Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Matthew Viscito sued Kevin Christianson asserting claims regarding the parties' agreement to build, own, and lease a hospital. On August 1, 2013, the district court granted Christianson's motion to compel arbitration, ordering the parties to complete arbitration within six months. On January 30, 2014, Viscito moved for an extension of time to complete arbitration. In response Christianson opposed the motion, moved to dismiss the action with prejudice, and requested "costs and fees incurred herein" under N.D.R.Ct. 11.5. In March 2014 the district court held a hearing on the parties' motions and ruled from the bench that the case be dismissed without prejudice and awarded Christianson reasonable attorney fees and costs. In May 2014 the court entered a judgment of dismissal without prejudice, awarding Christianson $33,405.14 for the full amount of costs and attorney fees Christianson had incurred in defending the entire case. iscito appealed the judgment, arguing the district court had abused its discretion in awarding all of Christianson's costs and attorney fees incurred throughout the case because the court misinterpreted the rules authorizing sanctions. In "Viscito I," the Supreme Court reversed the court's award and remanded for a determination of authority on which the court had imposed sanctions and for findings necessary to support its award. In this case's second trip, the Supreme Court concluded the district court on remand did not follow its mandate in "Viscito I" when the court applied N.D.R.Civ.P. 41 to justify the full amount of its prior attorney fees and costs award. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Viscito v. Christianson" on Justia Law

Johnston Law Office, P.C. appealed an order compelling discovery and finding it in contempt of court. PHI Financial Services, Inc., ("PHI") sued Johnston for alleged fraudulent transfers relating to a federal crop payment made to Johnston's client. After trial, the district court entered judgment against Johnston in the amount of $167,203.24. On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed and reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. While that appeal was pending, PHI began post-judgment discovery in aid of execution. PHI served Johnston with various interrogatories pertaining to Johnston's financial assets. Johnston returned the interrogatories on April 4, 2015, answering the first two interrogatories in their entirety, answering a portion of the third interrogatory, and objecting to the remainder of the third interrogatory and all other remaining interrogatories. Johnston claimed the unanswered interrogatories violated N.D.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(3). PHI moved for an order compelling Johnston to answer the remaining interrogatories. In its motion, PHI certified its May 8 letter and May 19 attempt to contact Johnston via telephone was a good faith attempt to confer to resolve the discovery dispute without judicial intervention, as required by N.D.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1). The district court granted PHI's motion. The court concluded N.D.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(3) did not bar PHI's interrogatories because, after including all discrete subparts, PHI served thirty-seven interrogatories. The court also concluded PHI's pre-judgment interrogatories should not have been considered in determining whether PHI's post-judgment interrogatories exceeded the limits under N.D.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(3). Further, the court concluded PHI's efforts to contact Johnston regarding the discovery dispute, and Johnston's resulting inaction, constituted a good faith attempt to confer to resolve the discovery dispute before seeking judicial intervention. The court entered its order to compel. PHI served notice of entry of the order. After Johnston did not comply with the order to compel, PHI moved to hold Johnston in contempt of court. The district court granted the motion, concluding Johnston had actual notice or knowledge of the order to compel and it had a willful and inexcusable intent to violate the order. PHI served notice of entry of this order too. Johnston appealed both orders. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the discovery order and finding of contempt. View "PHI Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnston Law Office, P.C." on Justia Law

Mark and Kayla Rath were divorced in January 2013. Kayla was awarded primary residential responsibility of the couple's children. Mark was awarded supervised parenting time. Mark filed a motion for an order to show cause and a motion for relief from the original divorce judgment. He argued both motions in one brief, asserting Kayla violated his due process and First Amendment rights by monitoring his phone calls with the children. He also argued Kayla violated the terms of the divorce judgment by making the children unavailable for scheduled calls, ending calls prematurely, and refusing to allow one of the children to accept a cell phone he sent as a gift. Finally, Mark asserted the district court judge presiding over his case failed to remain impartial and should have recused himself. The district court denied Mark's motion for an order and for relief. Finding no reversible error in the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

Lori Jury appealed a district court's order denying her motion to vacate a summary judgment. Jury argued the district court should have provided notice of the summary judgment hearing independent of the notice provided by the Barnes County Municipal Airport Authority ("BCMAA"). Jury had sued BCMAA pro se after she was terminated from her at-will employment. Jury worked as a part-time clerk for the Airport under the direction of its board and manager. In 2012, Jury applied for the vacant manager position. The BCMAA board of directors did not hire Jury for the manager position and shortly thereafter the BCMAA terminated her, citing a lack of trust. Jury filed a charge with the North Dakota Department of Labor alleging, among other things, that the BCMAA discriminated against her based on her gender. The Department found no probable cause to substantiate Jury's allegations and dismissed her charge. Jury subsequently sued the BCMAA alleging workplace discrimination, wrongful termination, defamation of character, harassment, emotional distress, loss of income, and retaliation. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jury v. Barnes County Municipal Airport Authority" on Justia Law

This case was another in an endless stream of repetitive actions stemming from Randy Holkesvig's 2008 stalking charge to which he pled guilty. Under a negotiated plea agreement, Holkesvig pled guilty to stalking in exchange for dismissal of an additional charge for violating a disorderly conduct restraining order. In addition to bringing numerous other actions, Holkesvig petitioned for post-conviction relief from the consequences of his pleading guilty to stalking, which was denied by the district court and summarily affirmed by the North Dakota Supreme Court. Holkesvig sued Gerald VandeWalle, individually and as Chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court, and the State of North Dakota, alleging numerous claims, including, obstruction of justice, defamation, corruption, deceit, fraud, false statements, breach of duty, conspiracy, collusion, racketeering, obstruction, and North Dakota constitutional violations. Holkesvig's ultimate grievance appeared to, at least in part, arise from a misstatement of the procedural facts in "Holkesvig v. North Dakota," where the Supreme Court stated, "Holkesvig's guilty plea was accepted by the district court in 2008 as part of a negotiated plea agreement between his lawyer and the State, which agreement included the State dropping charges that Holkesvig violated a domestic violence protection order." The district court dismissed Holkesvig's lawsuit on the ground it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims. Holkesvig moved for relief from the district court's judgment. The district court denied Holkesvig's motion for failure to comply with N.D.R.Ct. 3.2 and N.D.R.Civ. P. 60(b). Holkesvig timely appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court appropriately determined Holkesvig violated an order prohibiting him from filing further lawsuits that arose out of or related to his 2008 stalking charge and charge for violating a disorderly conduct restraining order, it affirmed. View "Holkesvig v. VandeWalle" on Justia Law

Susan Lundberg, as Trustee of the Gabriel J. Brown Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in a tract of land to Greg Holverson, directing the Trust to convey the land to Holverson, and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims for rescission or for damages for breach of contract. In May 1980, Holverson owed a balance on a contract for deed. Robert Lundberg, as original Trustee, released 5.09 acres from the contract and deeded that land to Holverson. Holverson executed a mortgage on the 5.09 acres as additional security for the contract for deed and the single indebtedness of $39,018.40 under the same repayment terms as the contract for deed. Holverson made sporadic payments under the amended contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she wrote Holverson multiple times asking him to make required payments. In December 2012, the Trust initiated proceedings to cancel the contract for deed and served Holverson with a notice of default. Holverson agreed to pay the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she reviewed records at the Burleigh County Recorder's Office and learned Holverson had obtained and satisfied several other mortgages on the land while making sporadic payments to the Trust since 1978. Susan Lundberg claimed she discovered Holverson had executed five mortgages on the land and satisfied three of the mortgages between 1978 and 1997, and he had obtained six mortgages and satisfied seven mortgages after 1997. She claimed she also discovered Holverson's stated reason for amending the contract for deed and mortgage on November 10, 1997, was false, because the record in the recorder's office reflected he had obtained the Capital Credit Union mortgage several days before Holverson's contract for deed and mortgage with the Trust were amended on November 10, 1997. Holverson made a timely tender of a certified check for the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage, and the Trust refused to accept the check and execute a warranty deed for the land. Holverson sued the Trust to quiet title and determine ownership of the land. Holverson generally denied the Trust's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and affirmatively pled accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, payment, release, statute of limitations, and waiver. The district court granted Holverson's motion for summary judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Trust's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

Cheetah Properties 1, LLC and Panther Pressure Testers, Inc. entered into a commercial lease agreement with an initial term that commenced on April 15, 2014, and ended on December 31, 2014. On January 19, 2015, Cheetah brought an eviction action to recover possession of the property. In the complaint, Cheetah sought damages for: (1) delinquent charges for late payment of rent owed up to December 31, 2014; (2) for Panther's willful holdover "in an amount double the yearly value of the Premises for the time of Defendant[']s withholding" under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28; and (3) for any physical damage to the property caused by Panther vacating the premises. Cheetah also sought an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the lease. Panther vacated the property by January 31, 2015. The district court returned lawful possession of the property to Cheetah and awarded it $22,000 for January 2015 rent and $8,200 for delinquent rent and fees under the lease. The district court declined to impose double damages under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28 based on its finding that Panther's holding over was not willful. After the district court entered its order for judgment, Cheetah moved for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees under the lease. The district court denied Cheetah's request for fees. Cheetah appealed the district court's judgment and the order denying an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment concluding Cheetah was not entitled to an award of double damages under N.D.C.C. 32-03-28, but reversed the denial of attorneys' fees. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cheetah Properties 1, LLC v. Panther Pressure Testers, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal resolved on in many disputes between Mark Rath and Kayla Rath. Mark appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order. In 2015, Kayla petitioned for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Mark, citing a litany of conduct purportedly rising to the level of disorderly conduct. These allegations included: Mark calling his children nearly twenty times in one night, Mark using foul language towards Kayla, Mark saying he had a business associate seek Kayla's phone records, Mark reporting Kayla to authorities out of concern she may be illegally receiving government benefits, and other miscellaneous conduct. After the hearing, the district court concluded Mark's conduct consisted of unwanted words and actions intended to adversely affect Kayla's safety, security, and privacy. After reviewing its order, the Supreme Court was concerned by the district court's lack of explanation for the necessity of the procedure it used in granting the restraining order. "While the court cited ensuring safety, minimizing conflict, and limiting the hearing to the pertinent issues before the court as justifying this procedure, the court did not elaborate on what facts or circumstances justified these concerns in this instance. Without further specificity, these conclusory justifications are insufficient to justify deviating from standard trial practices in restraining order proceedings because they leave us to speculate about the specific circumstances justifying denying Mark Rath the opportunity to directly question Kayla Rath." The Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in not allowing Mark to directly cross-examine Kayla without adequately explaining, on the record, its reasons for not allowing him to do so. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for a new hearing. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

This case was a continuation of "contentious" divorce proceedings between parties who "accumulated significant assets during their marriage." Sandra Hendricksen Martire appealed from an amended divorce judgment modifying Michael Martire's child support obligation and leaving unaltered his spousal support obligation. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in refusing to modify Martire's spousal support obligation. The Court further concluded, however, that the court failed to follow the Child Support Guidelines in setting Martire's child support obligation. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Martire' v. Martire'" on Justia Law

D.V.T., the father of minor child K.J.C., appealed a district court's final decree of adoption, terminating his parental rights and granting a petition for step-parent adoption. The father argued the district court clearly erred in terminating his parental rights and finding his consent to the adoption was not necessary. The father contended there was not clear and convincing evidence he intended to abandon the child. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded evidence supports the court's findings, and, based on the entire record, it was not convinced a mistake had been made. The record reflected the mother and step-father's attorney prepared the proposed written termination order before the hearing terminating the father's rights. "We recognize the court wanted the termination and adoption finalized quickly and the use of a document prepared by one of the parties may save time, but the court has an obligation to ensure the findings are correct." The trial court's written order erred in stating no person appeared at the hearing claiming to be the natural father; however, D.V.T. did appear. The Supreme Court found the error did not require reversal. The Court modified the final decree of adoption to reflect the father was present at the hearing and objected to the petition to terminate his parental rights and grant a step-parent adoption. View "Matter of K.J.C." on Justia Law