Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Keith and Latasha Warner were married in 2018 and have one child. In May 2022, Keith filed for divorce and requested primary residential responsibility. The parties initially agreed to an interim order granting equal residential responsibility. After mediation in August 2022, a summary agreement was prepared but not signed by either party. Keith served multiple documents to Latasha at an incorrect address, causing her to miss a scheduling conference and not receive a notice of trial. Despite this, the court mailed a scheduling order to her correct address, setting a trial date for June 5, 2023.At trial, Latasha requested a continuance to retain counsel, which the court denied. The court awarded primary residential responsibility to Keith. Latasha did not appeal the judgment but later moved for relief from judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60, arguing that Keith's misrepresentation about the mediation agreement prevented her from fairly preparing her case. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied her motion.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s denial of Latasha’s motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. The court found that the mediation agreement was not binding as it was not signed or approved by the court. The court also found that Keith’s counsel’s statement during trial was inaccurate but did not prevent Latasha from fairly preparing her case. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Latasha’s motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) and affirmed the decision. View "Warner v. Warner" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Amber Elizabeth McCay and David William McCay, who were married in 2016 and divorced in 2018. They have one minor child, for whom David was initially awarded primary residential responsibility. In 2019, Amber filed a motion for an ex parte interim order, alleging that David had a history of alcohol abuse and had been charged with child neglect. The court denied her motion, stating that David was "innocent until proven guilty." Later, David entered an Alford plea to a charge of reckless endangerment. In 2023, Amber moved to modify primary residential responsibility and requested to relocate the child from North Dakota to Nevada. The district court granted her motion, awarding her primary residential responsibility and permission to relocate the child to Nevada.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, found that Amber had established a prima facie case justifying modification and ordered an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the court granted Amber's motion, awarding her primary residential responsibility and permission to relocate the child to Nevada. The court entered an amended judgment and parenting plan.David appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, challenging the court's findings on a material change in circumstances, best interest factors, the findings supporting relocation, and the findings related to the new parenting schedule. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the findings supporting the material change in circumstances, best interest factors, relocation, and the modified parenting schedule were not clearly erroneous. The court found that David's conduct constituted a significant change of circumstances that required a change in custody. The court also found that the changes in circumstances adversely affected the child, requiring a change in custody to foster the child's best interests. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's findings regarding the best interest factors and that the court's findings on the Stout-Hawkinson factors, which consider the potential negative impact of relocation on the child, were not clearly erroneous. The court denied Amber's request for attorney’s fees for defending against the appeal, concluding that David's appeal was neither flagrantly groundless nor devoid of merit. View "McCay v. McCay" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Dorchester Minerals, L.P. (Dorchester) and Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC (Hess) over unpaid royalties and statutory interest. Dorchester, an unleased mineral interest owner, claimed that Hess failed to pay royalties from oil and gas production from the Hueske well between May 2008 and February 2011 due to a title issue. Dorchester sought statutory interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 for the unpaid royalties. Hess argued that Dorchester's claim was time-barred.The District Court initially dismissed Dorchester's claim regarding the Johnson well but denied the motion to dismiss the claim regarding the Hueske well. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the Hueske well claim, and the court granted Dorchester's motion. Dorchester then moved for statutory attorney’s fees, which the court denied, concluding no single “prevailing party” existed within the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1. The court awarded Dorchester $75,166.07 in statutory interest on its Hueske well claim and dismissed both parties’ claims for attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that Dorchester's claim for statutory interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 was time-barred. The court concluded that the six-year limitation period provided in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2) applied to Dorchester’s claims. The court found that Dorchester had actual knowledge of the material facts necessary for it to understand it had a claim under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 regarding the Hueske well by 2013 at the latest. Therefore, Dorchester’s claim for statutory interest under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-39.1 regarding the Hueske well was barred by the six-year statute of limitations provided in N.D.C.C. § 28-01-16(2). The court remanded the case for the district court to award attorney’s fees and costs to Hess as the “prevailing party.” View "Dorchester Minerals v. Hess Bakken Investments II" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a relationship and cohabitated from 2002 to 2022. They shared a bank account and ran an intermingled cattle herd. The dispute arose over the ownership of a property and cattle, and the enforcement of oral loan agreements. The property in question was initially owned by Anthony and Jean Ehrmantrout, who transferred it to each other in 1994. After their deaths in 2001, the property was distributed to their grandchildren, Chet, Carlos, and Marty Meyer, as co-trustees of the Jean Ehrmantrout Residuary Trust. In 2004, Marty Meyer transferred his interest in the property to Gary Meyer. In 2010, Gary Meyer transferred his interest in the property to Mary Roth.The District Court found that Gary Meyer had gained ownership of the property through adverse possession and had valid title when he transferred it to Mary Roth in 2010. The court also found that Gary Meyer had converted 13 of Mary Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, awarding her damages. Both parties appealed the decision.The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had erred in finding that Gary Meyer had gained ownership of the property through adverse possession. The Supreme Court also found that the District Court had erred in admitting certain evidence, in failing to determine when the alleged conversion of cattle began, in valuing the converted cattle, and in finding that Gary Meyer owed on loan contracts that were unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves Mariya Stephens and Kevin Lee, who were married in 2017 and have a child together. After their divorce in 2020, Stephens was granted primary residential responsibility of their child, with Lee receiving parenting time. The divorce judgment stated that if Stephens had a permanent change of duty station, the child would relocate with her. In 2021, Stephens married Charles Stephens and they had two children together. In 2022, the Stephens family contracted to build a home in Virginia and informed Lee of their plans to relocate. Stephens believed she had Lee's consent to relocate either under the divorce judgment or his text messages and emails. In April 2023, Stephens filed a motion for relocation and relocated before the district court could act on the motion.Lee objected to Stephens's relocation and requested the district court to deny her motion to relocate to Virginia. He also moved to amend the divorce judgment to give him primary residential responsibility for their child and filed a motion for contempt due to Stephens's alleged violations of the judgment. In May 2023, the district court required the Stephens family to return to North Dakota with their child. In October 2023, the district court denied Stephens's motion to relocate, awarded Lee primary residential responsibility, and granted his motion to amend the judgment.In the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Stephens argued that the district court erred in denying her motion to relocate. She claimed that she did not need Lee's consent due to language in the divorce judgment and, alternatively, that Lee consented to the relocation through text messages and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the divorce judgment did not provide Stephens with Lee's consent for her to move their child out of state, and did not err by denying her motion and by granting Lee's motion to change primary residential responsibility. View "Stephens v. Lee" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over primary residential responsibility for two minor children between Casey Kubal and Kari Anderson. The couple lived together in North Dakota, but Anderson moved to South Dakota with the children in March 2022. In April 2022, Anderson initiated litigation in South Dakota to establish primary residential responsibility. In August 2023, Kubal served Anderson with a summons and complaint in North Dakota, which were filed with the district court in October 2023. Anderson moved to dismiss the case, arguing that North Dakota was an inconvenient forum as she had already commenced litigation in South Dakota and the children continued to reside there.The District Court of Stark County, Southwest Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because North Dakota was not the children's home state when Kubal commenced the case. The court also ruled that even if it had jurisdiction, North Dakota would be an inconvenient forum. The court made its decision based on the pleadings and motion papers, noting that the parties failed to provide information regarding the South Dakota proceeding.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case. The Supreme Court found that the record was inadequate to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists under the UCCJEA. The court noted that the district court did not address the three other grounds for jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and that the nature of the rulings in South Dakota and the status of those proceedings were necessary to determine whether the district court has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court concluded that granting Anderson's motion to dismiss without understanding what has occurred in the South Dakota proceeding was contrary to the purpose of the UCCJEA. View "Kubal v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Ward family, who own extensive acreage in Bismarck, North Dakota, initiated a quiet title action against 152 adjacent landowners, including Dan and Lindsey Herbel, to determine adverse claims to their property. The Wards did not make any claims against the defendants personally but sought a decree that the defendants had no estate, interest, lien, or encumbrance upon their property. The Herbels moved to dismiss the action, arguing they were not proper defendants under chapter 32-17, N.D.C.C., as neither the Wards nor the Herbels claimed an adverse interest against the other’s property. The Herbels also sought recovery of attorney’s fees. The district court denied the motion despite finding the Wards were not aware if any of the named defendants were claiming title to any of the property. Following a bench trial, the court granted the judicial remedy of quiet title and a judgment dismissing the Herbels’ action was entered.The Herbels appealed to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, arguing that because neither party made an adverse claim against the other’s property, the Wards lacked standing to sue under section 32-17-01, N.D.C.C. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the plain language of N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01 requires the existence of an adverse claim. The court found that the parties’ properties did not share a fence line or a common boundary without any intervening land, and a well-traveled roadway separated the properties. The Herbels never claimed an interest in the Wards’ real property, and the Wards never asserted there was an adverse interest between the parties. The court concluded that a direct suit against the Herbels was not authorized by N.D.C.C. § 32-17-01.The Herbels also argued that the district court abused its discretion when it denied their request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the district court has discretion to determine whether a claim is frivolous and to determine the reasonable amount of an award of attorney’s fees. The court remanded the case to determine if the claim was frivolous and, if it was, to determine attorney’s fees. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing the claims against the Herbels. View "Ward v. Herbel" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Mary Roth and Gary Meyer, who were in a long-term relationship but never married. They cohabitated and ran a cattle operation together on a property that had a complex ownership history involving various members of Meyer's family. The couple's relationship ended, and Roth sued Meyer, alleging that he had converted some of her cattle and failed to repay loans she had given him.The District Court of Grant County, South Central Judicial District, found in favor of Roth. It ruled that Meyer had gained title to the disputed property through adverse possession and had transferred it to Roth in 2010. The court also found that Meyer had converted 13 of Roth's cattle and breached oral loan agreements with her, ordering him to pay her $52,500.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed the lower court's decision. It found that the lower court had erred in its findings on adverse possession, the admissibility of certain evidence, the timing of the alleged conversion of cattle, the valuation of the converted cattle, and the enforceability of the loan contracts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings, instructing it to make new findings based on the existing record. View "Roth v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The case involves a personal injury action initiated by Torrey Kath against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms. After the parties filed a "Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice," the district court dismissed the case. Kath then filed a separate declaratory judgment action against Agraria Insurance Company, doing business as Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), seeking an order that FUMIC had a duty to indemnify Prochnow under an insurance policy. While FUMIC's motion in the declaratory judgment action was pending, Kath and Prochnow filed a "Joint Rule 60 Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice" in the original case, seeking an amended judgment.The district court had previously dismissed the case with prejudice. However, Kath and Prochnow filed a motion to vacate the dismissal, which the court granted. FUMIC then filed a motion to intervene, arguing that Kath and Prochnow were seeking to impair its rights. The district court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on FUMIC's intervention motion because the case had been dismissed.The Supreme Court of North Dakota disagreed with the district court's decision. The court noted that Kath and Prochnow's motion to vacate the dismissal re-invoked the district court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, FUMIC's intervention motion initiated a special proceeding, which also invoked the court's jurisdiction. Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to consider FUMIC's motion to intervene. The case was remanded for the district court to decide on FUMIC's motion to intervene and, if necessary, to conduct additional proceedings consistent with its disposition of the motion. View "Kath v. Prochnow" on Justia Law

Glenn Solberg, representing himself, appealed against orders denying his motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. He also moved for a jury trial and disqualification of the Court, alleging bias and conflict of interest. Solberg's claims of bias were based on prior decisions that were adverse to him. Greg Hennessy, the defendant, argued that the appeal was frivolous and requested attorney’s fees and double costs.The District Court of Williams County had denied Solberg's motions for relief from judgment and for reconsideration. Solberg then appealed these decisions to the Supreme Court of North Dakota.The Supreme Court of North Dakota denied Solberg's motion for a jury trial and disqualification, stating that the law presumes a judge is unbiased and not prejudiced. The court also noted that adverse or erroneous rulings do not, by themselves, demonstrate bias. For recusal to be warranted, a judge must be partial or there must be some external influence that creates an appearance of impropriety. The court found that Solberg failed to allege facts showing bias or the existence of an external influence creating an appearance of impropriety. The court also concluded that Solberg's request for a jury trial was frivolous as the Supreme Court reviews the rulings of the district court and does not engage in fact finding. The court affirmed the orders of the district court under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(1) and (4), finding the appeal to be frivolous and completely without merit. The court also awarded Hennessy double costs and attorney’s fees in the amount of $15,697.50 for defending this frivolous appeal. View "Solberg v. Hennessy" on Justia Law