Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michelle Tidd appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict dismissing her negligence action against Scott Kroshus arising out of a collision between Tidd's bike and Kroshus' car. Tidd was riding her bike on a sidewalk in Fargo when she collided with Kroshus' car. Kroshus was entering the street from the alley when he collided with Tidd. Tidd sued Kroshus alleging Kroshus' negligence caused the collision and Tidd's bodily injuries. Over Tidd's objection, the district court instructed the jury on “sudden emergency.” Tidd argued on appeal that the sudden emergency instruction was unnecessary because there was no evidence of a sudden emergency. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding under the facts presented, the district court erred in instructing the jury on the sudden emergency doctrine. View "Tidd v. Kroshus" on Justia Law

Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for damages against Alerus Financial Corporation, Alerus Financial, National Association ("Alerus Entities") and Jayson Menke, and an order denying leave to amend their complaint. Robert Olson, Ronald Olson and Marlys Kjellberg ("Olsons") are siblings who owned farm real estate in Grand Forks County, North Dakota. Jayson Menke was a real estate agent with Botsford & Qualey Land Company of Grand Forks. On June 9, 2011, the Olsons signed a real estate listing agreement with Botsford Qualey and Menke that provided Botsford Qualey with the exclusive right to sell 200 acres of the Olsons' farmland. The listing agreement stated, "Seller is solely responsible for determining the appropriate listing price and has elected to offer the property by Conventional Sale." Menke provided the Olsons an analysis of their farmland, estimating the fair market value at $1,500 per acre. The Olsons increased the listing price to $1,700 per acre. The listing agreement shows an initially proposed sale price of $225,000, which the Olsons increased when they crossed out that amount and inserted $340,000 as the selling price. The Olsons' long-time tenant made a written offer to buy the land at the full asking price of $1,700 per acre. he Olsons and Menke subsequently learned the tenant was attempting to resell the farmland at a higher price than he agreed to pay the Olsons. On August 30, 2011, the tenant closed on his purchase from the Olsons. That same day, the tenant closed on the sale of the same farmland to a nearby farmer for $500 more per acre than he paid the Olsons. On December 15, 2011, Alerus Financial, N.A. acquired the stock of Botsford Qualey and Botsford Qualey filed notice of intent to dissolve. the Olsons sued "Alerus Financial Corporation (former parent company of Botsford & Qualey Land Company)." Alerus Financial Corporation answered. At about the same time, Botsford Qualey and Menke served a joint answer to the complaint even though they were not listed as defendants or served with the summons. The Olsons moved to amend the complaint to add Alerus Financial, N.A., Menke and Botsford Qualey as defendants. On April 4, 2014, the district court granted the Olsons leave to add Alerus Financial, N.A. and Menke as defendants but did not allow the Olsons to add Botsford Qualey. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's order denying leave to amend the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims against Menke for breach of fiduciary duty. The Court affirmed the district court's order for summary judgment dismissing the Olsons' claims seeking to impose respondeat superior liability on the Alerus entities and to pierce the Alerus entities' corporate veil. View "Olson v. Alerus Financial Corp." on Justia Law

Lori Ihli appealed a district court judgment dismissing her claims against Anthony Lazzaretto, d/b/a Lazzaretto Construction ("Lazzaretto"). In June 2011, Ihli's Minot home flooded. Ihli contacted Lazzaretto for an estimate to repair the home, and in February 2012, she accepted Lazzaretto's bid proposal. Lazzaretto began working on Ihli's home; however, a dispute arose between the parties regarding the quality of the work, and Lazzaretto ceased working on the home. In November 2012, Ihli applied for federal disaster relief funding to repair or replace her house through the City of Minot Disaster Recovery Homeowner Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program. Ihli sought estimates from two construction companies, Real Builders, Inc. and Wright Brothers, to "repair" and complete the project. Ihli then sued Lazzaretto, alleging he damaged her property by performing remodeling work in a negligent manner. After commencing the suit against Lazzaretto, she learned she was eligible for the disaster relief funding in "late August 2013." In Ihli's deposition, Ihli stated that program administrators inspected the house and recommended the house be torn down and replaced, instead of being repaired. After Ihli commenced the suit against Lazzaretto and learned of her eligibility for disaster relief funding and after Ihli's counsel granted Lazzaretto's counsel an extension to file Lazzaretto's answer to Ihli's complaint, Ihli allowed the house to be demolished. Before the house was demolished, Ihli's attorney had advised Ihli to take photos or video of the property before the house was torn down. Ihli never informed Lazzaretto of the plan to demolish the house. After the house was demolished, Lazzaretto served its answer. In June 2014, Lazaretto moved for sanctions, requesting the case be dismissed due to Ihli's spoliation of evidence. Ihli then moved to amend her complaint, seeking to add a claim for breach of contract. After a hearing on both motions, the district court denied Ihli's motion to amend the complaint, granted Lazzaretto's motion for sanctions, and dismissed Ihli's claims. On appeal, Ihli argued the district court erred in dismissing her case as a sanction for spoliation of evidence because the sanction was overly severe and an abuse of discretion. Ihli also argued the district court erred in denying her motion to amend the complaint because Lazzaretto was on notice of the proposed breach of contract claim and would not have been prejudiced. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of dismissal and denying Ihli's motion to amend. View "Ihli v. Lazzaretto" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Ward Farms' purchase of Enerbase Cooperative Resource's tractor at a third-party auction sale. Michael Ward, a partner of Ward Farms, attended an auction sale, and bid on the tractor. Shortly after the sale, Ward Farms discovered the tractor required significant repairs. At Ward Farms' request, Enerbase inspected the tractor and estimated the repair costs as ranging from $19,550 to $31,430. Subsequently, Ward Farms sued Enerbase alleging fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, and breach of express and implied warranties. Ward Farms sought alternative remedies of rescission or damages. Ward Farms appealed the district court judgment denying its motion to amend its complaint and granting a summary judgment motion in favor of Enerbase. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward Farms' motion to amend, and the district court did not err in granting Enerbase's summary judgment motion because Ward Farms did not raise an issue of material fact regarding its claim. View "Ward Farms v. Enerbase Cooperative Resource" on Justia Law

Susan White appealed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of Glen and Loretta White in an action by Glen and Loretta White against T.P. Motel, L.L.C., and an order denying her motion to intervene. Susan White was married to Ross White, and the daughter-in-law of Glen and Loretta. Susan and Ross were the co-owners and members of T.P. Motel. T.P. Motel entered into a contract for deed to purchase real property and a motel in Mandan from Glen and Loretta. The contract for deed required T.P. Motel to make monthly payments of $2,500 to Glen and Loretta beginning on March 15, 2012. T.P. Motel did not make payments in March, April, and May of 2012, but began making the monthly payments in June. Susan and Ross separated in January 2013, and Susan moved to California and initiated a divorce action against Ross in California. T.P. Motel failed to make monthly payments on the contract for deed in January and February 2013, but began making payments again in March 2013. In February 2013, Glen and Loretta served notice of default on the contract for deed on T.P. Motel and on Susan individually. When T.P. Motel failed to cure the default within 30 days as allowed by the contract for deed, Glen and Loretta sued T.P. Motel to cancel the contract for deed. In her answer, Susan included a counterclaim against Glen and Loretta and a crossclaim against Ross, alleging fraud, collusion, malicious intent, and breach of fiduciary obligations. The counterclaim alleged Ross, Glen, and Loretta acted in concert to operate the motel and prevented Susan from entering and operating the motel. Susan alleged Ross, Glen, and Loretta White perpetrated a fraud on her by acting in concert to manipulate T.P. Motel's financial information, by accepting and not reporting cash rentals of property, and by paying non-business bills and expenses out of T.P. Motel's accounts. A hearing was held on T.P. Motel's motion to dismiss Susan's crossclaim against Ross, and her motion to join Ross as a party to the action. The district court did not rule on the motions. Both parties acknowledged the district court indicated it did not believe Susan was a proper party to the action, and she should have moved to intervene if she wanted to be made a party. Susan moved to intervene, arguing as a fifty-percent owner of T.P. Motel, she had an equal right to answer the complaint on behalf of T.P. Motel. She argued Ross was not acting in the best interest of T.P. Motel by admitting the default and requesting cancellation of the contract for deed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings and in denying the motion to intervene. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "White v. T.P. Motel, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Matthew Viscito, Mary Lynn Berntson, and Florence Properties, LLC (collectively "Viscito") appeal from a district court judgment of dismissal without prejudice, which awarded Kevin Christianson, Pace's Lodging Corporation, Mednational, LLC, Aurora Medical Park No. 2, LLC, and Jeff Sjoquist (collectively "Christianson") attorney's fees and costs. Viscito sued Christianson alleging a number of claims pertaining to an agreement the parties entered to build, own, and lease a hospital. Christianson moved to compel arbitration, contending the agreement required that Viscito's claims be resolved through arbitration. The district court granted the motion to compel arbitration and ordered the parties complete arbitration within six months from the date of the order. Viscito moved for an extension of time to complete arbitration. Christianson moved to dismiss with prejudice and requested an award of attorney's fees and costs. The district court held a hearing on the motions; at the conclusion, the district court ruled from the bench that the case be dismissed without prejudice and awarded Christianson reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The district court requested Christianson submit an itemized billing statement of its attorney's fees, so the court could determine the reasonableness of the fees. Christianson submitted an affidavit requesting $33,405.14, the full amount of fees and costs it had incurred defending the entire case, along with itemized billing statements documenting the work performed from July 6, 2012, to April 7, 2014, totaling the amount requested. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice and awarded Christianson $33,405.14 in attorney's fees and costs. Viscito appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion in awarding Christianson all of its costs and attorney's fees incurred throughout the case because the court misinterpreted the rules authorizing sanctions. The Supreme Court agreed with Viscito, reversed and remanded the case for recalculation of the fees. View "Viscito v. Christianson" on Justia Law

Nicholas Law appealed a district court amended judgment that awarded Danielle Whittet parenting time every alternating week and ordered Law to pay child support. The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed this case previously in "Law v. Whittet," 844 N.W.2d 885, concluding the district court's judgment was clearly erroneous and remanded with instructions to grant Law primary residential responsibility of the minor child and to consider limited parenting time for Whittet. Law argued the district court did not follow the Supreme Court's mandate in the prior case, and erred by not granting primary residential responsibility to Law. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with "Law v. Whittet," 844 N.W.2d 885. View "Law v. Whittet" on Justia Law

J.G.S. was a 90-year-old retired attorney and owned a number of multi-family rental properties. In 2008, J.G.S. suffered a stroke. In 2013, the Petitioners in this proceeding, J.G.S.'s four children, C.C., C.S., J.F.S., and J.S., became significantly concerned J.G.S. was no longer able to care for himself or his financial affairs. Petitioners were specifically concerned that J.G.S. was no longer able to maintain and repair the rental properties, was failing to collect rent from some tenants, and had gifted three multi-family rental properties to a tenant who had managed the properties for him. Petitioners filed an ex parte petition in the district court for the appointment of a temporary guardian and temporary conservator, seeking an immediate emergency guardianship and conservatorship. The court appointed a temporary guardian and a temporary conservator. Shortly thereafter, Petitioners filed a petition seeking a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. On that same day, J.G.S. was personally served with a notice of the hearing on the petition for appointment of a guardian and conservator, with a copy of the temporary petition attached as an exhibit to the notice. The district court held a hearing on the temporary order, found that an emergency guardianship was not necessary, and vacated the temporary order. The court appointed a visitor and psychologist to evaluate J.G.S. In October 2013, the court held a three-day hearing on Petitioners' request for a permanent or indefinite guardianship and conservatorship. The court ultimately held that while a guardianship was not necessary, there was clear and convincing evidence of a need for a conservatorship to manage J.G.S.'s financial affairs. The court appointed a conservator for an indefinite period. J.G.S. argued to the Supreme Court that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because of a failure of service of process. J.G.S. claimed that Petitioners did not personally serve him with the petition seeking permanent or indefinite appointment of a guardian and conservator, or with any of the supporting affidavits, which J.G.S. contended the law required. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court had personal jurisdiction over J.G.S. and the court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported the appointment of a conservator. As such, the Court affirmed. View "Guardianship & Conservatorship of J.G.S." on Justia Law

Western Horizons sued Dakota Travel Nurse, a North Dakota corporation that contracts with healthcare facilities to provide licensed nursing staff, alleging Western Horizons and Dakota Travel Nurse entered a 2008 contract for Dakota Travel Nurse to provide licensed nursing staff for Western Horizons Care Center, a nursing home in Hettinger owned and operated by Western Horizons. Western Horizons claimed the parties' contract required Dakota Travel Nurse to "indemnify, hold harmless and defend Western Horizons against any and all claims, losses, demands, actions, administrative proceedings, liabilities and judgments, including reasonable attorneys fees, court[] costs and other expenses, arising from or associated with the action or inaction of [Dakota Travel Nurse] personnel." Western Horizons alleged Dakota Travel Nurse refused to defend or indemnify Western Horizons in a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons for injuries allegedly arising from the actions or inactions of Dakota Travel Nurse personnel providing care to the resident at the time of his injury. Dakota Travel Nurse was not a party to the resident's prior lawsuit, and Dakota Travel Nurse refused Western Horizons' tender of a defense in that action. Western Horizons thereafter settled the resident's lawsuit and brought this action against Dakota Travel Nurse, seeking a monetary judgment equal to the amount paid to settle the resident's lawsuit, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Western Horizons in defense of that action. Western Horizons Living Centers petitioned the Supreme Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court to reverse an order compelling Western Horizons to answer discovery requests by Dakota Travel Nurse, Inc., for information involving a nursing home resident's prior lawsuit against Western Horizons. Western Horizons argued that its insurer's claims file in the prior lawsuit was protected by the lawyer-client privilege and that settlement negotiations and related documents from the prior lawsuit are not subject to discovery in this action. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded this was an appropriate case to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court directed the district court to vacate its order compelling discovery. The case was then remanded for further proceedings. View "Western Horizons Living Centers v. Feland" on Justia Law