Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jimmy Booth, Jr., appeals from a judgment denying his application for post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Booth pled guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and four counts of endangerment of a child. Booth, accompanied by his attorney, agreed with the factual basis presented for the plea. The district court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Booth to ten years of incarceration on each count to be served concurrently, with credit for time served. Booth timely moved for reduction of his sentence. The court denied the motion. Booth then moved to correct an illegal sentence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a)(1), arguing his sentence was illegal because the State gave him only a one-day notice of its intention to seek habitual offender sentence enhancement. After that was denied, Booth filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief under N.D.C.C. ch. 29-32.1, claiming he received ineffective assistance of counsel leading up to his guilty plea. Finding Booth failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance of his counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of post-conviction relief. View "Booth v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2007 a jury found Tilmer Everett guilty of gross sexual imposition. In August 2015 the district court entered an order barring Everett from future filings without the court's permission. In February 2016, Everett filed what he referred to as a "motion requesting permission to file newly discovered evidence" and a supporting application for post-conviction relief. In March 2016, the district court entered an order denying his motion and dismissing his case. Everett appealed and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, holding the district court's order denying Everett leave of court to allow him further filings was not an appealable order. In May 2016 Everett filed the motion underlying this case, which he referred to as a "motion requesting permission to file newly discovered evidence" with another application for post-conviction relief. In June 2016 the district court entered an order denying his motion to file newly discovered evidence and denying his application. On appeal Everett argues the district court violated his due process rights when it did not correctly file his motion and application and the State violated his due process rights by not responding to his motion and application. The Supreme Court reviewed the new application and found all of the alleged new allegations as meritless, and Everett previously brought these same matters before the Court in previous post-conviction applications. View "Everett v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In 2007 a jury found Tilmer Everett guilty of gross sexual imposition. In August 2015 the district court entered an order barring Everett from future filings without the court's permission. In February 2016, Everett filed what he referred to as a "motion requesting permission to file newly discovered evidence" and a supporting application for post-conviction relief. In March 2016, the district court entered an order denying his motion and dismissing his case. Everett appealed and the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal, holding the district court's order denying Everett leave of court to allow him further filings was not an appealable order. In May 2016 Everett filed the motion underlying this case, which he referred to as a "motion requesting permission to file newly discovered evidence" with another application for post-conviction relief. In June 2016 the district court entered an order denying his motion to file newly discovered evidence and denying his application. On appeal Everett argues the district court violated his due process rights when it did not correctly file his motion and application and the State violated his due process rights by not responding to his motion and application. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court dismissed Everett's appeal. View "Everett v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Erin Rourke appealed a district court's judgment after a jury convicted him of gross sexual imposition. Because Rourke failed to preserve his argument on sufficiency of the evidence for appeal by failing to move for a judgment of acquittal at trial under N.D.R.Crim.P. 29, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Rourke" on Justia Law

The State charged David Gray with disorderly conduct for engaging in "harassing conduct by means of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person." The Bergs informed the deputy they observed their neighbor, Gray, on numerous occasions trying to look into the Bergs' residence with binoculars, and they showed the deputy pictures of Gray standing on the property line watching their home. The Bergs informed the deputy they were afraid in their home based on Gray's actions. Ronda Berg informed the deputy that she has to "constantly keep her shades closed, and that she is afraid to go outside her own home." The deputy spoke to Gray about these issues. Gray became upset with the deputy and started yelling at him. Gray admitted to watching the Bergs' windows with binoculars claiming he did so because he was afraid that someone in the Bergs' home would try to shoot him. Gray told the deputy he needs "boots on the ground so they don't overrun my territory." The deputy told Gray that the issues with the Bergs needed to stop. Gray replied "[n]o, it's going to continue." Gray appealed after a jury found him guilty. Gray, self-represented, argued the district court erred by not ruling on his motions to dismiss; N.D.C.C. 12.1-31-01 should not apply because he was engaged in a constitutionally-protected activity; the complaint against him was "illegal;" N.D.C.C. 12.1-31-01 was unconstitutional for vagueness; there was insufficient evidence to uphold the jury verdict; and the district court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. Gray" on Justia Law

Dylan Saari was charged with the crime of accomplice to forgery, a class C felony. The charge came after an investigation into his girlfriend's attempt to post bond for him while Saari was detained on a probation revocation. While Saari was detained in October 2014, he made several telephone calls to his girlfriend. During these recorded calls, Saari and his girlfriend discussed how she could obtain money to use to post bond. Saari's girlfriend ultimately passed a forged check belonging to her stepfather while on the phone with Saari. The funds were seized by police when Saari's girlfriend attempted to post bond. Saari pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years of incarceration to run concurrently with his sentences in other cases. He appealed the district court's order denying Saari's application for post-conviction relief, arguing his conduct did not support a conviction for accomplice to forgery. Saari argued his conduct only supported a conviction for criminal facilitation, a class A misdemeanor, which made his sentence unauthorized by law. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Saari v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Elijah Addai of murder. Addai applied for post-conviction relief arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his application. In 2015 Addai applied for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence. He appealed the denial of his petition, arguing that a witness who did not testify at trial, would offer the new evidence. The district court concluded the witness' statements to police were not 'evidence' in any sense, and "certainly not new evidence which could be the basis for reversal of the conviction here." Finding that the district court did not err in denying Addai's claim of newly discovered evidence and dismissing his application for post-conviction relief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Addai v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Michael Brewer appealed this conviction on two counts of gross sexual imposition. The Supreme Court concluded Brewer waived his claim of error that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the State to admit evidence surrounding G.H.'s forensic interview by not renewing his objection to the admission of this evidence at trial. View "North Dakota v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Sargent County Deputy Sheriff David Kozok arrested Paul Vincent for driving under the influence of alcohol after a blood test revealed Vincent's alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limits. Vincent moved to suppress any evidence related to the chemical test arguing, in part, that the deputy violated his limited statutory right to speak with an attorney before submitting to the chemical test. The deputy asked Vincent if he would submit to a chemical test. Vincent did not answer, instead said "talk to my attorney." The deputy informed Vincent that he would take his silence as a refusal. The deputy then transported Vincent to the Richland County jail. On the way to jail, the deputy received a call from the Richland County Sheriff, who advised the deputy to read the implied consent advisory to Vincent again. The deputy pulled over on the side of the road and, again, read Vincent the implied consent advisory. After the deputy finished, Vincent again stated "talk to my attorney." The deputy testified he told Vincent if Vincent could "get a hold of an attorney" he would be able to talk to one. Vincent gave the deputy a phone number, but did not provide the deputy with the name of the attorney. The deputy testified that it appeared to be a local cell phone number. The deputy called the number using his personal cell phone, but there was no answer. Vincent was in the back seat of the patrol car when the deputy placed the call. After the deputy's failed attempt to call the number Vincent gave him, Vincent did not mention an attorney again and agreed to submit to a blood test. The deputy drove Vincent to the Lisbon Hospital where a blood test was taken revealing his alcohol concentration level exceeded the legal limits. Vincent appealed his ultimate conviction on driving under the influence of alcohol, arguing evidence of the blood test should have been suppressed after having twice invoked his right to counsel. Finding no reversible error in denying the motion to suppress evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "City of Gwinner v. Vincent" on Justia Law

Russell Schank appealed when the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence. A City of Dickinson police officer arrested Schank and transported him to the law enforcement center. At the law enforcement center, Schank requested to speak with an attorney after being given the implied consent advisory. The officer brought Schank to an office that contained a working telephone. According to the officer, the office door was left open for him to monitor Schank to ensure nothing was placed in his mouth. Schank attempted to close the door to the office, but the officer did not allow it. At the suppression hearing, the officer indicated if the door was closed, he would have been locked out of the office. While Schank used the telephone, the officer stood at the doorway of the office, about six to eight feet away from Schank. In the hallway, the officer engaged in a conversation with another officer for at least part of the time Schank was inside the office. Standing in the hallway, the officer heard Schank ask the officer whether he (Schank) had taken a preliminary test. Responding, the officer told Schank his preliminary test result. Schank then continued his call, took the chemical test, and was allowed to post bond. Schank filed a motion to suppress evidence based upon a violation of his limited statutory right to counsel. The district court held a hearing at which only the arresting officer testified. The court denied the motion to suppress; Schank entered a conditional guilty plea, and the district court entered a criminal judgment. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the criminal judgment, concluding the district court did not err by denying Schank's motion to suppress evidence. View "City of Dickinson v. Schank" on Justia Law