Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Deborah Palmer, surviving spouse of Gary J. Palmer, appeals from a summary judgment dismissing Palmer's negligence claim against A.W. Kuettel & Sons, Inc. Gary Palmer was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer, in 2011, and died in March 2015. Kuettel supplied and installed asbestos-containing insulation products while performing industrial and commercial insulation contracting work. Palmer's deceased father worked for Kuettel from 1961 through 1965 and 1974 through 1979. Most of Kuettel's jobs were in Minnesota, however, in the 1960s, Kuettel supplied and installed insulation products at the Grand Forks Air Force Base. In 2013 Palmer sued numerous defendants, including Kuettel, alleging Kuettel's negligence caused his mesothelioma. Palmer alleged he contracted mesothelioma from childhood exposure to asbestos fibers through contact with his father's dusty work clothes. In his deposition he stated that while in elementary school he came in contact with his father's work clothes when he would hug his father after he arrived home from work. He also stated he played in the vicinity of the laundry area where his mother washed his father's work clothes. Palmer alleged Kuettel should have warned him or his father of the dangerous nature of asbestos and asbestos-containing products. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Palmer failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment. View "Palmer v. 999 Quebec, Inc." on Justia Law

Connie Welker and Vicki Ostrem appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title to certain Mountrail County mineral interests. Ross Markgraf and Shanahan alleged W.J. Hannah owned 100% of the surface and minerals when he conveyed the property to "Arnold Hannah, Trustee" by grant deed in 1965, intending to create a family trust and appointing his son, Arnold Hannah, as trustee. Markgraf and Shanahan were descendants of Kathryn Nelson, W.J. Hannah's daughter and Arnold Hannah's sister. They claimed W.J. Hannah intended Arnold Hannah would hold the legal title to the property in trust for the benefit of himself; his siblings, Kathryn Nelson and Robert L. Hannah; and Margaret Rehmer, the only child of his deceased brother, Wilbert Hannah. They claimed Arnold Hannah held himself out as trustee in dealings related to the property, kept an accounting of the income and expenses related to the property, and made disbursements to the beneficiaries from the proceeds of the trust. They argued a resulting or constructive trust was created and Welker and Ostrem, as Arnold Hannah's heirs, did not have exclusive rights to the property. Welker and Ostrem answered and requested the complaint be dismissed. Welker and Ostrem then moved for summary judgment, arguing the 1965 grant deed transferring the property to "Arnold Hannah, Trustee" conveyed the title to Arnold Hannah in his individual capacity, the word "Trustee" was surplusage under N.D.C.C. 47-09-12, and Markgraf and Shanahan's claims for a resulting or constructive trust failed. Welker and Ostrem argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court erred in granting Markgraf and Shanahan's motion for summary judgment because Markgraf and Shanahan's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the court relied on inadmissible evidence, and Markgraf and Shanahan did not prove the existence of an implied trust by clear and convincing evidence. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding summary judgment was not appropriate. View "Markgraf v. Welker" on Justia Law

Maurice Thill appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. Thill argued that the district court's order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence and that the findings were inadequate. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court determined the district court did not make sufficient findings enabling the Court to review the appeal. The district court did not identify the facts on which it relied in determining Thill's likelihood to engage in further sexual predatory conduct or the facts on which it relied in determining Thill had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. "These conclusory, general findings do not comply with N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)." The case was remanded for specific findings of fact. View "Interest of Thill" on Justia Law

In 2014, appellee Neil Bayles was arrested and charged with driving under the influence. He timely requested an administrative hearing, at the conclusion of which, an administrative hearing officer suspended Bayles' driving privileges for ninety-one days. The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing the administrative hearing officer's decision suspending Bayles' driving privilege because the Department failed to timely file the hearing transcript within the twenty-day period under N.D.C.C. 39-20-06. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, concluding the district court erred as a matter of law by summarily reversing the hearing officer's decision based on noncompliance with the statute, and because Bayles failed to show prejudice caused by the claimed delay or demonstrate the Department systemically disregarded the requirements of the law. View "Bayles v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Lori Yahna appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint against Altru Health System for age discrimination and for wrongful termination of employment. In 1984, Yahna began working for the Grand Forks Clinic, the predecessor to Altru, as a licensed practical nurse. She received additional training in vascular technology to work with Dr. Rolf Paulson in the ultrasound department and by 1986 she was working solely as a vascular technologist. According to Yahna, she was the technical director of the vascular lab, she developed the vascular medicine practice at Altru. She initially worked full time as a vascular technologist with on-call responsibilities, but she received approval to work three days per week in 2001 with no on-call responsibility. According to Yahna, she became coordinator and technical director of the vascular lab in 2006. In February 2012, Altru created a new position for an education and quality assurance coordinator, and hired Derek Todd for that full-time position. According to Yahna, she did not apply for that position because it was full time. She claimed, however, she maintained her position as technical director of the vascular lab and understood she would still be doing quality assurance and reviewing other technologists' films. Yahna claimed Altru required her to work full time with on-call responsibilities in July 2012, and she was terminated on July 2, 2012, after she informed Altru "she would not be able to take call at this time." Yahna was forty-eight years old when she was terminated. The district court granted Altru's motion for summary judgment, concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact that Altru's employment policies and procedures did not abrogate Yahna's at-will employment status with Altru and that her termination did not constitute age discrimination. The court explained the provisions in Altru's employment policy manual unambiguously preserved the presumption of at-will employment and did not evidence an intent that the manual created a contractual right to employment. In rejecting Yahna's age discrimination claim, the court cited the requirements for a prima facie age discrimination claim and said that because Yahna refused to take required on-call responsibilities for an ultrasound technologist she failed to satisfactorily perform the duties of her position and she failed to establish employees outside her protected age class were treated more favorably than her. The court ruled Altru established it terminated Yahna because she refused to take on-call responsibilities for her job and granted summary judgment dismissing her complaint. On appeal, Yahna argued there were disputed issues of material fact on her claims that her termination constituted age discrimination and violated Altru's employment policies and procedures. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yahna v. Altru Health System" on Justia Law

Christopher Williamson appealed a district court order affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer's decision to suspend his driving privileges for two years. Officer Travis Martinson stopped Williamson after he drove over a fire hose at a fire scene. Martinson smelled alcohol in Williamson's vehicle and noticed Williamson had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Williamson refused field sobriety tests but consented to perform an onsite screening test. The onsite test estimated Williamson's blood alcohol content was greater than permitted for operating a vehicle and Martinson arrested Williamson. Martinson took Williamson to the Williams County Correctional Center and Sergeant Randy Haugenoe administered an Intoxilyzer 8000 chemical test. The Intoxilyzer reported Williamson had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.231 percent by weight. A hearing officer introduced the Intoxilyzer report at an administrative hearing. Williamson objected, alleging the statutory requirements were not met and the report was inadmissible for lack of foundation. The hearing officer concluded the test was fairly administered, the objection was overruled and the hearing officer's suspension of Williamson's driving privileges for two years was not in error. The district court affirmed the decision. Williamson appealed, arguing the district court erred by receiving evidence that was not adequately authenticated. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williamson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

In November 2012, the Sargent County Water Resource District filed a declaratory action regarding the ownership and control of property in Sargent County, including all property located south of the north boundary of Drain 11. The District claimed ownership as the successor in interest to the Sargent County Board of Drain Commissioners, which had obtained its interest in the property by right-of-way deeds signed in 1917 and 1918 and recorded in the Sargent County register of deeds office. The District sought declaratory relief because Paul Mathews sought to exert control over the property, claiming a property interest through his rental agreement with Phyllis Delahoyde and Nancy Mathews, the purported owners of the property. Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews answered the complaint and raised a number of defenses and a counterclaim against the District (Delahoyde did not claim an interest in the disputed property, nor did she join the codefendants in the appeal). Nancy Mathews and Paul Mathews appealed the judgment determining language of the 1917 and 1918 deeds granted fee title in the disputed property to the District's predecessor. The Supreme Court reversed after review, concluding the plain language of the 1917 and 1918 right-of-way deeds at issue conveyed easements. View "Sargent County Water Resource District v. Mathews" on Justia Law

Between May 2002 and September 2004, David Robb received multiple loans from his mother, Ruby Robb. On September 13, 2004, Ruby Robb created a living trust identified as the Ruby M. Robb Living Trust ("Trust"), and she named American State Bank as the trustee. In October 2004, David signed a promissory note made payable to Ruby M. Robb. The note did not contain a due date or repayment schedule. David made a number of payments on the note; he made these payments payable to the Trust. However, he stopped making payments after American State Bank ceased administering the Trust. Debbie Rooks, David Robb's sister, became the successor trustee. In 2013, Rooks, in her capacity as trustee, served a complaint on David to recover the amount due on the note David signed, as well as an additional note that he did not sign. Rooks ultimately voluntarily dismissed her claim based on the unsigned note. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of Rooks' motion, she filed an affidavit made by the vice president and trust manager of American State Bank that alleged the note was assigned to the Trust (she filed this affidavit because the schedule of trust assets had been lost, and there was no record evidencing the assignment of the note to the Trust). At the hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, David argued the Trust did not have standing to sue because Rooks did not present evidence sufficient to show the Trust owned the note. The court found the trust manager's affidavit was sufficient to establish the note had been transferred to the Trust. The court found there were no genuine issues of fact and the note was payable on demand as a matter of law. Robb appealed the district court's order awarding summary judgment in favor of Rooks. Because the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it found there was no genuine dispute of material fact, the Court reversed and remanded. View "Rooks v. Robb" on Justia Law

Zachary Johnson and Margie Johnson contracted with Buskohl Construction Inc. as a general contractor to oversee the construction of their new house. John Buskohl was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Buskohl Construction Inc. Due to a deteriorating relationship with the Johnsons, Buskohl walked off the job before construction was complete, leaving various "odds-and-ends" unfinished on the house. The Johnsons repaired some of the alleged deficiencies themselves and solicited bids from various contractors to fix the remaining issues. The Johnsons sued Buskohl alleging Buskohl negligently constructed the house, breached the contract, and breached the warranty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Johnsons. Buskohl moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b), arguing irregularities in the proceedings prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Buskohl argued the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial because the district court erred by: (1) failing to provide a special verdict form that categorically itemized damages; (2) allowing hearsay into evidence; (3) excluding Buskohl's expert from testifying; and (4) denying Buskohl's motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall within an exclusion or exception. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, because the district court's error affected Buskohl's substantial right to a fair trial. View "Johnson v. Buskohl Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Larry Gronland and Linda Gronland (now Coleman), married in 1971 and divorced in 1994. The district court originally awarded Linda Gronland spousal support in the amount of $1,000 per month until her death, remarriage, or when Larry began drawing Social Security, whichever occurred first. In March 2014, Linda made a motion to modify the amended judgment under N.D.C.C. 14-05-24.1. Larry moved to dismiss the motion, contending the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the support award because a court's jurisdiction to modify a support award was limited to ongoing support awards. Larry argued no support award was ongoing at the time of the motion because the support award terminated as of January 1, 2014, the date on which he started drawing Social Security. The court dismissed the motion for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The issue presented on appeal was whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to modify a spousal support award that terminated prior to Linda filing her motion to modify the award. Linda argued the district court erred in holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that she never received actual notice that Larry began drawing Social Security. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Gronland v. Gronland" on Justia Law