Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christopher Williamson appealed a district court order affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years. Officer Travis Martinson stopped Williamson after he drove over a fire hose at a fire scene. Martinson smelled alcohol in Williamson's vehicle and noticed Williamson had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Williamson refused field sobriety tests but consented to perform an onsite screening test. The onsite test estimated Williamson's blood alcohol content was greater than permitted for operating a vehicle and Martinson arrested Williamson. Martinson took Williamson to the Williams County Correctional Center and Sergeant Randy Haugenoe administered an Intoxilyzer 8000 chemical test. The Intoxilyzer reported Williamson had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.231 percent by weight. A hearing officer introduced the Intoxilyzer report at an administrative hearing. Williamson objected, alleging the statutory requirements were not met and the report was inadmissible for lack of foundation. The hearing officer concluded the test was fairly administered, the objection was overruled and the hearing officer's suspension of Williamson's driving privileges for two years was not in error. The district court affirmed the decision. Williamson appealed, arguing the district court erred by receiving evidence that was not adequately authenticated. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williamson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District filed a declaratory action regarding the ownership and control of property in Sargent County, including all property located south of the north boundary of Drain 11. The District claimed ownership as the successor in interest to the Sargent County Board of Drain Commissioners, which had obtained its interest in the property by right-of-way deeds signed in 1917 and 1918 and recorded in the Sargent County register of deeds office. The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District (Delahoyde did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal). Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed the judgment determining language of the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the disputed property to the District's predecessor. The Supreme Court reversed after review, concluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements. View "Sargent County Water Resource District v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Between May 2002 and September 2004, David Robb received multiple loans from his mother, Ruby Robb. On September 13, 2004, Ruby Robb created a living trust identified as the Ruby M. Robb Living Trust ("Trust"), and she named American State Bank as the trustee. In October 2004, David signed a promissory note made payable to Ruby M. Robb. The note did not contain a due date or repayment schedule. David made a number of payments on the note; he made these payments payable to the Trust. However, he stopped making payments after American State Bank ceased administering the Trust. Debbie Rooks, David Robb's sister, became the successor trustee. In 2013, Rooks, in her capacity as trustee, served a complaint on David to recover the amount due on the note David signed, as well as an additional note that he did not sign. Rooks ultimately voluntarily dismissed her claim based on the unsigned note. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of Rooks' motion, she filed an affidavit made by the vice president and trust manager of American State Bank that alleged the note was assigned to the Trust (she filed this affidavit because the schedule of trust assets had been lost, and there was no record evidencing the assignment of the note to the Trust). At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, David argued the Trust did not have standing to sue because Rooks did not present evidence sufficient to show the Trust owned the note. The court found the trust manager's affidavit was sufficient to establish the note had been transferred to the Trust. The court found there were no genuine issues of fact and the note was payable on demand as a matter of law. Robb appealed the district court's order awarding summary judgment in favor of Rooks. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Rooks v. Robb" on Justia Law

Zachary Johnson and Margie Johnson contracted with Buskohl Construction Inc. as a general contractor to oversee the construction of their new house. John Buskohl was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Buskohl Construction Inc. Due to a deteriorating relationship with the Johnsons, Buskohl walked off the job before construction was complete, leaving various "odds-and-ends" unfinished on the house. The Johnsons repaired some of the alleged deficiencies themselves and solicited bids from various contractors to fix the remaining issues. The Johnsons sued Buskohl alleging Buskohl negligently constructed the house, breached the contract, and breached the warranty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Johnsons. Buskohl moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b), arguing irregularities in the proceedings prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Buskohl argued the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial because the district court erred by: (1) failing to provide a special verdict form that categorically itemized damages; (2) allowing hearsay into evidence; (3) excluding Buskohl's expert from testifying; and (4) denying Buskohl's motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall within an exclusion or exception. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, because the district court's error affected Buskohl's substantial right to a fair trial. View "Johnson v. Buskohl Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Larry Gronland and Linda Gronland (now Coleman), married in 1971 and divorced in 1994. The district court originally awarded Linda Gronland spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month until her death, remarriage, or when Larry began drawing Social Security, whichever occurred first. In March 2014, Linda made a motion to modify the amended judgment under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1. Larry moved to dismiss the motion, contending the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the support award because a court's jurisdiction to modify a support award was limited to ongoing support awards. Larry argued no support award was ongoing at the time of the motion because the support award terminated as of January 1, 2014, the date on which he started drawing Social Security. The court dismissed the motion for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue presented on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify a spousal support award that terminated prior to Linda filing her motion to modify the award. Linda argued the district court erred in holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that she never received actual notice that Larry began drawing Social Security. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Gronland v. Gronland" on Justia Law

Michelle Tidd appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against Scott Kroshus arising out of a collision between Tidd's bike and Kroshus' car. Tidd was riding her bike on a sidewalk in Fargo when she collided with Kroshus' car. Kroshus was entering the street from the alley when he collided with Tidd. Tidd sued Kroshus alleging Kroshus' negligence caused the collision and Tidd's bodily injuries. Over Tidd's objection, the district court instructed the jury on “sudden emergency.” Tidd argued on appeal that the sudden emergency instruction was unnecessary because there was no evidence of a sudden emergency. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding under the facts presented, the district court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. View "Tidd v. Kroshus" on Justia Law

Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for damages against Alerus Financial Corporation, Alerus Financial, National Association ("Alerus Entities") and Jayson Menke, and an order denying leave to amend their complaint. Robert Olson, Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg ("Olsons") are siblings who owned farm real estate in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. Jayson Menke was a real estate agent with Botsford & Qualey Land Company of Grand Forks. On June 9, 2011, the Olsons signed a real estate listing agreement with Botsford Qualey and Menke that provided Botsford Qualey with the exclusive right to sell 200 acres of the Olsons' farmland. The listing agreement stated, "Seller is solely responsible for determining the appropriate listing price and has elected to offer the property by Conventional Sale." Menke provided the Olsons an analysis of their farmland, estimating the fair market value at $1,500 per acre. The Olsons increased the listing price to $1,700 per acre. The listing agreement shows an initially proposed sale price of $225,000, which the Olsons increased when they crossed out that amount and inserted $340,000 as the selling price. The Olsons' long-time tenant made a written offer to buy the land at the full asking price of $1,700 per acre. he Olsons and Menke subsequently learned the tenant was attempting to resell the farmland at a higher price than he agreed to pay the Olsons. On August 30, 2011, the tenant closed on his purchase from the Olsons. That same day, the tenant closed on the sale of the same farmland to a nearby farmer for $500 more per acre than he paid the Olsons. On December 15, 2011, Alerus Financial, N.A. acquired the stock of Botsford Qualey and Botsford Qualey filed notice of intent to dissolve. the Olsons sued "Alerus Financial Corporation (former parent company of Botsford & Qualey Land Company)." Alerus Financial Corporation answered. At about the same time, Botsford Qualey and Menke served a joint answer to the complaint even though they were not listed as defendants or served with the summons. The Olsons moved to amend the complaint to add Alerus Financial, N.A., Menke and Botsford Qualey as defendants. On April 4, 2014, the district court granted the Olsons leave to add Alerus Financial, N.A. and Menke as defendants but did not allow the Olsons to add Botsford Qualey. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying leave to amend the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims against Menke for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court affirmed the district court's order for summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims seeking to impose respondeat superior liability on the Alerus entities and to pierce the Alerus entities' corporate veil. View "Olson v. Alerus Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Lori Ihli appealed a district court judgment dismissing her claims against Anthony Lazzaretto, d/b/a Lazzaretto Construction ("Lazzaretto"). In June 2011, Ihli's Minot home flooded. Ihli contacted Lazzaretto for an estimate to repair the home, and in February 2012, she accepted Lazzaretto's bid proposal. Lazzaretto began working on Ihli's home; however, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the quality of the work, and Lazzaretto ceased working on the home. In November 2012, Ihli applied for federal disaster relief funding to repair or replace her house through the City of Minot Disaster Recovery Homeowner Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program. Ihli sought estimates from two construction companies, Real Builders, Inc. and Wright Brothers, to "repair" and complete the project. Ihli then sued Lazzaretto, alleging he damaged her property by performing remodeling work in a negligent manner. After commencing the suit against Lazzaretto, she learned she was eligible for the disaster relief funding in "late August 2013." In Ihli's deposition, Ihli stated that program administrators inspected the house and recommended the house be torn down and replaced, instead of being repaired. After Ihli commenced the suit against Lazzaretto and learned of her eligibility for disaster relief funding and after Ihli's counsel granted Lazzaretto's counsel an extension to file Lazzaretto's answer to Ihli's complaint, Ihli allowed the house to be demolished. Before the house was demolished, Ihli's attorney had advised Ihli to take photos or video of the property before the house was torn down. Ihli never informed Lazzaretto of the plan to demolish the house. After the house was demolished, Lazzaretto served its answer. In June 2014, Lazaretto moved for sanctions, requesting the case be dismissed due to Ihli's spoliation of evidence. Ihli then moved to amend her complaint, seeking to add a claim for breach of contract. After a hearing on both motions, the district court denied Ihli's motion to amend the complaint, granted Lazzaretto's motion for sanctions, and dismissed Ihli's claims. On appeal, Ihli argued the district court erred in dismissing her case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence because the sanction was overly severe and an abuse of discretion. Ihli also argued the district court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint because Lazzaretto was on notice of the proposed breach of contract claim and would not have been prejudiced. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal and denying Ihli's motion to amend. View "Ihli v. Lazzaretto" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Ward Farms' purchase of Enerbase Cooperative Resource's tractor at a third-party auction sale. Michael Ward, a partner of Ward Farms, attended an auction sale, and bid on the tractor. Shortly after the sale, Ward Farms discovered the tractor required significant repairs. At Ward Farms' request, Enerbase inspected the tractor and estimated the repair costs as ranging from $19,550 to $31,430. Subsequently, Ward Farms sued Enerbase alleging fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, and breach of express and implied warranties. Ward Farms sought alternative remedies of rescission or damages. Ward Farms appealed the district court judgment denying its motion to amend its complaint and granting a summary judgment motion in favor of Enerbase. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward Farms' motion to amend, and the district court did not err in granting Enerbase's summary judgment motion because Ward Farms did not raise an issue of material fact regarding its claim. View "Ward Farms v. Enerbase Cooperative Resource" on Justia Law

Susan White appealed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Glen and Loretta White in an action by Glen and Loretta White against T.P. Motel, L.L.C., and an order denying her motion to intervene. Susan White was married to Ross White, and the daughter-in-law of Glen and Loretta. Susan and Ross were the co-owners and members of T.P. Motel. T.P. Motel entered into a contract for deed to purchase real property and a motel in Mandan from Glen and Loretta. The contract for deed required T.P. Motel to make monthly payments of $2,500 to Glen and Loretta beginning on March 15, 2012. T.P. Motel did not make payments in March, April, and May of 2012, but began making the monthly payments in June. Susan and Ross separated in January 2013, and Susan moved to California and initiated a divorce action against Ross in California. T.P. Motel failed to make monthly payments on the contract for deed in January and February 2013, but began making payments again in March 2013. In February 2013, Glen and Loretta served notice of default on the contract for deed on T.P. Motel and on Susan individually. When T.P. Motel failed to cure the default within 30 days as allowed by the contract for deed, Glen and Loretta sued T.P. Motel to cancel the contract for deed. In her answer, Susan included a counterclaim against Glen and Loretta and a crossclaim against Ross, alleging fraud, collusion, malicious intent, and breach of fiduciary obligations. The counterclaim alleged Ross, Glen, and Loretta acted in concert to operate the motel and prevented Susan from entering and operating the motel. Susan alleged Ross, Glen, and Loretta White perpetrated a fraud on her by acting in concert to manipulate T.P. Motel's financial information, by accepting and not reporting cash rentals of property, and by paying non-business bills and expenses out of T.P. Motel's accounts. A hearing was held on T.P. Motel's motion to dismiss Susan's crossclaim against Ross, and her motion to join Ross as a party to the action. The district court did not rule on the motions. Both parties acknowledged the district court indicated it did not believe Susan was a proper party to the action, and she should have moved to intervene if she wanted to be made a party. Susan moved to intervene, arguing as a fifty-percent owner of T.P. Motel, she had an equal right to answer the complaint on behalf of T.P. Motel. She argued Ross was not acting in the best interest of T.P. Motel by admitting the default and requesting cancellation of the contract for deed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings and in denying the motion to intervene. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. T.P. Motel, L.L.C." on Justia Law