Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Dixon appealed a judgment that reformed a warranty deed to except and reserve mineral interests in certain real property from the conveyance and retain the minerals as the property of the Shirley A. Dixon Trust. Dixon argued the district court erred in reforming the deed because there was no evidence of a mutual mistake and the statute of limitations precluded the reformation claim. Finding no error in the reformation, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. Furthermore, the Court concluded Dixon’s statute of limitations argument was waived. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law

A parent who has committed domestic violence may rebut the presumption favoring only supervised visitation with a sufficient accumulation of direct and indirect evidence of a lack of physical or emotional danger to the child. Keanna Schneider originally appealed a district court order denying her motion to modify the parenting time of Keaton O'Hara from unsupervised to supervised parenting time. The North Dakota Supreme Court previously held the trial court erred by improperly excluding evidence, making insufficient findings, and misapplying the law in analyzing the parties' conduct. We remanded for further proceedings and retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3). On remand, the district court issued additional findings and an amended order. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court complied with the Supreme Court's mandate by holding an evidentiary hearing and that its additional findings were not clearly erroneous. View "O'Hara v. Schneider" on Justia Law

In an eviction action, a district court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enter a valid order or judgment. Barbara Vondell appealed a judgment entered for Spirit Property Management, evicting her from possession of real property and awarding a money judgment against her. For over twenty-five years Luetta Vondell owned a mobile home on a rented lot. Sometime after Luetta was diagnosed with dementia, her daughter Barbara moved in with her, becoming her full-time care giver and agent under a durable power of attorney. In July 2014 Barbara and Luetta Vondell, through Barbara under the power of attorney, signed a one-year lease for the mobile home lot. The lease commenced on July 1, 2014, continuing on a month-to-month basis after the lease term. Luetta died in September 2015. In March 2016 Spirit Property filed suit for eviction and possession of real property for nonpayment of rent. Barbara answered the suit, denying Spirit Property's claims and asserting various defenses. At a May 2016 eviction hearing the district court found Barbara moved out of the home in November 2015, but the mobile home continued occupying Spirit Property's lot. The court found that while lot rent was partially paid for September 2015, no rent was paid in October and November 2015. The court entered an order and judgment against Barbara granting Spirit Property possession of the property and awarding $2,440 for unpaid rent and costs. Barbara argued the district court erred in deciding it had subject matter jurisdiction of the eviction action under N.D.C.C. ch. 47-32 when the court found Barbara terminated the lease and vacated the property in November 2015. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court had both subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction and personal jurisdiction over Vondell, and affirmed. View "Spirit Property Management v. Vondell" on Justia Law

When a person committed as a sexually dangerous individual petitions for discharge, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual. Expert testimony in sexually dangerous individual proceedings will not be reweighed on appeal, and a choice between two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous. Kelly Tanner appealed a district court order finding he remained a sexually dangerous individual and denying his petition for discharge from the North Dakota State Hospital. Tanner, at age 22, was convicted of sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with a sixteen-year-old female. The district court sentenced Tanner to one year of probation for the offense. In 2009, Tanner was convicted of failure to register as a sex offender and was sentenced to five years in prison with four years and eleven months suspended for two years of supervised probation. In 2010, Tanner's probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to one year of incarceration with two years of supervised probation to follow. Just before Tanner was released from incarceration, the State petitioned the district court to civilly commit Tanner as a sexually dangerous individual. After the commitment hearing, the district court found Tanner was a sexually dangerous individual and ordered civil commitment. Tanner petitioned for discharge in 2013 and 2014, and the district court ordered continued commitment on both occasions. Tanner petitioned for discharge a third time in September 2015. The State's doctor evaluated Tanner and filed a report, which was updated with an addendum twice. An independent doctor who previously evaluated Tanner, conducted an evaluation and filed a report. The district court held a hearing at which both doctors testified. The district court concluded Tanner remained a sexually dangerous individual and denied the petition for discharge. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court order denying Tanner's petition for discharge was supported by the record and was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, it affirmed the district court order continuing civil commitment. View "Interest of Tanner" on Justia Law

Under the abandoned mineral statutes, the surface owner must mail a copy of the notice of lapse to the mineral interest owner's address if the mineral interest owner's address is shown of record. Ronald and Sherry Huebner appealed a district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order for judgment and judgment denying their request to quiet title in certain Burke County mineral interests. The Huebners argued the district court erred in ruling they did not comply with the notice requirements in the abandoned mineral statutes, N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Huebner v. Furlinger" on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed orders denying his demands for a change of judge, an order denying his motion for an order to show cause, and an order modifying his child support obligation. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Rath did not meet the statutory requirements for a change of judge, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for an order to show cause, and the court did not err in modifying the child support obligation. View "Rath v. Rath" on Justia Law

An indemnification agreement need not be in writing, and an agent's authority to enter into an indemnification agreement need not be in writing. Jim Leach (“Leach”) and Elizabeth Leach appealed a district court judgment awarding money damages to SNAPS Holding Company after ruling they breached a stock purchase agreement with SNAPS. SNAPS cross-appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claims against Leach. Leach was the chief operating officer and majority shareholder of IDA of Moorhead Inc. Leach negotiated with Sanjay Patel, president and CEO of SNAPS, to sell IDA to SNAPS. During negotiations the parties discussed the effect of an employee lawsuit on the potential sale. The parties agreed SNAPS would be responsible for the first $100,000 of expenses associated with the lawsuit, and Jim Leach and IDA would be responsible for that portion exceeding $100,000. At a shareholders and board of directors meeting, the IDA shareholders and board of directors authorized the sale of IDA's stock to SNAPS for $1,180,000. A district court ruled IDA wrongfully terminated the employee and Leach breached a fiduciary duty. Leach and the selling shareholders of IDA refused to pay the employee lawsuit judgment. The employee filed the judgment against Leach in Arizona, and subsequently assigned the judgment to SNAPS and IDA. Leach objected to the filing of the judgment against him in Arizona. An Arizona court ruled SNAPS and IDA could not enforce the judgment against Leach in Arizona. The court concluded SNAPS exercised total control over the management and activities of IDA and was the alter ego of IDA. The Arizona court concluded both Arizona and North Dakota law prohibited contribution between intentional joint tortfeasors; therefore, allowing IDA to obtain contribution from Leach, its co-intentional joint tortfeasor, was prohibited in Arizona. SNAPS sued Leach and the other former IDA shareholders after they failed to pay the employee judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the proceeding in Arizona relating to the filing of the employee judgment and SNAPS' lawsuit in North Dakota relating to the stock purchase agreement were based on different factual circumstances, and as such, not barred by res judicata. The Court reversed and remanded that part of the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Jim Leach that found otherwise. The Court also reversed and remanded that part of the judgment dismissing SNAPS' claims against Jim Leach. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "SNAPS Holding Company v. Leach" on Justia Law

The clearly erroneous standard of review does not permit a reweighing of evidence or reassessment of credibility. Richard Colling appeals a district court judgment awarding Adrienne Behrens primary residential responsibility of their child, R.W.B.C. He argued the district court's findings relating to best interests factors (j), (d), and (f) were clearly erroneous. He also argued the district court judge had a duty to disclose his involvement in an earlier case in which Behrens was a party. Concluding the record supported the district court's findings, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Interest of R.W.B.C." on Justia Law

A party is barred from bringing an action for the recovery or possession of real property, unless the party was seized or possessed of the property within twenty years before bringing the action. The plaintiffs appealed an amended judgment entered after the district court granted summary judgment dismissing their claims against the defendants, seeking to determine title to real property. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding the plaintiffs' action was time-barred under N.D.C.C. 28-01-04. View "Hageness v. Davis" on Justia Law

A Department of Transportation decision suspending or revoking driving privileges may be appealed to the district court by serving the director and filing a notice of appeal with specifications of error in the district court within seven days after the date of the hearing as shown by the date of the hearing officer's decision. Fritz Opp appealed and the Department of Transportation cross-appealed judgments affirming the Department's decisions revoking Opp's driving privileges for 180 days and reciprocally disqualifying him from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Opp's untimely appeals of the Department's decisions, and reversed and remanded for the district court to enter judgments dismissing Opp's appeals to the district court. View "Opp v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law