Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lori Jury appealed a district court's order denying her motion to vacate a summary judgment. Jury argued the district court should have provided notice of the summary judgment hearing independent of the notice provided by the Barnes County Municipal Airport Authority ("BCMAA"). Jury had sued BCMAA pro se after she was terminated from her at-will employment. Jury worked as a part-time clerk for the Airport under the direction of its board and manager. In 2012, Jury applied for the vacant manager position. The BCMAA board of directors did not hire Jury for the manager position and shortly thereafter the BCMAA terminated her, citing a lack of trust. Jury filed a charge with the North Dakota Department of Labor alleging, among other things, that the BCMAA discriminated against her based on her gender. The Department found no probable cause to substantiate Jury's allegations and dismissed her charge. Jury subsequently sued the BCMAA alleging workplace discrimination, wrongful termination, defamation of character, harassment, emotional distress, loss of income, and retaliation. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jury v. Barnes County Municipal Airport Authority" on Justia Law

This case was another in an endless stream of repetitive actions stemming from Randy Holkesvig's 2008 stalking charge to which he pled guilty. Under a negotiated plea agreement, Holkesvig pled guilty to stalking in exchange for dismissal of an additional charge for violating a disorderly conduct restraining order. In addition to bringing numerous other actions, Holkesvig petitioned for post-conviction relief from the consequences of his pleading guilty to stalking, which was denied by the district court and summarily affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Holkesvig sued Gerald VandeWalle, individually and as Chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, and the State of North Dakota, alleging numerous claims, including, obstruction of justice, defamation, corruption, deceit, fraud, false statements, breach of duty, conspiracy, collusion, racketeering, obstruction, and North Dakota constitutional violations. Holkesvig's ultimate grievance appeared to, at least in part, arise from a misstatement of the procedural facts in "Holkesvig v. North Dakota," where the Supreme Court stated, "Holkesvig's guilty plea was accepted by the district court in 2008 as part of a negotiated plea agreement between his lawyer and the State, which agreement included the State dropping charges that Holkesvig violated a domestic violence protection order." The district court dismissed Holkesvig's lawsuit on the ground it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims. Holkesvig moved for relief from the district court's judgment. The district court denied Holkesvig's motion for failure to comply with N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 and N.D.R.Civ. P. 60(b). Holkesvig timely appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court appropriately determined Holkesvig violated an order prohibiting him from filing further lawsuits that arose out of or related to his 2008 stalking charge and charge for violating a disorderly conduct restraining order, it affirmed. View "Holkesvig v. VandeWalle" on Justia Law

Susan Lundberg, as Trustee of the Gabriel J. Brown Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in a tract of land to Greg Holverson, directing the Trust to convey the land to Holverson, and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims for rescission or for damages for breach of contract. In May 1980, Holverson owed a balance on a contract for deed. Robert Lundberg, as original Trustee, released 5.09 acres from the contract and deeded that land to Holverson. Holverson executed a mortgage on the 5.09 acres as additional security for the contract for deed and the single indebtedness of $39,018.40 under the same repayment terms as the contract for deed. Holverson made sporadic payments under the amended contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she wrote Holverson multiple times asking him to make required payments. In December 2012, the Trust initiated proceedings to cancel the contract for deed and served Holverson with a notice of default. Holverson agreed to pay the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she reviewed records at the Burleigh County Recorder's Office and learned Holverson had obtained and satisfied several other mortgages on the land while making sporadic payments to the Trust since 1978. Susan Lundberg claimed she discovered Holverson had executed five mortgages on the land and satisfied three of the mortgages between 1978 and 1997, and he had obtained six mortgages and satisfied seven mortgages after 1997. She claimed she also discovered Holverson's stated reason for amending the contract for deed and mortgage on November 10, 1997, was false, because the record in the recorder's office reflected he had obtained the Capital Credit Union mortgage several days before Holverson's contract for deed and mortgage with the Trust were amended on November 10, 1997. Holverson made a timely tender of a certified check for the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage, and the Trust refused to accept the check and execute a warranty deed for the land. Holverson sued the Trust to quiet title and determine ownership of the land. Holverson generally denied the Trust's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and affirmatively pled accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, payment, release, statute of limitations, and waiver. The district court granted Holverson's motion for summary judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Trust's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

Cheetah Properties 1, LLC and Panther Pressure Testers, Inc. entered into a commercial lease agreement with an initial term that commenced on April 15, 2014, and ended on December 31, 2014. On January 19, 2015, Cheetah brought an eviction action to recover possession of the property. In the complaint, Cheetah sought damages for: (1) delinquent charges for late payment of rent owed up to December 31, 2014; (2) for Panther's willful holdover "in an amount double the yearly value of the Premises for the time of Defendant[']s withholding" under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28; and (3) for any physical damage to the property caused by Panther vacating the premises. Cheetah also sought an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the lease. Panther vacated the property by January 31, 2015. The district court returned lawful possession of the property to Cheetah and awarded it $22,000 for January 2015 rent and $8,200 for delinquent rent and fees under the lease. The district court declined to impose double damages under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28 based on its finding that Panther's holding over was not willful. After the district court entered its order for judgment, Cheetah moved for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the lease. The district court denied Cheetah's request for fees. Cheetah appealed the district court's judgment and the order denying an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment concluding Cheetah was not entitled to an award of double damages under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28, but reversed the denial of attorneys' fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cheetah Properties 1, LLC v. Panther Pressure Testers, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal resolved on in many disputes between Mark Rath and Kayla Rath. Mark appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order. In 2015, Kayla petitioned for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Mark, citing a litany of conduct purportedly rising to the level of disorderly conduct. These allegations included: Mark calling his children nearly twenty times in one night, Mark using foul language towards Kayla, Mark saying he had a business associate seek Kayla's phone records, Mark reporting Kayla to authorities out of concern she may be illegally receiving government benefits, and other miscellaneous conduct. After the hearing, the district court concluded Mark's conduct consisted of unwanted words and actions intended to adversely affect Kayla's safety, security, and privacy. After reviewing its order, the Supreme Court was concerned by the district court's lack of explanation for the necessity of the procedure it used in granting the restraining order. "While the court cited ensuring safety, minimizing conflict, and limiting the hearing to the pertinent issues before the court as justifying this procedure, the court did not elaborate on what facts or circumstances justified these concerns in this instance. Without further specificity, these conclusory justifications are insufficient to justify deviating from standard trial practices in restraining order proceedings because they leave us to speculate about the specific circumstances justifying denying Mark Rath the opportunity to directly question Kayla Rath." The Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in not allowing Mark to directly cross-examine Kayla without adequately explaining, on the record, its reasons for not allowing him to do so. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for a new hearing. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

This case was a continuation of "contentious" divorce proceedings between parties who "accumulated significant assets during their marriage." Sandra Hendricksen Martire appealed from an amended divorce judgment modifying Michael Martire's child support obligation and leaving unaltered his spousal support obligation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in refusing to modify Martire's spousal support obligation. The Court further concluded, however, that the court failed to follow the Child Support Guidelines in setting Martire's child support obligation. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martire' v. Martire'" on Justia Law

D.V.T., the father of minor child K.J.C., appealed a district court's final decree of adoption, terminating his parental rights and granting a petition for step-parent adoption. The father argued the district court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights and finding his consent to the adoption was not necessary. The father contended there was not clear and convincing evidence he intended to abandon the child. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded evidence supports the court's findings, and, based on the entire record, it was not convinced a mistake had been made. The record reflected the mother and step-father's attorney prepared the proposed written termination order before the hearing terminating the father's rights. "We recognize the court wanted the termination and adoption finalized quickly and the use of a document prepared by one of the parties may save time, but the court has an obligation to ensure the findings are correct." The trial court's written order erred in stating no person appeared at the hearing claiming to be the natural father; however, D.V.T. did appear. The Supreme Court found the error did not require reversal. The Court modified the final decree of adoption to reflect the father was present at the hearing and objected to the petition to terminate his parental rights and grant a step-parent adoption. View "Matter of K.J.C." on Justia Law

Patricia Schurmann (now Heidt), appealed after the district court modified parenting time and child support. She argued the district court failed to properly weigh evidence of domestic violence in increasing Ralf Schurmann's parenting time. She also argued the court should not have reduced child support. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order regarding parenting time, but reversed and remanded the order regarding child support, finding that the district court relied on unreliable information to calculate child support in this case, and as such, failed to comply with statutory guidelines. The court's child support calculation was clearly erroneous. The judgment was reversed and the remanded for recalculation of child support. View "Schurmann v. Schurmann" on Justia Law

Appellants Dean Olsen, Susan Olsen, Bobby Olsen, Clee Raye Olsen, and Marion Bergquist, three stepchildren of Clarence Erickson and two spouses of the stepchildren, appealed a judgment granting a motion by Clarence Erickson's biological son, Curtis Erickson, to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). After Clarence Erickson died in December 2010, Curtis petitioned to rescind certain real and personal property transfers by Clarence to the appellants and to invalidate his September 2010 will. After a bench trial, the district court entered a judgment concluding that undue influence was exerted over Clarence when executing his will and while transferring real and personal property to the appellants, that Clarence lacked capacity to transfer money and real property, and that Clarence lacked testamentary capacity to execute the will. The court denied the appellants' motion to amend the findings and judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(b). The appellants then moved to correct the judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a), asking the district court to require repayment of the purchase prices the appellants paid for real property transfers invalidated by the court's judgment. The Supreme Court concluded the district court misapplied the law for clerical errors or mistakes arising from oversight or omission under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(a). Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in granting Curtis Erickson's motion to correct the judgment under Rule 60(a). View "Erickson v. Olsen" on Justia Law

John Benson appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in disputed mineral interests in Desert Partners IV, L.P. Benson argued the district court erred in concluding Desert Partners and Family Tree Corporation, Inc., were entitled to summary judgment as good-faith purchasers for value of the disputed mineral interests. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded there were disputed issues of material fact involving whether the plaintiffs were good-faith purchasers. The Court reversed summary judgment in this case and remanded for further proceedings. View "Desert Partners IV, L.P. v. Benson" on Justia Law