Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State appealed a pretrial order dismissing criminal charges of theft of property and exploitation of a vulnerable adult against Caroline Conrad based on the civil dispute doctrine. In December 2015 the State charged Conrad, alleging Conrad used for herself more than $50,000 in funds her elderly mother deposited in a joint bank account which listed the mother as the "member" and Conrad as a "joint owner." After the district court found probable cause at the preliminary hearing, Conrad, at the court's suggestion, brought a motion to dismiss the charges based on the civil dispute doctrine. Based on the mother's joint account application and her account contract with the bank, the court found "a legitimate dispute exists" regarding the mother's donative intent in determining whether an inter vivos gift had been given by the mother to Conrad. The court found delivery occurred because the mother changed her sole ownership of the funds to joint ownership with Conrad and Conrad accepted the gift because she "used these funds herself." The court concluded Conrad met her burden of showing "a legitimate dispute on a fairly unique underlying issue of property or civil law." The court therefore dismissed the charges. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings because the civil dispute doctrine did not apply in this case. View "North Dakota v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Danny Nelson appeals from a district court order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. Nelson was convicted in 2009 of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The underlying conduct for the conviction consisted of Nelson having repeated sexual contact and intercourse with his step-daughter between the time she was nine or ten years old until she was roughly fourteen or fifteen years old. After his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child, Nelson was sentenced to ten years in prison with three years suspended. While in prison, Nelson completed sex offender programming. Specifically, Nelson completed a low-intensity sex offender program in 2010 and a high-intensity sex offender program in 2014. The State petitioned the district court to civilly commit Nelson. The district court found probable cause to commit and ordered Nelson transported to the State Hospital for evaluation and creation of a report. Two doctors submitted reports of their evaluations of Nelson to the district court: one doctor diagnosed Nelson with "Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder, Other Specified Personality Disorder with Antisocial Personality and Narcissistic Traits;" the other doctor testified Nelson had "reasonable control" over his behavior and did not meet the requirement of serious difficulty controlling behavior. On appeal, Nelson argued his substantive due process rights were violated because he was committed after he already completed a sex offender treatment program while incarcerated. Nelson also argued the State failed to prove he was a sexually dangerous individual. Alternatively, Nelson argued the district court failed to specifically state the facts on which it relied to determine Nelson met the definition of a sexually dangerous individual. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court's findings were inadequate to permit appellate review. While retaining jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3), the Court remanded with instructions that the district court make specific findings of fact on whether Nelson was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and whether Nelson had a present serious difficulty controlling behavior. View "Interest of Nelson" on Justia Law

Daniel Myers appealed a district court order summarily dismissing his application for postconviction relief. In April 2012, Myers pled guilty to aggravated assault domestic violence, a class C felony. The district court sentenced Myers to five years' imprisonment, with five years suspended and five years of supervised probation. In August 2012, Myers pled guilty in three additional criminal cases involving theft of property, possession of drug paraphernalia, carrying a concealed weapon, hindering law enforcement, and driving while license suspended. The district court sentenced Myers to five years' imprisonment, with five years suspended and three years of supervised probation. The August 2012 judgments stated the sentences for all of the crimes would run concurrent to each other. The August 2012 judgments did not state whether the sentences would run concurrent or consecutive to Myers' April 2012 aggravated assault sentence. In April 2013, the State petitioned to revoke Myers' probation in all four criminal cases after Myers tested positive for methamphetamine. The district court revoked Myers' probation and entered amended criminal judgments sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment through a variation of concurrent and consecutive sentences in all of the cases. Myers applied for postconviction relief in August 2013, claiming the court failed to advise him that revocation of his probation could result in additional prison time. n April 2015, Myers filed another application for postconviction relief, claiming his sentence after revocation was not authorized by law and the district court should have sentenced him to five years' imprisonment instead of ten years. The State moved to dismiss Myers' application for postconviction relief, arguing Myers misused the postconviction relief process by inexcusably failing to raise his grounds for relief in his earlier application for postconviction relief. The district court summarily dismissed his application without a hearing. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Myers' postconviction relief application was a misuse of process. View "Myers v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Dennis Gaede appeals a judgment dismissing his amended complaint against Leann Bertsch, Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and from an order denying his motion for relief from the judgment. In 2006, Gaede was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and affirmed denials of his applications for post-conviction relief. In November 2015, Gaede sued Leann Bertsch, Director of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, claiming Bertsch violated N.D.C.C. 23-06-03 by fraudulently claiming he will be responsible for his funeral and burial expenses upon his death. He claimed Cass County was responsible for his funeral expenses under the statute, but Bertsch automatically placed 25 percent of his earned monies into a release aid account and the funds are being held to pay for his future funeral expenses. Gaede requested the court order all money the Department was holding in his release aid account be returned to him and grant a permanent injunction preventing Bertsch from deducting any further amounts for deposit in his release aid account for future funeral expenses. In December 2015, Gaede amended his complaint to sue Bertsch in both her official and personal capacities. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gaede v. Bertsch" on Justia Law

Chace Stewart appealed an order summarily denying his application for post-conviction relief. In August 2013, the State charged Stewart with two counts of aggravated assault for alleged assaults against his mother and step-father. In December 2013, in conjunction with the two pending charges of aggravated assault, two petitions to revoke probation for earlier aggravated assault convictions, and pending charges for disorderly conduct and for driving under the influence, Stewart, with counsel, entered into a written plea agreement with the State to resolve all the cases against him. In the written plea agreement, Stewart admitted the allegations in the two petitions to revoke his probation, the pending disorderly conduct charge, and the two pending aggravated assault charges. After a hearing, the district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Stewart under the agreement. In May 2015, Stewart filed a self-represented application for post-conviction relief, claiming his guilty plea to the aggravated assault charges against his mother and step-father was not voluntary and he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Stewart claimed his counsel "did not do what [Stewart] had submitted to him in writing," and his guilty plea was "unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with understanding" because there was an "[a]bsence of [his] right to a psychological evaluation." Stewart's application sought withdrawal of his guilty plea. After review of this matter, the Supreme Court concluded Stewart failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and therefore affirmed. View "Stewart v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Jacob Webster appealed after a jury returned a general verdict finding him guilty of driving under the influence. Because a driver may not be criminally convicted for refusing a warrantless blood test incident to arrest, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the general verdict finding Webster guilty of driving under the influence under an instruction alternatively criminalizing the refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test incident to arrest was not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court concluded Webster was not entitled to a jury instruction on the legal requirements for a law enforcement officer to request a preliminary onsite breath screening test. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Webster" on Justia Law

Jessica Belgarde appealed after a jury found her guilty of shoplifting. Belgarde notified the State of her intent to present her minor child as an alibi witness two weeks before trial and 112 days after the deadline set by the district court in its pretrial scheduling order. The issue on appeal was whether a district court abuses its discretion by excluding alibi testimony under N.D.R.Crim.P. 12.1 without first finding prejudice to the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "North Dakota v. Belgarde" on Justia Law

Caren Ashby was arrested for several drug related offenses after a traffic stop in Wells County in 2015. Caren Ashby moved to suppress all evidence seized from the traffic stop, and the State opposed the motion. Ashby challenged the validity of the traffic stop and argued all evidence uncovered should be suppressed. The State argued the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion or was valid as a community caretaking function. The State appealed when the district court granted Ashby's motion to suppress the evidence seized after the stop. Suppression was based on the district court's conclusion that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. After review, the Supreme Court concluded, under the totality of the circumstances, the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and the district court erred when it granted Ashby's motion to suppress evidence. The Court therefore reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Ashby" on Justia Law

Barry Roe appealed a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief in which he alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel from two attorneys who represented him at different stages of his criminal case. The State charged Roe with two counts of gross sexual imposition. The State's evidence included forensic interview statements by three children, two of whom alleged sexual abuse by Roe. During the preliminary hearing, a detective testified to what the children said at the interviews. The court found probable cause supported both counts, and the case was set for trial. Prior to trial, substitute counsel was appointed to represent Roe. During the trial, one of the children partially recanted her sexual abuse allegation. She altered her story to say Roe had touched her inner thigh rather than her vaginal area. A jury found Roe guilty of both charges. Roe later filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing his preliminary hearing attorney and his trial attorney ineffectively represented him. The district court denied his application, finding neither attorney's representation prejudiced Roe. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Roe was not prejudiced by his counsels' representation. View "Roe v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2015, officers executed a probation search at the residence of Keirsten Thomas. While speaking with officers, Thomas indicated some paint in the home belonged to Jeremy Kaul. As officers continued their search, officers heard movement of the door handle. The door to the residence had been locked after the officers entered and commenced the search. Hearing the noise, an officer opened the door to see Kaul standing in the doorway. The officer identified himself and told Kaul he was going to be detained because they were doing a probation search. Kaul entered the apartment and officers spoke with him and asked for consent to search his person and vehicle. Kaul consented to both and officers searched his person and vehicle, but did not find any contraband. Kaul was asked to consent to a search of his backpack which he refused. Officers requested a K-9 unit to conduct a sniff of Kaul's backpack because he was acting "extremely nervous," and the officer knew Kaul to be a "methamphetamine user, [and] a marijuana user." Roughly fifteen minutes later, the K-9 unit arrived and the dog alerted on Kaul's backpack. Kaul was asked for consent to search his backpack again, and he again refused. Officers seized the backpack, told Kaul he could leave, and Kaul left. Officers applied for and were granted a search warrant for Kaul's backpack. Officers found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia in Kaul's backpack when they executed the search warrant. Kaul was charged with possession of methamphetamine, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a controlled substance. Kaul filed a motion to suppress evidence, and the State opposed the motion. The district court held a hearing on the suppression motion at which an officer testified. After both parties questioned the officer, the district court asked several of its own questions. After post-hearing briefs, the district court granted Kaul's motion to suppress. The State appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by concluding the factors justifying the seizure of occupants contemporaneously with execution of a valid search warrant did not apply to Kaul's initial seizure. The record indicated Kaul was not an occupant of the residence belonging to the individual who was the subject of the probationary search. “At most, Kaul was a frequent visitor.” Furthermore, the Court found the district court did not err in holding there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion to support the continued detention of Kaul while waiting for the K-9 unit. View "North Dakota v. Kaul" on Justia Law