Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Paul Schaffner appealed a district court order denying his petition to modify his parenting time from supervised visitation to unsupervised. The district court denied his petition after finding Schaffner failed to show a material change in circumstances had occurred since the previous order establishing his parenting time. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schaffner v. Schaffner" on Justia Law

Absent a prior conveyance of pore space to a third party, the owner of a surface estate owns the pore space beneath the surface. A surface owner may recover damages from a mineral developer for the developer's use of pore space for saltwater disposal. Plaintiffs Randall Mosser, Douglas Mosser, Marilyn Koon, and Jayne Harkin owned a surface estate in a quarter section of land in Billings County. When the plaintiffs acquired their surface estate, it was subject to a 1977 oil and gas lease granted by the plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest, who had owned both the surface and mineral estate in several tracts of land included in the lease. In 2003, the Industrial Commission approved a plan for unitization of several tracts of land in Billings County, including the plaintiffs' surface estate. Denbury Onshore, LLC operated a well located on the plaintiffs' surface estate, and used the well for saltwater disposal since September 2011. Plaintiffs sued Denbury for saltwater disposal into their pore space, alleging claims for nuisance, for trespass and for damages under the Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act in N.D.C.C. ch. 38-11.1. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability, claiming Denbury's liability was clear and the only issue for trial was the amount of their damages. Denbury moved for summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiffs' action, contending it had the right to dispose of saltwater into the plaintiffs' pore space without providing them compensation. A federal magistrate judge denied the parties' motions, but ruled the plaintiffs owned the pore space beneath their surface estate and Denbury could be liable for saltwater disposal into their pore space under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-11.1. Denbury filed a second motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the plaintiffs' statutory claim for damages on the ground they failed to proffer any evidence to establish that they were currently using the pore space beneath their surface estate, that they had any concrete plans to do so in the near future, or that their property had diminished in value. The federal magistrate judge deferred ruling on that motion and certified several questions of North Dakota law to the North Dakota Supreme Court involving the plaintiffs' right to recover compensation for Denbury's disposal of saltwater into the pore space beneath the plaintiffs' surface estate under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-11.1. View "Mosser v. Denbury Resources, Inc." on Justia Law

John Dixon appealed a judgment that reformed a warranty deed to except and reserve mineral interests in certain real property from the conveyance and retain the minerals as the property of the Shirley A. Dixon Trust. Dixon argued the district court erred in reforming the deed because there was no evidence of a mutual mistake and the statute of limitations precluded the reformation claim. Finding no error in the reformation, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. Furthermore, the Court concluded Dixon’s statute of limitations argument was waived. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law

A parent who has committed domestic violence may rebut the presumption favoring only supervised visitation with a sufficient accumulation of direct and indirect evidence of a lack of physical or emotional danger to the child. Keanna Schneider originally appealed a district court order denying her motion to modify the parenting time of Keaton O'Hara from unsupervised to supervised parenting time. The North Dakota Supreme Court previously held the trial court erred by improperly excluding evidence, making insufficient findings, and misapplying the law in analyzing the parties' conduct. We remanded for further proceedings and retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3). On remand, the district court issued additional findings and an amended order. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court complied with the Supreme Court's mandate by holding an evidentiary hearing and that its additional findings were not clearly erroneous. View "O'Hara v. Schneider" on Justia Law

In an eviction action, a district court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a valid order or judgment. Barbara Vondell appealed a judgment entered for Spirit Property Management, evicting her from possession of real property and awarding a money judgment against her. For over twenty-five years Luetta Vondell owned a mobile home on a rented lot. Sometime after Luetta was diagnosed with dementia, her daughter Barbara moved in with her, becoming her full-time care giver and agent under a durable power of attorney. In July 2014 Barbara and Luetta Vondell, through Barbara under the power of attorney, signed a one-year lease for the mobile home lot. The lease commenced on July 1, 2014, continuing on a month-to-month basis after the lease term. Luetta died in September 2015. In March 2016 Spirit Property filed suit for eviction and possession of real property for nonpayment of rent. Barbara answered the suit, denying Spirit Property's claims and asserting various defenses. At a May 2016 eviction hearing the district court found Barbara moved out of the home in November 2015, but the mobile home continued occupying Spirit Property's lot. The court found that while lot rent was partially paid for September 2015, no rent was paid in October and November 2015. The court entered an order and judgment against Barbara granting Spirit Property possession of the property and awarding $2,440 for unpaid rent and costs. Barbara argued the district court erred in deciding it had subject matter jurisdiction of the eviction action under N.D.C.C. ch. 47-32 when the court found Barbara terminated the lease and vacated the property in November 2015. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court had both subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction and personal jurisdiction over Vondell, and affirmed. View "Spirit Property Management v. Vondell" on Justia Law

When a person committed as a sexually dangerous individual petitions for discharge, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual. Expert testimony in sexually dangerous individual proceedings will not be reweighed on appeal, and a choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Kelly Tanner appealed a district court order finding he remained a sexually dangerous individual and denying his petition for discharge from the North Dakota State Hospital. Tanner, at age 22, was convicted of sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old female. The district court sentenced Tanner to one year of probation for the offense. In 2009, Tanner was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to five years in prison with four years and eleven months suspended for two years of supervised probation. In 2010, Tanner's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to one year of incarceration with two years of supervised probation to follow. Just before Tanner was released from incarceration, the State petitioned the district court to civilly commit Tanner as a sexually dangerous individual. After the commitment hearing, the district court found Tanner was a sexually dangerous individual and ordered civil commitment. Tanner petitioned for discharge in 2013 and 2014, and the district court ordered continued commitment on both occasions. Tanner petitioned for discharge a third time in September 2015. The State's doctor evaluated Tanner and filed a report, which was updated with an addendum twice. An independent doctor who previously evaluated Tanner, conducted an evaluation and filed a report. The district court held a hearing at which both doctors testified. The district court concluded Tanner remained a sexually dangerous individual and denied the petition for discharge. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court order denying Tanner's petition for discharge was supported by the record and was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, it affirmed the district court order continuing civil commitment. View "Interest of Tanner" on Justia Law

Under the abandoned mineral statutes, the surface owner must mail a copy of the notice of lapse to the mineral interest owner's address if the mineral interest owner's address is shown of record. Ronald and Sherry Huebner appealed a district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judgment and judgment denying their request to quiet title in certain Burke County mineral interests. The Huebners argued the district court erred in ruling they did not comply with the notice requirements in the abandoned mineral statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Huebner v. Furlinger" on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed orders denying his demands for a change of judge, an order denying his motion for an order to show cause, and an order modifying his child support obligation. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Rath did not meet the statutory requirements for a change of judge, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for an order to show cause, and the court did not err in modifying the child support obligation. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

An indemnification agreement need not be in writing, and an agent's authority to enter into an indemnification agreement need not be in writing. Jim Leach (“Leach”) and Elizabeth Leach appealed a district court judgment awarding money damages to SNAPS Holding Company after ruling they breached a stock purchase agreement with SNAPS. SNAPS cross-appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claims against Leach. Leach was the chief operating officer and majority shareholder of IDA of Moorhead Inc. Leach negotiated with Sanjay Patel, president and CEO of SNAPS, to sell IDA to SNAPS. During negotiations the parties discussed the effect of an employee lawsuit on the potential sale. The parties agreed SNAPS would be responsible for the first $100,000 of expenses associated with the lawsuit, and Jim Leach and IDA would be responsible for that portion exceeding $100,000. At a shareholders and board of directors meeting, the IDA shareholders and board of directors authorized the sale of IDA's stock to SNAPS for $1,180,000. A district court ruled IDA wrongfully terminated the employee and Leach breached a fiduciary duty. Leach and the selling shareholders of IDA refused to pay the employee lawsuit judgment. The employee filed the judgment against Leach in Arizona, and subsequently assigned the judgment to SNAPS and IDA. Leach objected to the filing of the judgment against him in Arizona. An Arizona court ruled SNAPS and IDA could not enforce the judgment against Leach in Arizona. The court concluded SNAPS exercised total control over the management and activities of IDA and was the alter ego of IDA. The Arizona court concluded both Arizona and North Dakota law prohibited contribution between intentional joint tortfeasors; therefore, allowing IDA to obtain contribution from Leach, its co-intentional joint tortfeasor, was prohibited in Arizona. SNAPS sued Leach and the other former IDA shareholders after they failed to pay the employee judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the proceeding in Arizona relating to the filing of the employee judgment and SNAPS' lawsuit in North Dakota relating to the stock purchase agreement were based on different factual circumstances, and as such, not barred by res judicata. The Court reversed and remanded that part of the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Jim Leach that found otherwise. The Court also reversed and remanded that part of the judgment dismissing SNAPS' claims against Jim Leach. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "SNAPS Holding Company v. Leach" on Justia Law

The clearly erroneous standard of review does not permit a reweighing of evidence or reassessment of credibility. Richard Colling appeals a district court judgment awarding Adrienne Behrens primary residential responsibility of their child, R.W.B.C. He argued the district court's findings relating to best interests factors (j), (d), and (f) were clearly erroneous. He also argued the district court judge had a duty to disclose his involvement in an earlier case in which Behrens was a party. Concluding the record supported the district court's findings, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of R.W.B.C." on Justia Law