Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shawn Brew appealed a judgment granting him a divorce from Jennifer Brew, distributing their marital property, and ordering him to pay child support. Shawn argued the district court's property distribution was inequitable, the court improperly calculated his child support obligation, and the court erred in ordering him to pay attorney's fees. A district court is required to equitably distribute marital property in a divorce proceeding, and a property division does not need to be equal to be equitable. Under the child support guidelines, a district court averages a self-employed obligor's income over the most recent five years to determine income from self-employment. The district court has discretion to award attorney's fees when one party's actions have unreasonably increased the time spent on a case. Finding no clear error in the district court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Brew v. Brew" on Justia Law

In 2015, Beach Railport, LLC commenced this action against the Donnell and Jeanne Michels, for the partition of real property in Golden Valley County. Beach Railport and the Michels each owned an undivided one-half interest in the subject property, consisting of two tracts of land totaling eighty acres: the "North Forty" and the "South Forty." Donnell Michels used the property for agricultural purposes. Beach Railport acquired its interest in the North Forty and various other tracts of land around the subject property as part of its planned construction of a rail trans-load facility. It sought and obtained changes in zoning for certain property parcels. Beach Railport's construction plan did not include development on the South Forty acres. The Michels appealed the ultimate judgment partitioning real property between the Michels and Beach Railport. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard to review and adopt the partition referee's report, and that the court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Beach Railport, LLC v. Michels" on Justia Law

John Gassmann died in February 2012. Margaret Oakland was his only child. Under a generation-skipping trust created by his parents, Gassmann had a special power of appointment over the trust estate, which included family farmland. The power was exercisable "by appointment, outright or in trust, in such portions as my child may appoint in a valid testamentary instrument that specifically refers to this special power of appointment." The trust prohibited Gassmann from exercising the power in favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or creditors of his estate. The generation-skipping trust provided that unless Gassmann exercised the power of appointment in a valid testamentary instrument, all trust assets would pass to Gassmann's descendants at Gassmann's death. Gassmann exercised the special power of appointment through both his will and revocable living trust executed in 2011. Gassmann exercised his special power of appointment by distributing all of the real estate in his generation-skipping trust to the Valley Township Land Trust ("land trust") and the residue of the trust estate to the Canadian Mineral Share Trust ("mineral trust"), which were both created under Gassmann's revocable living trust. Oakland was a primary beneficiary of the mineral trust, not of the land trust. After Gassmann's death, Oakland contested his will and revocable living trust. Oakland argued Gassmann's will was invalid, alleging he executed the will under an insane delusion. Oakland appealed the district court order granting Bell Bank's petition to approve the accounting, distribution, and termination of the John T. Gassmann generation-skipping trust. She also appealed an order denying her motion for relief from the order approving Bell Bank's petition, arguing Gassmann improperly exercised a special power of appointment over the trust estate and that Bell Bank breached its fiduciary duty of impartiality. Finding no reversible error in the district court judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of John T. Gassmann Trust" on Justia Law

William Wilkinson and the other plaintiffs appeal and Statoil & Gas, LP and EOG Resources, Inc. cross-appeal from a summary judgment determining the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota ("Land Board") owns certain property below the ordinary high watermark of the Missouri River. Wilkinson argues the district court erred in determining ownership of the mineral interests. Chapter 61-33.1, N.D.C.C., became effective on April 21, 2017. The proceedings in this case began in 2012, and the trial court granted summary judgment in May 2016. Chapter 61-33.1, N.D.C.C., only applied to this case if it applied retroactively. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied retroactively, and that the district court did not have an opportunity to consider this statutory provisions when it decided ownership of the disputed minerals. The Supreme Court, therefore, remanded this case for the district court to determine whether N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied and governs ownership of the minerals at issue in this case. View "Wilkinson v. Board of University and School Lands of the State of N.D." on Justia Law

Marqus Welch appealed, and Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") cross-appealed a judgment affirming an administrative law judge's ("ALJ") decision that affirmed a WSI order ending Welch's vocational rehabilitation benefits and disability benefits and that reversed a WSI order finding Welch committed fraud and requiring him to repay benefits. To trigger the civil penalties for making a false statement in connection with a claim for WSI benefits, WSI must prove: (1) there is a false claim or statement; (2) the false claim or statement is willfully made; and (3) the false claim or statement is made in connection with any claim or application for benefits. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the ALJ did not err in affirming WSI's disability benefits order because a reasoning mind could reasonably conclude Welch could return to work. The Court concluded, however, the ALJ misapplied the law in failing to apply the proper definition of "work" and in analyzing whether Welch had "willfully" made false statements. View "Welch v. Workforce Safety & Insurance" on Justia Law

A board of county commissioners may not restrict an elected county sheriff's authority to fire an employee hired by the sheriff except through personnel policies that do not usurp or significantly interfere with the sheriff's authority to fire employee's in the sheriff's office. Gary Schwartzenberger, in his official capacity as the sheriff of McKenzie County, appealed a district court order denying his petition for a writ to prohibit the McKenzie County Board of County Commissioners from taking disciplinary action up to and including termination against a deputy in the sheriff's office. THe North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Board did not have authority to discipline a deputy in the sheriff's office, and reversed the order denying a writ of prohibition. View "Schwartzenberger v. McKenzie County Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

M.S. was subject to an existing one-year order for less restrictive treatment relating to his mental illness. On June 8, 2017, before the order expired, the Southeast Human Service Center filed a petition for continuing treatment under N.D.C.C. 25-03.1-23, alleging M.S. required further psychiatric care and was unwilling to adhere to treatment on his own. On June 15, 2017, M.S. filed a demand for change of judge under N.D.C.C. 29-15-21. Judge Daniel Narum, as presiding judge, denied his request, finding that Judge Bradley Cruff was assigned to M.S.'s case in 2013 and had made rulings in the matter. After a hearing, the district court found M.S. required continuing treatment and ordered that M.S.'s less restrictive treatment be extended for one year, to June 2018. M.S. did not challenge any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law related to the order for less restrictive treatment. The sole issue on appeal was whether Judge Narum erred in denying his demand for a change of judge. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the court did not err in denying M.S.'s demand for a change of judge. View "Interest of M.S." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota certified questions of North Dakota law to the North Dakota Supreme Court involving Dawn Vail's right to bring a common law tort action against S/L Services, Inc., for personal injuries she sustained while working for S/L Services. The certified questions and the parties' arguments involved issues about employer immunity and an employee's exclusive or dual remedy for injuries occurring during the course of employment under North Dakota’s statutory provisions for workforce safety and insurance. The Supreme Court concluded the exclusive remedy provisions of North Dakota’s workers' compensation laws did not preclude Vail's tort action against S/L Services under provisions authorizing the action for willfully misrepresenting to Workforce Safety and Insurance ("WSI") the amount of payroll upon which a premium is based, or for willfully failing to secure workers' compensation coverage for employees. View "Vail v. S/L Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Bremer Bank, the Public Service Commission ("PSC"), Auto-Owners Insurance Company, and Curt Amundson appealed a judgment in a grain warehouse insolvency proceeding involving Grand Forks Bean Company after the district court appointed the PSC as trustee for the sale of dry edible beans from Grand Forks Bean's warehouse, denied Bremer's motion to intervene in the insolvency proceeding, and ordered distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the beans to growers determined to be noncredit-sale receiptholders. We conclude the district court did not err in construing applicable statutory provisions for insolvency proceedings and in applying those provisions. The PSC initially issued a trustee's report concluding all nine bean growers were noncredit-sale receiptholders entitled to participate in the trust fund proceeds and recommending payment of $652,747.92 to those receiptholders based on a December 2014 insolvency date and a market price of $23 per hundredweight on that date. The court ruled eight of the bean growers were noncredit-sale receiptholders entitled to participate in the insolvency trust fund proceeds. The court concluded one grower, Amundson, had a credit-sale contract with Grand Forks Bean under N.D.C.C. 60-04-01(2) and was not entitled to participate in the trust fund proceeds. The court also determined the date of Grand Forks Bean's insolvency under N.D.C.C. 60-04-02 was October 15, 2013, and the market price for beans on that date was $38 per hundredweight. The court determined three growers were entitled to a different price per hundredweight for their beans because they had cash claims with Grand Forks Bean for an agreed price. The court further concluded the PSC was entitled to its costs and expenses under N.D.C.C. sections 60-04-03.1, 60-04-09, and 60-04-10. The court ordered disbursement of the trust fund proceeds and thereafter issued an order denying Auto-Owner's motion for post-hearing relief. The district court denied without prejudice Bremer's motion to intervene to litigate the priority of its security interest, but allowed Bremer to participate in the proceeding "to the full extent provided to any other receiptholder/claimant." Amundson argued the district court erred in concluding he had a credit-sale contract with Grand Forks Bean because the definition of a credit-sale contract in N.D.C.C. 60-02-19.1 controls and required signatures by both the grower and the warehouseman to be a credit-sale contract. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Public Service Commission v. Grand Forks Bean Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A person dealing with a personal representative does not receive the protections of N.D.C.C. 30.1-18-14 unless the person obtains the personal representative's letters of appointment or any other court order giving the personal representative authority to act in this state. Dudley Stuber, trustee of the D.J. Stuber Land and Royalty Trust, and Rocky Svihl, trustee of the RGKH Mineral & Royalty Trust (collectively "Plaintiffs") appealed a judgment deciding ownership of certain mineral interests in favor of the estates of Victoria Davis and Helen Jaumotte. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. They claimed Jay Jaumotte, as personal representative of the estates, was authorized to sell property in North Dakota as a foreign personal representative, and Northland Royalty Corp. (to whom Jay Jaumotte first conveyed the interests) was a good-faith purchaser and was entitled to statutory protections under N.D.C.C. 30.1-18-14, and the statute of limitations had expired, precluding the heirs' claims. The heirs also moved for summary judgment. The heirs argued the deeds transferring the minerals to Northland were void because Jay Jaumotte lacked any authority to act on behalf of the Davis or Helen Jaumotte estates when dealing with North Dakota property, the Plaintiffs were not good-faith purchasers, and there were genuine issues of material fact about whether Northland was a good-faith purchaser. EOG Resources intervened and responded to the motions, arguing the Plaintiffs had no interest in the mineral estate, the Plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest had notice of the heirs' potential interests in the property and failed to investigate, and the Plaintiffs and Northland were not good-faith purchasers. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision quieting title, but reversed its decision awarding damages to the Victoria Davis and Helen Jaumotte heirs. View "Stuber v. Engel" on Justia Law