Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daniel Bohe appealed entered after his conditional plea of guilty to a charge of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or greater. Bohe argued that because he was given an incomplete implied consent advisory, the district court erred by failing to suppress evidence of blood test results under N.D.C.C. 39-20-01(3)(b). We reverse the judgment and the district court's order denying Bohe's motion to suppress the blood test evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concurred the entire statutory warning was not given here, and as a result, the blood test was inadmissible. The Court concluded the motion to suppress the blood test result should have been granted. The Court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Bohe" on Justia Law

Roger Davies appealed an order granting summary judgment and the district court judgment dismissing his application for post-conviction relief. In 2014, Roger Davies was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a child. In November 2014, Davies pleaded guilty. During the change of plea, the district court advised Davies that as a part of the binding plea agreement, the court would not sentence him to more than 15 years imprisonment. After a presentence investigation, Davies was sentenced to a term of 15 years imprisonment and supervised probation for life. In March 2017, Davies filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief and a written request for a hearing. The application included several exhibits, including a page from his risk assessment, two pages from the sentencing transcript, two pages from his presentence investigation, a victim impact statement, two pages of the transcript from the change of plea hearing, and a copy of the information charging him. Davies' application alleged multiple legal errors leading to his conviction. Davies also alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel on multiple grounds. Davies' application also claimed judicial bias, deficiencies with the charging document, an unduly harsh sentence, and prosecutorial misconduct. Davies' application included a verification stating he signed it as both the affiant and petitioner, and his signature was notarized. The State answered, moved for summary disposition, and filed a brief pointing to citations in the record, arguing Davies' application did not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Davies requested a hearing on his application for post-conviction relief through his attorney, and personally responded to the State's motion for summary disposition. The court proceeded with arguments on the State's summary disposition motion. No additional evidence was presented. The court stated on the record there was no evidence presented in affidavit form by Davies. The court granted the State's motion and summarily dismissed the application for post-conviction relief. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined Davies raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was properly obtained, and reversed only to this issue. The Court found all of Davies' other arguments failed. The matter was remanded for the trial court to conduct further proceedings. View "Davies v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

Mary Redway and Alexander Simon appealed after the district court found Redway guilty of disorderly conduct and Simon guilty of disorderly conduct and physical obstruction of a government function. Redway and Simon participated with a group of about 150 other individuals in a protest against the Dakota Access Pipeline on October 22, 2016. The State initially charged several protesters, including Redway and Simon, with criminal trespass and engaging in a riot. The State subsequently dismissed those charges under N.D.R.Crim.P. 48 and filed new complaints against several protesters, including Redway and Simon, charging them with physical obstruction of a government function under N.D.C.C. 12.1-08-01, disobedience of a safety order during a riot under N.D.C.C. 12.1-25-04, and disorderly conduct under N.D.C.C. 12.1-31-01. Redway and Simon argued there was insufficient evidence to support their disorderly conduct convictions under N.D.C.C. 12.1-31-01; Redway and Simon claimed they were peaceful protesters marching in a field and caused no injuries to others or damage to property, and they argued their activity was constitutionally protected and should have been excluded from evidence under N.D.C.C. 12.1-31-01(2). Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Simon, North Dakota v. Redway" on Justia Law

Clyde Pickens appeals a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of gross sexual imposition. Pickens argues the district court's errors in responding to two requests from the jury prejudiced his substantial rights and denied him a fair trial. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court held a court must allow a jury to rehear any testimony requested. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, a court must respond to a jury's question or request for testimony in open court. Here, the district court's failure to bring the jury into open court and inform them that audio testimony was available were not constitutional errors; the court's responses to the jury's requests occurred in Pickens' presence. It was unclear whether any communications occurred between the jury and the clerk outside of Pickens' presence. Without a record of the interaction between the clerk and the jury, the Supreme Court felt it could only speculate as to whether any communications between them violated Pickens' constitutional right to be present. The Court did not decide whether one of these errors by itself had a significant impact upon the verdict. Taken as a whole, it concluded that the cumulative effect of these errors denied Pickens his right to a fair trial and prejudiced his substantial rights. Therefore the judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "North Dakota v. Pickens" on Justia Law

Jesseaca Finneman appealed after a jury found her guilty of: (1) possession of more than 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver; (2) unlawful possession of hashish; and (3) two counts of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. Finneman argued she was entitled to a new trial because the jury verdict form for the charge of possession of more than 500 grams of marijuana with intent to deliver was confusing and misapplied the law. After review of the circumstances of this case, the North Dakota Supreme Court was satisfied that because of the confusion and uncertainty demonstrated during jury deliberations, Finneman established the plain error in the verdict form affected her substantial rights. The Court therefore reversed Finneman's conviction for possession with intent to deliver. View "North Dakota v. Finneman" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer stopped a vehicle driven by defendant Crystal Corona on October 19, 2017, after she failed to dim her headlights. The officer thereafter detected the odor of alcohol emanating from Corona, and she refused to submit to an onsite screening test for intoxication and a subsequent Intoxilyzer test. The State charged her with driving under the influence for refusing a chemical test for intoxication. The State appealed the district court order denying the its pretrial motion to allow the introduction of evidence at a jury trial about Corona's refusal to submit to an onsite screening test for intoxication. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the State's appeal was not authorized by N.D.C.C. 29-28-07(5), and dismissed the appeal. View "North Dakota v. Corona" on Justia Law

Morris Brickle-Hicks appealed after the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence and a jury found him guilty of murder. Brickle-Hicks argued the court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made by him to law enforcement officers and physical evidence he provided to the officers. After review of the record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court's denial of Brickle-Hicks' motion to suppress was supported by sufficient competent evidence and was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. View "North Dakota v. Brickle-Hicks" on Justia Law

D.D. appealed a district court order requiring his involuntary hospitalization and treatment, directing law enforcement to seize D.D.'s firearms, and finding that federal and state firearm restrictions applied to him. And application for evaluation and emergency admission was filed, request for transportation for emergency detention made, and petition for involuntary commitment, alleging that D.D. was mentally ill and in need of emergency treatment was granted. D.D. was admitted to the North Dakota State Hospital. After a preliminary hearing, the district court ordered involuntary hospitalization and treatment at the State Hospital for fourteen days, and found the firearm restrictions under 18 U.S.C. sections 922(d)(4), 922(g)(4), and N.D.C.C. 62.1-02-01(1)(c) applied. Law enforcement seized about 100 firearms from D.D.'s residence. The State Hospital released D.D. three days after that seizure. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the state and federal firearms restrictions were not unconstitutionally vague and applied to D.D. However, the Court reversed the order to seize D.D.'s firearms because neither the state nor the district court identified legal authority for issuing a summary seizure order as part of a mental health commitment process. View "Interest of D.D." on Justia Law

Roland Riemers petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of mandamus directing the North Dakota Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to order a recount of the June 12, 2018 primary election for the office of secretary of state. Riemers argued he was entitled to an automatic recount under N.D.C.C. 16.1-16-01(1)(a) because he "failed to be nominated in a primary election by one percent or less of the highest vote cast for a candidate for the office sought." The Supreme Court determined the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 16.1-16-01(1)(a) requires a comparison of the highest votes cast for a candidate for the office sought without regard to the candidate's party. “The fact that we are required to construe N.D.C.C. 16.1-16-01(1)(a) does not preclude the remedy of mandamus.” Moreover, given the time constraints on ballot preparation for the general election, the Court determined no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law was available for Riemers. Under the plain language of N.D.C.C. 16.1-16-01(1)(a), Riemers was entitled to an automatic recount, and the Secretary of State was statutorily required to order that automatic recount. The Supreme Court exercised its original jurisdiction to consider Riemers' petition, and granted his request for a writ of mandamus. View "Riemers v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

After adjournment of the Regular Session of the 65th Legislative Assembly, North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum vetoed five items in four appropriation bills by striking through certain language in the bills before signing them into law. In an opinion requested by Senator Rich Wardner and Representative Al Carlson, the Attorney General concluded three of the partial vetoes were ineffective: Senate Bill 2003, section 18, subsection 3 ("Any Portion Veto"); House Bill 1020, section 5 ("Water Commission Veto"); and Senate Bill 2013, section 12 ("IT Project Veto"). The Attorney General stated that these partial vetoes were ineffective because they exceeded the Governor's constitutional authority by attempting to veto a condition on an appropriation without vetoing the appropriation itself. The Attorney General further stated that, although the Water Commission Veto and IT Project Veto were ineffective, a court would conclude the vetoed language is unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. The Legislative Assembly, joined by individual legislators consisting of the leaders of the senate and the House of Representatives and of the legislative management committee, petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the five partial vetoes. Governor Burgum, joined by Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem, cross-petitioned seeking judgment declaring unconstitutional the provisions in two bills which condition the spending or transfer of certain appropriated funds upon approval of a legislative committee. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, denied it in part, and granted the cross-petition. All claims presented were justiciable controversies: (1) the Workplace Safety Veto was valid and effective; (2) the Credit Hour Veto, Any Portion Veto, Water Commission Veto, and IT Project Veto were ineffective, causing the bills to have been enacted in their entirety. The Governor had standing to bring the cross-petition, and the Attorney General could advocate on the Governor's behalf. The budget section provision of House Bill 1020, section 5, was unconstitutional as an improper delegation and violation of separation of powers, and the provision providing the water commission the authority to transfer funds among categories was also stricken. The budget section provision of Senate Bill 2013, section 12, was unconstitutional as an improper delegation and violation of separation of powers, and the budget section condition was stricken. View "N.D. Legislative Assembly v. Burgum" on Justia Law