Justia North Dakota Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John and Tammy Sadek, the surviving parents of Andrew Sadek ("Andrew"), appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Jason Weber and Richland County, North Dakota. Defendant Jason Weber was a deputy with the Richland County Sheriff’s Office and a member of the South East Multi-County Agency Narcotics Task Force (“SEMCA”). Richland County was Weber’s employer and a participating agency in SEMCA. In 2013 Andrew Sadek was a student at the North Dakota State College of Science. In April 2013, two confidential informants purchased small quantities of marijuana from Andrew on two occasions. On November 21, 2013, officers searched Andrew's dorm room and found a marijuana grinder. At the time of the search, Weber informed Andrew about the felony charges he could face for the two April 2013 marijuana deliveries, and told him he could either take the charges or sign up to work as a confidential informant. Weber stated “a lot of this could go away” in exchange for his work as a confidential informant. Andrew agreed to work as a confidential informant, signing a Cooperating Individual Agreement. Weber told Andrew it was important for him not to tell anyone, including other law enforcement, that he was working as an informant. By January 2014, Andrew did three controlled buys of marijuana from two people, but subsequently lost contact with Weber. In April 2014, Weber told Andrew he would pursue the felony charges unless Andrew was able to line up additional controlled buys. Weber gave Andrew a deadline of May 1, 2014, to get the next deal done. On that day, Andrew was reported missing. His remains were found over a month later in the Red River; his backpack was tied to him and was full of rocks. The coroner determined Sadek died of a gunshot wound to the head, but the range of fire was not determined. No determination was made whether the cause of death was homicide, suicide or accidental. Andrew's parents sued Weber and Richland County, asserting claims of deceit and negligence. They alleged his death was directly related to his role as a confidential informant. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that due to the lack of available evidence to suggest how, when, or even where Andrew died, a conclusion that his death was proximately caused by Defendants’ acts or omissions would be based on speculation. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate and the district court did not err. View "Sadek, et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants, the Pederson defendants, appealed after a district court granted summary judgment quieting title to certain mineral interests in appellees, the Muhlbradt plaintiffs. The Pederson defendants argued the court erred in deciding a deed did not except or reserve a future 50 percent interest in the disputed mineral interests to the defendants or their predecessor in interest. They further contended the court erred in relying on division orders to conclude the defendants’ predecessor in interest conveyed the disputed mineral interests. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Muhlbradt, et al. v. Pederson, et al." on Justia Law

Dennis Thorson appeals from a judgment ordering him to remove a building from Keith Kvande’s property. Kvande owns real property described as Lot 3 in Block 1 of the School Addition to the City of Wheelock, Williams County, North Dakota. In 2012, Thorson purchased a building located in Epping, North Dakota. Kvande and Thorson had multiple discussions about moving the building to Kvande’s property. Thorson claimed they discussed moving the building onto Kvande’s property permanently, but Kvande claimed they only discussed moving the building onto his property for temporary storage. The parties did not have a written agreement about the property or the building. In fall 2012, Thorson had a concrete foundation poured for the building on Kvande’s property and moved the building onto the foundation. Thorson hooked the building up to sewer, water, and electrical service, and he began living in the building. Thorson did not pay Kvande rent or purchase the property. In May 2015 or 2016, Kvande demanded Thorson vacate the property, but Thorson did not leave. Kvande then attempted to evict Thorson from the property. In September 2017, Kvande sued Thorson, requesting the district court order Thorson to remove the building from the property and return the property to its prior state or award him the cost of having the building removed and the property restored. On appeal, Thorson argued laches and equitable estoppel applied and prevented Thorson’s removal from the property. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err by finding laches and equitable estoppel did not apply and did not preclude the court from ordering the removal of the building from Kvande’s property. View "Kvande v. Thorson" on Justia Law

The dispute concerned lots, streets, and alleys within or near the City of Glen Ullin. The lots, streets, and alleys were all surveyed and platted, but undeveloped. The Park District owned or had authority over the lots. The City had authority over the streets and alleys, which ran adjacent to and between the lots. The Schirados owned land near both the Park District property and the City property. The Shirados appealed after the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City and the Park District, concluding the case was res judicata due to a prior lawsuit between the Park District and the Schirados. The court entered judgment enjoining the Schirados from placing any obstruction or personal property on certain City lands and on certain Park District lands and awarded attorney’s fees. After its review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the court properly applied the doctrine of res judicata to the Park District lands, which were the subject of the prior lawsuit, but it erred when it applied res judicata to the City lands, which were not included in the prior lawsuit. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated the award of attorney’s fees and costs, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Glen Ullin, et al. v. Schirado, et al." on Justia Law

This dispute concerned two parcels of real estate located in Emmons County, North Dakota. Jeff and Donna Magrum appealed a district court judgment quieting title to real estate in Leslie Gimbel. The Magrums argued the court erred when it determined they did not acquire ownership of the property by adverse possession or acquiescence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gimbel v. Magrum, et al." on Justia Law

The Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State Engineer, and Statoil Oil & Gas LP appeal from a judgment determining William Wilkinson and the other plaintiffs owned mineral interests in certain North Dakota land. Although the judgment was not appealable because it did not dispose of all claims against all parties, the North Dakota Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to review the summary judgment. The Court concluded the district court did not err in concluding N.D.C.C. ch. 61-33.1 applied and the disputed mineral interests were above the ordinary high water mark of the historical Missouri riverbed channel, but the court erred in quieting title and failing to comply with the statutory process. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson, et al. v. Board of University and School Lands of the State of N.D." on Justia Law

Alysha Instasi appealed a district court judgment dismissing her motion to amend a Washington child custody judgment for lack of jurisdiction. Instasi and Jeremy Hiebert had two children. In December 2015, a judgment was entered in Washington relating to residential responsibility, parenting time, and child support. In July 2018, Instasi moved to amend the Washington judgment in North Dakota district court. In an affidavit supporting the motion, Instasi stated that she and the children have been living in North Dakota since October 2015. The district court entered a default judgment after Hiebert failed to respond to Instasi’s motion. In June 2019, Hiebert moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing the North Dakota court lacked jurisdiction to decide Instasi’s motion to amend the Washington judgment. After a hearing, the court vacated the default judgment and dismissed Instasi’s motion. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to modify the initial child custody determination made in Washington. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction in North Dakota. View "Instasi v. Hiebert" on Justia Law

Robyn Krile appealed from a district court order granting defendant Julie Lawyer’s motion to dismiss under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In February 2017, Assistant State’s Attorney Julie Lawyer received an anonymous letter concerning a Bismarck police officer's destruction of evidence. Lawyer averred her decision to review the officer files was to ensure the state’s attorney’s office was fulfilling its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). As part of her investigation, Lawyer reviewed the file of Sergeant Robyn Krile. In Krile’s file, Lawyer discovered two letters of reprimand and several performance evaluations, which Lawyer believed raised Giglio issues. Lawyer further investigated the incidents for which the letters of reprimand were issued, and concluded Krile had made false statements as a Bismarck police officer. Lawyer shared her belief that the letters of reprimand and performance evaluations raised Giglio concerns with Bismarck Police Chief Dan Donlin. Chief Donlin disagreed and advised Lawyer that he did not see the incidents for which the letters of reprimand were issued as amounting to Giglio issues. Despite Chief Donlin’s pleas, Lawyer continued to believe Krile’s conduct amounted to a Giglio issue. Lawyer informed Chief Donlin that the results of her investigation would have to be disclosed to defense in cases in which Krile was involved pursuant to Giglio and, as a result, the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office would no longer use Krile as a witness in its cases. Because the Burleigh County State’s Attorney’s Office was no longer willing to use Krile as a witness in its cases, the Bismarck Police Department terminated Krile’s employment. Krile filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Human Rights claiming the Bismarck Police Department discriminated against her. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed dismissal of Krile's defamation claims for Lawyer's disclosure of the results of her investigation (the Giglio letter) to Chief Donlin. The Court affirmed dismissal of Krile’s defamation claims for Lawyer’s disclosure of the Giglio letter and affidavits to the Department of Labor and Human Rights because the communications were absolutely privileged. On remand, the district court may decide whether Lawyer’s communications to Chief Donlin and the POST Board are entitled to a qualified privilege. View "Krile v. Lawyer" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs, in their individual capacities and on behalf of similarly situated taxpayers, sought declaratory relief regarding chapter 61-33.1, N.D.C.C., relating to the ownership of mineral rights in lands subject to inundation by the Garrison Dam, was unconstitutional. The district court concluded that N.D.C.C. 61-33.1-04(1)(b) was on its face unconstitutional under the “gift clause,” and enjoined the State from issuing any payments under that statute. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the rest of chapter 61-33.1. The Defendants appealed and the Plaintiffs cross-appealed the trial court’s orders, judgment, and amended judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed that portion of the judgment concluding N.D.C.C. 61- 33.1-04(1)(b) violated the gift clause and the court’s injunction enjoining those payments. The Supreme Court also reversed the court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs and service award to the Plaintiffs because they were no longer prevailing parties. The Court affirmed the remainder of the orders and judgment, concluding the Plaintiffs did not establish that chapter 61-33.1 on its face violated the North Dakota Constitution. View "Sorum, et al. v. North Dakota, et al." on Justia Law

Hess Bakken Investments II, LLC; Arkoma Drilling II, L.P.; and Comstock Oil & Gas, LP, (together the “Hess Group”) appealed an order and judgment dismissing their claims against AgriBank, FCB; Intervention Energy, LLC; and Riverbend Oil & Gas VI, L.L.C. (together, “Appellees”). At issue was the meaning of the term “actual drilling operations” as used in continuous drilling clauses in two oil and gas leases. The district court interpreted the term as requiring “placing the drill bit in the ground and penetrating the soil.” Each side has advanced competing readings of the term based on understandings of English grammar and industry usage. Although at odds, both interpretations are supported by rational arguments. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the term was ambiguous; "when ambiguity exists, the parties’ intent becomes a question of fact requiring a factual finding based on extrinsic evidence." Given this ambiguity, dismissal as a matter of law was improper. View "Hess Bakken Investments II, et al. v. AgriBank, et al." on Justia Law