Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

GEM Razorback, LLC appealed a judgment dismissing its declaratory judgment action because GEM failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissing its claim for specific performance because GEM could not establish that it was a third-party beneficiary of a contract. GEM and Zenergy, Inc. owned working interests in two oil and gas wells located in McKenzie County. Zenergy operated the wells, but GEM had not consented to pay its share of the drilling and operating costs. GEM did not execute a joint operating agreement for the wells and consequently was assessed a risk penalty as a nonconsenting owner. In 2013, Zenergy assigned its interest in the wells to Oasis Petroleum North America LLC. The assignment conveyed all assets, including "all files, records and data maintained by" Zenergy. After the assignment, GEM requested the same information from Oasis. Oasis provided Zenergy with the requested information. However, according to Oasis, some of the requested information for the time period before the assignment was not in its possession. Because of differences in the numbers provided by Zenergy and Oasis, GEM filed applications for hearing with the Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission determine the actual reasonable costs plus risk penalty for the two wells. After a hearing, Oasis agreed to allow GEM to conduct an audit of the wells. The Commission then dismissed the applications without prejudice. During the ensuing audit process, GEM discovered there were documents it requested that were not in Oasis' possession for the time period before the assignment when Zenergy operated the wells. GEM contacted Zenergy and requested an extensive list of 39 specific types of information regarding the wells. Zenergy refused to provide GEM with the requested information. GEM then commenced its declaratory judgment and specific performance action against Zenergy. Zenergy argued the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the request for declaratory relief because GEM failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with the Commission before filing the complaint. Zenergy further argued the claim for specific performance failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because a provision of the assignment agreement specifically bars third-party beneficiary status. The court agreed with Zenergy's arguments and dismissed GEM's action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. View "GEM Razorback, LLC v. Zenergy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Joni Tillich, Nicole LaFloe, Shawn Marcellais, Lisa DeCoteau, and Lynn Boughey filed an action in district court against defendants Don Bruce, Vinier Davis, and Linda Davis. The complaint alleged a tort claim for abuse of process based upon the defendants filing an action against the plaintiffs in Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. Defendants answered the complaint and raised defenses of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and alleged the claim to be frivolous. Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction and requested attorney fees and statutory costs for defending the action. Defendants filed and served several discovery requests and motions including interrogatories, requests for production, notice of deposition, subpoena duces tecum, and motions to command compliance with subpoena and to command attendance at deposition. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because matters outside the pleadings were presented. Defendants' argument the district court lacked jurisdiction was based upon the fact the Plaintiffs' action was a tort claim against members of a federally recognized Indian tribe for actions alleged to have occurred between tribal members within the exterior boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action without prejudice. The court ultimately denied defendants' request for attorney fees, determining no fees should be awarded in the case after "[t]aking into account fees and expenses previously awarded in the companion case, 40-2015-CV-3." An inaccuracy in the judgment following the district court's order was found and corrected. The district court entered a corrected judgment and defendants appealed the corrected judgment. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's denial of the defendants' request for attorney fees under N.D.C.C. 28-26-01(2) and remanded for calculation of attorney fees based upon accepted factors, and ordered the district court award attorney fees to the defendants. View "Tillich v. Bruce" on Justia Law

C.D.G.E. was born in 2010. Since 2014, J.E. had primary residential responsibility of the child. A.P. was obligated to pay monthly child support payments. J.E. petitioned the district court to terminate A.P.'s parental rights. With his petition, he submitted an affidavit from A.P. in which she consented to terminating her parental rights. The petition referenced N.D.C.C. 14-15-19, which applied only "in connection with an adoption action," which was never contemplated here. All further proceedings, including J.E.'s proposed default order, J.E.'s argument at the hearing on the petition, and motion to reconsider, were considered by the parties and the district court under N.D.C.C. 27-20-45, which governed termination of parental rights where no adoption was pending. At the parental-termination hearing, J.E. argued that A.P. had both: (1) abandoned her child; and (2) consented to terminating her parental rights. The district court denied the petition without finding on the record whether A.P. had abandoned the child. In denying J.E.'s petition, the district court found that A.P. had not validly consented to terminating her parental rights. Ultimately, the district court denied the father's petition, concluding the child's welfare would not be served by terminating A.P.'s parental rights. J.E. appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition where it was not established that denying the petition would seriously affect the child's welfare. View "Matter of C.D.G.E." on Justia Law

This case was the result of a long history between Jon Norberg and Alonna Knorr. Once married, they divorced after Knorr alleged Norberg sexually abused her after drugging her with Propofol. Knorr's allegations resulted in criminal charges against Norberg, and a jury acquitted him of all charges in 2012. Norberg appealed the district court order denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law or new trial. He argued collateral estoppel established as a matter of law Knorr's liability for his abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and defamation claims, and it should not have been redecided by the jury. He further argued Knorr's dismissal of her lawsuit prevented her from raising affirmative defenses to his claims. Concluding collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of matters previous determined, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Norberg v. Norberg" on Justia Law

Daniel Raak appealed and Danel Jacobs-Raak (now known as Danel Jacobs) cross-appealed a divorce judgment distributing their marital property, and ordering Raak to pay child support. Except with regard to the division of the mineral estate, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err as a matter of law, did not abuse its discretion, and its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. “When the parties agree to a division of property, the district court should explain its reasons for not dividing the property according to that agreement.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with respect to the division of a mineral interest for an identical division of that interest or an explanation concerning the division of that mineral interest. View "Jacobs-Raak v. Raak" on Justia Law

Jerry Harvey and Christine Rasmussen divorced in January 2014. The parties had three children together, and Rasmussen was awarded primary residential responsibility of the children. In December 2015, Rasmussen moved to modify Harvey's parenting time and requested the court find Harvey in contempt. In April 2016, the district court granted Rasmussen's motion, modified Harvey's parenting time, found Harvey in contempt, and ordered Harvey pay Rasmussen's attorney's fees and costs. Harvey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The district court found Harvey had the ability to pay Rasmussen's costs and fees, but did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need. The court ordered costs and attorney's fees under both the contempt and divorce statutes, but did not provide the required analysis for attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. section 14-05-23. Because the court did not award attorney's fees only for the contempt and it did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need, its findings were insufficient for appellate review. The case was therefore remanded for the district court to make its required findings. View "Rasmussen v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Lyndon Fredericks appealed, and Bole Resources, LLC, and others cross-appealed a judgment declaring the district court: had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, reforming a quit claim mineral deed, quieting title in the mineral interests in Paul Fredericks, and ordering Lyndon Fredericks to pay the Bole defendants damages plus interest and their attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court concluded, after review, the district court correctly ruled it had subject-matter jurisdiction, its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion, it affirmed. View "Fredericks v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

Shane Stolz appealed the district court's order: (1) denying his motion to vacate judgment and the judgment granting Stacy Hildebrand primary residential responsibility of their two minor children; (2) requiring Stolz to make $761 per month in child support payments; and (3) partitioning real property held jointly between them. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion denying Stolz's motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the judgment incorrectly stated the matter came before the district court "on motion" and "as a stipulated divorce action," rather than an action for partition of real property and for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The Supreme Court remanded this matter back to the district court to correct the judgment to accurately reflect this action. View "Hildebrand v. Stolz" on Justia Law

Ethan Mattingley and Rebecca Schweitzer had one child, born in 2012. Schweitzer lived in Minot and Mattingley lived in Velva, approximately 22 miles southeast of Minot. In 2014 both parties sought primary residential responsibility of the child. The district court, through Judge Hagar, entered an interim order in February 2015 establishing parenting time and requiring Mattingley to pay $970 per month in child support. Approximately one month after entry of the interim order, Mattingley moved to modify child support. While the motion was pending, Mattingley moved to recuse Judge Hagar. In June 2015, Judge Hagar entered an order decreasing Mattingley's child support obligation. In July 2015, Judge Hagar denied Mattingley's motion to recuse, but subsequently disqualified himself from the case on the same day. Judge Louser was assigned to the case and presided over a September 2015 trial. Before trial, Judge Louser informed the parties she intended to "proceed anew on all issues raised in the initial pleadings" including primary residential responsibility and child support. After trial, Judge Louser informed the parties of a personal conflict and requested the case be assigned to another judge. Presiding Judge Lee assigned himself to the case, awarded primary residential responsibility of the child to Schweitzer and established parenting time for Mattingley. The court found it was in the child's best interests to live with Schweitzer in Minot where the child would be attending school. Judge Lee also addressed Mattingley's motion to recuse and concluded it divested Judge Hagar of authority to proceed in the case. The court vacated Judge Hagar's order modifying child support and reinstated a $970 per month of child support amount under the February 2015 interim order. After filing his notice of appeal, Mattingley moved to modify child support because he lost his job in March 2016. After a hearing the district court reduced Mattingley's child support obligation. Mattingley argued the district court erroneously calculated child support. He also argued the court erred in vacating the June 2015 order modifying child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Judge Lee erroneously vacated Judge Hagar's June 2015 order modifying child support. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Schweitzer v. Mattingley" on Justia Law

Stephen Larson appealed when his case against Midland Hospital Supply, Inc. ("Midland"), Midland ProHealth, Inc. ("ProHealth") and Richard Larson was dismissed. Midland was a North Dakota corporation engaged in the wholesale, resale distribution and sale of medical supplies until dissolved in 2007. The Larson family owned all of the shares of the corporation. Richard Larson was the majority shareholder and the president of the company and his brother, Stephen Larson, and their two sisters were minority shareholders. The company had a buy-sell agreement requiring any shareholder desiring to sell, transfer or encumber their shares to first offer them to the other shareholders on a pro-rata basis. If the shareholders did not purchase the offered shares, the company could redeem them. If the company or shareholders did not purchase the shares, they could be sold to any party. In May 1999 Richard sent the minority shareholders a letter indicating the company wanted to purchase their shares by July 1999. The two sisters agreed to sell their shares. Stephen declined the offer. Richard personally purchased the sisters' shares, increasing his ownership interest in the company. In 1994 Richard Larson set up ProHealth, a retail company selling medical supplies, of which Richard was the president and sole shareholder. ProHealth purchased approximately half of its inventory from Midland. It had an outstanding accounts receivable with Midland by 2001. By the end of 2006 ProHealth owed Midland approximately $1,600,000. In August 2007, the full amount of the accounts receivable was paid. Interest on the receivable was paid in August 2008. Stephen sued for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, negligence, breach of shareholder buy-sell agreement, misappropriation, conspiracy, conversion, action for accounting and unjust enrichment. The summons and complaint were served in June 2013, and the action was filed in September 2014. The trial court held that Stephen's case against Midland and his brother was barred by statute of limitations. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the statute of limitations barred Stephen's claims related to his ownership interest in Midland and the district court did not err finding he was paid for his interest in Midland. View "Larson v. Midland Hospital Supply, Inc." on Justia Law