Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Trent Guthmiller appealed a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation ("DOT") decision to disqualify his commercial driving privileges for 60 days. In October 2016, the DOT notified Guthmiller that his commercial driving privileges were disqualified because he had committed two serious traffic violations within the last three years. Guthmiller committed the violations of speeding and aggravated reckless driving. The violations occurred within three years, but the convictions were approximately three years and ten months apart. At the administrative hearing on his commercial driving disqualification, Guthmiller did not contest the commission of the violations. On appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Guthmiller argued the district court's order was not in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and reinstated Guthmiller's commercial driving privileges: the statute unambiguously required two convictions within three years. View "Guthmiller v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation" on Justia Law

Sandra Glass Lenertz ("Lenertz") appealed the district court's order granting James Glass's Motion for Deposit of Funds With Court and for Satisfaction of Judgment. In 1996, James Glass ("Glass") and Lenertz divorced. The divorce judgment required Glass to pay spousal support. Lenertz remarried in 2002. In 2015, Glass filed a motion to terminate his spousal support obligation. The district court granted Glass's motion and terminated spousal support at the time of Lenertz's remarriage. The district court also granted Lenertz a judgment for $26,903.37 because this was the amount that the court determined Glass owed on unpaid spousal support. Glass only started paying spousal support in 2001; thus he was behind on payments and interest. On the basis of the order granting the motion to terminate spousal support ("Termination Order"), the district court issued an Amended Judgment and Decree ("Amended Judgment"), which granted Lenertz the money judgment of $26,903.37. Glass attempted to satisfy the money judgment by paying Lenertz and obtaining a final satisfaction of judgment. Lenertz refused to accept the $26,903.37 payment because it was conditioned on her signing a final satisfaction of judgment, which she claimed would preclude her from appealing, and the amount did not include post-judgment interest. Glass moved the district court to deposit the $26,903.37 payment with the clerk of court. At the motion hearing, the district court concluded that the amount owed was interest, not principal, and thus post-judgment interest did not accrue. Further, the district court ordered that Glass be allowed to deposit the funds into the court and that a full satisfaction be provided. Lenertz argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the judgment of $26,903.37 awarded to her in the Termination Order was principal and thus she was owed post-judgment interest on that amount. Glass argued that because Lenertz did not raise this issue in her appeal of the Amended Judgment, this argument was barred by the law of the case doctrine. The Supreme Court affirmed under the law of the case doctrine. View "Glass v. Glass" on Justia Law

John Dixon appealed the grant of summary judgment that dismissed his action to remove Billie Dixon as trustee of the Shirley A. Dixon Trust and sought reimbursement, an accounting and court supervision of the trust. In 2013 Billie, as trustee, sued John to reform a warranty deed their father executed conveying a tract of McKenzie County real property to John. Billie contended William Dixon intended to reserve the mineral interests as property of the trust. The district court agreed and reformed the warranty deed to reserve and except the minerals and retain the mineral interests as property of the trust to be distributed in accordance with the trust's terms and conditions. Shortly after the reformation action was commenced in 2013, John sued Billie seeking an accounting of the trust, her removal as trustee, court supervised administration of the trust, reimbursement of the trust for unauthorized distributions, and his attorney fees expended in the action. During multiple trial postponements, Shirley Dixon died in 2015. About two months before the scheduled February 2017 trial, Billie moved for summary judgment dismissal of the lawsuit. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the case was not moot and genuine issues of material fact precluded disposition by summary judgment. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dixon v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Counce Energy BC #1, LLC, appealed the judgment entered on a jury verdict awarding Continental Resources, Inc., $153,666.50 plus costs and disbursements for breaching its contract with Continental by failing to pay its share of expenses to drill an oil and gas well, and dismissing with prejudice Counce's counterclaims. Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Continental's breach of contract action and Counce's counterclaims, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the judgment. View "Continental Resources, Inc. v. Counce Energy BC #1, LLC" on Justia Law

Craig Benson ("Benson") appealed a district court's judgment defining the boundaries of Outlot 11 and awarding Feland Brothers Properties ("the Felands") the northern portion of Outlot 53 through adverse possession. In 1951, Ruby Benson, Benson's grandmother, acquired a 600 by 450 foot tract to the west of Whiskey Bay on Lake Metigoshe. This tract of land was subdivided into several lots. The Felands owned Outlot 10, Craig and Brenda Benson ("the Bensons") owned Outlot 53, and Danny and Gwen Aftem ("the Aftems") owned Outlot 11. Outlot 53 was the result of a survey completed in 2010. The northern portion of Outlot 53 was largely ignored by the record owners, Richard Benson and then Craig Benson. Chris Romfo, a neighbor, testified that he rented Outlot 53 from Richard Benson for about nine years and understood that it was only for the southern part of Outlot 53. Romfo testified that Richard Benson never mentioned owning the northern part of Outlot 53. Although Craig Benson testified that he and his family regularly stayed at the lake for many years, he was vague as to the use of the northern part. He testified that he didn't build anything on the northern lot, except for a small bridge across the creek, apparently connecting the north and south portions of the lot. This bridge was later removed. After the 2010 survey was completed, he placed "no trespass" signs on the northern lot and cut trees down. He also began warning others not to use the property. The previous owners of Outlot 10 made a number of improvements to the northern portion of Outlot 53. The Bensons sued the Felands and Aftems to quiet title in all of Outlot 53. The Felands and Aftems counterclaimed, arguing that they own the northern portion of Outlot 53 and title should be quieted in their favor. Alternatively, the Felands and Aftems argued that they acquired the northern portion of Outlot 53 through adverse possession. After a bench trial, the district court defined the southeastern boundary of Outlot 11 as the corner of L-8 and L-9 on Outlot 53's plat, awarded the Felands the northern portion of Outlot 53 on the basis of adverse possession, and quieted title to the southern portion of Outlot 53 in favor of the Bensons. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not clearly err in defining the boundaries of Outlot 11 or in concluding the Felands adversely possessed the northern portion of Outlot 53. View "Benson v. Feland Brothers Properties" on Justia Law

Michele Brandt, as Trustee of the Michele L. Brandt Revocable Trust, appealed an order dismissing her appeal of the City of Fargo's resolution of necessity. Karen Wieland appealed a judgment dismissing her appeal to the district court from the City's resolution of necessity. In December 2016, the Fargo City Commission passed a resolution of necessity for property owned by Brandt related to construction of a flood protection project. Days later in a separate proceeding, the City passed a similar resolution of necessity for property owned by Wieland. Each resolution authorized the City to proceed with all legal means to obtain the property, including eminent domain. In each case the City filed a record on appeal in the district court and moved the court to dismiss the appeal. In Brandt's appeal, the City moved alternatively to consolidate Brandt's appeal with an eminent domain proceeding that the City also commenced in December 2016. In both appeals, Brandt and Wieland moved the district court to strike all materials from the record that had not specifically been placed in front of the city commission during the respective December 2016 meetings. After a February 22, 2017 hearing in Brandt's appeal, the district court entered an order granting the City's motion to dismiss and holding a resolution of necessity as a predicate to eminent domain is not subject to appellate review by the court. The court also held the City had not acted in bad faith, with a gross abuse of discretion, or fraudulently in passing the resolution of necessity. The order denied Brandt's motion to strike, concluding further consideration of the motion was moot. After a March 21, 2017 hearing in Wieland's appeal before a different judge, the district court entered an order and judgment dismissing Wieland's appeal. The court explained that the decision to go forward with an eminent domain proceeding is the City's political or legislative decision which the court could not review by appeal from issuance of the resolution. The City commenced an eminent domain proceeding for the Wieland property in April 2017. Because of similar dispositions, the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed both appeals in this decision and affirmed, concluding the court in each case did not err in dismissing the appeals because no statutory basis authorized an appeal to the district court from the City's resolutions of necessity. View "Brandt v. City of Fargo" on Justia Law

Timothy Betz appealed a district court order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, prohibiting him from filing any new litigation or documents in existing litigation without first obtaining leave of court. In 1994, the Emelia Hirsch June 9, 1994, Irrevocable Trust was created. Trust beneficiaries were Emelia Hirsch's three children and ten grandchildren, including Betz. In 2003, Emelia requested the district court to dissolve the trust. In 2008, after protracted litigation, the district court entered an order reforming the trust from an irrevocable trust to a revocable trust, which was affirmed on appeal. Betz continued litigation relating to the trust: in February 2017, Betz moved the district court to reopen the case and moved to immediately vacate the 2008 order. The district court filed a notice stating the case had been resolved, it would not be reopened, and no further order would be entered. Although Betz filed an objection to the court's notice and again requested the case be reopened, no appeal was taken of the court's February 2017 denial. In March 2017, Carolyn Twite and Duane Hirsch ("the co-trustees") moved the court seeking a pre-filing order against Betz. In April 2017, after a hearing, the presiding judge issued a notice of proposed findings and order. Betz filed a response in opposition to the proposed findings and order. Thereafter, the district court presiding judge entered an order under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58, finding that Betz was a vexatious litigant. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering the order, it affirmed. View "Matter of Emelia Hirsch Trust" on Justia Law

R.W.D. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his two children, K.S.D. and J.S.D. After a review of the juvenile court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence established that the children were deprived, the deprivation was likely to continue, and the children had been in foster care at least 450 of 660 nights. The Court also concluded active efforts to prevent the breakup of this Indian family were made and those efforts have been unsuccessful. However, the Court found nothing in the record to satisfy the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) requirement of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, that continued custody by the parents would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. Accordingly, though the Court retained jurisdiction over this case, it remanded for testimony from an ICWA qualified expert witness. View "Interest of K.S.D." on Justia Law

Mary Ann Vig, as personal representative of the Estate of Junietta Swenson, appealed the dismissal of the Estate’s action against Willis Swenson. The Estate argued that Junietta Swenson lacked capacity to execute a July 2012 quit claim deed conveying her home in Noonan to her son, Willis Swenson, and that he converted rent and grain proceeds when he subleased her farmland. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding Junietta Swenson was legally competent to execute the quit claim deed, or in finding that Willis Swenson did not convert the proceeds of a sublease of land he leased from Junietta Swenson. View "Vig v. Swenson" on Justia Law

Dawn Osborne appealed a district court's order granting Brown & Saenger, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for improper venue. In 2011, Brown hired Osborne as a sales representative in its Fargo office to sell office supplies to businesses. Brown was headquartered in South Dakota, but operated as a foreign business corporation in North Dakota. Osborne signed yearly employment contracts with Brown. The parties agreed that the 2015 Employment Agreement was the controlling contract for this action, and it was the only one brought before the district court. The two clauses at issue in deciding the motion to dismiss were the "Agreement Not to Compete" ("non-compete clause") and the "Choice of Law/Forum" clauses. In January 2017, Brown terminated Osborne. Osborne sued Brown, alleging retaliation, improper deductions, and breach of contract. Osborne also sought a declaratory judgment declaring the non-compete clause to be void. Osborne moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent Brown from enforcing the covenant-not-to-compete against her. Brown responded to that motion and moved to dismiss the action for improper venue. Brown argued the forum-selection clause in the employment agreement was valid and therefore a North Dakota court was an improper venue. Brown argued that the clause required the case to be heard by the South Dakota court specified in the agreement. The district court, without ruling on the motion for preliminary injunction, agreed with Brown and granted the motion to dismiss. Additionally, Brown sued Osborne in the state circuit court situated in Minnehaha County, South Dakota, seeking a preliminary injunction against Osborne restricting her actions under the non-compete clause. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed under N.D.C.C. 28-04.1-03(5), concluding the forum-selection clause in the parties' employment agreement violated North Dakota's public policy against non-compete agreements. The non-compete clause was unenforceable under N.D.C.C. 9-08-06 to the extent it limited Osborne from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business in North Dakota. View "Osborne v. Brown & Saenger, Inc." on Justia Law