Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Richard Dodge appealed from a district court order denying his application for post-conviction relief. Dodge was charged with five felonies and a misdemeanor in December 2015. Dodge was appointed counsel. In April 2016, Dodge’s counsel moved the court to withdraw because the attorney-client relationship was “irreparably broken and rendered unreasonably difficult.” The court granted the motion, and Dodge was appointed substitute counsel in May 2016. In July 2016, Dodge himself filed a “motion to dismiss counsel.” The court denied Dodge’s motion. Five months after the deadline for motions and plea agreements, Dodge's counsel sought to have Dodge submit to a psychiatric examination. This request was denied, the trial court found no evidence, and the the court itself made no observations, that Dodge was incompetent to stand trial. After this denial, Dodge himself again moved to dismiss his trial counsel, and due to the allegations Dodge made in his motion, counsel moved to withdraw. The trial court denied both motions, and instead, required the attorney to appear as standby counsel and assist Dodge during trial if requested, but relieved him of any further obligations to consult with Dodge. The case proceeded to trial. At the beginning of trial, the court gave Dodge the option of representing himself or having his attorney represent him. Dodge chose to have his attorney represent him. Because his attorney had not prepared for trial and had no communication with Dodge since he moved to withdraw, Dodge’s attorney asked for a brief recess to consult with Dodge. During the recess, a settlement was reached. Dodge agreed to enter Alford pleas on all counts, waived a presentence investigation, and agreed to be sentenced immediately after entering his pleas. Dodge was immediately sentenced following his guilty pleas, and thereafter sought post-conviction relief on grounds he was not competent to enter his pleas, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court’s finding that Dodge was competent when he entered his pleas was not clearly erroneous, and disposed of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Dodge v. North Dakota" on Justia Law

In December 2018, Officer Nelson of the University of North Dakota Police Department conducted a traffic stop of Stanley Kolstad for suspicion of driving under the influence. Kolstad performed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test (PBT). Prior to performing the PBT, Kolstad informed Nelson that he had asthma. Nelson testified he was unable to obtain a PBT result because Kolstad was filling his cheeks with air while performing the test. Kolstad was arrested for DUI and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Kolstad was transported to the UND police station to be given an Intoxilyzer breath test. Prior to the Intoxilyzer test, Nelson read Kolstad the implied consent advisory. But, because Nelson was not a certified operator of the Intoxilyzer machine, Officer Waltz conducted the test. Prior to the test, Kolstad informed Waltz he had asthma. The Intoxilyzer test results were deficient. Waltz testified Kolstad was not providing enough air for the test machine to provide a valid result. Kolstad was charged with driving under the influence and refusing to submit to a chemical test. Kolstad’s counsel made a discovery request to the State seeking copies of any audio or video recordings taken by police officers. Kolstad’s counsel also requested the State inform him whether any sound or video recordings taken of Kolstad were subsequently “altered, edited, destroyed, or discarded.” The State provided Kolstad’s counsel with dash camera footage from Nelson’s police car that had been taken at the scene of the arrest, but the State did not provide any body camera footage from either Nelson or Waltz. Upon learning that Waltz’s body camera footage was successfully uploaded to UND servers, Kolstad’s counsel moved to dismiss the case because the State did not provide any body camera footage in discovery as requested. The district court ultimately dismissed the refusal to submit to a chemical breath test charge as a sanction for failing to provide the body camera footage. The State appealed, arguing the alleged discovery violation did not rise to a constitutional violation of Kolstad’s due process rights, and the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the refusal charge. Kolstad argued the district court’s order dismissing the refusal charge was not appealable, and if it was, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was nothing in the record to indicate the district court adequately considered an alternative or less severe sanction to dismissal, and by not considering a less severe sanction, the trial court erred. The district court’s order dismissing the refusal charge was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Kolstad" on Justia Law

Gregory Schwindt appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s revocation of his driving privileges for 180 days. Schwindt argued North Dakota’s implied consent and refusal laws were unconstitutional, the hearing officer erred by considering the results of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and the hearing officer erred in finding he refused to take a chemical test. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the hearing officer’s findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the conclusions of law were sustained by the findings of fact, and the decision to revoke Schwindt’s driving privileges was in accordance with the law. View "Schwindt v. Sorel" on Justia Law

Akeem Foster was convicted by jury of Terrorizing and Carrying a Concealed Weapon. Foster contended on appeal he was denied a fair trial because he was asked during cross-examination if other witnesses were lying and because the prosecutor expressed personal beliefs about the evidence during closing arguments. Foster also argued there was insufficient evidence to convict him of either charge. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed Foster’s conviction for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, but reversed his conviction for Terrorizing. The Court found Foster was improperly asked to provide an opinion on the veracity and credibility of the State’s witnesses. The improper questioning was prejudicial and denied Foster a fair trial on the terrorizing charge. View "North Dakota v. Foster" on Justia Law

The State of North Dakota appealed a district court order denying its motion to resume prosecution against Matthew Dahl and dismissing the case. In December 2014, the State charged Dahl with two counts of theft. Dahl did not appear on the charges until he was arrested on a bench warrant in February 2017. In mid-April 2017, the State mailed Dahl a pretrial diversion agreement. Dahl signed and returned the notarized agreement dated May 3, 2017. On May 9, 2017, the state’s attorney signed and filed the agreement with the district court, and the court approved the agreement the same day. Under the agreement, the State agreed to suspend prosecution for “two years from the date of execution” conditioned on Dahl’s timely payment of restitution. Dahl failed to make minimum monthly restitution payments. On June 6, 2019, the State moved to resume prosecution, alleging Dahl violated the pretrial diversion agreement by his non-payment. The district court held a hearing on the State’s motion in August 2019. The court concluded the pretrial agreement was executed when Dahl signed it on May 3, 2017. The court then denied the State’s motion to resume prosecution as untimely under N.D.R.Crim.P. 32.2(d)(2), and dismissed the complaint against Dahl. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred in determining the State’s motion was untimely, and remanded for further proceedings. View "North Dakota v. Dahl" on Justia Law

Russell Craig appealed a trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to murder. In 2006, Craig was charged with murder. A year later, he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Craig testified when he arrived at the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DOCR) he received a case plan stating he was eligible for parole in 20 years based on his life expectancy of 67 years less his then-current age of 44. In 2007 Craig wrote a letter requesting reduction of his sentence. In the letter Craig wrote the district court “Currently on a life sentence [I] have to [s]erve 85 [percent] of 30 years. I would be able to see the p[a]role board in 26.5 years . . . .” The court treated the letter as a motion for reduction of sentence and denied the requested relief. In 2017, the district court clerk sent Craig a letter regarding a statutory change requiring a calculation of life expectancy for life sentences with the possibility of parole. In 2018, Craig filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he believed he was eligible for parole after 20 years as outlined on his DOCR case plan which calculated his remaining life expectancy at 23 years, and not 85 percent of his remaining life expectancy of 33.8 years under the State’s calculation based on N.D. Sup.Ct. Admin. R. 51. Craig argues his sentence was illegal, the district court violated the prohibition on ex post facto punishment, and the district court erred by denying Craig’s motion to withdraw his plea. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding the evidence established Craig understood his plea deal, including that he had to serve a minimum of 30 years less reduction for good conduct. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a manifest injustice did not exist. View "North Dakota v. Craig" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Krogstad was convicted by jury of gross sexual imposition on a six-year-old victim. Krogstad argued on appeal that: (1) admission of video of the victim’s forensic interview violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the video under N.D.R.Ev. 803(24); and (3) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the guilty verdict. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Krogstad" on Justia Law

Frank West appealed after he conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. West moved to suppress evidence alleging it was obtained during an unconstitutional search. The district court denied his motion holding the search was a valid probationary search and West lost his opportunity to seek suppression because he did not object at the time of the search. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "North Dakota v. West" on Justia Law

Mohamed Awad appealed a district court order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a charge of knowingly voting when not qualified to do so. On appeal, Awad argued the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not adequately advised under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(b) of the possible immigration consequences of pleading guilty, and because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court order. View "North Dakota v. Awad" on Justia Law

T.P.-G. appealed the termination of her parental rights. On appeal, T.P.-G. argued she was denied due process and the juvenile court erred by denying her request to appear by telephone. A petition for involuntary termination of parental rights to a child, A.P.D.S.P.-G., was filed in the juvenile court. After a trial date was set, the mother, T.P.-G, filed a request to appear by phone because she lived in Wisconsin. The court denied the request. At trial, counsel stated T.P.-G. wished to contest the termination, regardless of whether she was able to attend the trial. Counsel stated T.P.-G. regretted being unable to attend, but T.P.-G. was saving her money to travel to see A.P.D.S.P.-G. for his birthday. After trial, the juvenile court found A.P.D.S.P.-G. was a deprived and abandoned child and terminated T.P.-G.’s parental rights to the child. Finding no due process violation, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "Interest of A.P.D.S.P.-G." on Justia Law