. After review of the case, the Supreme Court held that the law enforcement officer's use of a drug canine in a condominium building's hallway did not violate Williams' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Williams" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer with the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force sought and obtained a search warrant to search a residence. In his affidavit in support of the warrant, the officer stated he received information from a University of North Dakota college student that Nathe and unknown counterparts were part of a drug trafficking organization in the Grand Forks area that distributed marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, ecstasy, MDMA, DMT and other types of research chemicals. As part of the investigation, the Task Force conducted a garbage pull at the residence. During the garbage pull, the Task Force found a paystub containing identifying information for Nathe and a receipt from Jimmy Johns with the name and phone number of another individual, along with items containing marijuana residue. Finding probable cause existed, the magistrate issued a search warrant. Evan Taylor resided in the searched residence, and was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The information was later amended, to charge Taylor with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Taylor moved to suppress the evidence found in his bedroom, arguing law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Particularly, he asserted law enforcement violated his reasonable expectation of privacy by searching his private bedroom without a separate warrant. The district court entered a memorandum decision and order granting Taylor's motion to suppress evidence, concluding the evidence found in Taylor's bedroom was not lawfully seized under the search warrant because Taylor was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and no exigent circumstances existed which would have justified entering Taylor's bedroom without a search warrant. The State appealed. After reviewed, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting Taylor's motion to suppress evidence found inside his bedroom and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Matthew Jasmann appealed a judgment entered on a jury's verdict finding him guilty of gross sexual imposition. According to trial testimony, Jasmann met some family and friends at a local bar. While at the bar, Jasmann met A.W. who was with one of Jasmann's relatives. When the bar was about to close, some of the individuals, including Jasmann and A.W., went to the apartment where Jasmann was spending the night, to have a party. After a few hours, everyone had left the apartment, except for Jasmann, A.W., and two other individuals. The two other individuals slept in a bedroom of the apartment. Jasmann and A.W. slept in the living room. A.W. testified she fell asleep and awoke to Jasmann having sexual intercourse with her. The next day, A.W. reported to police that she had been sexually assaulted. A.W. made a phone call to Jasmann, which was recorded by law enforcement, to discuss the incident with him. The next day police interviewed Jasmann about the incident. According to the transcript of this interview that was read into evidence at trial, Jasmann claims A.W. was awake and initiated the sexual contact, however, Jasmann denied sexual intercourse occurred. Jasmann was charged with gross sexual imposition. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding: (1) the State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the failure of the district court to give a cautionary instruction did not amount to obvious error; and (3) sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "North Dakota v. Jasmann" on Justia Law

On November 21, 2013, a Stark County deputy sheriff pulled over Kyle Baxter's vehicle in Dickinson after observing the vehicle with frost on the windshield weaving, being driven in the opposite lane of traffic, and almost hitting the curb. The deputy noticed a very strong odor of alcohol on Baxter and that he was lethargic and slow to respond to questions. After Baxter failed a field sobriety test, the HGN test in which he "[s]cored six out of the possible six clues," the officer read him the implied consent advisory and asked him to take an onsite screening test with an Intoximeter. Baxter refused. The deputy placed Baxter under arrest, took him to the law enforcement center, again read him the advisory, and asked him to take a chemical test. Baxter again refused. Baxter appealed his conviction entered on a conditional plea of guilty to refusal to submit to an onsite screening or chemical test. Because the Supreme Court concluded the criminal refusal statutes did not violate Baxter's rights under the Fourth Amendment and N.D. Const. art. I, section 8, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, or the due process clause, the Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Baxter" on Justia Law

In January 2004, Garron Gonzalez pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition, both class A felonies. He was sentenced to five years' incarceration, with all but 130 days suspended for five years, and five years' supervised probation. In November 2004, the State petitioned to revoke Gonzalez's probation. After a hearing, the district court revoked probation and entered an amended criminal judgment, resentencing Gonzalez to five years incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, with all but 30 months suspended for five years, credit given for time served, and five years of supervised probation. The court also ordered Gonzalez's probation subject to certain rules and conditions, including he submit to a search of his vehicle or place of residence by any probation officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant; he not have unsupervised contact with minor females under the age of 18; he not purchase, possess, or use sexually stimulating materials of any kind; he not use 900 telephone numbers; and he not date or socialize with anyone who has children under the age of 18. In December 2010, Gonzalez's probation officer received information from the Mandan Police that Gonzalez was being investigated for contact with a minor. The probation officer and other law enforcement officers searched Gonzalez's residence and vehicle. During the search, the officers found two smartphone cellular phones, which were searched. The probation officer found evidence Gonzalez violated the conditions of his probation, and Gonzalez was resentenced to twenty years incarceration on each count, to run concurrently, with credit for time served Gonzalez argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his cell phones exceeded the scope of an authorized probation search, was not reasonable, and violated the Fourth Amendment. Concluding that the search was a valid probationary search, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

In October 2013, McKenzie County Deputy Sheriff Travis Bateman stopped defendant Michael Filkowski's vehicle after he observed the vehicle weave, leave the roadway on a curve and cross over the center line and into the lane for oncoming traffic. When Bateman approached the vehicle, he observed an odor of alcohol, noted defendant had bloodshot watery eyes and slurred speech. Highway Patrol Trooper Chelsey Schatz arrived at the scene of the stop and took over the investigation. Schatz noticed an odor of alcohol and defendant's speech was mumbled and slurred. Defendant failed the field sobriety tests, and later agreed to take an onsite screening test. Defendant would ultimately be arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and was informed of the implied consent advisory. He agreed to take a chemical blood test. A blood sample was collected and submitted to the state crime laboratory. Defendant requested an administrative hearing, arguing the Department did not have jurisdiction to suspend his license because a portion of Form 104, the blood collection and submission form, was not forwarded to the Department's director. Defendant also objected to the admission of the analytical report of the blood test because it used the word "ethanol," which did not comply with the statute defining alcohol concentration. He also claimed the Department failed to show the approved method for conducting blood analysis was used and no evidence showed who performed the blood-alcohol analysis. The hearing officer admitted the analytical report and foundational documents and suspended defendant's license for 91 days. Defendant appealed and the district court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the Department had authority to suspend defendant's driving privileges and the hearing officer did not err in admitting the analytical report containing the results of defendant's blood test. View "Filkowski v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In 2005, David Moe was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, possession with intent to manufacture psilocybin, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. Moe appealed a district court order dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. He argued the district court erred in applying the statute of limitations and dismissing his application because the State waived the statute of limitations defense and a statutory exception applied to the statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moe v. North Dakota" on Justia Law