Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Russell Parshall appealed a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. In 2015 Parshall pled guilty to "Driving Under the Influence N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal)" by a N.D.R.Crim.P. 43 plea agreement. Parshall's Rule 43 Change of Plea and Sentencing Appearance Waiver listed the charge without the parenthetical "(First Offense Refusal);" however, both the formal plea agreement section of the document and the later criminal judgment included the parenthetical. Parshall applied for post-conviction relief, arguing the United States Supreme Court's holding in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), was a retroactively applicable substantive rule of constitutional law that prohibited the State from imposing criminal liability for refusing a warrantless blood test. In opposing Parshall's application the State argued the factual basis in the plea agreement supported both general driving while impaired and refusal to submit to the blood test. The district court found Parshall entered a guilty plea to the general charge of driving under the influence, not merely refusal. The district court declined to rule on the retroactivity of Birchfield, "The Court need not make that ruling, as the Court finds that the ruling in Birchfield made the statute regarding conviction by refusal to provide a blood sample unconstitutional from the moment of passage." The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the parties' intent could be ascertained from the plea agreement itself. The plea agreement signed by Parshall stated "Defendant hereby pleads guilty to a charge of COUNT I DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 (First Offense Refusal) a Class B Misdemeanor." The criminal judgment mirrored this language. From this the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in interpreting the factual basis following the plea agreement to determine Parshall pled guilty to general driving under the influence when the plain language indicated refusal. With respect to Birchfield, because the district court did not rule on that issue, the matter was remanded for resolution. View "Parshall v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

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Nathan Rolfson appealed after a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Rolfson argued the district court erred in admitting into evidence three foundation documents for the Intoxilyzer test result because the State failed to disclose the documents in response to his discovery request. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding, that although the State violated the discovery rule, Rolfson failed to show significant prejudice resulted from the State's failure to disclose the three challenged documents before trial, and therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude the exhibits from evidence. View "North Dakota v. Rolfson" on Justia Law

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Laura Rende appealed after a jury found her guilty of simple assault on a peace officer and driving under the influence. The district court did not instruct the jury to make a finding whether Rende knew the arresting officer was acting in his official capacity at the time of her arrest. A district court's use of jury instructions that fail to include every element of the offense is error. However, that error is waived if defendant invited the error by submitting proposed instructions that also failed to include every element of the offense and if the defendant failed to object to the instructions at trial. "It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. A party may not take advantage of irregularities in the proceedings unless he objects at the time they occur, allowing the district court to take appropriate action." After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, because Rende invited the error. View "North Dakota v. Rende" on Justia Law

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Laura Rende appealed after a jury found her guilty of simple assault on a peace officer and driving under the influence. The district court did not instruct the jury to make a finding whether Rende knew the arresting officer was acting in his official capacity at the time of her arrest. A district court's use of jury instructions that fail to include every element of the offense is error. However, that error is waived if defendant invited the error by submitting proposed instructions that also failed to include every element of the offense and if the defendant failed to object to the instructions at trial. "It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. A party may not take advantage of irregularities in the proceedings unless he objects at the time they occur, allowing the district court to take appropriate action." After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, because Rende invited the error. View "North Dakota v. Rende" on Justia Law

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James Kremer appealed an order calling for the forfeiture and destruction of property involved in his criminal convictions for possessing images of sexual conduct by minors. In 2016 Kremer pled guilty to three class C felony counts of possessing prohibited materials. for which he was sentenced to serve ten years in prison followed by three years of supervised probation. During the first year after his release from incarceration, Kremer was prohibited from possessing "any equipment which allows you to access the internet." During the final two years of his probation, Kremer was allowed "to access the internet as per your probation officer." In December 2016, the State moved for the items to be forfeited and destroyed because the State alleged the items had been used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense and because the items were illegal for Defendant to possess based upon Defendant's sentence in this matter. Defendant argued he did not want to possess the items, but all tax information, personal documents, personal photos, business documents, school e-books and documents, and account information contained on the items needed to be saved, and that after saving such information Defendant's family would then be able to sell the items, and such would not be "illegal" based upon Defendant's sentence. Rejecting this premise, the district court ordered forfeiture and destruction of Kremer's X-Box, PlayStation, laptop, and portable hard drive which were in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The court found the laptop and hard drive "were used in the commission of the crime" and all four items "were either used in the commission of the crime . . . and/or enable the defendant to have access to the internet, an action specifically prohibited by his Criminal Judgment." The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court did not err in ordering forfeiture and destruction of the laptop and hard drive, but erred with respect to the X-Box and Playstation. With regard to the game systems, the State argued the "only way that we know that Mr. Kremer is not going to get these items back and access the internet when he is released from prison is to forfeit them." The Supreme Court found the State cited no authority for its proposition that the possibility defendant might use otherwise unforfeitable property in an unlawful manner after completion of his criminal sentence rendered the property forfeitable. View "North Dakota v. Kremer" on Justia Law

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John Isom appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault--domestic violence. Isom argues the district court imposed an illegal sentence, abused its discretion in substituting a juror after empanelment, and erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Specifically, Isom argued the district court imposed an illegal sentence of five years supervised probation when N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-06.1(2) provided a maximum of three years for aggravated assault--domestic violence. Furthermore, Isom argued the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 24 substituting a juror after jeopardy attached. The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Isom that the sentence he received was not in accordance with N.D.C.C. 12.1-32-06.1(2). The Court disagreed with Isom’s contention with respect to the juror substitution. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for resentencing. View "North Dakota v. Isom" on Justia Law

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Dylan Groce appealed after a jury found him guilty of aggravated assault. Groce argued the district court abused its discretion by quashing subpoenas for two witnesses and denying a motion for mistrial. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err by quashing the subpoenas and did not abuse its discretion in denying Groce's motion for a mistrial. View "North Dakota v. Groce" on Justia Law

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A jury found Kevin Decker guilty of disorderly conduct. Decker argued on appeal the district court created a structural error by denying his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial when court staff excluded one member of the public from jury selection proceedings. He also argued the State presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty of disorderly conduct. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, concluding the district court's exclusion of one member of the public was too trivial to amount to structural error and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. View "North Dakota v. Decker" on Justia Law

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The State appealed a district court order granting Tyler Fleckenstein's motion to suppress. Fleckenstein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (third offense). Fleckenstein moved to suppress the blood test. At the motion hearing, only the arresting officer testified. The district court concluded that the consent to the blood test was involuntary and granted the motion to suppress the blood test. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court misapplied the law by ruling Fleckenstein's consent to a blood test was per se involuntary and thus did not consider the totality of the circumstances. The Court reversed the district court's order and remanded for additional findings of fact and a determination of voluntariness on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. View "North Dakota v. Fleckenstein" on Justia Law

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Aaron Bruce appealed a district court's amended criminal judgment awarding restitution. In December 2015, the State charged Bruce with unlawful manufacturing, delivering, or possession with intent to deliver heroin; manslaughter; tampering in a criminal investigation; ingestion of a controlled substance; and theft of property. The charges arose from an incident in July 2015. In March 2017, pursuant to an agreement, the State amended the manslaughter charge to negligent homicide, and dismissed three of the charges. Bruce pled guilty to negligent homicide and manufacturing, delivering, or possession with intent to deliver heroin. The State requested $6,165 for funeral expenses for Aidan Vanderhoef, the victim of the negligent homicide charge, $500 for a cell phone that was allegedly stolen from Vanderhoef, and $492.20 for his father's transportation costs to and from the court proceedings. The court ordered Bruce to pay restitution in the amount of $7,157.20. Bruce argues the district court abused its discretion in ordering restitution for funeral expenses, a cell phone, and transportation costs to and from the court proceedings for Vanderhoef's father. Bruce also argues the district court abused its discretion when ordering restitution without considering his ability to pay. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the restitution award. View "North Dakota v. Bruce" on Justia Law