Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jerry Harvey and Christine Rasmussen divorced in January 2014. The parties had three children together, and Rasmussen was awarded primary residential responsibility of the children. In December 2015, Rasmussen moved to modify Harvey's parenting time and requested the court find Harvey in contempt. In April 2016, the district court granted Rasmussen's motion, modified Harvey's parenting time, found Harvey in contempt, and ordered Harvey pay Rasmussen's attorney's fees and costs. Harvey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The district court found Harvey had the ability to pay Rasmussen's costs and fees, but did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need. The court ordered costs and attorney's fees under both the contempt and divorce statutes, but did not provide the required analysis for attorney's fees under N.D.C.C. section 14-05-23. Because the court did not award attorney's fees only for the contempt and it did not make any findings about Rasmussen's need, its findings were insufficient for appellate review. The case was therefore remanded for the district court to make its required findings. View "Rasmussen v. Harvey" on Justia Law

Lyndon Fredericks appealed, and Bole Resources, LLC, and others cross-appealed a judgment declaring the district court: had subject-matter jurisdiction over the action, reforming a quit claim mineral deed, quieting title in the mineral interests in Paul Fredericks, and ordering Lyndon Fredericks to pay the Bole defendants damages plus interest and their attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court concluded, after review, the district court correctly ruled it had subject-matter jurisdiction, its findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and it did not abuse its discretion, it affirmed. View "Fredericks v. Fredericks" on Justia Law

Shane Stolz appealed the district court's order: (1) denying his motion to vacate judgment and the judgment granting Stacy Hildebrand primary residential responsibility of their two minor children; (2) requiring Stolz to make $761 per month in child support payments; and (3) partitioning real property held jointly between them. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion denying Stolz's motion to vacate, the Supreme Court affirmed. However, the judgment incorrectly stated the matter came before the district court "on motion" and "as a stipulated divorce action," rather than an action for partition of real property and for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities. The Supreme Court remanded this matter back to the district court to correct the judgment to accurately reflect this action. View "Hildebrand v. Stolz" on Justia Law

Ethan Mattingley and Rebecca Schweitzer had one child, born in 2012. Schweitzer lived in Minot and Mattingley lived in Velva, approximately 22 miles southeast of Minot. In 2014 both parties sought primary residential responsibility of the child. The district court, through Judge Hagar, entered an interim order in February 2015 establishing parenting time and requiring Mattingley to pay $970 per month in child support. Approximately one month after entry of the interim order, Mattingley moved to modify child support. While the motion was pending, Mattingley moved to recuse Judge Hagar. In June 2015, Judge Hagar entered an order decreasing Mattingley's child support obligation. In July 2015, Judge Hagar denied Mattingley's motion to recuse, but subsequently disqualified himself from the case on the same day. Judge Louser was assigned to the case and presided over a September 2015 trial. Before trial, Judge Louser informed the parties she intended to "proceed anew on all issues raised in the initial pleadings" including primary residential responsibility and child support. After trial, Judge Louser informed the parties of a personal conflict and requested the case be assigned to another judge. Presiding Judge Lee assigned himself to the case, awarded primary residential responsibility of the child to Schweitzer and established parenting time for Mattingley. The court found it was in the child's best interests to live with Schweitzer in Minot where the child would be attending school. Judge Lee also addressed Mattingley's motion to recuse and concluded it divested Judge Hagar of authority to proceed in the case. The court vacated Judge Hagar's order modifying child support and reinstated a $970 per month of child support amount under the February 2015 interim order. After filing his notice of appeal, Mattingley moved to modify child support because he lost his job in March 2016. After a hearing the district court reduced Mattingley's child support obligation. Mattingley argued the district court erroneously calculated child support. He also argued the court erred in vacating the June 2015 order modifying child support. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Judge Lee erroneously vacated Judge Hagar's June 2015 order modifying child support. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Schweitzer v. Mattingley" on Justia Law

Stephen Larson appealed when his case against Midland Hospital Supply, Inc. ("Midland"), Midland ProHealth, Inc. ("ProHealth") and Richard Larson was dismissed. Midland was a North Dakota corporation engaged in the wholesale, resale distribution and sale of medical supplies until dissolved in 2007. The Larson family owned all of the shares of the corporation. Richard Larson was the majority shareholder and the president of the company and his brother, Stephen Larson, and their two sisters were minority shareholders. The company had a buy-sell agreement requiring any shareholder desiring to sell, transfer or encumber their shares to first offer them to the other shareholders on a pro-rata basis. If the shareholders did not purchase the offered shares, the company could redeem them. If the company or shareholders did not purchase the shares, they could be sold to any party. In May 1999 Richard sent the minority shareholders a letter indicating the company wanted to purchase their shares by July 1999. The two sisters agreed to sell their shares. Stephen declined the offer. Richard personally purchased the sisters' shares, increasing his ownership interest in the company. In 1994 Richard Larson set up ProHealth, a retail company selling medical supplies, of which Richard was the president and sole shareholder. ProHealth purchased approximately half of its inventory from Midland. It had an outstanding accounts receivable with Midland by 2001. By the end of 2006 ProHealth owed Midland approximately $1,600,000. In August 2007, the full amount of the accounts receivable was paid. Interest on the receivable was paid in August 2008. Stephen sued for breach of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, negligence, breach of shareholder buy-sell agreement, misappropriation, conspiracy, conversion, action for accounting and unjust enrichment. The summons and complaint were served in June 2013, and the action was filed in September 2014. The trial court held that Stephen's case against Midland and his brother was barred by statute of limitations. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the statute of limitations barred Stephen's claims related to his ownership interest in Midland and the district court did not err finding he was paid for his interest in Midland. View "Larson v. Midland Hospital Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Karisa and Roger Frith appealed the dismissal of their complaint against the Park District of the City of Fargo and the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund. The Friths sued the Park District and Fund seeking monetary damages for injuries Karisa allegedly sustained while rollerblading in a Fargo park on July 7, 2012. The Friths alleged Karisa tripped on soft patching material used to fill a crack in the park pathway. The Friths argued the district court erred in dismissing their complaint because it applied the wrong statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in its use of the appropriate statute of limitations to dismiss the case. View "Frith v. Park District of the City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Linda Ketterling was married to Larry Ketterling. They were the co-owners of L & L Rentals, and each owned a fifty percent membership interest in the company. Larry died on July 31, 2014. An application for the informal probate of Larry's will was filed and a personal representative was appointed. In November 2015, the personal representative petitioned for approval of the final accounting, settlement, and distribution of the estate, including distribution of Larry's interest in L & L Rentals to his children. Linda objected to the petition, arguing Larry's interest in the company was not available for distribution because she intended to purchase the interest under the terms of the L & L Rentals operating agreement. In 2016, a bank petitioned for allowance of its claim against the estate for payment of debts, including a loan to L & L Rentals. Linda filed a claim against the estate for amounts she may be required to pay creditors on loans to Larry. Linda then objected to the petition for approval of an amended final accounting and distribution, arguing L & L Rentals was not an estate asset. Linda filed a notice of appeal, stating she was appealing the earlier order. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not ruled on Linda's claim: the petition for approval of the amended final accounting and distribution, or the objection. There were also remaining issues with creditors and the transfer of the ownership interest in L & L Rentals could have been interrelated to these issues. The Supreme Court held that the district court's order was not appealable without Rule 54(b) certification, if it was providently granted. Linda did not request Rule 54(b) certification, and therefore this was not a final, appealable order. Concluding it did not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed. View "Estate of Ketterling" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Goliath Energy Services, LLC, and George Satterfield challenged orders denying their N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motions to vacate default judgments entered against them in favor of Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC, and Rossco Crane and Rigging, Inc. Monster was in the oil field construction, trucking, and rigging business. Rossco was in the business of providing various crane and rigging services. Goliath was a limited liability company with its principal place of business located in Grand Junction, Colorado, and it conducted business in North Dakota. Satterfield was Goliath's president and Karl Troestler was its chief financial officer. Rossco and Monster sued Goliath, Troestler, and Satterfield to collect payment of outstanding balances owed for services provided to Goliath. A default judgment eventually entered in favor of Monster for $240,107.23. Rossco advised its attorney that negotiations had also failed with the defendants. Rossco's attorney filed the closing papers with the clerk of court, and a default judgment was entered against the defendants in favor of Rossco for $97,233.04 a month later. On appeal, Goliath and Satterfield argued the district court erred in denying their motions to vacate the default judgments under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the underlying actions and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Joan and Shane Tangedal appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their negligence claim against the Lake Region District Health Unit and denying their motion to amend their complaint to add a Lake Region employee, Allen McKay, as a defendant to their lawsuit. In September 2014, the Tangedals sued William and Mavis Mertens, Lake Region, and the Ramsey County Board of Commissioners for damages resulting from the January 2014 collapse of a septic tank on land the Tangedals had purchased from the Mertens in 2009. The Tangedals alleged the Mertens failed to disclose that in 2000 they built an addition to the residence on the land on top of the septic system in violation of applicable state and county regulations. The Tangedals also alleged that, as part of the purchase and as required under North Dakota law and Ramsey County regulations, McKay, the Environmental Health Supervisor for Lake Region, inspected the septic system and negligently certified it as "expected to function satisfactorily and . . . not likely to create an insanitary condition." Lake Region and the Ramsey County Board answered, denying liability and alleging governmental immunity in the performance of a public duty. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Lake Region and McKay had immunity for their alleged acts under N.D.C.C. section 32-12.1-03(3). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Tangedals' motion to amend their complaint and did not err in granting summary judgment dismissal of their claim against Lake Region. View "Tangedal v. Mertens" on Justia Law

New Public School District #8 appealed a judgment affirming the State Board of Public School Education's decision approving annexation of certain real properties to the Williston School District. New Public School District argued the State Board erred in approving the petition for annexation because the property to be annexed was not contiguous to the Williston School District before the petition was heard. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Public Sch. Dist. #8 v. North Dakota Bd. of Public Sch. Edu." on Justia Law