Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In Dencember 2022, Olson Family Limited Partnership (“Olson”) served a summons and complaint on Velva Parks, LLC through Velva Parks’ registered agent, Legalinc Corporate Services Inc. (“Legalinc”). Olson alleged it entered into a contract for deed with Velva Parks for the sale of its mobile home park to Velva Parks. Olson alleged Velva Parks breached their contract for deed by failing to pay the final balloon payment of $406,414 when it became due December 1, 2022. Olson sought to have the contract judicially terminated and canceled. Velva Parks appealed an order denying its motion to vacate the default judgment entered after Velva Parks failed to answer or otherwise appear withn 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Velva Parks’ motion to vacate. View "Olson Family Limited Partnership v. Velva Parks, LLC" on Justia Law

Thomas Kaspari appealed a district court’s judgment entered after the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration. Jean Kaspari initiated divorce proceedings in 2019. The district court entered a second amended judgment following the Supreme Court’s remand; Jean served Thomas with notice of the entry of the second amended judgment in February 2023. On April 19, 2023, Thomas moved for relief from the judgment, and the district court denied the motion. Thomas served Jean with notice of the court’s denial of his motion on June 12, 2023. On the same day, Thomas filed a notice of appeal to the second amended judgment appealing the denial of his motion for relief from judgment. Because Thomas served and filed his motion for relief from judgment more than 28 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment, and the time to appeal the second amendment was not tolled, Thomas filed his notice of appeal more than 60 days after service of the notice of entry of judgment. Thomas asked the Supreme Court to review the order denying his motion for relief from judgment. The Court found Thomas only mentioned the order but did not present any argument regarding how the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion. Because the issue was not adequately articulated, supported or briefed, the Supreme Court dismissed Thomas’ appeal of the second amended judgment. View "Kaspari v. Kaspari" on Justia Law

Randy Severance appealed the dismissal of his personal injury claim against Dr. Brenden Howe. The district court dismissed the case because Severance did not submit an affidavit containing an expert opinion to support a prima facie case of professional negligence as required by N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46. The North Dakota Supreme Court held Severance pleaded a cognizable claim for the intentional tort of battery and that N.D.C.C. § 28-01-46 did not apply to intentional torts. Accordingly, the Court reversed the dismissal judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Severance v. Howe" on Justia Law

A.I. appealed a district court’s order continuing her commitment to the North Dakota State Hospital (“NDSH”) for a period not to exceed 180 days. She argued the court erred in not ordering a less restrictive alternative treatment as testimony supported A.I.’s needs could be met with a lower level of care. In addition, A.I. asserted the entry of an order, that indicated a waiver of the continuing treatment hearing filed after a hearing was held, was clearly erroneous. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court’s order to continue her hospitalization was not clearly erroneous, and the court’s order following waiver of treatment or continuing treatment hearing, as conceded by both parties, was entered in error. The Court affirmed the district court’s order for continued treatment and vacated the superfluous order entered in the record at docket entry 43. View "Interest of A.I." on Justia Law

Darren and Tamara Berger (“Bergers”) appealed a judgment dismissing their claims of violation of a planned unit development (PUD), breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, private nuisance, and negligence against their neighbors Jason and Krysta Sellers (“Sellers”), Sellers’ homebuilder Jordan Anderson and Big River Builders, Inc. (together, “Builder”), and the Misty Waters Owners’ Association (“Association”). Sellers and Builder cross-appealed the judgment dismissing their claims of defamation, interference with contract and business, and negligence against Bergers and neighbor Jeff Carlson. The central issue in this case was whether the PUD minimum setback from the bay could be changed by obtaining a new Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) without an amendment to the PUD. To this, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the PUD unambiguously set the minimum setback from the bay as the contour line in the 2005 LOMR-F and therefore Sellers’ home violated the PUD. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Bergers’ claims against Sellers for violation of the PUD, breach of restrictive covenants, negligence (drainage), and private nuisance (setbacks). The Court remanded with instructions to grant Bergers partial summary judgment on their claims against Sellers for violation of the PUD and breach of restrictive covenants and for declaratory relief (against Sellers) as requested in their motion for partial summary judgment. The Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on Bergers’ claims against the Association for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. The Court affirmed the court’s grant of summary judgment on all of Bergers’ claims against Builder, namely the PUD violation, breach of restrictive covenants, and negligence. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Bergers’ claims against the Association for breach of restrictive covenants and private nuisance. The Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on all of Sellers’ and Builder’s claims. View "Berger, et al. v. Sellers, et al." on Justia Law

On April 25, 2023, Discover Bank served a summons and complaint on the defendant alleging past due debt on a credit card. The defendant did not answer or otherwise appear. On May 25, 2023, Discover filed the summons and complaint, sheriff’s return of service, “affidavit of no answer,” and other documents supporting its motion for default judgment. In response, the district court filed a “Notice,” requiring Discover to serve a “Notice of Filing” of the complaint on the defendant and allow him 14 days from the date of the filing of the “Notice of Filing” to respond to the motion for default judgment. Discover then petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the court to vacate its order. The Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction, granted the petition, and directed the court to vacate its order. View "Discover Bank v. Romanick, et al." on Justia Law

Mercy Medical Center d/b/a CHI St. Alexius Health Williston; and David Keene, M.D. (Defendants), appealed an amended judgment awarding Michael and Kimberly Davis $1,660,000 in damages and $204,973.31 in costs and disbursements for medical malpractice relating to Michael’s kidney failure. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court awarded disbursements not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 28-26-06 and allowed other costs without explanation. The Court reversed the Davises’ award of disbursements and costs and remanded for further proceedings. View "Davis, et al. v. Mercy Medical Center, et al." on Justia Law

Robert Goff appealed an order denying his request for costs and attorney’s fees relating to the Department of Transportation’s suspension of Goff’s driving privileges. In December 2021, Fargo police officers arrested Goff in an apartment parking lot for being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A driveway used to access the parking lot included a sign reading “private property, private drive.” Goff requested an administrative hearing, arguing an ordinance, Fargo Municipal Code § 8-1011, limited the public’s right to access property marked as private without written permission from the owner. The owner of the property, John Goff, testified the parking lot was for tenant parking only. John Goff testified that deliverers and visitors are prohibited from going past the sign to access the parking lot. The hearing officer concluded the ordinance prohibited the public from parking in the private parking lot, but did not limit the public’s right to access the lot. The hearing officer found the public had a right of access to the private lot for vehicular use. The Department suspended Goff’s driving privileges for 91 days, and the district court affirmed. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the hearing officer misinterpreted the ordinance. The case was then remanded for a determination of whether the Department acted without substantial justification requiring an award of costs and attorney’s fees to Goff under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-50(1). On remand, Goff argued he was entitled to costs and attorney’s fees because the Department’s action against him was not substantially justified. Goff claimed a reasonable person would not believe the public had a right to access the private parking lot in light of signage on the property and Fargo Municipal Code § 8-1011. The district court decided the Department acted with substantial justification, and denied Goff ’s request for costs and attorney’s fees. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the district court abused its discretion in deciding the Department’s proceeding against Goff was substantially justified. The case was remanded for a determination of Goff's reasonable attorney's fees. View "Goff v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Tyler Vetter appealed a fifth amended judgment entered after the district court denied his motion to hold Amy Salter in contempt and, on its own motion, invoked N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a) to modify a fourth amended judgment. The district court entered a judgment requiring Vetter to pay Salter child support. The judgment was amended various times (for reasons not relevant to this appeal). In a separate action, the court ordered primary residential responsibility changed from Salter to Vetter. The court subsequently entered a fourth amended judgment requiring Salter to reimburse Vetter child support amounts he paid. Two days after the court entered its order to amend the judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hamburger v. Hamburger, 978 N.W.2d 709, which explained a vested child support obligation could not be retroactively modified. Neither party appealed the fourth amended judgment. Vetter moved for an order to hold Salter in contempt for not paying him the $2,930. In consideration of Hamburger, the court, citing N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), ordered the fourth amended judgment “be modified to reinstate the child support obligation of Tyler Vetter” for the earlier period and to “strik[e] the obligation of Amy Salter to make reimbursement.” A fifth amended judgment was entered accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part: even if the trial court was correct that its original decision was based upon a mistaken view of the law, Rule 60(a) did not authorize the court’s modification. Therefore, the Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the law when it invoked Rule 60(a) to relieve Salter of her obligations under the fourth amended judgment. View "North Dakota, et al. v. Vetter" on Justia Law

Savanna Perales appealed a district court order requiring her to return her children to North Dakota. Perales and Erik Gonzalez were divorced by a Texas divorce decree. After the divorce, both parties lived in North Dakota. Perales then relocated with the children to Georgia. The district court, in an ex parte emergency order, ordered Perales to return the children to North Dakota. Later, the court held a hearing and issued the order from which Perales appealed. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded this order was not appealable and dismissed the appeal. View "Gonzalez v. Perales" on Justia Law