Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Patricia Schurmann (now Heidt), appealed after the district court modified parenting time and child support. She argued the district court failed to properly weigh evidence of domestic violence in increasing Ralf Schurmann's parenting time. She also argued the court should not have reduced child support. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order regarding parenting time, but reversed and remanded the order regarding child support, finding that the district court relied on unreliable information to calculate child support in this case, and as such, failed to comply with statutory guidelines. The court's child support calculation was clearly erroneous. The judgment was reversed and the remanded for recalculation of child support. View "Schurmann v. Schurmann" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist, three stepchildren of Clarence Erickson and two spouses of the stepchildren, appealed a judgment granting a motion by Clarence Erickson's biological son, Curtis Erickson, to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). After Clarence Erickson died in December 2010, Curtis petitioned to rescind certain real and personal property transfers by Clarence to the appellants and to invalidate his September 2010 will. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment concluding that undue influence was exerted over Clarence when executing his will and while transferring real and personal property to the appellants, that Clarence lacked capacity to transfer money and real property, and that Clarence lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will. The court denied the appellants' motion to amend the findings and judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b). The appellants then moved to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), asking the district court to require repayment of the purchase prices the appellants paid for real property transfers invalidated by the court's judgment. The Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law for clerical errors or mistakes arising from oversight or omission under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Curtis Erickson's motion to correct the judgment under Rule 60(a). View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

John Benson appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in disputed mineral interests in Desert Partners IV, L.P. Benson argued the district court erred in concluding Desert Partners and Family Tree Corporation, Inc., were entitled to summary judgment as good-faith purchasers for value of the disputed mineral interests. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there were disputed issues of material fact involving whether the plaintiffs were good-faith purchasers. The Court reversed summary judgment in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson" on Justia Law

In June 2015, the State began this civil action against Patricia Goodale, contending that her home was a public nuisance. The Walsh County sheriff's office personally served Goodale with the summons and complaint. On August 5, 2015, after several weeks without receiving an answer from Goodale, the State filed with the district court an affidavit of default and proof for judgment; proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for abatement; and a proposed judgment. On August 7, 2015, the district court signed the findings and order, and a default judgment for abatement of nuisance was entered. Goodale was served notice of the judgment. Goodale did not seek relief from the default judgment in the district court under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), but instead appealed directly to the North Dakota Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "North Dakota v. Goodale" on Justia Law

The City of Williston shut down a man camp because of the lack of a fire protection system. Black Gold Oil Field Services applied and received multiple extensions for time to install the system, and finally got approved for a water tank (first step in the installation). At a City meeting, the City fire chief recommended shutting down the camp because it didn't seem like much progress was being made to install the system. The City accepted recommendation and shut down the camp. Black Gold filed for an injunction to stop the City from shutting its camp. The Supreme Court concluded that Black Gold failed to establish a substantial probability of succeeding on the merits of its underlying lawsuit against Williston and the City Commission and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Black Gold's request for a preliminary injunction. View "Black Gold Oil Field Services, LLC v. City of Williston" on Justia Law

Deborah Palmer, surviving spouse of Gary J. Palmer, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing Palmer's negligence claim against A.W. Kuettel & Sons, Inc. Gary Palmer was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer, in 2011, and died in March 2015. Kuettel supplied and installed asbestos-containing insulation products while performing industrial and commercial insulation contracting work. Palmer's deceased father worked for Kuettel from 1961 through 1965 and 1974 through 1979. Most of Kuettel's jobs were in Minnesota, however, in the 1960s, Kuettel supplied and installed insulation products at the Grand Forks Air Force Base. In 2013 Palmer sued numerous defendants, including Kuettel, alleging Kuettel's negligence caused his mesothelioma. Palmer alleged he contracted mesothelioma from childhood exposure to asbestos fibers through contact with his father's dusty work clothes. In his deposition he stated that while in elementary school he came in contact with his father's work clothes when he would hug his father after he arrived home from work. He also stated he played in the vicinity of the laundry area where his mother washed his father's work clothes. Palmer alleged Kuettel should have warned him or his father of the dangerous nature of asbestos and asbestos-containing products. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Palmer failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. View "Palmer v. 999 Quebec, Inc." on Justia Law

Connie Welker and Vicki Ostrem appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County mineral interests. Ross Markgraf and Shanahan alleged W.J. Hannah owned 100% of the surface and minerals when he conveyed the property to "Arnold Hannah, Trustee" by grant deed in 1965, intending to create a family trust and appointing his son, Arnold Hannah, as trustee. Markgraf and Shanahan were descendants of Kathryn Nelson, W.J. Hannah's daughter and Arnold Hannah's sister. They claimed W.J. Hannah intended Arnold Hannah would hold the legal title to the property in trust for the benefit of himself; his siblings, Kathryn Nelson and Robert L. Hannah; and Margaret Rehmer, the only child of his deceased brother, Wilbert Hannah. They claimed Arnold Hannah held himself out as trustee in dealings related to the property, kept an accounting of the income and expenses related to the property, and made disbursements to the beneficiaries from the proceeds of the trust. They argued a resulting or constructive trust was created and Welker and Ostrem, as Arnold Hannah's heirs, did not have exclusive rights to the property. Welker and Ostrem answered and requested the complaint be dismissed. Welker and Ostrem then moved for summary judgment, arguing the 1965 grant deed transferring the property to "Arnold Hannah, Trustee" conveyed the title to Arnold Hannah in his individual capacity, the word "Trustee" was surplusage under N.D.C.C. 47-09-12, and Markgraf and Shanahan's claims for a resulting or constructive trust failed. Welker and Ostrem argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in granting Markgraf and Shanahan's motion for summary judgment because Markgraf and Shanahan's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the court relied on inadmissible evidence, and Markgraf and Shanahan did not prove the existence of an implied trust by clear and convincing evidence. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding summary judgment was not appropriate. View "Markgraf v. Welker" on Justia Law

Maurice Thill appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Thill argued that the district court's order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the findings were inadequate. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court determined the district court did not make sufficient findings enabling the Court to review the appeal. The district court did not identify the facts on which it relied in determining Thill's likelihood to engage in further sexual predatory conduct or the facts on which it relied in determining Thill had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. "These conclusory, general findings do not comply with N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)." The case was remanded for specific findings of fact. View "Interest of Thill" on Justia Law

In 2014, appellee Neil Bayles was arrested and charged with driving under the influence. He timely requested an administrative hearing, at the conclusion of which, an administrative hearing officer suspended Bayles' driving privileges for ninety-one days. The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing the administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Bayles' driving privilege because the Department failed to timely file the hearing transcript within the twenty-day period under N.D.C.C. 39-20-06. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred as a matter of law by summarily reversing the hearing officer's decision based on noncompliance with the statute, and because Bayles failed to show prejudice caused by the claimed delay or demonstrate the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law. View "Bayles v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Lori Yahna appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint against Altru Health System for age discrimination and for wrongful termination of employment. In 1984, Yahna began working for the Grand Forks Clinic, the predecessor to Altru, as a licensed practical nurse. She received additional training in vascular technology to work with Dr. Rolf Paulson in the ultrasound department and by 1986 she was working solely as a vascular technologist. According to Yahna, she was the technical director of the vascular lab, she developed the vascular medicine practice at Altru. She initially worked full time as a vascular technologist with on-call responsibilities, but she received approval to work three days per week in 2001 with no on-call responsibility. According to Yahna, she became coordinator and technical director of the vascular lab in 2006. In February 2012, Altru created a new position for an education and quality assurance coordinator, and hired Derek Todd for that full-time position. According to Yahna, she did not apply for that position because it was full time. She claimed, however, she maintained her position as technical director of the vascular lab and understood she would still be doing quality assurance and reviewing other technologists' films. Yahna claimed Altru required her to work full time with on-call responsibilities in July 2012, and she was terminated on July 2, 2012, after she informed Altru "she would not be able to take call at this time." Yahna was forty-eight years old when she was terminated. The district court granted Altru's motion for summary judgment, concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact that Altru's employment policies and procedures did not abrogate Yahna's at-will employment status with Altru and that her termination did not constitute age discrimination. The court explained the provisions in Altru's employment policy manual unambiguously preserved the presumption of at-will employment and did not evidence an intent that the manual created a contractual right to employment. In rejecting Yahna's age discrimination claim, the court cited the requirements for a prima facie age discrimination claim and said that because Yahna refused to take required on-call responsibilities for an ultrasound technologist she failed to satisfactorily perform the duties of her position and she failed to establish employees outside her protected age class were treated more favorably than her. The court ruled Altru established it terminated Yahna because she refused to take on-call responsibilities for her job and granted summary judgment dismissing her complaint. On appeal, Yahna argued there were disputed issues of material fact on her claims that her termination constituted age discrimination and violated Altru's employment policies and procedures. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yahna v. Altru Health System" on Justia Law