Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Aron Williams appeals from a two-year disorderly conduct restraining order prohibiting him from having contact with Jennifer Williams. Aron and Jennifer were married in April 2015, have two minor children together, and resided in Jamestown. They separated in April 2016 and were in the process of obtaining a divorce in Stutsman County. After the separation, Jennifer moved to West Fargo. In June 2016, Jennifer filed for a temporary domestic violence protection order against Aron in Cass County, but the parties stipulated to dismissal of the order and the district court in the divorce action ordered that exchanges for Aron’s parenting time with one of the children occur at Rainbow Bridge in Moorhead, Minnesota. In December 2016, Jennifer moved to modify the provisions of an interim order on child support, attorney fees, spousal support, and parenting time in the Stutsman County divorce proceedings. In January 2017, the district court granted the motion and ordered exchanges of the children to occur at the West Fargo Police Department. On January 30, 2017, Jennifer filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Aron in Cass County, alleging he committed several acts intended to adversely affect her safety, security, and privacy. Although Jennifer testified about several acts of alleged disorderly conduct, the district court indicated the only incidents it would consider were those that occurred after the January 13, 2017, amended interim order was entered in the divorce action. Aron’s attorney argued that Aron's words constituted constitutionally protected free speech, and the parties argued the constitutional issue before the court. The trial court found reasonable grounds to believe Aron’s actions constituted disorderly conduct and granted the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred by failing to address the constitutional issues Aron raised. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a new determination as to whether a disorderly conduct restraining order should issue on the basis of any remaining conduct. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Aron Williams appeals from a two-year disorderly conduct restraining order prohibiting him from having contact with Jennifer Williams. Aron and Jennifer were married in April 2015, have two minor children together, and resided in Jamestown. They separated in April 2016 and were in the process of obtaining a divorce in Stutsman County. After the separation, Jennifer moved to West Fargo. In June 2016, Jennifer filed for a temporary domestic violence protection order against Aron in Cass County, but the parties stipulated to dismissal of the order and the district court in the divorce action ordered that exchanges for Aron’s parenting time with one of the children occur at Rainbow Bridge in Moorhead, Minnesota. In December 2016, Jennifer moved to modify the provisions of an interim order on child support, attorney fees, spousal support, and parenting time in the Stutsman County divorce proceedings. In January 2017, the district court granted the motion and ordered exchanges of the children to occur at the West Fargo Police Department. On January 30, 2017, Jennifer filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Aron in Cass County, alleging he committed several acts intended to adversely affect her safety, security, and privacy. Although Jennifer testified about several acts of alleged disorderly conduct, the district court indicated the only incidents it would consider were those that occurred after the January 13, 2017, amended interim order was entered in the divorce action. Aron’s attorney argued that Aron's words constituted constitutionally protected free speech, and the parties argued the constitutional issue before the court. The trial court found reasonable grounds to believe Aron’s actions constituted disorderly conduct and granted the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred by failing to address the constitutional issues Aron raised. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for the district court to make a new determination as to whether a disorderly conduct restraining order should issue on the basis of any remaining conduct. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Shawn Montgomery appealed after he conditionally pled guilty to a charge of driving under the influence. Montgomery argued the State violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search by compelling his consent to a blood test. Voluntary consent to a warrantless blood test is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, for which the State bears the burden of proof. A district court's decision on a motion to suppress will not be reversed if there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Finding no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

When considering whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a container found within an automobile, courts will look at whether the individual: (1) asserts ownership of the container; (2) asserts ownership of the vehicle; (3) testifies or presents evidence establishing possessory interest in the container; (4) was present at the time of the search; and (5) whether the container itself has identifying markings or if the contents within have identifying characteristics. Casey Adams appealed after a jury found him guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. Police received a report of suspicious activity in a Grand Forks parking lot. The caller reported individuals moving backpacks from a Nissan into a Cadillac, among other suspicious behavior. Three officers responded to the scene. The officers testified they observed the individuals displaying odd behavior, consistent with drug use. One officer observed a blue container he believed to be drug paraphernalia inside the Cadillac, indicating he saw a crystal or powder substance on it and it was similar to a container used in a separate drug related call less than 24 hours prior. Three individuals were in the Cadillac and Adams was in the Nissan. No consent was given to search either vehicle. Based on the observation of the blue container in plain view, the officers searched the Cadillac and seized more than 80 items relating to drug use. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Adams' argument that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not support the district court's probable cause finding was moot. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Adams' motion to suppress evidence because Adams failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpacks. View "North Dakota v. Adams" on Justia Law

Brenda Doll appealed a district court order denying her motion for reconsideration of a disorderly conduct restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Doll's motion for reconsideration. View "Kautzman v. Doll" on Justia Law

C.B. appealed a juvenile court order adopting a judicial referee's order finding C.B. failed to register as a sex offender. In June 2012, C.B. pled guilty to "assault IV with sexual motivation" in Washington state. The adjudication and disposition order did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender in Washington. In the fall of 2012, C.B. moved to North Dakota with his father. At the request of the juvenile court, C.B. registered as a sex offender in North Dakota in November 2013. In May 2015, C.B. updated his registration at the Bismarck Police Department. After updating his registration, an assistant Burleigh County state's attorney issued a juvenile petition to C.B. for committing the delinquent act of failure to register as a sex offender. The petition alleged C.B. failed to timely "alert law enforcement to a new job, a new place of residence, a telephone number or his facebook account." C.B. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing he should not be required to register. At an October 2015 hearing on the motion, an assistant attorney general testified C.B.'s assault IV with sexual motivation in Washington was equivalent to a class A misdemeanor sexual offense in North Dakota that required registration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judicial referee stated he was dismissing the petition, and issued an order of dismissal. Shortly thereafter, the referee rescinded the order of dismissal, stating he decided the motion wrongly due to a legal error. The judicial referee provided notice to the parties the same day that they had the right to have the order reviewed by a juvenile court judge if the request was made within seven days. C.B. did not request review of the order. C.B. again moved to dismiss the petition in November 2015, arguing the judicial referee exceeded his authority when he rescinded the order dismissing the petition. The referee denied the motion. C.B. sought review of the referee's decision from the juvenile court. The juvenile court adopted the referee's decision denying the motion. C.B. filed another motion to dismiss in December 2015, arguing the State failed to give full faith and credit to the Washington order that did not require C.B. to register as a sex offender. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed: although C.B. was not required to register as a sex offender in Washington, Full Faith and Credit does not prohibit North Dakota from requiring C.B. to register. View "Interest of C.B." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jonathan Horvath of murder, reckless endangerment, two counts of terrorizing, and a felon in possession of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Horvath appealed arguing insufficient evidence existed for a rational jury to find him guilty. Horvath filed a supplemental statement alleging perjury, improper closing statements, among other matters. Horvath filed an amended application for post-conviction relief and requested an evidentiary hearing. Horvath's amended application alleged he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel: (1) failed to subpoena an essential witness to rebut two of the State's witnesses; and (2) trial counsel failed to present exculpatory video evidence, when exhibit 24 was not shown in full. The court summarily dismissed Horvath's application for post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Horvath’s application. View "Horvath v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Cody Michael Atkins appealed a district court's order summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. In 2015, Atkins plead guilty to gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to 20 years with the North Dakota Department of Corrections with five years suspended for 10 years and 10 years of supervised probation. Atkins' conviction was affirmed on appeal. In March 2016, Atkins filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In April 2016, the court entered a scheduling order but Atkins failed to timely file a brief and the petition was dismissed. In September 2016, Atkins filed an identical petition for post-conviction relief. In October 2016, the court entered a scheduling order and after being granted an extension, Atkins filed a supplemental brief in March 2017. Atkins' brief included several conclusory statements alleging his counsel was defective and a request for an evidentiary hearing. In April 2017, the State filed a motion and brief in support of summary dismissal. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for June 2017. Atkins failed to respond to the State's motion. Atkins did not file any affidavits or other comparable means of evidence in support of the allegations contained in his brief. On May 5, 2017, the district court granted the motion for summary dismissal. Atkins' supplemental brief listed six ways in which he is entitled to post-conviction relief; Atkins argued the State's failure to refute the factual assertions in his brief relieved him of the burden of producing competent, admissible evidence prior to the evidentiary hearing. Because Atkins was put to his proof when the State moved for summary disposition, and Atkins did not meet his minimal burden of supporting his application with competent, admissible evidence raising an issue of material fact, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirm the district court's order summarily dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. View "Atkins v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Michael Truelove appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition ("GSI"), terrorizing, interfering with a telephone during an emergency call, and aggravated assault. ruelove met HFP at Dempsey's, a bar in downtown Fargo. HFP was working as a cocktail server, and Truelove was a patron that night (although he was also employed by Dempsey's as a custodian). They had not interacted prior to that night. HFP wrote her phone number on Truelove's pizza box. Truelove left, but after they exchanged a few text messages, he decided to come back to Dempsey's to meet her. HFP's shift ended, and the two of them consumed alcohol at Dempsey's. Toward the end of the night, HFP offered Truelove a ride home. The two of them walked to HFP's car, kissed, and drove to Truelove's apartment in South Fargo. HFP accompanied Truelove into his studio apartment. Once in the apartment, Truelove went into the bathroom, and HFP went to lie down on the mattress. After this point, the testimony of HFP and Truelove differed. Challenging only the GSI conviction, Truelove argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding there was sufficient evidence in the record. View "North Dakota v. Truelove" on Justia Law

Anoulak Thornsavan appealed an order denying his motion to suppress and from the civil judgment forfeiting $127,930 to North Dakota. n July 2015, Officer Mason Ware pulled over Thornsavan, along with his passenger, Saravanh Phommakhy, on Interstate 94. Ware stopped Thornsavan because it appeared to him that the car had excessive window tint. Prior to the stop, Ware checked the vehicle registration in his database, which indicated that the vehicle was registered to an individual born in 1937. Ware noted that both Thornsavan and Phommakhy looked as though they were in their late 20's or early 30's. Walking toward the stopped car, Ware saw a pillow, blanket, and backpack in the backseat of the car, but not any luggage. Soon after making contact, Ware asked for licenses and registration. When Thornsavan reached into his center console to obtain his information, Ware saw a "bundle of cash" in the console with a $50 bill on top of the stack and a $20 bill on the bottom. Thornsavan then gave Ware a photocopy of the vehicle title. The photocopy indicated that the car had been purchased just four days prior. Ware testified that Thornsavan and Phommakhy appeared nervous, avoided eye contact, stuttered, and displayed tremors in their hands. Ware asked Thornsavan about the contents of his car just prior to issuing a warning citation. A later search of the vehicle revealed two duffle bags containing vacuum-sealed blocks of cash with dryer sheets in between the sealed layers. The total cash amount found and seized by law enforcement was $127,930, which included $930 found in the center console. Thornsavan filed a motion to suppress his statements and the money found. The district court denied the motion to suppress and ordered the money to be forfeited. Thornsavan argued that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him or his car beyond the initial traffic stop and that his statements and the money seized had to be suppressed. The North Dakota Supreme Court found reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and a Miranda warning was not required. View "North Dakota v. $127,930 United States Currency" on Justia Law