Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A Watford City police officer, initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for exceeding the speed limit. The driver of the vehicle could not produce any form of identification, proof of insurance, or registration, but identified herself as Sarah Hernandez. The officer detected an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and noticed the driver had bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech and displayed slow, sluggish movements. After the driver submitted to field sobriety testing and an onsite screening test, she was arrested for driving under the influence. The officer received the driver's permission to move the vehicle out of a private driveway, across the street. The driver submitted to a chemical blood test and was taken to jail for booking. During the booking process, law enforcement realized the driver had provided false identification information. When confronted by law enforcement, the driver identified herself as Pogue and admitted she had initially provided a false name. According to Pogue's arrest report, law enforcement then impounded the vehicle Pogue had been driving and performed an inventory search of it due to "the vehicle not belonging to her, expired registration, and False Information charge . . . ." During the search, law enforcement found a black cloth bag containing drug paraphernalia items and methamphetamine. The officer applied for a warrant to further search the vehicle and submitted an affidavit in support of the application. In the affidavit, the officer stated he impounded the vehicle "due to no current registration, false information to a police officer, and obstruction of a private driveway." The officer also stated "[u]pon completing an impound inventory, per department directive," he found a black cloth bag containing multiple items of drug paraphernalia and a clear plastic container of a white crystalline substance, which tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. The district court issued a search warrant for the vehicle based upon the affidavit. The officer executed the search warrant and found additional used syringes and what resembled a drug transaction ledger. The State appealed a district court order granting Rebekah Pogue's motion to suppress evidence found in her impounded vehicle. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order because the State did not satisfy its burden to show law enforcement's warrantless search of Pogue's vehicle qualified as a valid inventory search, an exception to the warrant requirement, or that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. View "North Dakota v. Pogue" on Justia Law

Joshua Clark and Theo Crowe were acquaintances and co-workers at a construction business in Bismarck. They were drinking together at Clark's apartment one evening in 2013. In an interview with law enforcement officers, Clark stated he and Crowe were upset about the women in their lives and statements were made to the effect "they were so mad they could kill somebody." Clark testified at trial he did not specifically recall making that statement, but he "might have said it," and if he did, he was not serious and "it would've just been two individuals blowing off steam." After a confrontation between Crowe and Clark's roommate at Clark's apartment, Clark and Crowe got a ride to Crowe's apartment. A neighbor testified he later saw Crowe and Clark leave Crowe's apartment and "they seemed like they were intoxicated and they wanted to fight or something like that." Clark testified they left Crowe's apartment to get some marijuana, and they saw John Swain, an individual he had never met, at a nearby park. Clark testified Crowe invited Swain back to Crowe's apartment, where the three men listened to music and drank for about ten to fifteen minutes before Crowe got up and hit Swain in the head with a hammer. Clark testified he was "shocked" by the incident and Crowe hit Swain four or five more times and then told Clark "it's your turn now." Clark testified he believed Swain was already dead and he hit Swain once in the head because he was scared of repercussions if he did not follow Crowe's directions. Clark testified that after he hit Swain, he gave the hammer back to Crowe, who continued to hit Swain at least five more times. Clark testified he helped Crowe move Swain's body to a bathtub, he started to wipe up some blood, he helped amputate Swain's legs, and he helped move the body into a garage. Clark appealed after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder. Clark argued there was insufficient evidence to establish he conspired or agreed with another to commit murder. After review, the Supreme Court concluded there was indeed sufficient evidence to support the verdict, and affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Clark" on Justia Law

In March 2013, the City of Dickinson charged Byishimo Etienne with simple assault domestic violence, alleging he violated Dickinson Municipal Code 25.08.010. Etienne personally appeared before the Dickinson municipal judge and signed a document stating that the judge had explained the notification of rights to Etienne and that he did not wish to consult with an attorney and waived his right to assistance of an attorney. Etienne also signed a notification of rights and acknowledgment, stating he had been orally informed of rights listed on a preprinted form and understood those rights, including that if he pled guilty, there would not be a trial of any kind and he would give up his right to a trial and to confront witnesses as well as his privilege against self-incrimination. Etienne appeared again without counsel and pled guilty to the charge. Etienne claimed he subsequently learned the deportation consequences of his conviction, and in May 2014, he moved to vacate his guilty plea. The municipal court denied Etienne's motion, ruling he failed to show either the court or the prosecutor had an obligation to inform him that deportation may result from his guilty plea. The municipal court concluded withdrawal of Etienne's guilty plea was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Etienne appealed to the district court, and the court ruled it had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. 29-28-06(5) to hear Etienne's appeal of the municipal court's decision denying his motion to vacate the guilty plea because the municipal court's decision affected Etienne's substantial rights. The district court nevertheless affirmed the municipal court's denial of Etienne's motion to vacate the guilty plea. The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal, concluding Etienne did not have a right to appeal to the district court the municipal court's post-judgment order under N.D.C.C. 40-18-19, and his post-judgment motions, which were made more than one year after entry of the judgment of conviction, did not extend the time for filing an appeal from the judgment. Etienne did not exercise his right to appeal in the manner prescribed by N.D.C.C. 40-18-19 and N.D.R.Crim.P. 37, and the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court, therefore, concluded it did not have jurisdiction to hear Etienne's appeal. View "City of Dickinson v. Etienne" on Justia Law

Jonathan Kordonowy appealed after a jury found him guilty of refusal to submit to a chemical test. Kordonowy argued the criminal refusal statute was unconstitutional and the district court erred in refusing to give his requested jury instruction informing the jury he had a right to refuse a chemical test. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Kordonowy" on Justia Law

In 2014, a Fargo convenience store was robbed at gunpoint by two unknown persons. During the course of an unrelated narcotics investigation, Fargo police officers conducted a garbage pull outside a residence where drug activity was suspected. They collected two matching bags containing a red jacket with white lettering, a pair of cut-up sweatpants, and numerous pieces of mail indicating which residence the bags came from. One officer at the scene believed the jacket matched one worn during an armed robbery of a convenience store weeks earlier. On the basis of the evidence found in the garbage, the officers applied for a search warrant of the residence from which the bags were believed to have come. After obtaining a search warrant, the officers searched defendant Ibrahim Kardor's residence and found a duffle bag containing three loaded handgun magazines, black boots, and a red hooded sweatshirt of his that matched the sweatshirt worn during the robbery, as shown by the store's security video. Officers informed defendant of his Miranda rights and then interviewed him. Although defendant denied involvement in the robbery, he was arrested for robbery and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school. Defendant appealed a district court judgment after a jury found him guilty of robbery. He argued the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial, claiming the State denied him due process by suppressing favorable evidence. Because defendant was aware of the existence of the evidence and failed to conduct reasonable diligence in making further inquiry to obtain the undisclosed evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment. View "North Dakota v. Kardor" on Justia Law

Michael Filkowski appealed after a jury found him guilty of driving under the influence while operating a motor vehicle. Filkowski was stopped by a McKenzie County Deputy Sheriff for driving outside of the traffic lane. The deputy detected the smell of alcohol and observed that Filkowski's speech was slurred. A Highway Patrol officer arrived and made the same observations. After conducting field sobriety tests, Filkowski was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. He was transported to a local hospital where he consented to a blood alcohol test. At trial, Filkowski objected to the admission into evidence of certain documents offered by the State. A "Submission for Blood form" was objected to based on a lack of foundation. The State subsequently introduced a "Memo Regarding Designees of the State Crime Laboratory Director" without objection. The memorandum, authored by Hope Olson, Director of the State Crime Laboratory, appointed and authorized Charles Eder and Kali Hieb to sign and certify records. The results of the blood alcohol test indicated Filkowski had a blood alcohol level above the legal limit. The district court determined Filkowski failed to provide sufficient proof that Ms. Hieb was not a designee of the Director of the State Crime Laboratory and overruled the objections. The jury returned a verdict finding Filkowski guilty. Finding no reversible error to the admission of the evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Filkowski" on Justia Law

A Grand Forks police officer stopped a vehicle after observing it screech to a halt at an intersection, causing a group of people to jump out of the crosswalk. The officer approached the vehicle and found defendant-appellant Tyler Jennewein sitting in the front passenger seat. While the officer spoke with Jennewein, Jennewein's girlfriend ran up to the vehicle and sat in the driver's seat. The officer went to the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with Jennewein's girlfriend and noticed a glass marijuana pipe lying on the ground below the driver's side window. Jennewein denied driving the vehicle, Jennewein's girlfriend said she had been driving and neither Jennewein nor his girlfriend claimed possession of the pipe. The officer returned to the passenger side of the vehicle and observed that Jennewein exhibited signs of intoxication. After Jennewein performed field sobriety tests, the officer placed him under arrest for driving under the influence, driving under suspension and possession of drug paraphernalia. Jennewein's first trial in July 2014 resulted in a mistrial. A second trial was held a few months later. Jennewein's defense was that he was not the driver of the vehicle, his girlfriend was the driver and the paraphernalia was not his. Jennewein's girlfriend testified as a witness for the prosecution and on cross-examination admitted she was the driver of the vehicle. Jennewein rested without testifying or presenting any evidence. The jury found Jennewein guilty of driving under the influence and driving under suspension, but not guilty of possessing drug paraphernalia. The conviction was Jennewein's third alcohol-related driving offense within seven years, and his sentence included one year of supervised probation with one year of participation in the 24/7 sobriety program. Jennewein argued on appeal that the district court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce into evidence two certified copies of criminal driving under the influence judgments because the prosecution failed to disclose the documents prior to trial in violation of N.D.R.Crim.P. 16. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the two judgments into evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Jennewein's conviction and sentence. View "North Dakota v. Jennewein" on Justia Law

Appellant Morgan Kroschel appealed a district court judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's suspension of her driving privileges. Officer Ryan Haskell worked for the North Dakota State University Police Department. He was driving outside NDSU campus and observed Kroschel turn across a designated turn lane rather than enter a travel lane. The officer followed the vehicle before making a stop. At no time during this incident was the officer or Kroschel on NDSU property. Officer Haskell ultimately arrested Kroschel for driving under the influence of alcohol. Kroschel argued on appeal of her arrest and ultimate suspension of her license that the officer acted outside his territorial jurisdiction and was without lawful authority to arrest Kroschel. The authority for NDSU police officers to act on the NDSU campus was not being challenged; the authority of Fargo police officers to act on the NDSU campus was not being challenged. The issue was whether NDSU Police Officer Haskell had authority to arrest Kroschel under the circumstances in this case. Specifically, Kroschel argued Officer Haskell did not have authority to arrest her under a joint powers agreement adopted under N.D.C.C. ch. 54-40.3. Kroschel contended that under N.D.C.C. sec. 54-40.3-04, a MOU must be approved by the governing body, here the board of higher education. The district court found section "54-40.3-04 only [applied] to agreements between a criminal justice agency of this state and another state. The MOU in this case is an agreement between two law enforcement agencies within the state, and therefore, 54-40.3-04 is inapplicable." The Supreme Court agreed: chapter 54-40.3, N.D.C.C. did not authorize Officer Haskell to arrest Kroschel. The Court reversed the district court judgment affirming the Department of Transportation's suspension of Kroschel's driving privileges. View "Kroschel v. Levi" on Justia Law

A deputy sheriff pulled over Rebecca Havemeier's vehicle after observing her driving erratically in Dunn County. After failing field sobriety tests and registering a .286 alcohol concentration on an onsite screening test, Havemeier was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. During an hour-long transport to jail in Dickinson, Havemeier consented to take a chemical test with an Intoxilyzer. Havemeier argued the Department erred in revoking her driving privileges because she did not refuse to submit to the Intoxilyzer test and, even if she did refuse, she cured the refusal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the Intoxilyzer test report was not "prima facie" evidence of a refusal, because the test was not performed in accordance with the approved method when the deputy did not give Havemeier three minutes to provide a sample and no expert testimony was introduced to explain the effect of the deviation. Furthermore, the deputy's testimony at the hearing did not establish an affirmative refusal by Havemeier to chemical testing. View "Havemeier v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Guy Packineau appealed after a jury found him guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia, driving with a suspended license, and driving under the influence. At trial, Packineau objected to the State offering testimony from witnesses not endorsed on the information under N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(g). He also objected to the introduction of documents under N.D.R.Crim.P. 16 because they were not adequately disclosed to him, and the State only provided the location of the documents and not copies. The district court overruled both objections. Packineau also objected to the DUI jury instruction including language not found in the original complaint. This objection was also overruled. On appeal, Packineau argues the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because he did not consent to the blood draw and a search warrant was needed. He also alleged the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Packineau" on Justia Law