Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2015, a highway patrol officer stopped defendant Blaise O'Connor's car for a defective taillight. The officer observed O'Connor had slurred speech and bloodshot and watery eyes. O'Connor admitted he consumed some alcohol. The officer administered field sobriety tests, recited a complete implied consent advisory and asked O'Connor if he would submit to an onsite screening test. The State contended O'Connor was read the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(a), which included the warning that "refusal to take the test . . . is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." O'Connor contended he was given the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(3), relating to screening tests, which included the warning that "refusal to take the screening test is a crime." O'Connor submitted to the onsite screening test which revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the jail, the officer asked O'Connor whether he remembered the implied consent advisory previously read to him and O'Connor responded, "yeah, I think so." It was undisputed that before O'Connor submitted to the Intoxilyzer chemical test the officer provided him with a partial implied consent advisory which failed to inform him that refusal to take a chemical test "is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." The chemical test revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor moved to suppress the result of the Intoxilyzer chemical test because the officer failed to provide him with the complete implied consent advisory after he was arrested and before he submitted to the chemical test. The district court agreed with O'Connor and suppressed the result of the chemical test. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression because the law enforcement officer after placing O'Connor under arrest did not inform him of the complete implied consent advisory before administering the Intoxilyzer test. View "North Dakota v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

In May 2015, a highway patrol officer stopped defendant Blaise O'Connor's car for a defective taillight. The officer observed O'Connor had slurred speech and bloodshot and watery eyes. O'Connor admitted he consumed some alcohol. The officer administered field sobriety tests, recited a complete implied consent advisory and asked O'Connor if he would submit to an onsite screening test. The State contended O'Connor was read the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(a), which included the warning that "refusal to take the test . . . is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." O'Connor contended he was given the implied consent advisory contained in N.D.C.C. 39-20-14(3), relating to screening tests, which included the warning that "refusal to take the screening test is a crime." O'Connor submitted to the onsite screening test which revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the jail, the officer asked O'Connor whether he remembered the implied consent advisory previously read to him and O'Connor responded, "yeah, I think so." It was undisputed that before O'Connor submitted to the Intoxilyzer chemical test the officer provided him with a partial implied consent advisory which failed to inform him that refusal to take a chemical test "is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence." The chemical test revealed a blood alcohol level above the presumptive limit. O'Connor moved to suppress the result of the Intoxilyzer chemical test because the officer failed to provide him with the complete implied consent advisory after he was arrested and before he submitted to the chemical test. The district court agreed with O'Connor and suppressed the result of the chemical test. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression because the law enforcement officer after placing O'Connor under arrest did not inform him of the complete implied consent advisory before administering the Intoxilyzer test. View "North Dakota v. O'Connor" on Justia Law

In 1995, Jason Gale was cited for driving under the influence. Gale retained attorney Henry Howe to represent him. Howe requested a jury trial. Although the record did not contain information regarding plea negotiations that presumably took place, a sentencing hearing was scheduled for June 21, 1995. Gale failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, despite the court having mailed him three notices stating he was required to appear personally. After Gale failed to appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. No subsequent action was taken on the case until March 5, 2015, when Gale filed a motion to recall the arrest warrant. The City of Grand Forks then filed an amended information, and Gale filed a motion to dismiss arguing his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The district court held a hearing on his motion. Gale asserted he was unaware of the pending case and bench warrant because Howe had told him the case was closed and that Gale's bond had been used to pay the associated fines. Gale claimed he was made aware of the open case when a pre-employment background check revealed the warrant. He asserted the City did not prosecute his case for twenty years despite the fact that he had appeared in North Dakota courts for various criminal and child support proceedings. Gale argued his address was on file with the state, and the City's failure to prosecute the matter amounted to a speedy trial violation. The City claimed it could not locate Gale because he moved to Colorado soon after he failed to appear. The City claimed it had no knowledge of Gale's whereabouts, he caused the delay, and there was no speedy trial violation. The district court found Gale's testimony incredible. The court reasoned Gale likely knew the case was pending but chose not to do anything about it. The court found it likely the only reason Gale took action in 2015 was because his employment opportunity was dependent upon resolution of the warrant. The court denied Gale's motion to dismiss. A jury ultimately found Gale guilty of driving under the influence. He appealed that conviction. The Supreme Court concluded Gale's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, and reversed the judgment. View "City of Grand Forks v. Gale" on Justia Law

Spencer Curtiss was convicted of gross sexual imposition. He appealed a district court order denying his request for relief from an order denying his application for post-conviction relief. He also appealed an order denying his motion for reconsideration. He argued to the Supreme Court: (1) the court erred when it did not consider the criminal trial transcript while ruling on his application for post-conviction relief; and (2) the court erred when it ruled on his motion for reconsideration before he was given an opportunity to respond to the State's answer. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Curtiss v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2002, Matthew Eagleman pled guilty to gross sexual imposition and harboring a runaway. After twice violating his probation, the district court revoked Eagleman's probation and sentenced him in 2011. This 2011 sentence included a third probationary term. In 2012, the State moved to correct this sentence because, under "North Dakota v. Stavig," (711 N.W.2d 183), a defendant could not be sentenced to more than two terms of probation for the same crime, rendering Eagleman's 2011 sentence illegal. The district court held another sentencing hearing. On October 31, 2012, the court entered a corrective order sentencing Eagleman to twenty years in prison with credit for time served. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. In December 2013, Eagleman moved the district court to correct what he argued was an illegal sentence. This motion contained arguments similar to those rejected in his 2013 appeal. In February 2014, the district court dismissed the motion. Eagleman appealed that order. In May 2014, Eagleman withdrew the appeal. In June 2014, Eagleman filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the October 2012 sentencing hearing because, among other alleged deficiencies, his counsel failed to request a recent risk assessment concerning his classification as a sexually dangerous individual. In April 2015, the district court summarily dismissed the application, concluding Eagleman already exercised his right to post-conviction relief, the application was a reiteration of previously adjudicated claims, and the statute of limitations barred the application. "While we have heard an appeal from the 2012 sentencing hearing, we have not previously considered whether Eagleman's counsel was ineffective. Although Eagleman may have a prolific litigious streak, the courts have not addressed the issues contained in the current appeal. The district court erred in its contrary conclusion." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded Eagleman's case for further proceedings View "Eagleman v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Corey Costa appealed a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. Costa argued the prosecutor's closing argument misstated the evidence and improperly vouched for evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court rejected Costa's arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Costa" on Justia Law

Bo James appealed a judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence and he conditionally pled guilty to driving under the influence. After review, the Supreme Court concluded sufficient evidence established reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop James's vehicle, and affirmed James' conviction. View "North Dakota v. James" on Justia Law

Peggy Keller appealed after a jury found her guilty of refusing to submit to alcohol testing. At trial, Keller asked the district court to instruct the jury that an individual accused of driving under the influence had a limited statutory right to contact an attorney before deciding whether to submit to alcohol testing. Keller requested the jury be instructed that a request to consult an attorney is a defense to the crime of refusal. Keller also asked the district court to instruct the jury that affirmative refusal is required to find guilt, and the accused does not affirmatively refuse if she requests to contact an attorney and law enforcement fails to provide an opportunity to do so. The district court refused to give Keller's requested instructions. Keller argued on appeal that the district court erred in failing to give her requested jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Keller" on Justia Law

Ruthie Mann appealed a district court order denying her motion to dismiss a criminal charge for refusing to submit to chemical testing, and the resulting criminal judgment sentencing her to five years in prison with all but eighteen months suspended. Mann argued the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss because her prosecution under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01(1)(e), North Dakota's criminal refusal statute, was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and North Dakota Const. art. I, section 8. The North Dakota Court had previously rejected these same arguments, and the Court concluded Mann provided no compelling arguments warranting departure from these holdings. Mann also argued the district court erred by not conforming its criminal judgment with the jury verdict. In doing so, Mann raised the issue of whether N.D.C.C. 39-08-01(3) authorized a court to take judicial notice of a defendant's prior offenses when such offenses are an essential element of the charged offense. Mann argued the court's ability to take judicial notice of prior convictions under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01(3) was limited to matters of pleading and does not allow judicial notice of an essential element of a charged offense. To that argument, the State agreed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Mann's motion to dismiss, but reversed the criminal judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Mann" on Justia Law

Robert Putney assaulted a woman on the night of June 15, 2014. According to police affidavits, Putney brought an injured woman to a Minot hospital. Medical personnel observed the woman had abrasions on her face, an injury to the back of her head, and hair had been forcibly pulled from her head. After further examination, medical personnel also discovered the woman had been shot, which necessitated removal of part of her large intestine. The medical personnel also informed the responding officers the woman identified Putney as the man who assaulted her. The City of Minot charged Putney with violation of a municipal ordinance for simple assault. After Putney pled guilty to the municipal charge, police discovered a discarded handgun that matched an empty gun box found in Putney's residence. Medical personnel could not recover the bullet because of the way it was lodged in the woman, but it had a diameter comparable to that which would be fired from the recovered handgun. The State then charged Putney with aggravated assault. Prior to trial, Putney moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the charge violated his constitutional and statutory rights against double jeopardy because he had already been convicted of the assault in municipal court. The court preliminarily denied the motion, concluding factual issues existed making summary judgment inappropriate. After a bench trial, the court found Putney guilty. Because the court found Putney caused a permanent impairment of a bodily function, the court found Putney guilty of a class B felony. After entry of the judgment and order, Putney moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence supported his conviction and double jeopardy applied. The trial court concluded sufficient evidence supported the conviction because the evidence showed Putney acted with the requisite culpability, the woman suffered a serious bodily injury, and the woman suffered a permanent impairment of a bodily function. The court also concluded it could not judicially notice the municipal ordinance despite Putney having provided the court with the ordinance because it was a court of general jurisdiction, Putney did not offer the ordinance into evidence, and the parties had not stipulated to the ordinance. Because the court concluded it could not judicially notice the ordinance so as to perform the double jeopardy analysis, and sufficient evidence otherwise supported the conviction, the court denied Putney's motions for judgment of acquittal and new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, and reversed the order denying the motion for new trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Putney" on Justia Law