Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Heather Leavitt was convicted by jury of the attempted murder her husband Timothy. In early 2014, Timothy "woke up to being stabbed by an assailant in his home." He was seriously injured, but was able to flee. On appeal, Leavitt argued the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence obtained through a search warrant lacking probable cause and lacking a nexus to support a search of her vehicle and home. She also argued the district court erred by admitting a photograph into evidence, which she alleged had been improperly altered by the State and lacked proper foundation and authentication. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. View "North Dakota v. Leavitt" on Justia Law

Daniel Wacht appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his application for postconviction relief. Wacht was convicted by a jury in 2012 of the murder of Kurt Johnson. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Wacht applied for postconviction relief claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel and newly discovered evidence showed a State's witness fabricated his trial testimony. Wacht claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney was unable to remove a juror who was distantly related to Johnson through marriage. Wacht also claimed his attorney failed to object to the admission of a pair of latex gloves at trial. " Summary dismissal of an application for postconviction relief is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." After review, the Supreme Court concluded the court did not err in summarily dismissing Wacht's claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and for relief based on newly discovered evidence. View "Wacht v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Shane Peterka appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the State and denying in part Peterka's application for postconviction relief. Peterka was charged with 119 counts of unlawful possession of images of sexual conduct by a minor, class C felonies. In November 2013, Peterka filed an application for postconviction relief alleging his due process rights were violated when the prosecutor obtained a wrongful conviction by charging him with 119 counts when he only possessed or had two devices containing the prohibited materials. Peterka also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to properly investigate whether he committed 119 separate acts, because the attorney failed to investigate whether it was prosecutorial misconduct to charge him with 119 separate offenses and because his attorney failed to file and serve motions for change of venue and change of judge. After appointment of counsel for his postconviction relief claim, Peterka filed an amended application alleging that his probation exceeds the time allowed by statute, that he should not be required to register as a sex offender for the duration of his life and that his request for reduction in sentence should have been accepted by the sentencing court for review. The amended application also alleged Peterka's attorney failed to object to the sentence, inform the court of the lack of authority to issue such a sentence, advise Peterka in writing of his rights to appeal the sentence and challenge the sentencing portions regarding excessive probation and the requirement to register as a sex offender. Finding no reversible error in the denial of Peterka's claims, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Peterka v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In December 2012, the State charged Russell Everett, Jr. with aggravated assault involving domestic violence, and counsel was appointed to represent him. Everett was unable to post bond and he remained in custody until May 2013, when he appeared at a change of plea hearing with counsel, pled guilty to the charge, and was sentenced to a period of incarceration. In August 2013, Everett filed a self-represented application for post-conviction relief, claiming his plea was not voluntary and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Everett's application claimed his guilty plea was not voluntarily made with an understanding of the charge and the consequences of his plea because his lawyer "was not helping [him]" and his "lawyer said [he] would get probation and get out." Everett also claimed his "plea bargain did not come true" and he was "lied [to] about [his] plea bargain." He also claimed he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was "unlawfully arrested . . . with no evidence against" him. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding Everett failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a guilty plea to a charge of aggravated assault involving domestic violence and that withdrawal of the guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. View "Everett v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Watford City Police Officer Dylan Bostic stopped James Bauer for speeding at approximately 3:00 a.m., on Highway 85, near Watford City. During the stop, the officer noticed Bauer had slurred speech, watery and bloodshot eyes, poor balance and alcohol on his breath. The officer asked Bauer to submit to field sobriety testing, but Bauer declined. The officer read Bauer the North Dakota implied consent advisory and asked Bauer to submit to a preliminary breath test. Bauer agreed. The test showed a blood alcohol content over the legal limit for driving. The officer arrested Bauer for driving while under the influence and read Bauer his Miranda rights. The officer asked Bauer if he understood his rights, but Bauer remained silent. After transporting Bauer to the county jail, the officer again read Bauer the North Dakota implied consent advisory and asked Bauer if he would submit to a blood draw at the hospital. Bauer did not answer. The officer left Bauer in the squad car to consider his options and upon return, again asked if Bauer would submit to a blood draw. Bauer remained silent. The officer told Bauer if he did not answer, his silence would be considered a refusal. Bauer did not respond. The officer cited Bauer for refusal to submit to onsite screening or chemical test. Bauer appealed the judgment entered upon his conditional plea of guilty to refusal to submit to a chemical test. Bauer pled guilty after the district court denied his motion to suppress and dismiss his charge of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Bauer argued the district court erred in denying his motion when it determined the use of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence did not violate Bauer's constitutional rights against self-incrimination, due process or the Fifth Amendment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Bauer" on Justia Law

In 2009, Riak Riak pled guilty to a charge of gross sexual imposition, a class A felony, and was sentenced to twenty years in prison with three years suspended for ten years while on supervised probation. In 2010, Riak applied for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the part of his trial attorney, but he subsequently withdrew that application by stipulation. In February 2013, Riak filed another application for post-conviction relief, asserting he received ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and that his sentence was too long. In March 2013, the State filed a request for additional time to respond, and the court granted the State's request. In May 2013, the parties jointly filed a stipulation requesting an additional 60 days for the State to file an answer or response motion, which the court again granted. The State did not file a response within the following 60 days. In November 2013, the district court's "Electronic Court Recorder" mailed a "Notification of Dismissal and Order of Dismissal" to the parties. The notice stated the case would be dismissed without prejudice after 14 days unless the court received "the required documents." Neither the State nor Riak's attorney filed any response to the notification. The district court thereafter entered an order dismissing Riak's February 2013 application without prejudice. No notice of entry of the order was filed after the court entered its dismissal order. In a letter dated February 4, 2014, and filed on February 12, 2014, Riak on his own behalf informed the district court that he was filing a disciplinary complaint against his appointed counsel and requested the court to appoint different counsel for him. In a letter to the court dated February 18, 2014, and filed February 24, 2014, he was aware his application had been dismissed in November 201, requested his post-conviction relief application be reopened, a hearing be scheduled, and new counsel be appointed for him. The district court judge informed Riak that the court was unable to act on the request in his February 4 letter, and that Riak would need to make and serve "an appropriate motion." Riak moved to reopen his dismissed post-conviction relief application, asserting complaints against his appointed post-conviction counsel. The district court denied Riak's motion, and Riak appealed from the order denying his motion. Under the narrow circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion because Riak filed his application under prior law and had not yet been put to his proof when the court dismissed his application. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Riak v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

A law officer attempted to serve a misdemeanor bench warrant on Devan Lavallie at the location listed on the warrant. Deven Schmidt resided at that residence, but was not a subject of the warrant. Schmidt answered the door for the officer, who asked if Lavallie was there. Schmidt responded that he was sleeping in the back bedroom. The officer then informed him that he had an arrest warrant for Lavallie. Schmidt did not verbally respond or invite the officer in, but did step back and walk to Lavallie's bedroom with the officer following. During Lavallie's arrest, the officer observed in plain view drug paraphernalia in his bedroom. The officer took him into the living room and detained both him and Schmidt. The officer then observed drug paraphernalia in the living room. Officers received permission to search the residence from Schmidt and Lavallie. That search discovered marijuana and drug paraphernalia in both of their bedrooms, and they were placed under arrest. The State appealed from a district court order granting Deven Schmidt's motion to suppress the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the Court agreed with the lower courts that a warrant supported by probable cause, regardless of whether it is a felony or misdemeanor warrant, provides a law officer authority to enter the residence of the person named in the warrant in order to execute the warrant. In this case, the district court granted the motion to suppress evidence on the ground that the initial entry into the home was unlawful because no consent was given. Here, no consent was necessary for the initial entry into Lavallie's residence by law enforcement for the purpose of executing the misdemeanor bench warrant. The Court did not reach other issues raised on appeal with respect to the time after the initial entry into the home. View "North Dakota v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Alexander Smith appealed after a jury found him guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court's denial of Smith's motion to strike the mandatory minimum sentence did not amount to obvious error and that sufficient evidence supported his conviction. View "North Dakota v. Smith" on Justia Law

Andrew Williams appealed a criminal judgment entered after conditionally pleading guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and drug paraphernalia. After review of the case, the Supreme Court held that the law enforcement officer's use of a drug canine in a condominium building's hallway did not violate Williams' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Williams" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer with the Grand Forks Narcotics Task Force sought and obtained a search warrant to search a residence. In his affidavit in support of the warrant, the officer stated he received information from a University of North Dakota college student that Nathe and unknown counterparts were part of a drug trafficking organization in the Grand Forks area that distributed marijuana, psilocybin mushrooms, LSD, ecstasy, MDMA, DMT and other types of research chemicals. As part of the investigation, the Task Force conducted a garbage pull at the residence. During the garbage pull, the Task Force found a paystub containing identifying information for Nathe and a receipt from Jimmy Johns with the name and phone number of another individual, along with items containing marijuana residue. Finding probable cause existed, the magistrate issued a search warrant. Evan Taylor resided in the searched residence, and was initially charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The information was later amended, to charge Taylor with possession of more than one ounce of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Taylor moved to suppress the evidence found in his bedroom, arguing law enforcement violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Particularly, he asserted law enforcement violated his reasonable expectation of privacy by searching his private bedroom without a separate warrant. The district court entered a memorandum decision and order granting Taylor's motion to suppress evidence, concluding the evidence found in Taylor's bedroom was not lawfully seized under the search warrant because Taylor was entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bedroom and no exigent circumstances existed which would have justified entering Taylor's bedroom without a search warrant. The State appealed. After reviewed, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting Taylor's motion to suppress evidence found inside his bedroom and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Taylor" on Justia Law